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Abstract 
This study seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the advisory role of the 
International Court of Justice in light of its jurisprudence and overall contribution over a 
period of more than 55 years. The last comprehensive study of the ICJ's advisory 
jurisdiction was published in 1973. Since then, there have been 11 more advisory 
opinions, some covering areas of great contemporary importance such as decolonisation, 
legal issues arising from the possession and possible use of nuclear weapons and 
international legal aspects of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. 
This thesis attempts to update previous work on the subject and also to re-
examine the function of the advisory jurisdiction in light of these more recent opinions. 
The thesis highlights the "organic connection" between UN organs and the Court and the 
Court's contribution as one of the UN's principal organs to the Organisation. The basic 
argument of this thesis is that the advisory function should be understood as a two-sided 
process involving the interplay between UN organs and the ICJ. The request for and the 
giving of an advisory opinion is a collective coordinated process, involving more than 
one organ or part of the Organisation. Consequently, each must be mindful of the need 
for some degree of restraint. The collective commitment to achieving the purposes of the 
Charter should be the ultimate goal for all organs. 
The study concludes that the Court's role as a participant in the UN's work is 
circumscribed by its duty to act judicially. In practice, the Court has succeeded in 
establishing a balance between its role as a principal organ of the UN and its position as a 
judicial institution with a duty to administer justice impartially. Lastly, the study 
emphasises that since the San Francisco Conference the advisory function has proved to 
be a successful instrument for providing authoritative legal opinions that aid the UN in 
carrying out its functions. The advisory opinions rendered by the Court and by its 
predecessor, the PCU, have actually gone beyond the expectations of the founders of 
these Courts, particularly in terms of their contribution to International Law. Yet, as this 
thesis suggests, the advisory function can still be improved. 
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Introduction 
1. Origin and Purpose of the Advisory Function 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established as the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations (UN),l with an organisation and powers broadly similar to those of its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCD).2 As the UN's principal 
judicial organ the Court is therefore part of the UN system. 
In addition to its function of settling disputes between States in its contentious 
jurisdiction, the Court may also give non-binding advisory opinions on legal questions 
submitted to it by certain bodies. Thus, Article 65 of the Court's Statute provides that "the 
Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body 
may be authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a 
request." Article 96 of the Charter notes that in addition to the General Assembly and 
Security Council, other organs of the UN and specialised agencies where so authorised by the 
Assembly may also request such opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of their 
activities. The Court's latter function is the subject-matter of this study. 
Authorising advisory opinions at the international level was first provided for in 
Article 14 of the League Covenant, which declared the PCU competent to give advisory 
opinions upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Councilor by the Assembly.3 The 
experience of the PCD proved to be of greater value than was anticipated at its inception.4 As 
a result, at the San Francisco Conference two landmark decisions were taken of relevance to 
1 See Article 92 of the UN Charter which complements Article 7(1) of the Charter. 
2 This point will be discussed in Chapter One, infra. 
3 See Chapter One, infra. 
4 Hudson, Manley, 0., The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942: A Treaties, New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1943, pp. 513-524. 
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this study. First, in the light of the successful experience of the advisory function of the PCD, 
it was decided that an advisory capacity should be retained and even extended for the PCI], s 
successor, the IC]. Second, the IC] became the principal judicial organ of the UN, sharing 
collectively with the other UN organs in the fulfilment of the tasks stated in the provisions of 
the Charter.s It has been suggested that the decision to establish the Court as a principal 
organ of the UN was the most important innovation made by the UN's founders since it 
meant that the Court's decisions had to be closely geared to the requirements of the political 
community which it was designed to serve.6 . 
The advisory function of the IC] underlines the 'organic connection' between the 
Court and the UN and, therefore, its role and contribution as one of the Organisation's 
principal organs, as well as the principal judicial organ. The position of the Court within the 
UN and its integral relationship within the Organisation has largely been reflected in the way 
the Court has viewed its advisory jurisdiction.7 The practice and dicta of the Court have 
emphasised this relationship by affirming that the delivery of an opinion represents the 
participation of the Court in the work of the UN, and so, in the absence of compelling 
contrary reasons, a request for an opinion ought not to be refused.8 One should also 
remember that in the dicta of the Court there has always been the presumption of validity as 
regards resolutions adopted by the UN political organs, if such resolutions are appropriate for 
the achievement of the UN purposes.9 
S A detailed analysis of the evolution of the advisory function of the IC] is provided in Chapter One, infra. 
6 Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, The Hague; London: 
Martinus NijnhoffPublishers, vol. I, 1997, pp. 162-163. 
: A detailed analysis of this point is provided in Chapters Two, Three, Five of this thesis. 
See Chapter Four, infra. 
9 See Chapter Two, infra. 
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On the other hand, the practice of the UN organs, and more specifically of the 
political organs, sometimes reveals a cautious attitude towards the Court. One cannot but 
notice that the political organs are, for various reasons, reluctant to seek an advisory opinion 
from the Court when it might be needed. to This attitude of the political organs is partly 
reflected in the matters that did not come before the Court for advisory opinions. 11 Many 
different reasons might explain this limited recourse to the advisory jurisdiction. 
In light of the above, many inaccurate and divergent views, assumptions, and 
unfulfilled expectations about the nature and purpose of the advisory jurisdiction, and indeed 
the advisory role of the ICI, have been voiced. Hence, two major interrelated questions will 
be of immediate concern. First, what exactly is the nature of the advisory function of the ICI, 
and what are its peculiar characteristics? Second, how has the Court reconciled its role as a 
court of law and as a principal organ of the UN? Both questions are also intimately related to 
other, wider questions that I hope to examine in this study. 
10 The reasons behind this cautious attitude of the political organs will be analysed in Chapters Seven and Nine, 
infra. 
11 See the discussion in Chapter Nine, infra. 
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2. General Features of the Existing Literature 
While the ICI, more generally, has already received extensive scholarly treatment, the 
advisory function has not received proportional attention from intemationallawyers, a fact 
which has partly influenced my choice of this subject. 12 The comparatively little literature 
that is available on the ICI advisory function may be criticised on several grounds: First, the 
studies are somewhat dated so that a new, fresh approach is required. Second, most of the 
studies tend to examine the advisory function in terms of both the PCD and the ICI. 13 Third, 
some studies have misconceived the status of the Court as the "principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations" and conclude that the Court-political organs relationship is a "client-lawyer" 
relationship,14 while others looking at the Court as an "academy of jurists" have concluded 
that the Court should be responsive to the sensitivities of the General Assembly. 15 Fourth, the 
12 The three major studies on this subject are Keith, Kenneth 1., The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice, Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1971; Pratap, Dharma, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972; Pomerance, Michla, The Advisory Function of 
the International Court in the League and U.N Eras, Baltimore; London: John Hopkins University Press, 1973. 
On the other hand, there are some non-exclusive studies which took the advisory function of the ICI as part of 
the complete study on the Court as a whole, examples of those studies are many: Amr, Mohamed S., The Role 
of the International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations, The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2003; Oduntan, Gbenga, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice [1945-
1996 J: A Critique of the Contentious and Advisory Jurisdictions, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1999; 
Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court. 1920-1996, The Hague; London: Martinus 
Nijnhoff Publishers, 4 Vols., 1997; Rosenne, Shabtai., The World Court: What it is and How it Works, 
Dordrecht, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994; Oda, Shigeru, "The International Court of Justice 
Viewed from the Bench 1976-1993",244 RCADI, 1993, pp. 9-190; Fitizmaurace, Gerald G., The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, Cambridge: Grotius Publications limited, 2 Vols., 1986; Gross, 
Leo, (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 
1976; Lissitzyn, Oliver I., The International Court of Justice: Its Role in the Maintenance of International 
Peace and Security, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951. 
13 This is perhaps for two reasons: first, the ICI is the continuation of the PCIJ as the Statute and Rules of the 
ICJ are essentially that of its predecessor. Secondly, the available cases were too few in numbers to merit an 
exclusive study for the ICI advisory opinions. 
14 Pomerance, supra note 12. This view seems to underestimate the peculiar characteristics of a court-of-Iaw, 
and implies that the weight ofthe Court's pronouncement is "advisory" rather than "authoritative". 
15 Falk argues that the Court has to be a much more genuine judicial arm of the UN, sensitive to the way the 
Organisation has evolved. In effect he claims that "what the world Court should become is an academy of 
jurists, responsive primarily to the prevailing normative sensitivities of the General Assembly, although 
maintaining as well a more principled and long-range view on the overall global agenda. It should be an 
academy of jurists that seeks to persuade a non-professional audience of individuals concerned about global 
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existing literature has paid little attention to the contribution of the advisory opinions to UN 
law and to International Law. 16 Fifth, some of the available literature has overlooked the role 
of the advisory function in clarifying the law and providing guidance for future action by the 
UN organs, and has consequently called for applying the principle of consent as a condition 
for giving an advisory opinion on questions relating to disputes pending between States. 17 
Sixth, a sizable amount of literature has concentrated on ways and means to increase the use 
of the advisory function through expanding the number of bodies authorised to request the 
Court's opinion, while overlooking methods which would not require constitutional 
changes. IS Lastly, some studies have gone further to compare the ICJ with the European 
Court of Justice, ignoring the fact that such a comparison is between two judicial bodies 
which are entirely dissimilar. 19 
policy that in the Court's view deserves respect." See Falk, Richard, Reviving the World Court, Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1986, pp. 186- 191. 
16 A handful of writers have addressed this subject, although as part of the Court's total contribution. See Arnr, 
supra note 12; Schwebel, Stephen M., "The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the 
Development of International Law", in: Heere, Wybo p. (ed.), International law and the Hague's 75(jh 
Anniversary, T.M.C, Asser Press, 1999, p. 405. Lauterpacht, Hersch, The Development of International Law by 
the International Court, London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1958; Lauterpacht, Elihu, "The Development of the 
Law of International Organization by the Decisions of International Tribunals", 152 RCADI, 1976, pp. 377-478; 
Higgins, Rosalyn, "The International Court of Justice and Human Rights", in: Wellens, Karel, (ed.), 
International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus 
NijhoffPublishers, 1998, pp. 691-706; Rosenne, Shabtai, ''The Contribution of the International Court of 
Justice to the United Nations", 35 Indian Journal of International Law, 1995, pp. 67-76. 
17 See Pomerance, Michla, "The Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice and its 'Judicial' Character: 
Past and Future Prisms, in: Muller, A.S. & Raic, D. et al (eds.), The International Court of Justice: Its Future 
Role After Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1997, pp. 271-323; Greig, D. 
W., "The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the Settlement of Disputes between 
States", 15ICLQ, 1966, pp. 325-368. 
18 Gross, Leo, "The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing it Role in the 
International Legal Order" in: Gross, (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice, Dobbs Ferry, New 
York, Oceana Publications, 1976, pp. 22-105; Schwebel, Stephen M., "Authorizing the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinion", 78 AJIL, 1984, pp. 869-879. 
19 Schwebel, Stephen, "Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National 
Courts", 28 VJlL, 1987- 88, pp. 495-506; Rosenne, Shabtai, "Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of 
Justice at the Instance of National Courts: A Reply", 29 VJIL, 1989, pp.401-413; McLaughlin, William T., 
"Allowing Federal Courts Access to International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion: Critique and Proposal", 
6 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 1983, pp. 745-772. 
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On the whole, the literature available centres on a rather narrow evaluation of the 
role, scope and contribution of the advisory function, and, consequently, on the unfulfilled 
expectations of the international legal community. This limited approach is regrettable. 
The importance of the advisory function sterns from the fact that it affects the general 
interpretation of International Law for the international community rather than simply for the 
particular States or entities directly affected by an individual opinion. Thus, advisory 
opinions of the Court if properly implemented cannot only guide the requesting organ but 
also may serve the interests of the whole international community. Many International Law 
principles which are now taken for granted, such as self-determination, international legal 
personality of certain international organisations, implied powers, and the object and purpose 
of the Convention principle, were born out of advisory opinions.2o 
To my knowledge this thesis is the first study, in English, since 1973 that seeks to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the advisory role of the IC] in the light of its 
jurisprudence over more than fifty-five years. It attempts to update the previous work and 
also to reanalyse the function of the advisory opinion in light of the more recent opinions of 
the Court. This analysis is carried out by examining the nature, object, scope, contribution, 
and limits of the role of the advisory function of the Court. This thesis hopes to bring some 
elements of clarification to, and fresh insight into, a rather confused yet important subject. 
The basic argument of this thesis is that the advisory function should be understood as 
a two-sided process involving the interplay between other UN organs and the IC]. In other 
words, the requesting for and giving of an advisory opinion is a collective coordinated 
20 This will be discussed in Chapter Six, infra. 
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process involving more than one organ or part of the Organisation. Consequently, each must 
be mindful of the need for some degree of restraint. The genuine need for legal advice must 
be the only motive for requesting advisory opinions, but the Court must always be mindful of 
the need to protect its judicial character and not to sacrifice its independence in order to 
satisfy the interests of the requesting organ. 
The study concludes that the Court's role as participant in the UN's activities is 
circumscribed by its duty to act judicially. In practice, the Court has succeeded to establish a 
balance between its role as a principal organ of the UN and its position as ajudicial 
institution with a duty to administer justice impartially. Still, many practical and theoretical 
issues regarding the advisory role of the Court remain unsettled. From the proper perspective 
of the function which was designed originally to clarify the law and to participate in the 
Organisation's work but not to settle, at least directly, international disputes, the Court has 
not only achieved the expectations of its founders but it has contributed to the progressive 
development of International Law. 
Lastly, it must be emphasised that the framework of analysis that this research uses 
does not call into question the Court's role as a judicial body or undermine the authority of 
its opinions as authoritative statements of law. Moreover, it does not detract from, or 
contradict, the literature available on the Court or its function. On the contrary. it is hoped 
that this study will help to increase awareness of the role of the advisory function by 
stimulating and provoking academic discussion. 
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3. The Contemporary Relevance of the Advisory Function 
The advisory process if invoked at the right time can be an effective instrument of 
preventative diplomacy or it can make a substantial contribution to resolving an existing 
dispute.21 It is to be hoped that the Court's most recent advisory opinion, the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, will have 
such an effect. 22 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitutes a serious threat to international peace and 
security.23 Rightly or wrongly, many statesmen and experts assume that its resolution would 
be the key to lasting stability in the Middle East. However, since the inception of the UN, 
years of debates and countless resolutions have not brought the problem any closer to a 
permanent solution. Until the Wall Case, no UN organ had ever succeeded in requesting the 
Court to voice its views on this conflict, which had preoccupied the international community 
for such a long time. In the Wall Case, for the first time, the Court was given the chance to 
give an opinion on legal issues relating to the status of the Palestinian People, their right to 
self-determination, the status of Israeli settlements on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, 
Israel's acquisition of territory in those areas, and the applicability of the laws of war in the 
Occupied Territories.24 
It is now up to the international community to utilise the Court's findings in helping 
to achieve a just and peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such a settlement 
21 Bedjaoui, Mohammed, "The Contribution of the International Court of Justice Towards Keeping and 
Restoring Peace", in: Conflict Resolution: New Approaches and Methods, UNESCO Publishing, 2000, p. 13. 
22 Advisory opinion of 9 July 2004. Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketJimwp/imwpframe.htm (Accessed 21 October 2004). 
23 For a historical background of the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Pogany, Istvan, The Security Council and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, Aldershot: Gower, 1984; Cotran, Eugene & Mallat, Chibli, (eds.), The Arab-Israeli 
~ccords: Legal Perspective, Kluwer Law International, 1996. 
See Chapter Six, infra. 
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must take into account in addition, the principles laid down in successive Security Council's 
resolutions including resolution 242 which emphasised the inadmissibility of acquisition of 
territory by war and called for the "[ w ]ithdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict." At the same time, the Resolution called for the, 
"[t]ermination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and 
their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts 
of force.,,25 
The Court's Opinion, much like its Opinion on Namibia,26 strengthens the position of 
the global community as it seeks to assert International Law as a basis for resolving 
protracted or difficult problems.27 It is necessary that both sides, Palestine and Israel, should 
accept their responsibilities under International Law. Although it is perhaps too early to 
predict the effect of the Wall Opinion, it nevertheless illustrates vividly the contemporary 
relevance of the advisory function. 
25 See SC Res. 242, November 22,1967. 
26 D' d' Ch S" lscusse In apter IX, mfra. 
27 See Quigley, John & Akram, Susan, "A Reading of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality ofIsrael's Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories" available at: 
http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/pubs/update on wall On004.pdf (Accessed 21 October 2004). 
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4. The Structure of the Work 
This thesis is divided into nine Chapters reflecting the controversies, questions and concerns 
that have long animated legal studies on the advisory function. The starting point is Chapter 
One, which examines the historical evolution of the function, along with the associated 
surrounding political atmosphere at the inception of the advisory function. This Chapter 
sheds light upon the history of the advisory function of the present Court and the 
circumstances in which the function was adopted and, consequently, the reasons behind the 
taking up or rejection of certain proposals. Moreover, some consideration is given to the 
institutional status of the two Courts, the PCIJ and the ICI. 
Chapter Two examines the advisory jurisdiction of the Court, along with the Court's 
compliance with requests for advisory opinions. This is followed by an examination of those 
UN organs which are empowered to request advisory opinions, and the prerequisites to do so. 
An analysis of the Court's jurisdiction ratione personae and jurisdiction ratione materiae, 
accompanied with a detailed examination of the Court's dicta in dealing with these 
requirements. Lastly, the discretion of the Court to render or to refrain from rendering an 
advisory opinion is discussed. 
Chapter Three identifies the effect of the 'organic relationship' between the Court and 
the UN upon their views of the advisory function. This Chapter argues that the success of the 
advisory function depends on a process of interaction which can be characterised as 
coordination between the UN and the Court, within the boundaries of duties and restraints 
imposed on each actor. Because the Court does not act proprio motu, it can only contribute to 
the development of UN law if it is given the opportunity to do so. Therefore, this Chapter 
concludes that the advisory opinion rendered by the Court could be used as a suitable guide 
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for UN organs in future actions or as a device to control their actions. The last part of the 
Chapter argues that coordination among UN organs by requesting an opinion upon the 
compatibility of certain acts with law might create certain kinds of control over the acts of 
UN political organs, thereby helping to protect the Organisation's institutional life. 
Chapter Four pays particular attention to the Court's duty to act judicially. It 
addresses the question of reconciliation of the Court's role as a principal UN organ and its 
duty to adhere to its judicial character, and examines in detail the Court's dicta concerning 
these two obligations. 
Chapter Five further stresses the judicial character of the advisory function by 
shedding light on the Court's procedure in exercise of its advisory jurisdiction. A true gauge 
of the quality of the law administered by a court of law is its procedure, as the law 
administered by the Court is reflected, at least in part, in the procedures employed. The 
Court's advisory procedures are highly assimilated to the procedures in contentious cases. 
The Chapter highlights at least two important issues: First, the implications of the 
assimilation of the advisory proceedings to contentious proceedings where appropriate, 
including the question of ad hoc judges, and the equality of parties. Second, the process of 
decision making, which includes the choice of law, deliberation and reading the opinion. 
Besides providing an extensive examination of the origins, nature, and procedure of 
the advisory function, Chapter Six deals at length with the actual practice of the Court and its 
contribution to the development of International Law through the exercise of its advisory 
jurisdiction. This Chapter shows how the Court has been mindful of the evolving nature of 
International Law and acknowledges that the real measure of the function's role could not be 
determined exclusively in terms of the number of advisory opinions handed down. Of more 
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importance is the Court's contribution to providing authoritative statements oflaw, thus 
aiding the development of International Law in a wide variety of areas, such as the law of 
international organisations, the law of treaties, human rights law, international humanitarian 
law and international environmental law . 
The attitude of States towards adjudication and International Law in general, along 
with the attitude of UN member States toward the advisory function in particular, provide the 
subject matter of Chapter Seven. In trying to understand the reasons why States tend not to 
invoke the advisory function of the Court, one must look at the general attitude of States 
towards law and adjudication. Therefore, the Chapter examines two important issues: first, it 
analyses States' attitude towards adjudication by examining not only the place of law in 
international society, but also the factors which determine its place, second, it reviews the 
frequently cited reasons for the reluctance of States to use the Court. 
Chapter Eight examines the attitude of the requesting organ on receiving the opinion. 
This Chapter also emphasises that the primary motive for most advisory opinions rendered so 
far has been for law clarification and guidance for future action, rather than judicial 
legitimation of decisions already taken. 
The concluding Chapter discusses some of the concerns that have been raised about 
the advisory jurisdiction and its limitations, while also considering the future role of the 
advisory procedure. Finally, the Chapter suggests certain ways to improve the Court's 
advisory function. 
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5. Methodology and Methodological issues 
This study is based primarily on an analysis of primary and secondary texts. The ICJ's 
jurisprudence, together with some selected PCIJ cases which have had an important impact 
on the ICJ, provide rich insights as well as useful tools for an overview of the advisory 
function. This jurisprudence of the ICJ is examined for four purposes: First, to show how the 
advisory function marks the role of the Court as a principal organ of the UN.28 Second, to 
demonstrate that the ICJ has conceived of its advisory function as a judicial one and that in 
exercising this function it has kept within the limits which characterise its judicial role.29 
Third, to consider the impact of the advisory opinions on facilitating the work of the 
Organisation, and on the development of International Law. Last, to illustrate how the 
judicial reasoning of the Court in advisory opinions affects the authoritativeness of the 
opinion and the degree of compliance. 
Due to the limited number of advisory opinions, this study has dealt with all the cases 
rendered up to 2004, including the most recent advisory opinion rendered on seventh of July 
2004, the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. This thesis also provides some statistical data as one method of illustration of the 
role and use of the advisory function. Although such an examination yields quantitative 
rather than qualitative results, it helps to illustrate the attitude of UN member States towards 
the advisory function. 
The documents used in this thesis are first, ICJ and PCIJ publications, pertinent ad 
hoc agreements, and UN documents. In addition, a wide variety of scholarly monographs and 
articles on the advisory function, on the ICJ and other legal studies on related issues are 
28 See Chapter Three. 
29 Hudson, supra note 4, p. 511. 
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examined. All translations from Arabic Language texts, unless specified to the contrary, are 
those of the author. Emphasis has been placed, in particular, on the more recent scholarly 
publications related to the subject of this study. 
Moreover, in this thesis references are made to several branches of knowledge outside 
public International Law: sociology; philosophy; as well as literature on general management 
theory. To sum up, the data collected from all the above sources, primary and secondary, has 
been employed to answer questions and concerns about the role of the advisory function of 
the leI. While this was the goal, I hope that the result of this study will contribute, in some 
small measure, towards a better understanding of the Court's advisory function. 
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Chapter One 
The Advisory Function of the International Court of Justice in an 
Historical Context 
1. Introduction 
Article 14 of the League Covenant gave the PCIJ competence to render advisory opinions 
"upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly." This 
provision introducing the advisory function at the international level was a controversial 
innovation in International Law. Article 14 of the League Covenant stated: 1 
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption 
plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court 
shall be competent to hear and determine any disputes of an international character 
which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion 
upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Councilor by the Assembly. 
However, the advisory function cannot be discussed in the abstract. Its historical evolution, 
together with the surrounding political environment at its inception, must be considered. This 
Chapter explores the history of the advisory function of the PCIJ and the ICJ, and the 
circumstances in which the function was adopted and, consequently, the reasons behind the 
adoption or rejection of certain proposals. Moreover, some consideration will be given to the 
institutional status of the two Courts, the PCIJ and the ICJ. 
I See Hudson, Manley 0., World Court Reports: A Collection of the Judgements, Orders and Opinions of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, 1922-1926, vol. I, p. 3; Miller, David H., The Drafting of the 
Covenant, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1928, Vol. 2, p. 331; available also at: 
http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonlleagcov.htm. (Accessed 9 December 2004). 
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2. Advisory Opinions in General 
An advisory opinion has been defined as "an authoritative but non-binding explanation of a 
question or issue.,,2 A tribunal does not have the authority when exercising its advisory 
jurisdiction to order judicial sanctions to impose duties or obligations on any State.3 
However, although an advisory opinion cannot create legal obligations, it nevertheless can be 
said to enjoy "legal value and moral authority.,,4 Pasqualucci argues that advisory opinions 
may be more influential than judgements in contentious cases because they affect the general 
interpretation of International Law for all States rather than just for the parties to an 
individualopinion.s 
The need for an advisory function to help the Council and Assembly of the League of 
Nations was realised and accepted almost immediately by the League's member-States.6 
However, it seems that the difficulties of putting this function into practice were not fully 
appreciated and, indeed, the function came to be regarded with scepticism if not suspicion.7 
One could say that this attitude seems to persist, even today, though to a lesser degree. 
2 See Pasqualucci, Jo M., The Practice and Procedure a/the Inter-American Court 0/ Human Rights, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 29; Interpretation 0/ Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 71. 
3 Hudson, Manley, The Permanent Court a/International Justice, 1920-1942: A Treatise, New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1943, p. 512. 
4 See Diss. Op. of Judge Koroma in the Legality a/the Threat or Use 0/ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 
IC] Rep., 1996, p. 930. Hudson also noted that advisory opinions are "advisory not legal advice in the ordinary 
sense, not views expressed by the counsel for the guidance of client, but pronouncements as to the law 
applicable in given situations formulated after deliberation by the Court", Hudson, Manley, ''The Effect of 
Advisory Opinions of the World Court", 42 AJ/L, 1948, p. 630. 
S Pasqualucci, Jo M., supra note 2, p. 30; Heffernan, Liz, "The Nuclear Weapons Opinions: Reflections on the 
Advisory Procedure of the International Court of Justice", 28 Stetson Law Review, 1998, p. 133. 
6 Dunne, Michael, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1935, London: Pinter, 1988. ; It was the organs 
of the League of Nations that were expected to feel the need for advisory opinions, and was not intended for 
States to be entitled for such requests. Thirlway, Hugh, "The International Court of Justice" in: Evans, Malcolm 
D. (ed.), International Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 582. 
7 See the views of Judges Elihu Root and Moore who maintained a negative attitude towards empowering the 
Court an advisory jurisdiction at the time of drafting the peu Statute. See Sugihara, Takane, "The Advisory 
Function of the International Court of Justice", 17 Japanese Annual 0/ International law, 1973, pp. 26-27. 
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The power of an international tribunal to give advisory opinions must normally be 
expressly stated in the constitutive instrument of that tribunal and not thought of as inherent 
to its judicial status.8 This raises two questions: how could the pcri begin to exercise its 
advisory jurisdiction absent expressly stated relevant provisions in its Statute? And, can other 
tribunals possess such jurisdiction? 
Keith has pointed out that the absence of express provisions in the treaty establishing 
the PCU had raised two important questions: whether the Court was competent to give 
advisory opinions, and whether the Court had an obligation to answer requests for opinions.9 
The answer to the first question seems to emerge from President Loder' s 10 statement that, by 
virtue of Article 1 of the PCU Statute the Court was established in accordance with Article 
14 of the Covenant, therefore Article 14 could be regarded as an integral part of the Statute. I I 
As for the obligation of the Court to answer a request, Judge Moore, in his memorandum of 
18 February 1922, concluded that the Court was under no unconditional obligation to accept 
a request for an advisory opinion and this view was not challenged by other judges.12 In 
1922, there was a proposal for a provision in the Rules to be adopted stating that "the Court 
reserves the right to refrain from replying to questions put to it which require an advisory 
opinion on a theoretical case.,,13 However this was not adopted. 
The question now is whether an advisory jurisdiction can be given to tribunals of a non-
permanent, non-general and regional nature, unlike the pen and the IeJ. Although one must 
8 Amerasinghe, Chittharanjan F., Jurisdiction of International Tribunals, The Hague; London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003, p. 503. 
9 Keith, Kenneth, The extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Leyden: A.W, 
Sijthoff, 1971, p. 14. 
10 Judge Loder was the first President of the PCIJ. 
11 PCIJ, Ser. D, No.2, p. 502. 
12 PCIJ, Ser. D, No.2, 1922, p. 383. 
13 See draft Article 63 a., PCIJ Ser. D, No.2, 1922, p. 308. 
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assert that the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ is unique, due to the nature of the Court, it 
seems that in theory other tribunals can possibly have an advisory jurisdiction.14 At present 
there are a number of regional tribunals with advisory jurisdiction expressly stated in their 
constitutive instruments. These are: the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(CJEC)IS, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)16, the Inter-American Court on 
Human Rights (lACHR). 17Lastly, the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea also has advisory jurisdiction .18 
It is worthy of note that the jurisprudence developed by the ICJ, which is, in broad 
lines, a continuation of the PCU, sets the standards which may apply to the advisory 
jurisdiction of other tribunals in appropriate cases. 19 As a result the advisory function has 
become widely accepted in International Law. It has been argued that "advisory opinions 
14 Thirlway notes that since the purpose of international arbitral tribunals is to give a binding settlement to a 
dispute, the possibility of giving advisory opinions seems to be unlikely. Thirlway, Hugh, "Advisory Opinions 
ofInternational Courts", in: Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International LAw, vol. 1, 1992, p. 38. 
15 Article 300 (ex 228) of the Treaty of European Union states: "[t]he Council, the Commission or a Member 
State may obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the 
provisions of this Treaty. Where the opinion ofthe Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into 
force only in accordance with Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union." 
16 Articles 47 and 48 of the Convention of ECHR provides: 47(1): "[t]he Court may, at the request of the 
Committee of Ministers, give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the 
Convention and the protocols thereto." Article 48: "[t]he Court shall decides whether a request for an advisory 
opinion submitted by the Committee of Ministers is within its competence as defined in Article 47. See the 
present European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome, 
4 November 1950, and as amended by Protocol No. II. See Brownlie, Ian, Basic Documents in International 
LAw, Oxford University Press, 5th edition, 2002, p. 244. 
17 Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides that: 1. The member states of the 
Organization may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties 
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of competence, the 
organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by the Protocol of 
Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court. 2. The Court, at the request of a member State of the 
Organization, may provide that state with opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with 
the aforesaid international instruments. See American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 9 
ILM,1970,p.673. 
18 Article 191 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 10 December 1982 which entered into force on 16 November 
1994 provides that the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea "shall 
give advisory opinions at the request ofthe Assembly or the Council on legal questions arising within the scope 
of their activities. Such opinions shall be given as a matter of urgency." See The Law of Sea Convention of 10 
Recember 1982, UN AlCONF. 621122, 21 ILM, 1982, p. 1261. 
Amerasinghe, supra note 8, p. 505. 
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contribute to an international common law and to the resolutions of doctrinal differences. 
They also provide an alternative non-confrontational means to resolve international 
disputes.,,2o 
3. The Advisory Function Prior to the Inception of International Courts21 
The advisory function was used at the national level before the establishment of the League 
of Nations. The genesis of such a function may be traced back to the twelfth century when 
the King of England used to call upon judges to seek legal advice as to the state of the law. 
This consultation with the judges was done in the King's capacity as the fountain of justice.22 
Contrary to the position in England, the framers of the US Constitution rejected proposals to 
confer specifically upon the executive and Congress the right to request opinions from the 
Supreme Court.23 Therefore, when President Washington turned to the judges of the Supreme 
Court for an advisory opinion, the judges declined to comply.24 
It is worth noting that the constitutions of many States embody provisions for advisory 
opinions to be given by their respective supreme courts.25 Finally, the advisory function as 
developed in practice by the PCIJ was different from the advisory function of national courts 
in some States.26 Pomerance argues that advisory opinions of national courts were normally 
20 Pasqualucci, Jo M., supra note 2, p. 31. 
21 On the advisory function of national courts in general see Hudson, Manley, "Advisory Opinions of National 
and International Courts", 37 HLR, 1924; Wright, Q., "Advisory Opinions" in: Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Science, Vol. 1, 1953, pp. 475-478. 
22 The King could seek judicial advice not only in his capacity as a dispenser of justice, but also in his executive 
capacity. Judges did not attend the Concilium Regis, which was an administrative body. However, the King 
could require their presence as necessary. See Baldwin, James F., "The King's Council in England During the 
Middle Ages", 1913, p. 301, cited in: Beg, Mirza A., The Attitude of United Nations Members Towards the Use 
of Advisory Opinion Procedure: 1945-1963, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1965, p. 8. 
2 See Wright, Q, supra note 21, p. 476. 
24 Wright, Q, supra note 21, p. 476. 
25 For the experience of the domestic legal system with advisory opinions see De Wet, Erika, The Chapter VII 
Powers of the United Nations Security Council, Oxford; Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004, pp. 25-26. 
26 For the difference between the two experiences, see Pomerance, Michla, The Advisory Function of the 
International Court in the League and UN Eras, Baltimore; London: John Hopkins University Press, 1973, p. 9; 
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"served with reference to proposed administrative or legislative measures, without reference 
to actual litigants or specific sets of facts. 27 Hudson also concluded that "in view of the 
history of Article 14 .. .it cannot be said that the provision ... was due to the experience of 
national courts", but that "this experience may have been in the minds of the draftsmen. ,,28 
4. The Advisory Function and the Permanent Court of International Justice 
The PCll's advisory function raised serious questions regarding the jurisprudence and 
jurisdiction of the Court.29 Judge Moore claimed that "[n]o subject connected with the 
organization of the Permanent Court of International Justice has caused so much confusion 
and proved to be so baffling as the question whether and under what conditions the Court 
shall undertake to give 'advisory' opinions.,,3o 
It was arguable whether this function was suitable for a court of law, whose primary 
function is deciding disputes brought voluntarily by the contending States. Moreover, the 
League of Nations' "Great Powers" as well as the US feared that this function could become 
a back-door for compulsory jurisdiction. The US government was also concerned that 
advisory opinions could be used to legitimise the League's policies31 thereby committing the 
US government, (as a potential member of the League) to such pOlicies.32 Another point of 
Goodrich, Leland, "The Nature of the Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice", 
32AJIL, 1938, pp. 738-758. 
27 Pomerance, Michla, "The Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice and its 'Judicial' Character: 
Past and Future Prisms, in: Muller, A.S., et al., (eds.), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role After 
Fifty Years, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, 
~. 272. 
8 Hudson, supra note 3, p. 458. 
29 See Eyffinger, Arthur, The International Court of Justice 1946-1996, The Hague; London: Kluwer Law 
International, 1996, p. 146; Rosenne, Shabtai, The World Court: What it is and How it Works, Dordrecht, 
~ondon: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, pp. 106-107. 
Memorandum of 18 February 1922, PCIJ, Ser. D, No.2, p. 383. 
31 Dunne, supra note 6, p. 104. 
32 Ibid, p. 9. 
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concern for the US government was the protection of its domestic jurisdiction from foreign 
judicial scrutiny, a concern which still exists.33 
Indeed, there was great uncertainty about how the advisory function would work in 
practice.34 This resulted in numerous draft proposals and counter proposals, and even the 
demand by the US government for a veto power on the exercise of the advisory jurisdiction 
by the pcn.35 Many attempts were made to create a clear, distinct differentiation between the 
contentious and the advisory jurisdictions of the Court but were unsuccessful. 36 
4.1 The Advisory Function at the Drafting Stage 
Article 14 of the Covenant gave the League Council responsibility for formulating plans for 
the establishment of the pcn.37 However, the term "advisory opinion" was only introduced 
for the first time in the final draft of Article 14, in the third sentence.38 Although some earlier 
drafts of Article 14 had made reference to the Court's competence to answer questions 
referred to it by some specific organs,39 none of those drafts had directly used the term 
33 Dunne, ibid, p. 39. For details about the attitude of the great power States at the time of the League of Nations 
see Section 2 in Chapter Seven, infra. 
34 Pomerance, supra note 27, p. 272. 
35 Between 1926-29 the US Government and the League were at an impasse over this point. Dunne, supra note 
6, p.4. 
36 Pomerance, supra note 27, p. 272. The argument against a clear distinction that, if the advisory opinions were 
to be regarded as provisional with uncertain status, that may be reversed by a subsequent contentious 
proceedings, then this would render the whole function "self- stultifying", lacking in authority and hence 
effectiveness. See Dunne, supra note 6, p. 38. 
37 Resulting on a meeting between Wilson, Cecil, Smits, and Miller on January 31,1919, it was decided that" a 
general provision might be inserted for the creation of a permanent Court." See Miller, supra note 1, vol. 1, 
fs' ~~~ original draft of this Article contained no reference to the advisory opinion. The Hurst - Miller draft 
which presented to the Commission on the League of Nations by President Wilson provided for the creation of 
the PCIJ with no reference to the idea of an advisory function. Article 12 of the draft provided" [t]he Executive 
Council will formulate plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice, and this Court 
will be competent to hear and determine any matter which the parties recognize as suitable for submission to it 
for arbitration under the forgoing Article". See Miller, ibid, vol. 2, p. 234. 
39 Article 5 of the French Ministerial Commission of 8 June 1918; Article 7 of the British draft of 20 January 
1919; Article 14 of the Italian draft of 3 February 1919; and Article 10 ofthe Colonel House draft of 16 July 
1918. See Miller, ibid, vol. 2, p. 239, 111,250, and 8 respectively. 
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"advisory opinion." The British Draft Convention of 20 January 1919, in Article 7, might be 
considered to refer indirectly to advisory opinions. This draft provided:4o 
Where the Conference or the Council finds that the dispute can with advantage be 
submitted to a court of international law, or that any particular question involved in 
the dispute can with advantage be referred to a court of international law , it may 
submit the dispute or the particular question accordingly, and may formulate the 
questions for decision, and may give such directions as to procedure as it may think 
desirable. In such case, the decision of the Court shall have no force or effect unless it 
is confirmed by the Report of the Conference or Council 
On 18 March 1919, Lord Robert Cecil and President Wilson proposed an addition to an early 
draft of Article 14.41 This gave the Court competence to hear and determine "any issue 
referred to it by the Executive Councilor Body of Delegates.,,42 A similar amendment was 
also proposed by France, on March 24, to the effect that the Court would be competent to 
hear and determine "any matter which is submitted to it by the Body of Delegates or the 
Executive Council.,,43 The broad language of these proposed drafts, however, were believed 
to have implied the "idea of obligatory arbitration." 44 
Miller, the American legal advisor, wrote to Colonel House that: "[i]t seems to me that 
still more objection will be raised in the Senate to the addition to Article 14. This goes the 
whole length of permitting the Executive Councilor the Body of Delegates to compel 
arbitration.,,45 Hurst and Miller met again to draft a text that could satisfy Miller.46 While the 
40 Miller, ibid, vol. 2, p. 111. 
41 The early draft of Article 14 stated that: "[t]he Executive Council shall formulate plans for the establishment 
of a Permanent Court of International Justice and this Court shall, when established, be competent to hear and 
determine any matter which the parties recognize as suitable for submission to it for arbitration under the 
forgoing Article." See Miller, vol. 2, p. 311. 
42 Miller, ibid, vol. 2, p. 585. 
43 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 391; vol. II, p. 585 
44 Ibid, vol. 1, p.391and p. 290. 
45 Ibid, vol. 1, p. 290. 
46 Hurst had proposed this draft: "[t]he Executive Council shall formulate plans for the establishment of a 
permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute or 
difference of an international character which the parties thereto may submit to it and also advise upon any legal 
questions referred to it by the Executive Council or the Body of Delegates". See MiIIer, ibid, vol. 1, p. 391. 
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new formulation met Miller's objection regarding compulsory arbitration, Miller considered 
that this formulation could have been construed "to make the Court the legal advisor of the 
Council and of the Assembly, a duty which its function of rendering advisory opinions does 
not involve.,,47 Eventually, Miller accepted the draft, and the words "Executive Council" 
were replaced by the word "Council". 
It is quite clear that Miller's objections were intended to exclude the possibility of 
compulsory jurisdiction developing in accordance with this provision.48 Eventually, the 
Drafting Committee, in its final draft49 of Article 14 introduced the term "advisory opinion" 
in a separate sentence, and the phrase "give an advisory opinion" was used instead of the 
term "advice". Miller argued that this substitution was made to indicate that "the function to 
be exercised is a judicial one."so 
The uncertainty and doubt associated with adopting the advisory function led to the 
omission of any reference to such opinions in the original Statute of the PCIJ.S1 Therefore, 
"[t]he matter, implied from Article 14 of the Covenant, was initially left to the governance of 
the Court. ,,52 
In 1920 an Advisory Committee of Jurists (ACJ) was established to draft a Statute for 
the Court. 53 Article 36 of their draft provided that the Court shall give an advisory opinion 
47 Miller, ibid, vol. 1, pp. 391-392. 
48 Wright, Q., supra note 21, p. 479. Miller's point of view was that the establishment of the PCIJ "would make 
compulsory arbitration depend solely upon the vote of the Executive Council, a vote from which the parties to 
the dispute would be presumably excluded." See Miller, vol. 1, p. 290. 
49 Report of 5 April of 1919 of the Drafting Committee. 
so Miller, supra note 1, vol. 1, p. 406. Thus Article 14 then read: "[t]he Court may also give an advisory opinion 
upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Councilor by the Assembly." 
51 Pomerance, supra note 26, p. 277. The Statute that was issued, in its first form, contained no provisions 
concerning advisory opinions. 
52 Rosenne, Shabtia, The Law and Practice o/the International Court. /920-1996, The Hague; London: 
~art~nus Nijn~offPublishers, vol. 1, 1997, p. 280. 
ThiS CommIttee was appointed by the League Council to draft a Statute of the PCIJ. See PCIJ, SeT. D, No.2, 
1936, p. 838. 
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upon any question or dispute of an international nature referred to it by the Councilor the 
Assembly. Thus, it distinguished between two kinds of advisory opinions, namely, advisory 
opinions on a "question" and advisory opinions on an existing "dispute,,54 The draft article 
was controversial. The French jurist, M. De Lapradelle maintained that a "question" was a 
theoretical matter, while a "dispute" was a practical one.55 Therefore, a limited panel of 
judges should respond to a question, while, in contrast, the plenary full Court should deal 
with a dispute. 56 
On the other hand, Root, an American jurist, totally opposed giving the PCIJ any right 
to give advisory opinions affecting disputes. In his view this right would be "a violation of all 
juridical principles,,57, and therefore the League Assembly removed the entire Article from 
the draft.58 The opinion was expressed that "[t]he Covenant, in Article 14, contained a 
provision in accordance with which the Court could not refuse to give advisory opinions". It 
"was therefore unnecessary to include a rule to the same effect in the Constitution of the 
Court.,,59 Pomerance observed that the ambiguity of the criterion for distinguishing the two 
types of advisory opinions, in addition to the "desire not to bind the Court in an area which 
54 This draft Article provided: [w]hen the Court shall give an opinion on a question of an international nature 
which does not refer to any dispute that may arise, it shall appoint a special commission of three to five 
members. When it shall give an opinion upon a question which forms the subject of an existing dispute, is shall 
do so under the same conditions as if the case had been actually submitted to it for decision. See League of 
Nations, Advisory Committee of Jurists 1920, 27th meeting, p. 584. 
55 Permanent Court oflnternational Justice Advisory Committee of Jurists, Proces-Verbaux a/the Proceedings 
o/the Committee (1920), 27th meeting p. 584. 
56 Ibid, p. 584. 
57 Ibid. 
58 The Sub-Committee was of the view that the opinions in every case should be given by the same quorum of 
judges as judgments as many practical difficulties would result in making this distinction. See League of 
~ations, Records o.f the first Assembly, Third Committee, 9th meeting, p. 401. 
Records of the First Assembly, Meeting of the Committees, I, p. 401; Hudson, supra note 3, p. 483. 
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had no international past and an uncertain international future,,,60 led the Assembly to omit 
Article 36 from the Statute as finally adopted. 
However, the conflict regarding the usefulness of the advisory function and its 
compatibility with the function of a court of law was resolved quickly by the PCIJ itself 
which did not doubt its competence to render advisory opinions. In fact, the first decision that 
the Court rendered was under its advisory jurisdiction.61 Meanwhile, the Court in 1922 
adopted its own Rules of procedure as permitted by Article 30 of its Statute, and these set out 
in detail, in Article 71-74, the procedure to be followed in advisory opinions.62 
It is interesting to note that during the discussion of the Rules, Judge Moore once again 
in his memorandum on "the question of advisory opinions", which was submitted to the 
Court, proposed omitting any reference to advisory opinions. They were not "an appropriate 
function of a Court of Justice", he wrote, because:63 
60 Pomerance, supra note 26, p. 274. Goodrich was of the view that the omission might be due to "the authority 
of certain of the Court's opinions would be weakened thereby." See Goodrich, supra note 26, p. 740. 
61 The first case which the PCIJ dealt with was the Designation of the Worker's Delegatefor the Netherlands at 
ILC, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 1, 1922. 
62 Articles 71-74 of 24 March 1922 Rules of the Court stated: 
Article 71: Advisory opinions shall be given after deliberation by the full Court. The opinions of 
dissenting judges may, at their request, be attached to the opinion of the Court. 
Article 72: Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before the 
Court by means of a written request, signed either by the President of the Assembly or the President of 
the Council of the League of Nations, or by the Secretary-General of the League under instructions from 
the Assembly or the Council. 
The request shall contain an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required, and shall 
be accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question. 
Article 73: The Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the request for an advisory opinion to the 
members of the Court, and to the Members of the League of Nations, through the Secretary-General of 
the League, and to the States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant. 
Notice of such request shall also be given to any international organizations which are likely to be able to 
furnish information on the question. 
Article 74: Any advisory opinion which may be given by the Court and the request in response to which 
it was given, shall be printed and published in a special collection for which the Registrar shall be 
responsible. 
It is to be noted that these Rules were revised in 31 July 1926, 21 February 1931, and 11 March 1936. See 
Hudson, World Court Report, supra note 1, vols. I and IV. 
63 Memorandum of Judge Moore, of 18th February 1922, The question of advisory opinions, PCIJ, Series 0, No. 
2,1922,pp.383-398. 
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A Court of Justice, whether national or international, is essentially a judicial body, 
whose function is to end disputes by deciding them. The maintenance of the 
character, reputation and usefulness of such a Court is inextricably bound up with the 
obligatory force and the effective performance of its decisions or judgments. 
This memorandum, although submitted to the Court, was not put to the vote.64 Judge 
Altamira then submitted a draft proposal that would have distinguished between an opinion 
related to an existing dispute from one related to a question.65 Another proposal regarding the 
Rules of the Court suggested granting the Court the right to give secret advice.66 Judges 
Moore and Finalay had opposed this proposal on the grounds that secret advice would be 
incompatible with the Statute and "would be a death blow to the Court as ajudicial body.,,67 
In the end, all these proposals were rejected and Articles 71-74 of the Rules were 
adopted. Furthermore, it was decided that advisory opinions should always be given by the 
full Court.68 In fact, the Rules as finally adopted aimed to attribute a judicial character to 
advisory opinions. 
When the Court revised its Rules in 1926 any distinctions between the advisory and 
contentious jurisdictions were eliminated. The revision, indeed, reflected the practice of 
assimilating the advisory to the contentious function which the Court demonstrated in 1923 
in the Eastern Care/ia Case.69 Here the League Council requested an advisory opinion over 
the objection of Soviet Russia, but the Court declined to answer the question on the ground 
that "[a]nswering the question would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute 
between the parties." Since the question submitted to the Court concerning a pending dispute 
64 Sugihara, Takane, supra note 7, p. 29. 
65 PCIJ, Ser. 0, No.2, p. 280. 
66 This proposal was submitted by Judge Anzilotti. See PCIJ, Ser. 0, No.2, 1922, p. 160. To avoid the 
possibility of secrecy Article 74 provided that the opinions "should be read out at a public meeting of the 
Court." 
67 Ibid. 
68 PCIJ, Ser. 0, No.2, p. 98. 
69 PCIJ, Ser. B, No.5, 1923, pp. 27-29. 
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between two States (Soviet Union and Finland), the consent of the two States was required 
by the Court in order to render its opinion.7o 
Moreover, during the revision of the Rules, a proposal to admit a national judge in 
advisory cases in certain circumstances was also rejected.71 However, in 1927 the Court 
reversed its earlier position, adding a new paragraph to Article 71 of the Rules adopting 
judges ad hoc to its proceedings.72 By adding this provision the Court enhanced the 
assimilation of the advisory jurisdiction to the contentious in cases related to existing 
disputes. 
Once again the Court never doubted its competence to render advisory opinions even 
absent any reference to this function in its Statute.7J An amendment to the Statute, which 
came into force in February 1936, clarified the legal position by adding four Articles 
concerning Advisory Opinions. Articles 65-68 reaffirmed the provisions of the Rules of the 
Court of 1926, that is to say Articles 71-74. However, Article 68 of the Statute was new, and 
provides that "[i]n the exercise of its advisory function, the Court shall further be guided by 
the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it 
recognizes them to be applicable. To correspond to this new addition, the Court on 11 March 
1936 added Article 82 to its Rules.74 
70 PCIJ, ibid. 
71 PCIJ, Ser. E, No.4, p. 73. 
72 This added paragraph provided "[o]n a question relating to an existing dispute between two or more States or 
Members of the League of Nations, Article 31 of the Statute shall apply. In case of doubt, the Court shall 
decide." 
73 The legal basis of the Court's power to give advisory opinions embodied in Article 14 of the Covenant. 
74 Article 82 ofthe 1936 Rules provided "[i]n proceedings in regard to advisory opinions, the Court shall, in 
addition to the provisions of Chapter IV of the Statute of the Court, apply the provisions of the articles 
hereinafter set out. It shall also be guided by the provisions of the present Rules which apply in contentious 
cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable, according as the advisory opinion for which the 
Court is asked relates, in the terms of Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to a "dispute" or to a 
"question." See PCIJ, Ser. D, No.1. 
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The history of the drafting of the Covenant, Statute and the Rules of the Court, 
demonstrates that the doubts and uncertainty initially associated with Article 14 of the 
Covenant gradually diminished and that the Court adopted "the essential principle that 
advisory procedure before a Court of Justice could not differ from judicial procedure.,,75 
4.2 The PCIJ Advisory Opinions and the Nature of the Requests for Advisory Opinions 
During the PCU's short life it rendered twenty-seven advisory opinions.76 Nineteen were on 
questions relating to existing disputes and eight on questions not so related.77 Hudson opined 
that in no cases, including cases relating to the competence of the ILO,78 was the Court 
requested to give an opinion on a purely hypothetical question.79 
Some questions were deemed improper for submission to the Court such as: questions 
of a general theoretical nature with abstract formulations and without practical interest80 
because this might lead to legislation or policy determination;81 questions calling for 
determining the law of the future, which is considered as an act of legislation; questions that 
undermine the voluntary nature of international litigation, where the request constituted a 
back-door for compulsory jurisdiction;82 questions related to Covenant interpretation in the 
abstract, since this could lead to de facto amendments that should be reserved for the 
Covenant signatories,83 and questions related to domestic jurisdiction.84 
7S Judge Anzilotti, PCIJ, Ser. D, No.2, p. 189. 
76 See Oda, Shigeru, "The International Court of Justice Viewed from the Bench 1976-1993", Chapter III, "The 
Advisory Function of the Court", 244 ReAD!, 1993, pp. 90-91. 
71 Oda, ibid, p. 91; Goodrich, supra note 26, pp. 744-745. 
78 However, requests related to the provisions of the ILO constitution were "framed in more generalized and 
abstract terms", See Pomerance, supra note 26, p. 50. 
79 Hudson, supra note 3, p. 496. 
80 League of Nations Official Journal, 1923, pp.585-586, pp. 667-670. 
81 P omerance, supra note 26, p. 216. 
82 Hudson, supra note 3, p. 497. 
83 P omerance, supra note 26, p. 216. 
84 Article 1.5(8) of the Covenant stated that the Council "[iJf the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of 
them, and IS found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the 
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4.3 Sources of Requests for Advisory Opinions during the League Era 
Although Article 14 of the League Covenant authorised both the Council and the Assembly 
to request advisory opinions, in fact, the Council submitted all of the twenty-seven requests 
for opinions during the period 1922 - 1935. One must not draw any distinction between the 
competence of the League Council and that of the Assembly with respect to the capacity to 
request advisory opinions.85 
In its recourse to the Court, the Council did not always act in the same capacity. 
Pomerance noted that the Council frequently served simply as the avenue of access to the 
Court for other international bodies or for States involved in a dispute.86 The Council 
requested advisory opinions on behalf of the IL087 and other international bodies such as the 
Mixed Commissions for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations.88 It is interesting to 
note that agreements by interested States for requesting an advisory opinion were sufficient 
for initiating a request by the Council. 89 
domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its 
settlement." See the Covenant of the League of Nations, Hudson, supra note 1. 
85 It seems that once the Council refused a request, this refusal did not exclude the Assembly from lodging a 
request, provided that the matter was not expressly reserved to the Council. 
86 Pomerance, supra note 26, p. 47. 
87 The rendered opinions in relation to the internal procedures of international organisations were all related to 
the function of the ILO. Oda suggests that this is natural due to the fact that between the two World Wars the 
ILO was the first if not the only international organisation playing an important role in the international 
community. See Oda, supra note 76, pp. 90-91. 
88 P omerance, supra note 26, p. 47. 
89 Ibid. 
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4.4 Assimilation of the Advisory Procedure to the Contentious Procedure before the 
PCIJ 
As stated earlier, the uncertainty associated with the advisory jurisdiction in the drafting of 
the original PCIJ Statute in 1920, which led to its deletion, extended to the drafting of the 
Rules governing the advisory function in 1922. The distinction between the subject matter of 
the request as involving disputes or questions, which would in tum have involved different 
procedures for handling the requests, was not adopted. The judicial character of the function 
was emphasised, and the 1922 Rules included Articles 71-74 to that effect.9o Sugihara 
observed that the most striking feature in the advisory practice of the PCIJ was "the close 
assimilation of advisory procedures to the Court's contentious procedures.,,91 The consent of 
the interested States was required in the great majority of advisory cases dealt with by the 
In 1927 a further step towards assimilating the advisory to the contentious procedure 
was taken when the Court allowed the admission of judges ad hoc in certain advisory 
proceedings where the submitted question related to an existing dispute. 93 This marked the 
Court's acceptance of the dichotomy between requests relating to 'questions' and others 
relating to 'disputes', and meant that the latter should be assimilated as closely as possible to 
contentious procedures. The rationale behind assimilating the advisory procedure to the 
90 See supra note 62. 
91 Sugihara, supra note 7, p. 31. 
92 Ibid. 
93 PCIJ, Ser. C, No. 15, p. 250. Before adopting this amendment, the question of Judge ad hoc arose in the 
Exchange of Greek and Turkish populations case in 1925 and in the Mosul Case in 1925. The Court decided in 
the two cases that Article 31 of the Statute did not apply to the advisory procedure, therefore, no national judge 
could be appointed. 
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contentious, when the request involved a dispute, was out of concern on how to protect the 
moral authority and prestige of the Court while executing its advisory function. 94 
Goodrich claimed that the Court's refusal to give an opinion in the Eastern Carelia 
Case was due, inter alia, to the Court's practice of assimilating its advisory to its contentious 
procedure.95 The Court had considered the lack of the Soviet consent,96 along with the USSR 
failing to furnish the necessary facts of the case, as grounds to tum down the request. 
However, it is important to note that when a question submitted to the Court dealt with the 
competence of the Council, rather than the actual merits of a dispute, the Court did not 
consider consent as important for exercising its advisory jurisdiction. Hence, in the opinion 
requested in the interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier 
between Turkey and Iraq) Case, 97 the Court held that answering the request would not 
equate to deciding the dispute since the request "referred not to the merits of the affair but to 
the competence of the Council.,,98 Due to this assimilation it was thought that the advisory 
function exercised by the PCIJ was to a large extent, "of substantially the same kind as that 
rf d h h . d' ,,99 pe orme were t ere were contentious procee mgs. 
4.5 Voting in the League Council and Assembly to Request Advisory Opinions 
It was unclear to members of the League whether voting in the Councilor the Assembly must 
be unanimous. In addition, Article 5(1) of the Covenant provides that "except where 
otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the present treaty, decisions 
94 Goodrich, supra note 26, p. 739. 
95 Ibid, p. 742. 
96 Consent is the principle for establishing the Court's jurisdiction in the contentious procedure. See the 
discussion in Chapter Four, infra. 
:: In this case the Court gave an opinion despite the absence of Turkey's consent. 
pcn, Ser. B, No. 12, 1925, p. 18. 
99 S 'h ugl ara, supra note 7, p. 39. 
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at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shaH require the agreement of all the 
members of the League represented at the meeting." Moreover, Article 5(2) of the Covenant 
provides that: lOO 
All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the 
appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, ... may be decided by a 
majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting. 
The question remains as to whether a request for an advisory opinion is a matter of procedure 
or otherwise. Proposals to refer the nature of the vote required to the PCD for advisory 
opinions were always rejected. IOI In practice, the Council developed a practice whereby 
requesting the Court's opinion may only occur on the base of a unanimous vote. 102 
5. The PCIJ and the ICJ: Their Institutional Status 
Prior to studying the advisory function in the IC] era it is pertinent to investigate the 
institutional status of the two Courts. This is necessary for two reasons: first, the historical 
dimension of the study will not be complete without such a study, especially in view of the 
fact that the institutional setting could have an effect on the advisory jurisdiction of the 
Court. Second, the determination of the institutional setting could, perhaps, pave the way for 
understanding the institutional role of the two Courts. 
The PCU was not established as a formal part of the League. Indeed, its Statute was 
independent of the League Covenant and the Members of the League were not ipso facto 
parties to the PCU Statute. This contrasts with the position of the IC] within the UN. 
Nevertheless, there was a strong relationship between the PCU and the League, as 
100 See Hudson, supra note 1; WaIters, P.R., A History of the League of Nations, Oxford University Press, 1952, 
p.46. 
101 Pomerance, supra note 26, p. 213. 
102 F . h' 
or exceptIOns to t IS rule see Pomerance, supra note 27, p. 277 (note 22). 
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demonstrated by several facts: at the outset, the PCll was established under the auspices of 
the League; 103 the League Council and Assembly elected the members of the PCll bench; 104 
expenses of the PCll were borne by the League; 105 States other than members of the League 
and those States mentioned in the Annex to the Covenant could access the Court in 
accordance with conditions determined by the Council;106 the Court's main function, which 
coincided with the conceived purpose of the League,107 was to assist in resolving 
international disputes and the Council and the Assembly had the right to request advisory 
opinions from the PCll. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the PCll was regarded as 
one of the organs of the League of Nations. 108 President Loder, the first elected president of 
the PCll, in his inaugural speech stated: 109 
The Court is one of the principal organs of the League, and at the same time it 
exercises its powers in full and sovereign independence. It occupies within the 
League of Nations a place similar to that occupied in many States by the Judicature, 
which is an integral part of the State, and depends upon the national legislature as 
regards all that concerns its constitution, its organization, its powers, its maintenance, 
but which recognises no master in the exercise of its duties, in regard to which it 
enjoys absolute liberty and is bound only by the law which is its task to apply. 
League Secretary General Sir Eric Drummond in the Court's inaugural speech stated: I 10 
The definite establishment of the Court completes the organizations of the League as 
laid down under the Covenant. It is clearly the greatest and will, I believe, be the most 
important creative act of the League... an international judicial body... which is 
entirely free from all political control and entirely unfettered as to its decisions by 
103 See Article 14 of the Covenant, supra note 1. 
104 See Articles 4, 8 and 10 ofthe PCIJ Statute. 
tOS See Articles 32 and 33 of the PCIJ Statute. 
t06 Article 35 of the PCIJ Statue. 
107 Article 14 of the Covenant. 
108 See League of Nations Official Journal, March 1920, p. 37. Hudson, supra note 3, p. Ill. Contrary to this view 
Kelsen was of the opinion that the PCIJ was not an organ within the League of Nations, but that it was an 
independent organisation. Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental 
f~oblems, London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1951, p. 465. 
PCIJ, Ser. D, No.2, 45, (minute of inaugural meeting), Annex 36, p. 326. 
110 Minutes of PCIJ inaugural meeting of 15 February 1922, Annex 33, Speech of Sir Eric Drummond, League 
Secretary-General. Ser. D, No.2, 45 (minutes), Annex 33, p. 320. 
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political bodies. Although it derives its authority from the League, its judgments are 
in no way subject to advice or revision by the Councilor Assembly. 
A closer look at the practice of the PCIJ discloses that the Court functioned as part of the 
League system, although the Court's Statute did not formally constitute an "integral part" of 
the League Covenant. The Court's concern to cooperate with the League Council manifested 
itself through the Court's attitude towards the Council when the request was deemed 
urgent. III In more than one case the Court declared its readiness to accelerate its procedures 
whenever the Council needed the Court's opinion.1l2 
By contrast, the organic connection between the IC] and the UN is much clearer. 
Article 92 of the UN Charter states that the Court is the "principal judicial organ" of the UN 
and that the Statute is an "integral part" of the Charter. This means that all Members of the 
UN are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the IC], as further confirmed by Article 93 of the 
Charter. 1l3 Moreover, the Charter has extended accessibility to the Court and made it 
possible for authorised organs, other than the General Assembly, Security Council and the 
UN specialised agencies, to request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the 
scope of their activities, I 14 thereby allowing the Court a broader participation in the activities 
of the UN. These facts lead to the conclusion that the IC] is a new Court and that it "operates 
in a political and legal environment entirely different from that of the Permanent Court.,,115 
111 Keith, supra note 9, p. 144. 
112 For instance by invoking extraordinary sessions or by fixing the time limit and gave the request priority over 
a matter which preceded it on the list. For example this happened in the case of Polish War Vessels in the Port 
or; Danzig. See Keith, ibid. 
13 Article 93 provides: (1) "All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. (2) A state which is not a Member ofthe United Nations may become a party to 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council". 
114 See the full text of Article 96(2) of the Charter below. 
liS Rosenne, supra note 52, p. 106. 
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As for the Statute being an "integral part" of the Charter, the Charter and the Statute 
should be read together as one instrument without implying that the Statute is subordinate to 
the Charter. 116 First, the provisions of the Statute are to be interpreted in the light of the 
Charter117 and, secondly, the provisions of the Charter which are of general applicability to 
the Organisation as a whole, as well as to its individual organs, are applicable to the Court.llS 
Thirdly, and most, importantly, this could be extended to permitting the Court "to extract 
from the Charter all that it can in order to strengthen itself for its role in international life. 119 
It is clear that the position of the PCIJ in the League of Nations was different from that 
of the IC] in the UN. As the IC] is the main judicial organ of the UN, this new status of the 
IC] has largely affected the way in which the IC] has exercised its advisory jurisdiction. This 
new status has enabled the Court to embrace the principle that, as a principal organ of the 
UN, giving an advisory opinion represents its participation in the work of the Organisation, 
as will become clearer throughout the study. 
6. The Advisory Function of the IeJ: How Much is it Changing? 
It is an undisputed fact that the advisory function of the IC] is based to large extent on the 
experience of its predecessor, the PCIJ, as will be made clear in the following pages. 
6.1 The Drafting Stage 
The uncertainty and scepticism which surrounded the adoption of the advisory function of 
the PCU had to some degree diminished by the time the provisions of the Charter and the 
Statute relating to advisory opinions were drafted. 120 Article 96 of the Charter has been, to 
116 R 'b'd osenne,l 1 ,p. 109. 
117 Simma, Bruno, et a/., (eds.) The Charter of the United Nation: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 
Vol. 2, 2002, p. 1147. 
118 Rosenne, supra note 52, p. 109. 
119 Ibid, p. 110. 
120 Even though, some of the members of the Inter -Allied Committee were inclined to think that the Court's 
jurisdiction to give advisory opinions was "anomalous and ought to be abolished" it was argued that the 
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some extent, built on the League's experience with the advisory function. Indeed, the efforts 
at the San Francisco Conference centred primarily on ways and means of enhancing the 
usefulness of this function. 121 Even the US, despite its previous attitude towards the advisory 
opinions of the pcn, consented to such a function being entrusted to the new Court. 
The advisory function of the ICJ is broadly similar to that of the pcn, and the ICJ 
Statute is based on the Statute of the pcn. This is confirmed in Article 92 of the UN Charter 
which provides "[ilt shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based 
upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice .... "The ICJ, therefore, has 
generally been regarded as a continuation of its predecessor. 122 However, the UN Charter 
departed from Article 14 of the Covenant by making the Court one of "the principal organs 
of the United Nations",123 and more specifically "the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations,,:24 Although this change introduced by the Charter did not relate specifically to the 
advisory function, it has influenced the Court's view of its advisory role. 125 
Prior to the San Francisco Conference, many proposals were made and committees 
charged with preparing drafts for consideration by the Conference. 126 Earlier, the Informal 
Inter-Allied Committee on the future of the pcn,127 held in London in 1943, adopted a 
existence of this function tended to encourage using the court as an instrument to settle, political issues. See 
r:ara. 65 of the Report of the Informal Inter -Allied Committee on the Future of the PCIJ, 39 AJIL, 1945, p. 20. 
21 This was exemplified by extending the number of bodies authorised to request an advisory opinion. 
122 Judge Read observed in his dissenting opinion in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case that: "[tJhe 
provisions of Article 92 of the Charter discloses the intention of the United Nations that continuity should be 
maintained between the Permanent Court of International Justice and this Court. There can be no doubt that the 
United Nations intended continuity in jurisprudence, as well as in less important matters." See Diss. Op. of 
Judge Read, ICJ Rep., 1950, pp. 232-233. 
123 See Article 7 of the UN Charter. 
124 See Article 92 of the UN Charter. 
125 Pomerance, supra note 26, p. 25. 
126 The most important proposals were formulated by the Informal Inter Allied Committee, The Dumbarton 
Oaks and Washington Committee of Jurists. 
127 The Inter Allied Committee commenced its deliberations in 1943 to consider "the question of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice". Early in 1943, the UK invited a number of experts to London to constitute an 
informal Inter-Allied Committee to examine the matter. This Committee, under the chairmanship of Sir William 
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liberal approach in considering the usefulness of the advisory function. The majority believed 
that this function ought to be retained and even extended,128 while at the same time proposing 
safeguards to prevent misuse.129 Except for authorising States to request advisory opinions of 
the Court, the recommendations of the Inter Allied Committee were adopted at San 
Francisco. In effect, this adoption rejected the Dumbarton Oaks proposals that the right to 
request advisory opinions should be limited to the Security Council. In the end, the 
Conference resolved that both the General Assembly and the Security Council may request 
advisory opinions on any legal question as well as other UN organs and specialised agencies 
through authorisation by the Assembly. 
It was decided also, to insert a new paragraph into Article 65 of the Statute, making 
explicit provision for the Court to give an advisory opinion at the request of certain bodies. 
Thus Article 96 of the UN Charter states: 
(1) The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International 
Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. 
(2) Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any 
time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory 
opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their 
activities. 
Malkin held 19 meetings, which were attended by jurists from 11 countries. In its report, which was published 
on 10 February 1944, it recommended that the Statute of any new international court should be based on that of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice; that advisory jurisdiction should be retained in the case of the new 
Court; that acceptance of the jurisdiction of the new Court should not be compulsory; and that the Court should 
have no jurisdiction to deal with essentially political matters. See Report of the Informal Inter-Allied 
Committee, supra note 120, pp. 1-42. 
128 In its report the Committee, by way of replying to the objections raised by some of the members about the 
compatibility of this function with the proper function of a court of law, stated that" it is not correct to say that 
the jurisdiction of an 'advisory' nature is inconsistent with the proper function of a court of law." See para. 66 
of the Report, supra note 120, p. 21. 
129 For instance, the questions referred to the Court were not to be "of a merely general or abstract character", 
but were to "relate to some definite issue and circumstance," the Court was not to be used "for making 
pronouncements on political issues, or in a semi-legislative capacity." Moreover, in order to avoid a species of 
indirect compulsory jurisdiction and to ensure that the Court proceeded on "an agreed basis of fact", Ex parte 
should not be permitted. On the whole, the Committee had found it desirable to leave the necessary control to 
be exercised by the Court itself. See Report of Inter - Allied Committee, supra note 120, paras. 69-75. 
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This was incorporated into Article 65 of the ICJ Statute as "[t]he Court may give an advisory 
opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorised by or in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request." The following 
pages go on to discuss the drafting stage of the provisions pertaining to advisory opinions. 
6.1.1 The Rights of the General Assembly and the Security Council to Request an 
Advisory Opinion 
It was mentioned above that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would have given the Security 
Council the exclusive right to request advisory opinions. Chapter VIII of Section A, 
paragraph 6 of the proposals stated: 130 
Justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the international court of justice. 
The Security Council should be empowered to refer to the court, for advice, legal 
questions connected with other disputes. 
Schwebel maintains that, this "regressive approach" of confining the right to request advisory 
opinion to the Security Council, reflected the preoccupation of the United States with the 
exclusive role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and 
security.l3l Despite this, the Washington Committee of Jurists, which was convened prior to 
the opening of the San Francisco Conference and was charged with preparing a draft of the 
Court's Statute for the consideration of the Conference132 proposed that, the General 
130 UNCIO, Vol. 14. It is to be noted that the word '~usticiable" had been recognized at the San Francisco 
Conference, in Committee 11112, it was suggested that the word "legal" rather than" justiciable" described more 
accurate the category of disputes which was in question. UNCIO, 12, summary Report of eleventh Meeting of 
Committee 11112, Document, 674, 11112/24, p. 97. 
131 Schwebel, Stephen, "Was the Capacity to Request an Advisory Opinion Wider in the Permanent Court of 
International Justice than it is in the International Court of Justice" in: Schwebel, Stephen, Justice in 
International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 55. 
\32 This Committee, under the chairmanship ofG. H. Hackworth (United States), was entrusted with the 
preparation of a draft Statute for the future International Court of Justice, for submission to the San Francisco 
Conference. The draft Statute prepared by the Committee was based on the Statute of the PCU. The Committee 
nevertheless left a number of questions open which it felt should be decided by the San Francisco Conference 
such as should a new court be created; in what form should the court's mission as the principal judicial organ of 
the United Nations be stated; should the court's jurisdiction be compulsory and, if so, to what extent; and how 
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Assembly, as well as the Security Council, should have the right to request advisory 
opinions. 133 At San Francisco, the delegates supported the view that the General Assembly as 
well as Security Council should have the right to ask the Court for an advisory opinion. 134 
The representative of China argued that, in view of the relationship of the Assembly to the 
Economic and Social Council and the former's function of co-ordinating the policies of the 
specialised agencies, the Assembly could be called upon to consider juridical questions.135 
The San Francisco Conference approved the recommendations of the Committee of 
Jurists and extended to the General Assembly the right to request advisory opinions. It was 
also agreed, as mentioned above, to add to the UN Charter the provisions of Article 96(2), 
and a new paragraph to Article 65 of the Statute granting the Court the right to give advisory 
. . . h' d 136 OpInIOnS to certam aut OrIse organs. 
The provisions as adopted have given both the General Assembly and the Security 
Council the right to ask for an advisory opinion "on any legal question", while paragraph 2 of 
Article 96 permits the General Assembly to authorise other organs of the UN and specialised 
agencies to request an advisory opinion on a legal question arising within the scope of their 
activities. Paragraph 2 of Article 96 of the UN Charter, as finally adopted "was an 
innovation, having no counterpart in the League Covenant.,,137 Moreover, the San Francisco 
should the judges be elected. Available at: 
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformationlibbookIBbookframepage.htm. (accessed 24 October 2004). 
133 Despite the earlier attitude of the US at Dumbarton Oaks, in confining the right to request advisory opinion 
only to the Security Council, in the Committee of Jurists, the Chairman of the Committee said that the US did 
not object to the authorization of the Assembly. See UNCIO, vol. 14, The United Nations Committee of Jurists, 
45, 0/34, p. 178. 
134 The Delegations of Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, and many other Members. See UNCIO, 14, 
The United Nations Committee of Jurists, 45, G/34, pp. 178-179. 
\35 Ibid, p. 177. 
:~~ For the full texts of those Articles see Section 6.1 above. 
Pomerance, supra note 26, p. 33. 
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Conference authorised UN specialised agencies to seek advisory opinions although this was 
restricted to intergovernmental agencies brought into relationship with the UN. 138 
Another major difference between Article 14 of the Covenant and Article 96 of the 
Charter concerns the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae in its advisory capacity. In San 
Francisco, the term "any legal question" was introduced instead of the former term, "any 
dispute or question". This change has raised a number of questions which will be discussed 
in the following Chapter.139 
6.1.2 Proposals that were not adopted 
It is pertinent before ending this discussion to refer to some proposals put forward during the 
drafting stages which were not adopted. These were geared towards authorising States and 
international organisations to request advisory opinions. 
The question of empowering States to request advisory opinions arose during the 
League's era. 140 At San Francisco it was again proposed that States should be authorised to 
request advisory opinions of the Court directly. Here, the UK representative pointed out that 
disputes which might otherwise lead to litigation could be prevented if States, by agreement 
among themselves, obtained the Court's advice on their position in the matters involve 
dispute at an early stage. 141 The Belgian representative put forward a most provocative 
proposal to enable individual States to request advisory opinions, upon a recommendation or 
138 UNCIO, vol. 9, 161-162. See also UNCIO, vol. 13, p. 298. For details see discussion in Chapter Two, infra 
139 See Chapter Two, infra. . 
140 While drafting Article 36 of the PCIJ Statute, the representative of Argentina proposed that such a power 
should be given to States. Moreover, there was another proposal by the International Labour Organization to the 
same effect. Those proposals were rejected by the subcommittee because such proposals "would involve a 
considera~le extension of the duties of the members of the Court and might lead to consequences difficult to 
f4~Iculate In advance." See Records of the First Assembly, Meeting of the Committees, I, p. 534. 
UNCIO, vol. 14, p. 319. 
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decision of the Security Council, on matters which affected their essential rights. 142 These 
proposals were rejected on the grounds that the Court should not be treated as a general 
adviser to Member States and that it should not become overloaded with work. In addition, 
States could get the Court's advice indirectly through the General Assembly. 143 This indirect 
access to the Court had many applications in the practice of the two CourtS. I44 
The majority of delegates at San Francisco agreed that only States could be parties to a 
contentious case before the Court. 145 International organisations were not given locus standi 
as parties before the Court, neither in the League nor in the UN eras. Therefore, the only 
access to the Court for international organisations has been through the medium of advisory 
opinions. The authorisation of international organisations was hardly in question at San 
Francisco. However, the point under consideration was the form of authorisation, whether 
direct or indirect. In the Committee of Jurists, the UK representative argued that international 
organisations should be given direct access to the Court.146 On the other hand, some members 
favoured indirect access. 147 Eventually, the Committee of Jurists did not adopt the UK 
142 UNCIO, 12, p. 48. This proposal was withdrawn on the grounds that, if adopted it would weaken the 
authority of the Security Council and cause delay when action was needed. See ibid, p. 49. 
143 Ibid, p. 181. See also, Keith, supra note 9, p. 23. 
144 For instance, the advisory opinion of the PCIJ in the Nationality Decrees issued in Tunisia and Morocco 
Case. PCIJ, Ser. B, No.4, 1923. In the present Court, The Applications for Review of Judgment No. 2730f the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case, ICI Rep., 1982, p. 325. In this latter case the application was 
p,resented by the US for review of an Administrative Tribunal judgment. 
45 UNCIO, 13, p. 282. This became paragraph (1) of Article 34 of the ICI Statute, which provides "only states 
may be parties in cases before the Court." This principle has its roots in Article 34 of the Statute of the PCIJ 
which provided that "only States or Members of the league of Nations may be parties in cases before the 
Court". However, two paragraphs were added to Article 34 of the ICI's Statute on the recommendation of the 
Washington Committee of Iurists, namely, paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 34. The second paragraph of 
Article 34 of the new Statute provides that "[t]he Court, subject to and in conformity with its Rules, may request 
of public international organizations information relevant to cases before it, and shall receive such information 
presented by such organizations on their own initiative." Paragraph (3) provides "[w]henever the construction 
of the constituent instrument of a public international organization or of an international convention adopted 
thereunder is in question in a case before the Court, the Registrar shall so notify the public international 
organization concerned and shall communicate to it copies of all the written proceedings." 
146 UNCIO, 14, p. 319. See also, by the same token, the views of the representatives of Venezuela and France, 
ibid, pp. 179-180. 
147 See, for instance, the view of the Australian representative, ibid, p. 182. 
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proposal because the question of allowing international organisations the right to request an 
advisory opinion was a policy matter best left to the San Francisco Conference to decide. 
While considering the matter at San Francisco, Committee IV/I unanimously adopted the UK 
proposals148 which stated "[s]uch other organs of the Organization, and such specialized 
agencies brought into relationship with it, as may at any time be authorised thereto by the 
General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on questions of 
constitutional or juridical character arising within the scope of their activities.,,149 
International organisations other than UN organs and UN specialised agencies were thus 
denied the right to request advisory opinions. 
148 UNCIO, 13, p. 233. 
149 UNCIO, 13, p. 513. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
In the early years of the League of Nations the concept of an "advisory opinion" was a 
"controversial innovation" because jurists could not agree as to whether it was proper for a 
court of law to render advisory opinions. ISO As a consequence of some of the early doubts 
about the judicial character of advisory opinions, the PCU was inclined to interpret its 
jurisdiction narrowly, refusing to give an advisory opinion on a legal dispute actually 
pending between two or more States without the consent of the States concerned. lSI The 
drafting stage of the Covenant and the Statute indicate that the prime concern of the drafters 
was to protect the judicial character of the Court. This was exemplified by the proposals put 
forward during the drafting of the original Statute to distinguish between a request related to 
a "dispute" and one related to a "question".152 
The concept of advisory opinions has become well established. The advisory function 
of the IC] is largely based on that of its predecessor and on the experience of the League of 
Nations. Few alterations were introduced. The most important of these is paragraph 2 of 
Article 96 of the UN Charter which extends the range of organs empowered to seek the 
Court's opinion. More drastic alterations were introduced by Article 92, pursuant to which 
the Court was established as the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations". This 
innovation has made the Court more inclined to participate in the work of the UN. In the final 
analysis, the advisory function is now recognised and accepted in international law, and its 
existence is no longer in question. 
ISO Rosenne, supra note 52, p. 107. 
lSI The principle of Eastren Carelia For further details on this principle, see Section 2.1.2 in Chapter Four, 
:g[rpa. th d "'t' fth .. IS' d" or e ra1' Ing 0 e onglna tatute In 1920, see IscussJOn above. 
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Chapter Two 
The Advisory Jurisdiction of the ICJ: Compliance with Requests and 
the Court's Discretion in Giving Advisory Opinions 
1. Introduction 
As noted in Chapter One, the ICJ may provide advisory opinions to certain UN organs and 
agencies upon their request. This jurisdiction was primarily designed to assist UN organs and 
agencies in deciding on the course of action that they should follow. When the Court is 
seised of a request for an advisory opinion, it must first determine whether the request is 
within its jurisdiction, both ratione personae and ratione materiae. In other words, the 
Court's first concern as to determine the standing of the organ requesting the opinion and the 
subject matter of the requested opinion. 
Having established its jurisdiction, the Court can then consider its 'discretionary power' 
to render or to refrain from rendering the requested opinion. The Court is not bound to give 
an advisory opinion even if the requesting organ is acting fully intra vires in requesting the 
question. 1 However, the Court's case law demonstrates that it will not refuse a request unless 
there are 'compelling reasons' to do so. Before discussing these issues in some detail, it will 
be pertinent to describe briefly the ICJ's jurisdiction in general, and the difference between 
jurisdiction and competence. 
1 Bowett, Derek W., "The Court's Role in Relation to International Organizations" in: Lowc,Vaughan & 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in I/onour of Sir Robert 
Jennings, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1996, p. 186. 
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2. The Jurisdiction of the IeJ 
In its broadest sense the Court's jurisdiction refers to its power "to do justice between the 
litigating States, to decide the case before it with final and binding force on those States.,,2 
The IC] enjoys two different types of jurisdiction. On the one hand, it possesses a 
contentious jurisdiction to decide disputes between States in accordance with Article 36( 1) of 
the Statute.3 The exercise of this jurisdiction depends on the consent of the States parties to 
the dispute and is known as 'consensual jurisdiction. ,4 Once consent has been given, the 
Court is under a duty to fulfil its judicial function unless a gap in International Law forces it 
to make a finding of non liquet.s Contentious cases produce judgments binding on the parties 
to the case. 
On the other hand, the Court has another type of jurisdiction which permits it to give an 
advisory opinion upon a request by certain international organisations. This latter jurisdiction 
is set out in Article 65(1) of the IC] Statute, which is parallel to Article 96 of the UN 
Charter.6 Rosenne pointed out that Article 65 is incomplete as it indicates just two elements 
of the advisory jurisdiction, namely that the request must be made by a duly authorised organ 
(ratione personae), and that the question posed to the Court for an opinion must be a 'legal 
question.' However, the Ie] Statute and even the UN Charter pass in silence over the third 
element, namely the addressee of the opinion.7 Rosenne has argued that this silence over the 
2 Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice oltlle I"ternational Court, 1920-1996, The Hague; London: 
Martinus NijnhoffPublishers, 1997, p. 536. 
3 Article 36(1) provides: "[tlhe jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all 
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties or conventions in force." 
4 Rosenne, supra note 2, pp. 563-603. 
~ Bedjaoui, Mohammed, "Expediency in the Decisions of the International Court of Justice", 71 BYIL, 2000, 
f' 11. 
For the full text of both Articlcs see Chapter Onc, supra. 
7 Both Articles 96 of the Charter and 65 of the Statute use the verb 'give' in a general way, which is 
theoretically open to several interpretations. Rosenne, sllpra note 2, pp. 988-989. 
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third element of jurisdiction entitles the Court "to act independently of any formal expression 
of consent on the part of States individualIy."g 
2.1 Distinction between Jurisdiction and Competence 
The interchangeable and inconsistent use of the terms 'jurisdiction' and 'competence' when 
referring to the Court's power to give advisory opinions has caused some confusion.9 
Rosenne has pointed out that the Statute has used the term "jurisdiction" mostly in a 
contentious context while the term 'competence' is more frequently found in advisory 
opinions with an occasional use of the term 'jurisdiction.' 10 Moreover, he states that the 
difference between the two terms is not of major importance, maintaining that 'jurisdiction' 
is a stricter concept and relates to the Court's capacity to decide cases before it with binding 
force while 'competence' includes both jurisdiction and elements of propriety when the 
Court is exercising its function. I I 
At any rate, the Court's practice does not provide a definite answer to the above 
question and it appears that the Court does not distinguish between the two terms. 12 Caution 
must be taken here as the risk of differentiating between the Court's powers in advisory and 
contentious cases might lead to the suggestion that the advisory function is less judicia1. 13 
Therefore, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, amongst others, has suggested that the term 'jurisdiction' 
should preferably be used for both, contentious and advisory functions, while 'competence' 
should be used only when referring to the capacity of an organ to request an opinion.14 
8 Rosenne, supra note 2, p. 989. This will be discussed in dctail in Chapter Four, infra. 
9 Paratap, Dharma, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Oxford: Clarcndon Press, 
1972, p. 113. 
lOR osenne, supra note 2, p. 536. 
II Ibid. 
:~ Paratap, supra note 9, pp. 114-115. 
Ibid, p. 115. 
14 Fitzmaurice, Gerald, "The Law and Procedurc of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Questions of 
Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedurc", 43 BYIL, 1958, p. 8-9; Pratap, supra nole 9, p. 115. 
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2.2 The Court's competence de la competence15 
It is a generally accepted rule that courts are competent to decide on their own competence.16 
The IC] in the exercise of the principle of competence de la competence may determine 
whether it has jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion or a judgement in a contentious case. 
This principle is embodied in Article 36(6) of the Court's Statute which provides that "in the 
event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court.,,17 As far as the advisory function is concerned, the Court's power to 
decide upon its advisory jurisdiction is conferred by Article 68 of the Court's Statute which 
provides that the Court shall be guided in advisory cases by the Statute's provisions which 
apply in contentious proceedings. 
In its jurisprudence the Court has examined its own jurisdiction proprio motu, even if 
no objections were raised by interested parties. In the Judgments of the Administrative 
Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints made against UNESCO Case,IS none of the interested 
parties challenged the Court's jurisdiction. Yet, the Court considered at the outset its right to 
IS This principle means the power of the Court to decide on its own jurisdiction. The origins of the principle can 
be traced back to the 1794 Jay Treaty; the 1797 Betsy Case and the 1872 Alabama Case. See Rosenne, supra 
note 2, pp. 846-862; Shihata, Ibrahim, The Power of the International Court to Determine its Own Jurisdictioll, 
The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965, pp. 11-24. 
16 Shihata, ibid. 
17 In the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), the Court stated that "[slince the Alabama case, it has 
been generally recognized, following the earlier precedents, thut, in the absence of any agreement to the 
contrary, an international tribunal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret 
for this purpose the instruments which govern that jurisdiction. See IC] Rep., 1953, p. 119. 
18 Hereinafter cited as: "the ILD Administrative Tribunal Case", IC] Rep., 1956, p. 77. 
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exercise jurisdiction in this case ex officio and held that: 19 
The Court will consider at the outset whether it should comply with the request for an 
opinion. The question put to the Court is a legal question. It arose within the scope of 
the activities of UNESCO when the Executive Board had to examine the measures to be 
taken as a result of the four judgments. The answer given to it will affect the result of 
the challenged raised by the Executive Board with regard to these judgments. In 
submitting the request for an opinion the Executive Board was seeking a clarification of 
the legal aspects of a matter with which it was dealing. 
Based on the above, it seems that the Court has the power to decide upon its own jurisdiction, 
its competence de la competence, and, if it finds that it has no jurisdiction because of the 
absence of the required elements, namely jurisdiction ratione personae or jurisdiction ratione 
materiae, it may refrain from giving the requested opinion. 
In the following pages the conditions which are required to establish the Court's 
jurisdiction in advisory cases will be examined to illustrate the attitude of the Court towards 
challenges to its jurisdiction. In general terms the Court, when determining its own 
jurisdiction in advisory cases, has adopted a liberal approach when it has received a request 
from the political organs of the UN. Yet, the Court has been more restrictive and cautious 
when it has received requests for advisory opinions from specialised agencies. In the latter 
cases, the Court has adopted a narrow interpretation of the purposes and functions of the 
requesting agencies and seems to not have accorded them discretion comparable to that 
which it has accorded to the political organs.20 
19 Ibid. p. 84. 
20 See discussion in Section ii below. 
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3. The Elements of Jurisdiction to Give an Advisory Opinion 
The ICJ, in accordance with Articles 96 of the UN Charter and 65 of the Court's Statute, may 
give an advisory opinion upon requests submitted to it by the General Assembly, Security 
Council and by other UN organs and specialised agencies authorised by the General 
Assembly.21 By contrast the PCIJ could only respond to requests for advisory opinions on 
'disputes' or 'questions' referred by the Councilor the Assembly of the League of Nations.22 
As mentioned above, there are at least two legal conditions to be met before requesting 
an advisory opinion.23 The first is that the request must emanate from a body authorised by or 
under Article 96 of the Charter i.e. jurisdiction ratione personae. The second is that the 
advisory opinion requested must be related to a 'legal question' within the meaning of the 
UN Charter and the ICJ's Statute, i.e. jurisdiction ratione materiae. In this respect the Court 
in its advisory opinion of July 2004, in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory24 cited its findings in the Application for Review of 
Judgement No. 273 of tile United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case, held that: 25 
It is ... a precondition of the Court's competence that the advisory opinion be 
requested by an organ duly authorized to seek it under the Charter, that it be requested 
on a legal question, and that, except in the case of the General Assembly or the Security 
Council, that question should be one arising within the scope of the activities of the 
requesting organ. 
Moreover, the Court in its advisory opinion in the 1996 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear 
21 For the full texts of Articles 96 of the Charter and 65 of the Statute, see Section 6.1 in Chapter One, supra. 
22 See Article 14 of the League Covenant in Chapter One, supra. 
23 In the view of some scholars there is another condition relating to the consent of the parties to a dispute. This 
condition is not expressly emhodied neither in the Charter nor the Statute of the IC]. See Section 2.1 in Chapter 
Four, infra. 
24 Hereinafter cited as: "the Wall Case", available at: 
http://www.icicij.org/icjwww/idockct/imwp/imwpframe.htm. ( Accessed 21 October 2004). 
25 IC] Rep., 1982. para. 21. pp. 333-334. 
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Weapons Case stated that: 26 
For the Court to be competent to give an advisory opinion, it is thus necessary at the 
outset for the body requesting the opinion to be "authorized by or in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request." The Charter provides in 
Article 96, paragraph 1, that: "The General Assembly or the Security Council may 
request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal 
question 
In the 1975 Western Sahara Case the Court explained that legal questions are "framed in 
terms of law and rais[ing] problems of intemationallaw ... are by their very nature 
susceptible of a reply based on law ... [and] appear ... to be questions of a legal character.,,27 
The absence of either of the aforementioned conditions may lead the Court to decline to 
render an advisory opinion. On the other hand, it may be inferred from Article 65 of the 
Court's Statute which provides that the Court "may give" advisory opinions, that the Court 
has 'discretion' to give or to refrain from giving an opinion requested even when the 
aforementioned prerequisites are satisfied. 
3.1 Jurisdiction ratione personae 
The General Assembly and the Security Council have an 'original' right under Article 96(1) 
of the UN Charter to request an advisory opinion on 'any legal question', while other UN 
organs and specialised agencies have a 'derivative' right that may be conferred by the 
General Assembly.28 The following pages shed light on those organs authorised by or in 
accordance with the Charter to request advisory opinions and on the Court's attitude towards 
objections made to the competence of the requesting organs. 
26 IC] Rep., 1996, para. II, p. 232. 
27 Cited in the IC] Rep., 1996, para. 13, p. 233. 
28 See Bowell, Derek W., The Law of IIItcrnatiollallll.l'titutiolls, London: Stevens and Sons, 1982, p. 277; Sands, 
Philippe & Klien, Pierre, Bowett's Law of Illternlltiollalillstitlltions, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2001, p. 364. 
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3.1.1 Organs with an 'Original Right' to Request Advisory Opinions: The General 
Assembly and the Security Council 
Article 96(1) of the UN Charter authorises the General Assembly and the Security Council to 
request advisory opinions on any 'legal question. ,29 This Article has prompted international 
lawyers to debate the intended meaning of the term 'any legal question.' Some maintain that 
both organs have an absolute right to request an advisory opinion 'on any legal question' 
without limits. Judge Schwebel has argued that the term 'any legal question' is a broad term 
which "would entitle the General Assembly to serve as a conduit (though a conditional rather 
than a "mere" conduit) for requests to the Court from national courts to answer international 
legal questions arising in the Course of national judicial proceedings.,,3o 
This view is based on the permissive wording of paragraph 1 of Article 96 which 
provides that both organs may request advisory opinions on 'any legal question.' This 
reading of the term is enhanced by paragraph 2 of Article 96 which imposes restrictions on 
other UN organs and specialised agencies by limiting the legal question to those that are 
within the organ's range of activities. Rosenne rejects such views and argues that "[n]o 
organ, including the General Assembly and the Security Council, can decide to request an 
advisory opinion except within the scope of its activities.,,31 Moreover, Kelsen argued that: 32 
The determination of any organ's jurisdiction implies the norm not to act beyond the 
scope of its activity as determined by the legal instrument instituting the organ. It is not 
very likely that it was intended to enlarge, by Article 96, paragraph I, the scope of the 
activity of the General Assembly and the Security Council determined by other articles 
of the Charter. lIenee, the words "arising within the scope of their activities" in 
paragraph 2 of Article 96 are redundant. 
29 Por the fulltcxt of Article 96 of the UN Chartcr see Chapter One, supra. 
30 Schwebel, Stephen, "Relations between the Internationul Court of Justice and the United Nations" in: Justice 
in International Law: Selected Writings of Stephen M. Schwebel, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1994, 
~p. 18·19. 
I Rosenne, Shubtai. The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice. Dordrecht; Lancaster: Martinus 
Niijhoff. 1985, p. 660. 
n Kelsen, Hans, The law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems, London: 
Steven and Sons Ltd, 1951, p. 546. 
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Judge Higgins more recently observed that the General Assembly practice in regard to the 
Alvarez-Machain Case indicates that even the General Assembly and the Security Council 
cannot decide to request an advisory opinion unless the request relates to their activities. 
Higgins emphasised that although the phrase 'any legal question' may be wider than the 
formulation in Article 96(2), it must at least refer to a legal question under consideration 
within the UN.33 
One can conclude that Article 12(1) of the Charter restricts the General Assembly's 
power to ask for an advisory opinion.34 It could also be argued that the broad scope of the 
term 'any legal question' may be construed to reflect the broad competence of the General 
Assembly and the Security Council. 3S 
In its jurisprudence the Court has adopted a wide interpretation of the powers and 
activities of the political organs of the UN.36 It has been argued in several cases that the 
requesting organ lacked competence to seek an advisory opinion as it acted ultra vires in 
making the request, claming powers that it did not possess.37 In the Wall Advisory Opinion, 
33 In this case most of the General Assembly's Latin American members, in addition to Spain, Portugal and Iran 
proposed a drart resolution to ask the ICI for an advisory opinion in regard to the findings of the Supreme Court 
of the US that the abduction of Mr. Alvarez from Mexico, and his transfer to the US to stand trial, did not 
violate the extradition treaty between Mexico and the US and as a consequence render the US courts without 
jurisdiction. It should be noted thlltthis draft resolution was formulated in abstract terms avoiding rererence to 
Mr. Alvarez and the dispute between Mexico and the US. On the recommendations of the Sixth Committee this 
drart resolution was turned down. See Higgins, Rosalyn, "A comment on the current health of Advisory 
Opinions", in: Lowe,Vaughan & Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (cds.), Fifty Years of the IIIIl'rnllliona/ Court of Justice: 
Essays in honour of Sir Robert Jennings, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1996, p. 580. 
34 This Article provides: "[w]hile the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the 
functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with 
regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." 
3~ The powers of the General Assembly are broadly stuteJ in chapter IV of the UN Charter and include the Eower to "discuss any question or uny matter within the scope of the present Churter." 
II See Section 5 in Chapter Five, infra. In the Reservations Case the Court stated that Article 96 of the Charter 
conferred upon the General Assembly and the Security Council in general terms the "right" to request the Court 
to give an advisory opinion on any legal question. ICI Rep., 1951, p. 20. 
37 Ciobanu observed that difficulties in raising the ultra vires objection to the jurisdiction of UN political organs 
are due to the fact that under the law of the UN, these organs are not, in principle, required to state the reasons 
for their resolutions. See Ciobanu, Dan, Preliminary Objections Related to the Jurisdiction of tire United 
Nations Political Organs, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975, p. 73. 
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Israel contended that due to the active engagement of the Security Council with the 
Palestinian question, the General Assembly had acted ultra vires under the Charter when it 
requested this advisory opinion because the request was in breach of Article 12( 1) of the 
Charter. 38 
In reply the Court stated that a request for an advisory opinion was not in itself a 
'recommendation' by the General Assembly "with regard to [a] dispute or situation" within 
the meaning of Article 12.39 However, the Court after examining Article 12 and relevant 
Articles such as Article 24 of the Charter, 40 together with the practice of the General 
Assembly and Security Council 4t with regard to interpreting and applying Article 12, 
concluded that the General Assembly in requesting that advisory opinion "did not contravene 
the provisions of Article 12, paragraph, I, of the Charter.,,42 
In submissions to the Court in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case,43 which 
concerned the interpretation of the 1947 peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, 
it was contended that:44 
[T]he Request for an Opinion was an action ultra vires on the part of the General 
Assembly because, in dealing with the question of the observance of human rights and 
38 The question of the General Assembly was "[w]hat arc the legul consequences arising from the construction 
of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Pulestiniun Territory, including in and 
around East Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretury-General, considering the rules and principles 
of international law, including the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and 
General Assembly resolutions'!" 
39 See para. 25 of the Court's opinion, SlIpra note 24. 
40 Article 24 of the Charter provides that the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security." Therefore, the Court held that Article 24 refers to a primary, but not 
necessarily exclusive, competence. Thus the Court emphasised that the General Assembly does have the power, 
inter alia, under Article 14 of the Charter, to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment" of various 
situations. See Expenses Case. ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 163. 
41 The Court concluded that. "both the General Assembly and the Security Council initiully interpreted and 
applied Article 12 to the effect thut the Assembly could not make a recommendation on a question concerning 
the maintenance of international pettce and security while the mailer remained on the Council's agenda". See 
rara. 27 of the Opinion, slIpra note 24. 
2 See paras. 26-28 of the Wall Opinion. 
43 Hereinafter cited as: "the Peace Treaties Case", IeJ Rep., 1950, p. 65. 
44 Ibid, p. 70. 
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fundamental freedoms in the [concerned States], it was "interfering" or "intervening" in 
matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. 
The Court rejected this argument because the object of the request was directed at obtaining 
from the Court a legal clarification of the applicability of the procedure for dispute settlement 
provided for in the Peace Treaties. This purpose did not constitute a question within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a State, but was a question of International Law which lay within the 
Court's jurisdiction.4s 
The 1962 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the 
Charter) Case,46 arose out of the refusal of some member States, most notably the former 
Soviet Union and France, to pay their share of the costs of the UN Emergency Forces in the 
Middle East (UNEF) and the UN Force in the Congo (ONUC).47 The contesting States' view 
was that peace-keeping operations should only be taken under the exclusive powers of the 
Security Council. Therefore, the General Assembly decision to set up the peace-keeping 
operations was ultra vires. To this objection the Court stated that:48 
[W]hen the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization. 
If it is agreed that the action in question is within the scope of the functions of the 
Organization but it is alleged that it has been initiated or carried out in a manner not in 
conformity with the division of functions among the several organs which the Charter 
prescribes, one moves to the internal plane, to the internal structure of the Organization. 
If the action was taken by the wrong organ, it was irregular as a matter of that internal 
structure, but this would not necessarily mean that the expense incurred was not an 
expense of the Organization. Both national and international law contemplate cases in 
which the body corporate or politic may be bound, as to third parties, by an ultra vires 
act of an agent. 
4~ IC] Rcp., 1950, pp. 70-71. 
4611ercinafter cited as: "the Expe1lses Case", IC] Rep., 1962, p. 151. 
47 The Soviet Union declined to pay its share to UNEF and to the ONUC, while France declined to contribute to 
the lutter. The UNEF was established by the General Assembly in 1956. See Res. 1000 (ES-l) of 5 November 
1956 and 1001 (ES) of7 Novcmber 1956. As for ONUC, it was established by the Security Council in 1960. 
See SC Res. 143 of 14 July 1960; Res. 145 of22 July 1960 and lastly Res. 146 of9 August 1960. 
48 Ie] Rep., 1962, p. 168. 
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In the 1971 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
Case,49 South Africa did not contend that the Security Council had acted ultra vires.so 
However, it alleged that the Security Council resolution which requested an advisory opinion 
was invalid because two permanent members had abstained from voting on the draft 
resolution requesting an opinion.51 The Court stated that: "[a] resolution of a properly 
constituted organ of the United Nations which is passed in accordance with that organ's rules 
of procedure, and is declared by its President to have been so passed, must be presumed to 
have been validly adopted."s2 
Lastly, in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, in a positive 
response to the General Assembly's request for an advisory opinion, the Court stated that: 53 
Some States which oppose the giving of an opinion by the Court argued that the 
General Assembly and Security Council are not entitled to ask for opinions on matters 
totally unrelated to their work. They suggested that, as in the case of organs and 
agencies acting under Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and notwithstanding the 
difference in wording between that provision and paragraph 1 of the same Article, the 
General Assembly and Security Council may ask for an advisory opinion on a legal 
question only within the scope of their activities. 
In the view of the Court, it matters little whether this interpretation of Article 96, 
paragraph I, is or is not correct; in the present case, the General. Assembly has 
competence in any event to seise the Court. Indeed, Article 10 of the Charter has 
conferred upon the General Assembly a competence relating to "any questions or any 
matters" within the scope of the Charter. Article 11 has specifically provided it with a 
competence to "consider the general principles ... in the maintenance of international 
peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation 
of armaments." Lastly, according to Article 13, the General Assembly "shall initiate 
studies and make recommendations for the purpose of ... encouraging the progressive 
development of international law and its codification." 
49 Hereinafter cited as: "the Namibia Cnse", IC] Rep., 1971, p. 16. 
~o South Africa contended that General Assemhly Resolution 2145 (XXI) which terminated South Africa's 
mandate in South West Africa was ullra vires. For further details See Section 6.3.3 in Chapter Three, infra. 
51 For further details about this case see Chapters Three and Sill, infra. 
52 IC] Rep., 1971, para. 20, p. 22. 
~3 Ie] Rep., 1996, para. 11, pp. 232-233. 
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The Court's practice throughout its history bears out that allegations of ultra vires in regard 
to actions taken by the two political organs are difficult to sustain. This is due to the broad 
competence of the General Assembly and Security Council. Moreover, the Court's case law 
has established that the Court will not refuse a request for an advisory opinion unless there 
are 'compelling reasons' for it to do so. Therefore the Court applies a presumption that 
requests by the political organs for an advisory opinion as intra vires. 
On the other hand, one could argue that the Security Council and the General Assembly 
are special cases and that the IC] would not make a comparable assumption with respect to 
requests from other UN organs and specialised agencies. This argument is supported by the 
Court's findings upon the WHO's request in the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear 
Weapons Case. At any rate, as Judge Elihu Lauterpacht has observed, "although there have 
been quite a number of allegations of unlawful or ultra vires action by the Organisation, 
these allegations and the episodes in the context of which they were made, have not led to the 
formation of any general theory about the effect of such acts.,,54 
~ Lauterpacht, Elihu, "The legal Effect of Illeglll Acts of Internlltionul Organisations ", in: Cambridge Essays in 
Internatiollal Law: Essays in 1I01wur of Lord McNair, London: Stevens, 1965, p. 100; Gowllllnd-Debblls Vera, 
"The Relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council in the light of the 
Lockerbie case", 88 AlIt, 1994, p. 670; and Osicke, Ebere, "The Legal Validity of Ultra Vires Decisions of 
International Organization", 77 AllL, (1983), p. 239. 
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3.1.2 Organs with a "Derivative Right" to Request Advisory Opinions: Other UN 
Organs and the Specialised Agencies 
Paragraph 2 of Article 96 of the UN Charter expressly gives the General Assembly the power 
to authorise other organs of the UN and specialised agencies to request advisory opinions on 
'a legal question arising within the scope of their activities. ,55 As far as the nature of such an 
authorisation given by the General Assembly is concerned, one might ask if it is of a general 
or of an ad hoc character. The answer may be found in General Assembly practice. When the 
General Assembly dealt with the request of ECOSOC to be authorised to request an advisory 
opinion from the Court, the Soviet Union argued that the authorisation should have an ad hoc 
character. However, this view was rejected by the General Assembly and instead it gave 
ECOSOC authorisation of a general character.56 
One can conclude that the practice of the General Assembly on this issue suggests 
that authorisations have not been confined to a given case or a group of cases, but have been 
given either generally 'within the scope of the activities' of an organisation or agency, or as 
far as legal questions arising from a convention are concerned.57 However, it is widely 
accepted that an authorisation may be revoked unilaterally at any time by the General 
Assembly.58 
~~ For the full text of para. 2 of Article 96 see Chapter One. supra. It is ohvious from this paragraph that the 
General Assemhly is the sole organ that is empowered to give such an authorisation. In contrast. Stone argued 
that hoth the General Assemhly and the Security Council eiln give such authorisation. Sec Stone, Julius, Legal 
Collfrols of International Conflict: A Treaties Oil ,he Dynamics of Di.'putes- and War-Law. Sydney: Maitland 
Publications. 2nd Impression. 1959. p. 120. 
~CI See GA Res. 89 (I). II Deeemher 1946. 
~7 Simma. Bruno. et al .• The Charter of the Unitt'd Nations: A Commentary. Oxford University Press. vol. 2. 
2002, p. 1184. 
~M Ibid. 
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i. Authorised Organs 
As indicated above, the General Assembly in accordance with Article 96(2) of the Charter 
may authorise other UN organs and specialized agencies to request advisory opinions on 
'legal questions' arise within the scope of their activities. The term 'other organs' raises a 
question as to whether they are restricted to the other principal organs indicated in Article 
7(1) and 96(2) of the Charter, namely ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat, 
or whether it can be extended to 'subsidiary organs' established under the provisions of the 
Charter.59 One view asserts that paragraph 2 of Article 96 does not empower the subsidiary 
organs to request advisory opinions from the Court. This view is based on the argument that 
Article 65 of the IC] Statute and 96 of the UN Charter give the right to request an opinion 
solely to organs and specialised agencies which already exist and have a legal personality of 
their own.60 
The practice of the General Assembly indicates that "other organs of the United 
Nations" includes both the principal organs established in accordance with Article 7(1) and 
subsidiary organs established in accordance with Articles 7(2), 8, 22, 29 and 68 of the UN 
Charter.61 The General Assembly has authorised two subsidiary organs to request advisory 
59 The Charter gives the authority to the Generul Assemhly and the Security Council by virtue of Articles 22 and 
29 of the Charter to establish suhsidiury organs as it deems necessury for the performance of their functions. 
There are also provisions authorising other organs of the UN to establish their own subsidiary organs. Article 68 
authorises the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to set up commission in economic and sociul fields and 
for the promotion of human rights, and any commissions thut is necessary to pcrform its functions. 
It is interesting to note that Judge Hackworth defined the term 'subsidiary organ' in his dissenting opinion in the 
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribllnal Case, where he stated 
that: 
[t]he term "subsidiary organ" has a spcciul and well rccognized meaning. It mcans an auxiliary or inferior 
organ; an organ to furnish aid nnd nssistunce in a suhordinate or secondary eapucity. This is the common 
acceptation of the meaning of the term. 
See Diss. Op. of Judge Hackworth, ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 79. 
60 This vicw was citcd in the disscnting opinion of Judge De Castro in the Application for Review of Judgment 
No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case, ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 276. 
61 See Amr, Mohamcd S., Tire Role of tire International Court of Justice as tire Principal Judicial Organ of the 
United Nations, The Hugue: Kluwcr Law International, 2003, p. 63. 
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opinions on a 'legal question' within their sphere competence. These were the Interim 
Committee of the General Assembll2 and the Committee for Applications for Review of 
Judgments of the Administrative Tribunals.63 
The latter subsidiary organ had requested three advisory opinions of the Court before 
abandoning this procedure in 1995.64 One of these three advisory opinions raised an 
important question regarding the relationship between the principal organ and its subsidiary, 
the authority that a principal organ exercises over its subsidiary body and whether decisions 
of a subsidiary organ can in any case bind the principal organ which created the subsidiary. 
The Court, in the 1954 Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the UNAT Case 
was asked to determine whether the General Assembly is legally entitled to refuse to give 
effect to an award of compensation made by the Administrative Tribunal properly constituted 
and acting within the limits of its statutory compctence.65 The Court, after examining the 
relevant provisions of the Statute of the Tribunal, took the view that the decisions of the 
Tribunal did bind the General Assembly, the creator of the Tribuna1.66 Therefore, the 
Assembly must comply with an award granting compensation to a staff member. The fact 
that the Tribunal was established as a judicial body to exercise judicial functions which the 
62 This Committee was established by the General Assembly under Resolution 196(III). 30 Decemher. 1948. 
63 This Committee was established by the General Assemhly under Resolution 957. November. 1955 and is 
composed of the representati ves of ull member States of the most recent regular session of the General 
Assembly. See Rosenne. supra note 2. p. 335; and Amr. supra note 61, p. 354. In the words of the Court in the 
Fasla Case this Committee "is an organ of the United Nations. duly constituted under Articles 7 and 22 of the 
Charter, and duly authorized under Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter to request advisory opinions of the 
Court for the purpose of Article 11 of the Statute of the United Nations Administrative Trihunul." ICJ Rep., 
1973. p. 175. 
64 See Section 4.4 in Chapter Five. ;,,/ra. 
M ICJ Rep., 1954. p. 51. 
66 Contrary to the Court's opinion, Judge Hackworth was of the view that "ltJhe whole idea of the Charter was 
that the role of subsidiary orguns should be, as the name implies, to assist and 1I0t to control the principal orgnn. 
Any other view, if accepted, would render extremely hazardous the creation of subsidiary organs, unless their 
powers were severely circumscrihed. The principal organ must continue to be the principal organ with authority 
to accept. modify or reject, the acts or recommendations of the subordinate organs if the former is not to 
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General Assembly did not itself possess led the Court to deliver that the Tribunal was 
established "not as an advisory organ or a mere subordinate committee of the General 
Assembly, but as independent and truly judicial body pronouncing final judgments without 
appeal within the limited field of its functions.,,67 The Court found that a principal organ 
which establishes a subsidiary organ to exercise powers that it cannot itself exercise cannot 
change decisions of its subsidiary which are an exercise of those powers and functions. In 
this respect Sarooshi has argued that if the Court acted otherwise "the principal organ would 
in effect be performing the very functions which it does not itself possess under the 
Charter.,,68 
As far as other principal organs are concerned, these organs are ECOSOC, the 
Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat. 
(a) The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
On 21 sl December 1946, ECOSOC adopted Resolution 15(111) requesting the General 
Assembly to authorise it to request advisory opinions "on all legal questions within its scope, 
including legal questions concerning mutual relations of the United Nations and Specialised 
Agencies,,69 in order to discharge its co-ordinating responsibility under Chapter X, and more 
particularly under Article 63 of the Charter.7o The request was discussed in the Sixth 
Committee which resulted in the resolution 89(1), on 11 December 1946, authorising 
ECOSOC to request advisory opinions. ECOSOC has twice used this power. 
become functus officio in any given field." See Diss. Op. of Judge Hackworth, ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 79 (emphasis 
in original). 
67 Ie] Rep., 1954, p. 53. 
68 Sarooshi, Danesh, "The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs", 67 BYIL, 1996. 
E· 452. 
9 Rosenne, supra note 2, p. 327. 
70 Article 63(2) of the UN Charter provides that the ECOSOC, "may co-ordinate the activities of the 
specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through 
recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations." 
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The first request was in 1989, relating to the Applicability of Article VI, section 22, of 
the Convention of the Privileges and immunities of the United Nations,71 while the second 
was in 1999 in the Difference relating to immunity from legal process of a special 
Rapporteur of the commission on human rights.72 
(b) The Trusteeship Council 
In 1947, the General Assembly, upon its own initiative, authorised the Trusteeship Council to 
request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities 
conferred upon it by Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter.73 However, the Trusteeship 
Council has never requested an advisory opinion. 
Indeed, the aims of the trusteeship system have now been fulfilled because all trust 
territories have now attained self-government or independence either as separate States or by 
joining neighbouring independent countries.74 The Trusteeship Council is no longer operative 
following the emergence of Palau as an Associate State of the United States, in 1994, and its 
admission to the UN.75 
(c) The Secretariat 
Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Charter, the Secretariat is one of the principal organs of the 
UN. The Secretary General is "the chief administrative officer of the Organization.,,76 
71 Hereinafter cited as: "the Mazilu Case", ICI Rep., 1989. For the facts of this case see Section 4 in Chapter 
Six, infra. 
n Hereinafter cited as: "the Cumaraswamy Case", ICI Rep., 1999. For the facts of this case see Section 4 in 
Chapter Six, infra. 
73 See GA Res. 171(1), 14 November 1947. Rosenne, Supra note 2, p. 332. This authorisation for the 
Trusteeship Council was due to the Trusteeship functions and responsibilities in accordance with chapters XII 
and XIII of the Charter. 
74 See http://www.un.org/documents/tc.htm. (Accessed 24 October 2004). The Trusteeship Council has 
discharged successfully all the functions entrusted to it under the Charter: see UN Yearbook Special Edition: 
UN Fiftieth Anniversary, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1945-1995, 1995, p. 212. 
75 R osenne, supra note 2, p. 332. See GA Res. 511209, 17 December 1996, where the General Assembly 
~~itiated a review of the role of the Trusteeship Council. 
See Article 97 of the UN Charter. 
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Nevertheless, the Secretariat is the only principal organ which has not been authorised to 
request advisory opinions from the Court. The question which is frequently raised is whether 
the Secretariat, acting through the Secretary-General, is legally entitled to be authorised to 
request advisory opinions with regard to any legal question within the scope of its activities 
and if so whether there is any reason for such an authorisation.77 
The Secretariat, as one of the principal organs, may be authorised by the General 
Assembly to request an advisory opinion. It has been suggested that Paragraph 2 of Article 
96, which provides that 'Other organs of the United Nations and specialised agencies, which 
may at any time be so authorised by the General Assembly', does not relate to the scope of 
UN organs that may be authorised to request advisory opinions, but to the scope of legal 
questions that they may put to the Court. The Secretary-General, then, is legally in a position 
to seek such an authorisation,78 and he has not hesitated on several occasions 79 to seek a 
general right to request an opinion on his own initiative. 
In his 1950 report on whether the Commission of Human Rights could be authorised to 
request advisory opinions from the Court, the Secretary-General argued that as the 
Commission had no right under Article 96(2) to be granted such authorisation, it would be 
appropriate if he himself could be granted such an authorisation to consider suggestions of 
the Commission in regard to requesting advisory opinions arising out of that Commission's 
work. 
77 Schwebel, Stephen, "Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory Opinions 
of the International Court of Justice", 78 AJlL, 1984, p. 869. 
78 Schwebel, ibid, p. 870. 
79 See Judicial Review of United Nations Administrative Tribunal Judgments, working paper submitted by the 
Secretary-General: UN Doc. AlAC.781L.land corr. 1 (1955); Annual Reports ofthe Secretary-General: UN 
Doc. Al45/1, part III. 
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Again, in 1955, the Secretary-General asked to be authorised to request advisory 
opinions on legal questions concerning the Administrative Tribunals' Judgements. The last 
attempt to seek an authorisation was in his 1992 report "An agenda for peace: preventive 
diplomacy, peace making and peace keeping" where the Secretary-General sought 
authorisation to seek advisory opinions from the Court.80 These suggestions have not yet 
been accepted. 
However, the Secretary-General may seek an advisory opinion through the General 
Assembly or the Security Council. In practice, there is no instance where the Secretary-
General has requested the General Assembly to ask for an advisory opinion on a specific 
issue confronting him while carrying out his duties and was denied permission.8l One might 
try to imagine a situation where a genuine need arising from the duties of the Secretary-
General for direct authorisation really exist. If so, what are the possible consequences of such 
an authorisation? These consequences could, in fact, be the reasons behind withholding 
authorisation. 
The role of the Secretary-General encompasses administrative as well as "so-called" 
political functions,82 which flow from Articles 98 and 99 of the Charter.83 In view of the 
80 See Para. 38 of the Agenda for Peace: N471277; S/2411, 17 June 1992, which provides that "I recommend 
that the Secretary-General be authorized, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, to take advantage 
of the advisory competence ofthe Court." available at http://www.un.orglDocs/SG/agpeace.html.(accessed 12 
December 2004). 
81 The requests by the General Assembly for advisory opinions in the Reparations Case; Reservations Case, 
UNAT Cases were made on behalf of the Secretary-General. Moreover, on the conditions determined by the 
Headquarters agreement between the UN and the US, the Secretary-General may ask the General Assembly to 
make a request. 
82 S' Imma, supra note 57, p. 1196. 
83 The range of the groups offunctions that the Secretary-General can perform is large: Administrative, 
technical, financial, representational, and political. See Simma, ibid, p. 1207. For example: the Secretary-
General participates in the meetings of all principal organs of the UN except the Court, and he also may be 
entrusted by the General Assembly, Security Council, ECOSOC and Trusteeship Council with some functions 
(Article 98 Charter). He has the right to convoke special sessions of the General Assembly and to bring to the 
attention of the Security Council any issue that in his opinion may threaten peace and security (Article 99 
Charter): Also, Article 12(2) Charter requests him, with the consent of the Security Council, to notify the 
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Secretary-General's broad functions and duties it would be undoubtedly helpful for him to be 
able to request advisory opinion from the Court. A wide range of international lawyers 
believe that he should be accorded such an authority. 84 
However, Judge Bedjaoui has observed that if the Secretary-General is authorised to 
request advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of his activity, it is only 
to be expected that he will not confine himself to putting questions related to the running of 
the Secretariat as his activities are wide and include every sector ofthe Organisation's work. 
Therefore, authorising the Secretary-General to request an advisory opinion of the Court 
might encourage him to compete with the Security Councilor the General Assembly.85 
Bowett maintains that the argument for authorising the Secretary-General to request advisory 
opinions presupposes that the Security Council and the General Assembly are not prepared to 
make that request. In such circumstances, it would be very likely that the Secretary-General 
would lack the support of the political organs for making such a request. Therefore, Bowett 
concludes that such an authorisation might "heighten the risk of conflict between the 
Secretary-General and those main organs, and this may be too high a price to pay for the 
advantage gained.,,86 Bedjaoui has stated that another reason behind withholding 
authorisation from the Secretary-General is fear that the Secretary General "would be 
politically over-strengthened if he were able to obtain from the Court opinions that might 
General Assembly of matters relating to the maintenance of peace and security that being dealt with by the 
Security Council. UN organs have frequently asked the Secretary-General or his official representative for 
advice on procedural and legal questions. See Simma, ibid, p. 1209. 
84 See Schwebel, supra note 77; Szasz, Paul, "Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court" in: 
Gross, Leo, The Future of the International Court of Justice, Dobbs Ferry, New York, Oceana Publications, 
1976, vol. 2, pp. 531-532; Bedjaoui, Mohammed, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the 
Legality of its acts, Dordrecht, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, p. 78. 
8S B d' . e JaoUl, supra note 84, p.78. In contrast to this argument, Schwebel argues that "there is no reason to 
believe that, if the Secretary-General were accorded the authority to request advisory opinions of the Court, he 
~ould exercise the authority incautiously". Schwebel, supra note 77, pp. 876-878. 
Bowett, supra note I, pp. 187-188. 
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encourage him to exercise greater autonomy in his action vis-a-vis the Security Councilor 
the General Assembly.,,87 
Lastly, the Secretary-General's authorisation to request advisory opinions might 
embarrass the Security Council or the General Assembly if he referred a legal question to the 
Court where the Council or the Assembly, for political reasons, did not desire such a referral. 
Because of the above considerations it is doubtful, at least in the near future, that the 
Secretary-General will be authorised to request advisory opinions directly. 
(ii) Specialised Agencies 
Specialised agencies are international organisations of limited competence linked to the UN 
by special agreements under Article 57 (1) and 63 of the Charter.88 They may request 
advisory opinions from the IC] on legal questions within the scope of their activities if 
authorised by the General Assembly to do SO.89 Provisions for such authorisation are 
contained in the agreements between the UN and the specialised agencies.90 So far there are 
sixteen specialised agencies authorised by the General Assembly to request advisory 
87 Bedjaoui, supra note 84, p. 78. 
88 Sands & Klein, supra note 28, p. 77. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the specialised 
agencies provides that specialised agencies means specifically agencies mentioned in the Convention, and any 
other agency brought into relationship with the UN in accordance with Article 57 and 63 of the UN Charter. 
This Convention was approved by the General Assembly on 21 November 1947, Res. 197 (III), Article 1. See 
also Article 57 and 63 of the Charter. 
89 Article 96 (2) of the UN Charter. 
90 For instance, Article 76 of the WHO constitution; Article 66 of the IMO constitution. See ICJ Yearbook, 
2000, No. 54, p. 96. Article 9 of the agreement with the ILO provides: "[t]he General Assembly authorises the 
International Labour Organisation to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice on legal 
questions arising within the scope of its activities other than questions concerning the mutual relationships of 
the Organisation and the United Nations or other specialised agencies. 
Such request may be addressed to the Court by the Conference or by the Governing Body acting in pursuance of 
an authorisation by the Conference. 
When requesting the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion the International Labour 
Organisation shall inform the Economic and Social Council of the request". 
It is interesting to note that all the agreements between the UN and the specialised agencies which grant the 
authority to request an advisory opinion of the Court require that the organisation shall inform the ESOSOC, 
with the exception of the agreement with UNESCO. See Hambro, Edvard, "The Jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice", 76 ReADI, 1950, p. 149; Jenks, Wilfred C., The Prospects of International Adjudication. 
London: Stevens and Sons, 1964, p. 197. 
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opinions,91 in contrast to the Universal Postal Union which has not been authorised in this 
manner.92 
Specialised agencies cannot request advisory opinions beyond their sphere of 
competence, and each agency has a broad discretion to determine whether its request falls 
within its activities. As the Court stated in the 1996 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear 
Weapons in Armed Conflict Case93 "each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its 
own jurisdiction.,,94 However, it is ultimately within the powers of the Court to determine 
whether the subject matter of a request is within the legitimate sphere of activities of a 
particular organ.95 
The Court generally interprets the scope of a specialised agency's activities in a 
restrictive manner. In order to illustrate this, the Court's finding in the WHO Legality Case is 
illustrative. Here the Court was asked whether the danger to health that would result from 
States using nuclear weapons would breach their international obligations, including those set 
91 Those specialised agencies are: International Labour Organisation (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organisation 
of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 
World Health Organisation (WHO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
International Finance Corporation (lFC), International Development Association (IDA), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), International Maritime Organisation (IMO), World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). See IC] 
Yearbook 1990-1991, pp. 63-68. 
92 Article 32 of the constitution of the UPU refers disputes directly to arbitrators. 
93 Hereinafter cited as: .. the WHO Legality Case". IC] Rep., 1996, p. 66. 
94 ICI Rep., 1996, para. 29, p. 82. 
95 Pasqualucci, 10 M., The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 40. 
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forth in the WHO constitution.96 The cardinal objections raised were whether the WHO was 
competent to request an advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons and 
whether the advisory opinion requested related to a question arising "within the scope of 
[the] activities,,97 of that Organisation in accordance with Article 96/2 of the Charter. The 
Court, however, refused to render an opinion on the ground that the WHO's request was 
ultra vires:98 
It has thus been argued that World Health Assembly resolution WHA46.40, having 
been adopted by the requisite majority, "must be presumed to have been validly 
adopted" ... The Court would observe in this respect that the question whether a 
resolution has been duly adopted from a procedural point of view and the question 
whether that resolution has been adopted intra vires are two separate issues. The mere 
fact that a majority of States, in voting on a resolution, have complied with all the 
relevant rules of form cannot in itself suffice to remedy any fundamental defects, such 
as acting ultra vires, with which the resolution might be afflicted. 
The Court stated that in order to delineate the field of activity or the area of competence of an 
international organisation it is necessary to refer to the relevant rules of the organisation and 
in the first place, to its constitution.99 According to the "well-established rules of treaty 
interpretation"IOO expressed in Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties, the terms of treaties must be interpreted "in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose."IOI Therefore, the Court concluded that in the light of the object and 
purpose of the WHO constitution, as well as of the practice followed by the Organisation, the 
question put to the Court did not relate to the effect of the use of nuclear weapons on health, 
96 The WHO question was:" [i]n view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law 
including the WHO constitution? 
97 Ie] Rep. 1996, para. 18, p. 74. 
98 The "Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case", IC] Rep., 1996, para. 29, 
~. 82. 
9 Ibid, para. 19, p. 74. 
tOO Ibid. 
tot Ibid, para. 19, p. 75. 
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but to the legality of the use of such weapons in view of the health and environmental effects 
arising from their use. According to the Court, the functions listed in Article 2 "may be read 
as authorising the Organisation to deal with the effects on health of the use of nuclear 
weapons, or of any other hazardous activity, and to take preventive measures aimed at 
protecting the health of populations in the event of such weapons being used or such 
activities engaged in.,,102 
The Court's opinion was that the question before it did not relate to the "effects of the 
use of nuclear weapons on health, but to the legality of the use of such weapons in view of 
their health and environmental effects.,,103 The Court, after defining the WHO's functions 
listed in Article 2 of its constitution, concluded that none of these functions had a sufficient 
connection with the question before it and that "the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear 
weapons in no way determines the specific measures, regarding health or otherwise (studies, 
plans, procedures, etc.), which could be necessary in order to seek to prevent or cure some of 
their effects." 104 
The Court's view was that, whether nuclear weapons were used legally or illegally their 
effects on health would be the same, and the competence of the WHO to deal with those 
effects would not depend upon the legality of the acts that caused them. 105 The Court also 
pointed out that international organisations do not possess a general competence but are 
governed by the "principle of speciality": 106 
The Court need hardly point out that international organizations are subjects of 
international law which do not, unlike States, possess a general competence. 
International organizations are governed by the "principle of speciality", that is to say, 
102 IeJ Rep., 1996, para. 21, p. 76. 
103 Ibid, para 21, p. 76, (emphasis in original). 
104 Ibid, para. 22, p. 77. 
lOS Ibid, para. 22. pp. 76-77. 
106 Ibid, para. 25, p. 78. 
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they are invested by the States which create them with powers, the limits of which are a 
function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them. 
The Court also held that: 107 
[T]o ascribe to the WHO the competence to address the legality of the use of nuclear 
weapons .... would be tantamount to disregarding the principle of specialty; for such 
competence could not be deemed a necessary implication of the Constitution of the 
Organization in the light of the purpose assigned to it by its member States. 
Furthermore, interpreting the term "wide international responsibilities" in Article 57 of the 
UN Charter, the Court held that those responsibilities are necessarily restricted to the sphere 
of public health and cannot encroach on the responsibilities of other parts of the UN 
system. lOB Therefore, the WHO was not competent to deal with the question of the legality of 
nuclear weapons. 
The Court's decision provoked controversy. While the Court declined jurisdiction, it 
must be remembered that the Court has asserted on various occasions that only "compelling 
reasons" should lead it to refuse to give an advisory opinion when requested. 109 With this 
background, were there any compelling reasons for the Court to refuse to render an advisory 
opinion for the WHO? 
The WHO is one of the UN specialised agencies within the meaning of Articles 57 and 
63 of the Charter and is entrusted with wide responsibilities related to health and, therefore, 
issues that affect peoples' health globally. 1 10 According to the Court, the question of the 
legality of the use of nuclear weapons did not fall within the WHO mandate. It held that the 
Organisation was only authorised to "deal with the effects on health of the use of nuclear 
107 IC] Rep., 1996, para. 25, p. 79. 
108 Ibid, para. 26, p. 80. 
109 See Chapters Three and Four, infra. 
110 By virtue of Article 1 of the WHO's constitution, the objective of the Organisation is " the attainment by all 
peoples of the highest possible level of health." At the same time, Article 2 (V) provides that the Organization 
may "generally ... take alI necessary actions to attain the objective of the Organization." 
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weapons, or of any hazardous activity and to take preventive measures aimed at protecting 
the health of populations in the event of such weapons being used or such activities engaged 
in." III 
Despite this finding by the Court, one can still argue that the question was within 
WHO's sphere of activities and that it was directly relevant to it. The question submitted was 
not devoid of a relevant object and purpose, and an answer by the Court would have given 
important guidance to the WHO in discharging its duties. Also, an opinion would have 
helped to develop International Law in relation to environmental and health matters. Indeed, 
the purpose of the Court's advisory jurisdiction is to provide an authoritative legal opinion to 
the requesting body and is a means of participating in the UN activities. I 12 On the other hand, 
if we are to suppose that the question was improperly formulated and led the Court to 
misconstrue the question, the Court nevertheless should have felt called upon to accept the 
task of assisting the UN and should not have declined to give an opinion. The Court in such 
cases should utilise its discretion to reformulate the question in order to overcome 
b I . h h . 113 a stractness, specu atlOn or any ot er s ortcommg. 
Moreover, the Court has applied the doctrine of implied powers in the absence of 
express provisions in the constituent instrument of an organisation in regard to its 
competence. I 14 Such competence might be assumed if considered an essential for the 
promotion of its function. Indeed, one might wonder why the Court did not deduce from 
III ICI Rep., 1996, para. 21, p. 76. 
112 See Chapter Three, infra. 
113 Such discretion was applied in the Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal Case. Indeed, in this case the Court notcd several irregularities in the way the request 
had been formulated. Despite such irregularities the Court did not dccline to give the opinion requested. See 
Chapter Five, infra. 
114 For discussion on the doctrine of implied powers, see Section 2.2 in Chapter Six, infra. 
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WHO practice that the WHO was attempting to exercise its implied powers to further its 
duties towards promoting peoples' health when the WHO requested the advisory opinion. 
One might also disagree with the Court's findings, because the WHO is entitled to 
propose conventions, agreements and regulations, and also to make recommendations with 
respect to international health matters by virtue of Article 2(K) of its constitution. Akande 
argues that it seems logical that the WHO should have competence as regards actions 
affecting the legality of activities affecting health since the WHO has the right to propose 
treaties dealing with things that are known to damage human health. I 15 Nevertheless, the 
Court held that the WHO was not empowered to seek an opinion on the interpretation of its 
constitution in relation to matters outside the scope of its function. 
Judge Weeramantry in a dissenting opinion rightly argued that there is an inconsistency 
between an agency having the power to seek advisory opinions on a question of law, while at 
the same time having no power to seek an interpretation of its constitution. I 16 
3.2 Jurisdiction ratione materiae, or Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Even if the question posed for an advisory opinion falls within the scope of the requesting 
organ and is therefore admissible, the question must still be a "legal" one. This follows from 
Articles 96 of the UN Charter and 65 of the ICJ Statute. I 17 It has been argued that if a 
question is entirely political in character, the Court in theory has no jurisdiction 118 and should 
lIS Akande, Dapo, "The Competence ofInternational Organizations and the Advisory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice", 9 EJIL, No.3, 1998, pp. 458ff. 
116 See Diss. Op. of Judge Weeramantry, ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 129. 
117 See Articles 96(1) of the Charter and 65 of the Statute. The characterization of the legality of the question by 
the requesting organ is not binding on the Court. See Amerasinghe, Chittharanjan F., Jurisdiction of 
International Tribunals, The Hague; London: Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 521. 
1\8 Gerig, D. W., "The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court and the Settlement of Disputes between 
States", 15ICLQ, 1966, p. 339. 
71 
refuse to give an opinion. In the Expenses case the Court held that it "can give an advisory 
opinion only on a legal question. If a question is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion 
in the matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested.,,119 
The Court in its case law has adopted the principle that the question would have a legal 
character if it were framed in terms of law and raised problems of International Law, even if 
it had political or factu~l elements. In the Admission of a State to the United Nations 
(Charter, Article 4) Case, 120 the Peace Treaties Case,121 the Western Sahara Case,122 the 
Interpretation of Agreement of25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt Case,123 the 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case,124 the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case,125 and lastly in the Wall CaseJ26 the Court had 
the opportunity to identify what constitutes a 'legal question.' The Court's consistent practice 
illustrates that it has always been able to answer questions placed before it, even if these were 
intermixed with political and factual issues or even if the drafting of the request was unclear. 
Thus, the Court emphatically held in the Wall Case that "lack of clarity in the drafting 
of a question does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Rather, such uncertainty will require 
clarification in interpretation, and such necessary clarifications of interpretation have 
frequently been given by the Court.,,127 The Court observed that throughout its jurisprudence 
there had been cases where the wording of a request for an advisory opinion did not 
119 See the Expenses Case, IC] Rep., 1962, p .155. 
120 Hereinafter cited as: "the Admissions Case", IC] Rep., 1948, p. 61. 
121 IC] Rep., 1950, p. 65. 
122 IC] Rep., 1975, p. 18. 
123 H . f . d 124 erema ter cIte as: the "WHO/Egypt Case", Ie] Rep., 1980, p. 88. 
IC] Rep., 1996, pp. 71-72. 
12S IC] Rep., 1996, pp. 233-234. 
126 See the Wall Opinion at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketJimwp/imwpframe.htm.( Accessed 21 October 2004). 
127The Wall Opinion, ibid, para. 38. 
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correspond to the "true legal question" under consideration,128 or that "the question put to the 
Court was, on the face of it, at once infelicitously expressed and vague.,,129 Consequently, the 
Court stated that it had often been required to broaden, interpret and even reformulate 
questions put to it.130 The Court concluded that, in the case under consideration, the Court 
would only have to do what it had often done in the past, namely "identify the existing 
principles and rules, interpret them and apply them ... , thus offering a reply to the question 
posed based on law.,,131 
Some scholars have also contributed to defining what constitutes a 'legal question.' 
Lissitzyn argued that in advisory cases the request must be "capable of being adequately 
answered by the application of judicial techniques within the existing framework of law." 132 
Judge Dillard has noted that "[t]he notion that a legal question is simply one that invites an 
answer "based on law" appears to be question-begging and it derives no added authority by 
virtue of being frequently repeated.,,133 
Before ending the discussion on the meaning of a 'legal question', it is important to 
recall that while the provisions of Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the IC] 
Statute have limited the scope of the request to a 'legal question', Article 14 of the Covenant 
of the League covered "any legal dispute or question.,,134 However, the phrase 'legal 
question' would seem to be wider than 'dispute' and would even seem to include the latter. 
128 See the WHO/Egypt Case, IC] Rep., 1980, paras. 34-36, pp. 87-89. 
129 See the Applicationfor Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case, 
IC] Rep., 1982, para. 46, p. 348. 
130 See the Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa Case, IC] Rep., 
1956, p. 25; the Expenses Case, ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 162. 
131 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, IC] Rep., 1996, para. 13, p. 234. 
132 Lissitzyn, Oliver, The International Court of Justice: Its Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951, p. 30. 
133 Sep. Op. of Judge Dillard, ICJ Rep., 1975, p. 117. 
134 The jurisprudence of the PCIJ drew a distinction between "disputes" and "questions". The latter was meant 
to be the request for an opinion "to obtain authoritative guidance on a question of a legal nature arising during 
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In this regard Hambro has pointed out that "any legal question" does not seem to allow for 
any restrictive interpretation. 135 
At any rate, despite the deletion of any reference to the term "dispute" in Article 96 of 
the UN Charter, the Rules of the Court contain provisions relating to the procedure to be 
followed in advisory requests concerning inter-States disputes, including the possibility of 
appointing a judge ad hoc. Article 102 of the Rules (1978 rules as amended in 2000) reads: 
1. In the exercise of its advisory functions under Article 65 of the Statute, the Court 
shall apply, in addition to the provisions of Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter IV 
of the Statute, the provisions of the present Part of the Rules. 
2. The Court shall also be guided by the provisions of the Statute and of these Rules 
which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be 
applicable. For this purpose, it shall above all consider whether the request for the 
advisory opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more 
States. 
Article 102(3) of the Rules provides that if the requested opinion relates to a legal question 
actually pending between States, Article 31 of the Statute shall apply·136 As will be made 
clear in Chapter Four, the Court's case law indicates that the deletion of the word 'dispute' 
from the provisions pertaining to the advisory procedure does not prevent UN organs from 
requesting advisory opinions in respect of legal disputes between two States, or between a 
State and the Organisation as long as the question is a 'legal question' and of interest to the 
UN. 
the activities of the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations" while an opinion on a "dispute" was 
meant to be a legal dispute actually pending between two or more states. See Rosenne, supra note 2, p. 280. 
135 Hambro, supra note 90, p. 192. 
136 This Article deals with provisions relating to appointing of Judges ad hoc. 
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3.2.1 The Political Nature or Motivation of Questions Referred for Advisory Opinions 
Objections to the Court's jurisdiction to give advisory opinions based on the political 
implications of a question have been frequently raised and justified on the grounds that these 
implications would risk politicising the Court. In the Admissions Case, the Court replied to 
the contention that the question submitted to it was political and that the Court therefore 
lacked competence to render an advisory opinion by stating: 137 
It has nevertheless been contended that the question put must be regarded as a political 
one and that, for this reason, it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court 
cannot attribute a political character to a request which, framed in abstract terms, 
invites it to undertake an essentially judicial task, the interpretation of a treaty 
provision. It is not concerned with the motives which may have inspired this request, 
nor with the considerations which, in the concrete cases submitted for examination to 
the Security Council, formed the subject of the exchange of views which took place in 
that body. It is the duty of the Court to envisage the question submitted to it only in the 
abstract form which has been given to it; nothing which is said in the present opinion 
refers, either directly or indirectly, to concrete cases or to particular circumstances. 
In the Expenses Case, the Court again rejected contentions that it should refuse to give an 
opinion simply because "the question put to the Court is intertwined with political 
questions.,,138 The Court's view was reiterated in the WHO/Egypt Case, which arose from a 
request by the WHO Assembly for an advisory opinion on whether transfer of its Regional 
Office would be covered by Section 37 of the 1951 Agreement between the WHO and 
Egypt. 139 In this case doubts were raised concerning the legal character of the question. The 
Court held that its jurisprudence "establishes that if, as in the present case, a question 
submitted in a request is one that otherwise falls within the normal exercise of its judicial 
process, the Court has not to deal with the motives which may have inspired the request.,,140 
137 The Admission of a State to the United Nations Case, IC] Rep., 1948, p. 61. 
::: The Expenses o!the United Nations Case, ICI Rep., 1962, p. 155. 
For further details about this Case see Section II in Chapter Four inl'ra 
140 ' '.I' • IC] Rep., 1980,para. 33, p. 87. 
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The Court has reaffirmed its settled jurisprudence on this issue in the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, which arose out of a request for an advisory 
opinion by the General Assembly, when it held that "the political nature of the motives which 
may be said to have inspired the request and the political implications that the opinion given 
might have are of no relevance in the establishment of its jurisdiction to give such an 
opinion" .141 
One could say that the Court regards all questions submitted to it as "legal" regardless 
of their political implications as long as the requested question can be answered by the 
application of legal rules. Scobbie observes that "[ilt has been a prominent feature of the 
Court's jurisprudence that the possible political ramifications of an advisory opinion do not 
compromise its judicial character and thus involve no impropriety.,,142 
In the final analysis, because all questions necessarily have a political background, 
attempting to draw a clear distinction between legal and political questions would be futile. 
However, the whole purpose of such an endeavour is to determine justiciability. The fact that 
the Court has a duty to clarify the law is paramount and should supersede other 
considerations. Indeed, the Court has a wide discretionary power. Therefore, it can 
reformulate questions put to it in order to highlight the legal points contained within the 
question. In general States try to avoid having to refer their vital interests to the decision of a 
third party. 143 This consideration can lead them to argue that the question referred to the 
Court is essentially political in character. In this regard it is important to cite the eloquent 
141 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, IC] Rep., 1996, para. 13, p. 234. 
142 Scobbie, lain, "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Territory: Request for an 
advisory opinion, An Analysis of issues Concerning Competence and Procedure", available at: 
http://www.soas.ac.uk!Iawpeacemideastlpapers/lscobbie.pdf (accessed 23 October 2004), p. 18. 
143 Higgins, Rosalyn, "The Place ofInternational Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council", 
64 AJIL, 1970, p. 14. 
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statement of the former United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar in the 
introduction to his last report, which provides: 144 
[E]ven those disputes which seem entirely political (as the Iraq-Kuwait dispute prior to 
invasion) have a clearly legal component. If, for any reason, the parties fail to refer the 
matter to the Court, the process of achieving a fair and objectively commendable 
settlement and thus defusing an international crises situation would be facilitated by 
obtaining the Court's advisory opinion. 
The Court at any rate must decide whether to take into account the political motives behind 
the request and subsequently decline to respond, or to answer the request in accordance with 
its duty as the principal UN judicial body, entrusted with responsibilities for coordinating 
with other organs of the UN in order to achieve its goals. The practice of the Court in dealing 
with the subject matter of the questions posed for advisory opinions is in harmony with the 
spirit of the UN Charter that places great emphasis on full coordination amongst the UN 
organs. 145 Finally, the fact remains, as Bowett has argued that "refusal to give an opinion 
ought never to be based on the ground that the question at issue is a "political" one: the 
distinction between "legal" and "political" questions has many meanings and should not be 
used as ajurisdictional criterion.,,146 
144 UN Doc. N4111, 1991, p. 8. 
145 See Chapter Three, infra. 
146 Bowett, Derek W., supra note 28, p. 278. (Emphasis in original) 
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3.2.2 Factual Questions 
Following several requests for advisory opinions some States objected to the requests on the 
grounds that the question was factual question rather than legal. However, such arguments 
have never caused the Court to decline to render an opinion requested. In the Namibia Case 
the Court held: 147 
In the view of the Court, the contingency that there may be factual issues underlying the 
question posed does not alter its character as a "legal question" as envisaged in Article 
96 of the Charter. The reference in this provision to legal questions cannot be 
interpreted as opposing legal to factual issues. Normally, to enable a Court to 
pronounce on legal questions, it must also be acquainted with, take into account and, if 
necessary, make findings as to the relevant factual issues. 
The Court rejected the notion that where factual matters require clarification a legal issue 
cannot be said to arise. In the Court's view, factual and legal questions may coexist. The 
Court reaffirmed this view in the Western Sahara Case where it was argued that "the 
questions posed by the General Assembly are not legal, but are either factual or are questions 
of a purely historical or academic character.,,148 The Court dismissed this argument and 
stated that "a mixed question of law and fact is nonetheless a legal question.,,149 The Court's 
case law on this issue is in line with that of its predecessor. In the Status of Eastern Carelia 
Case the PCIJ stated that: 150 
147 ICJ Rep., 1971, para. 40, p. 27. 
148 Western Sahara Case, ICJ Rep., 1975, para. 16, p.19. 
149 Western Sahara, ibid; see also Elias, Taslim 0., "How the International Court of Justice Deals with Requests 
for Advisory Opinions" in: Makarczyk, ]erzy, (ed.), Essays In International Law In Honour of Judge Manfred 
Lachs, The Hague; Boston; Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, p. 356. 
150 PCIJ, Ser. B, No.5, 1923, p. 28. 
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The Court does not say that there is an absolute rule that the request for an advisory 
opinion may not involve some enquiry as to the facts, but, under ordinary 
circumstances, it is certainly expedient that the facts upon which the opinion of the 
Court is desired should not be in controversy, and it should not be left to the Court itself 
to ascertain what they are. 
3.2.3 Abstract Questions 
It has been mentioned in Chapter One that the PCIJ was never asked to give an opinion on an 
abstract question in the sense that the question was "purely hypothetical.,,151 The ICJ's view 
in this respect has been manifested on various occasions. In the Wall Advisory Opinion the 
Court did not consider allegedly the abstract nature of the question posed to it as raising an 
issue of jurisdiction. The Court observed that the contention that it should not deal with a 
question couched in abstract terms was "a mere affirmation devoid of any justification" and 
that "the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise.,,}52 
The Court in the Wall Opinion followed its own previous case law 153 and stated that the 
question posed was not an abstract one. 
An abstract question need not necessarily be a vague one. Article 65 of the Statute 
provides that a request for an advisory opinion should contain "an exact statement of the 
question upon which an opinion is required." This requirement should suffice to limit the 
vagueness of the questions asked. In this connection Judge Azevedo in his Separate Opinion 
in the Peace Treaties case stated: 154 
151 Hudson, Manley, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942: A Treatise, New York, The 
Macmillan Company, 1943, p. 497. 
152 See the Wall Case para. 44. 
153 See IC] Rep., 1996, p. 236, para. IS, referring to Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership to the 
United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), IC] Rep., 1948, p. 61; Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the 
United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case, IC] Rep., 1954, p. 51; and Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council 
~~solution 276 (1970) Case, IC] Rep., 1971, p. 27, para. 40. 
Sep. Op. of Judge Azevedo, IC] Rep., 1950, p. 85. 
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No doubt it is always possible to discern at the base of any abstract opinion a specific 
situation which is alluded to remotely or indirectly; for, apart from any factitious 
attitude of mere curiosity, there is always a fact underlying any question. But it is 
necessary to refrain from too deep or too searching an effort for its discovery, not from 
a vain desire to create purely artificial situations, but to promote the usefulness of the 
advisory function by reducing the difficulties. 
It was feared by some States in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons Case that the abstract 
question posed might lead to hypothetical answers outside the scope of the Court's legal 
function. In this regard the Court stated: 155 
Certain States have however expressed the fear that the abstract nature of the question 
might lead the Court to make hypothetical or speculative declarations outside the scope 
of its judicial function. The Court does not consider that, in giving an advisory opinion 
in the present case, it would necessarily have to write "scenarios", to study various 
types of nuclear weapons and to evaluate highly complex and controversial 
technological, strategic and scientific information. The Court wi1l simply address the 
issues arising in all their aspects by applying the legal rules relevant to the situation. 
Ideally the presence of elements of concreteness is desirable in a request. Judge Zoricic, in 
the Admissions Case, correctly stated that: 156 
In human life, all activity is based on concrete considerations or facts. To attempt to 
judge and explain such acts in the abstract would be to misconstrue the intentions, to 
work in vacuum, and to misunderstand the meaning of real life. This is still more 
evident in the case of a Court of Justice whose first duty is to decide whether certain 
acts are in accordance with law. 
In the final analysis, the Court's position towards abstract questions is clear, and objections 
advanced by the States regarding the abstract nature of a question cannot consequently lead 
the Court to decline to give the requested opinion.157 One must take into account that, to a 
significant extent, International Law is interpreted and applied in the light of the case law of 
the ICJ. 
155 ICJ Rep., 1996, para. 15, p. 237. 
156 Diss. Op. of Judge Zoricic, Ie] Rep., 1947-1948, p. 96. 
157 The tendencies of the Court, in general, seems to treat questions submitted to it for an advisory opinion as an 
abstract question. See Rosenne, supra note 2, p. 1004. 
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Therefore in drafting a request for an advisory opinion a balance between abstractness 
and elements of factuality should be present. The question offered should not be narrowly 
defined and confined to a very specific point. On the other hand, the question should be 
phrased in such a way as to produce a broad answer not confined to the case initiating the 
question but also applicable to future cases. Indeed, this view is compatible with what was 
suggested by Judge Azevedo in his Separate Opinion in the Admissions Case that "it is quite 
fitting for an advisory body to give an answer in abstracto which may eventually be applied 
to several defacto situations: minima circumstantiafacti magnam diversitatemjuris.,,158 
4. The Advisory Jurisdiction as Subject to the Court's Discretion 
Judicial discretion has been defined by Barak as "the power the law gives the judge to 
choose among several alternatives, each of them being lawful.,,159 In this connection, Judge 
Bedjaoui has pointed out that "[w]hen a legal norm gives courts the choice between two or 
more solutions, all of them are legal ones therefore, it gives them latitude or freedom of 
decision, whence comes what is termed their discretion or discretionary power."I60 
One may wonder whether 'discretionary power' is inevitable. Roscoe Pound's 
answered this question by stating that "in no legal system, however, minute and detailed its 
body of rules, is justice administered wholly by rule and without any recourse to the will of 
158 Sep. Op. of Judge Azevedo, ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 74. (Emphasis in original). In the same context see the 
statement of the UK representative, where he stated that the requests were "specific legal questions" and that 
they "were of a general character, strictly legal in nature and limited in scope, and were designed to illicit the 
maximum guidance from the Court without calling upon it actually to retry the cases which had been 
adjudicated by the Administrative TribunaL" UN General Assembly, 81h session, 5th committee, official records, 
42Sth meeting, p32S. The statement of the UK representative in the fifth committee where the Court was 
requested to render an opinion on the obligation of the Assembly to give effect to an award of compensation 
made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal. 
159 Barak, Aharon, Judicial Discretion, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989, p.7. 
160 B d' 'S e JaUI, upra note 5, p. 3. 
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the judge and his personal sense of what should be done to achieve a just result in the case 
before him. Both elements are to be found in all administration of justice.,,161 
As far as the IC] is concerned, the Court's power to determine its jurisdiction is distinct 
from its power to exercise its discretion when considering the merits of a case with which it 
has been seised.162 When its jurisdiction to render an opinion is challenged, the Court will 
first consider whether it is competent to decide the case before it. If it finds that it has the 
requisite jurisdiction, the Court will then determine whether it will exercise that jurisdiction 
or whether to decline to do so. In the Wall Advisory Opinion the Court stated that "when 
seised of a request for an advisory opinion, it must first consider whether it has jurisdiction to 
give the opinion requested and whether, should the answer be in the affirmative, there is any 
reason why it should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction." 163 In the WHO Legality Case 
where the Court eventually declined jurisdiction, the Court stated: 164 
[V]arious arguments have been put forward for the purpose of persuading the Court to 
use the discretionary power it possesses under Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, to 
decline to give the opinion sought. The Court can however only exercise this 
discretionary power if it has first established that it has jurisdiction in the case in 
question; if the Court lacks jurisdiction, the question of exercising its discretionary 
power does not arise. 
The constitutional basis of the IC]' s discretionary power in its advisory function is to be 
found in the terms of the permissive language of Article 65(1) of the Statute which provides 
that "the Court may give an advisory opinion." 165 The Court has repeatedly made it clear, 
161 Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence, Saint Paul, Minn. : West Publishing, vol. II, 1959, p. 355. 
162 For the power of the Court to decide upon its own jurisdiction see discussion above. 
\63 See para. 13 ofthe Court's opinion. 
\64 The Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case, ICJ Rep., 1996, para. 14, 
f6S ~he term "may give" which is contained in Article 65 of the present Statute is deeply rooted in Article 14 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. However, this term has been subject to controversies during the League 
period, because Article 14 of the League Covenant, in its French version used the word "donnera" which means 
shall or will give, while the English version reads may give. The French version conveys a duty on the Court to 
answer the question. In this connection Judge Moore went on to say that "the contradiction between two 
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whenever confronted with a request for an advisory opinion that the language of Article 65 is 
permissive in character. In the Peace Treaties Case the Court stated that "Article 65 of the 
Statute is permissive. It gives the Court the power to examine whether the circumstances of 
the case are of such a character as should lead it to decline to answer the request.,,166 Thus, in 
the Western Sahara Case the Court stated: 167 
In exercising this discretion, the International Court of Justice, like the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, has always been guided by the principle that, as ajudicial body, 
it is bound to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character even in giving 
advisory opinions. If the question is a legal one which the Court is undoubtedly 
competent to answer, it may non the less decline to do so. 
The Court has taken a similar view in its advisory opinions in other cases. In the 1951 
Reservations Case; 168 the 1956 ILO Administrative Tribunal Case; 169 the 1962 Expenses 
Case;170 the 1973 Application/or Review 0/ Judgment No. 158 o/the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal Case,· 171the 1989 Mazilu Case;l72the 1996 legality o/the Threat or 
use of nuclear weapons Case;173 the 1999 Cumaraswamy Case,174 and lastly the 2004 Wall 
Case.175 
This being said, the Court has repeatedly emphasised that, as the principal judicial 
organ of the UN, its opinion on a legal question posed by the UN or its specialised agencies 
ought not to be refused unless there are 'compelling reasons' to the contrary. In the Wall 
provisions can consider that a difference in formulation." See Memorandum to the PCB, 18 February 1922, 
Pt. 385. 
66 Ie] Rep., 1950, p. 72. 
167 Ie] Rep., 1975, para. 23, p. 21. 
168 Ie] Rep., 1951, p. 19. 
169 Ie] Rep., 1956, p. 86. 
170 Ie] Rep., 1962, p. 155. 
171 Ie] Rep., 1973, p. 175 para 24 
172 Ie] Rep., 1989, p. 189 ff. 
173 Ie] Rep., 1996, p. 234. 
174 Ie] Rep., 1999, p. 78. 
175 See http://www.icj-ciLorglicjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm. (accessed 24 October 2(04). 
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Case, where the Court reiterated its statements in earlier cases, the Court observed that "the 
reply of the Court, itself an 'organ of the United Nations' , represents its participation in the 
activities of the Organisation, and, in principle, should not be refused.,,176 
In the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, the Court, citing statements in 
several earlier cases, stated that only "compelling reasons" could lead it to refuse to give an 
opinion requested. 177 The Court explained that there had been no refusal in its history based 
on its 'discretionary power' to act upon a request for an advisory opinion, and that its refusal 
in the WHO Legality Case to give the opinion requested was justified by its lack of 
jurisdiction. 178 
Arguably there is no doubt that a literal interpretation of Article 65 of the Statute gives 
the Court a 'discretionary power' to reply or refrain from replying to a request for an 
advisory opinion. However, the judicial policy of the Court in exercising its advisory 
jurisdiction can be summed up in its tendency to respond affirmatively to requests unless 
there are 'compelling reasons' to decline. 179 As the principal judicial organ of the UN 
designed to serve the UN in its work, the Court's primary role is to uphold the aims and 
objects of the Organisation while at the same time preserving its own autonomy. 
Whilst discussing the 'discretionary power' of the ICJ in advisory cases, it is important 
to note that Judge Abi Saab in a recent work180 observed that there is an apparent 
176 See para. 47 ofthe Wall Opinion. 
177 IC] Rep., 1996, para.l4, p. 235. 
178 Ibid, p. 235. 
179 Although the Court did not declare these compelling reasons, it has been suggested that the Court might 
refuse to give an opinion if it found that rendering an opinion might complicate the matter or create difficulties 
for the UN in discharging its duties or that such rendered opinion would effect the Court's judicial character as 
a court of law. See Amr, supra note 61, pp. 108-109. 
180 Abi Saab, Georges, "On Discretion: Reflections on the Nature of the Consultative Function of the 
International Court of Justice" in: Boisson De Chazournes, Laurence & Sands, Philippe, (eds.), International 
Law, The International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 36-51. 
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contradiction between the Court's statement in the Western Sahara Case that: "[i]f the 
question is a legal one which the Court is undoubtedly competent to answer, it may non the 
less decline to do SO,,,181 and its statement in the same opinion that "the reply of the Court, 
itself an organ of the United Nations, represents its participation in the activities of the 
Organization and, in principle, should not be refused." 182 
Judge Abi Saab observed that the Court on the one hand, said that because its power is 
'discretionary' it can decline to give an opinion even if it is competent to do so. On the other 
hand, because it is 'the principal judicial organ' of the UN, the delivery of an opinion 
represents its participation in the work of the UN and so, in the absence of compelling 
contrary reasons it cannot refuse to give an opinion.183 Judge Abi Saab examined the issue of 
whether the Court could exercise an unfettered discretion when exercising its advisory 
function. He concluded that the discretion in question is very far from being unfettered, and 
that it is in fact reduced to: 184 
[A]special duty of vigilance for the Court lest in any advisory proceedings (but also in any 
contentious proceedings) be trespassed those "inherent limitations" of the judicial function 
'which are none the less imperative because they may be difficult to catalogue.' 
In other words, the 'discretionary power' of the Court comes down to no more than a wider 
margin of appreciation of the general considerations of admissibility('recevabilite generale' 
in French) of requests for advisory opinions, considerations whose default would mean that 
answering the question would be incompatible with the judicial function and not merely 
'inopportune' or 'inconvenient' for the Court or for any other instance, and would thus 
constitute one of those "compelling reasons" which alone "should lead [the Court] to refuse 
to give the requested opinion." 
181 IC] Rep., 1975, para. 23, p. 21. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Abi Saab. supra note 180, pp. 42-43. 
184 Ibid. p. 45. See also the written statement of the League of Arab States in Wall Case. available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm. (accessed on 9 December 2004), p. 19. 
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It is argued here that due to the place of the IC] within the UN and its particular 
responsibility to share collectively with the other UN organs in the fulfilment of the tasks 
enumerated in the Charter's provisions, the Court does not enjoy unfettered discretion in 
terms of its advisory jurisdiction. It has a duty to give an advisory opinion whenever possible 
in order to assist the UN in its future course of action. However, the Court's 'discretionary 
power' is "circumscribed by the overriding principle of the Court's duty.,,185 This 
'discretionary power' is then subject to the test of what is compatible with the proper judicial 
function, namely the consideration of 'propriety', but it is not at all an unfettered power. 
Therefore, it has been rightly stated that the apparent meaning of the discretionary language 
of Article 65 is significantly offset by other Charter articles that oblige the organs of the 
United Nations to cooperate with each other. 186 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The potential importance of the advisory function led the drafters of the UN Charter to 
extend the number of bodies authorised to request an advisory opinion, as compared with the 
PCIJ. Some twenty organs and agencies may ask the ICJ for advisory opinions. Although the 
Secretary-General has not hesitated on various occasions to insist upon his right to request an 
advisory opinion, he has not succeeded for reasons suggested earlier. 
The Court's jurisprudence illustrates that, in giving advisory opinions, it is concerned 
about its position and role within the UN as its principal judicial organ. In general terms, the 
Court, when determining its jurisdiction in advisory cases, has adopted a liberal approach 
when the request emanates from UN political organs. However, the Court has been more 
185 Amr, supra note 61, p.l06. 
186 Memorandum of Egypt in the Wall Advisory Opinion p. 15. Available at http://www.icj-
ciLorg/icjwww/idocketJimwp/imwpframe.htm (accessed 16 November 2004) 
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restrictive and cautious when the request for an advisory opinion has come from a specialised 
agency. 
The Court's case law also illustrates that, in exercising its 'discretionary power', it 
accepts its status as a "major participant in the activities of the Organisation and has acted 
accordingly, notwithstanding the permissive nature of Article 65 (1) of its Statute.,,187 The 
Court's discretion is always circumscribed by its duty to act judicially and to preserve its 
autonomy vis-a-vis the UN organs. 
Judge Ruda, in his Separate Opinion, in the Review of Judgement No. 273 Case, was 
conscious to the Court's role and responsibility to the UN system: 188 
The main purpose of the advisory competence of the Court is precisely to assist, on 
legal questions, organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in the 
fulfillment of their functions; such assistance partakes of the very nature of the advisory 
competence. But, as the Court has always remembered, and as it does also in the 
present instance, such competence is discretionary, according to the clear terms of 
Article 65 of the Statute. The discretionary power to give or not to give an advisory 
opinion could have only one purpose, to leave to the Court the power to fix by itself the 
limits of the assistance to be given. Discretionary power means also, by its very nature, 
that there are limits beyond which the assistance should not be given. 
The next two Chapters continue the legal analysis by addressing the following questions: the 
effect of the 'organic relationship' between the Court and the UN on the processes of 
interaction and coordination between them, and the effect of such a link on the judicial 
Character and integrity of the Court. 
187 Weissberg, Guenter, "The Role of the International Court of Justice in the United Nations System: the First 
Quarter Century", in: Gross, Leo, (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice, 1976, p. 137. 
188 ICJ Rep., 1982, p. 377. 
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Chapter Three 
The Role of the ICJ as the Principal Judicial Organ of the UN and the 
Implications of this Role for the Court's Advisory Function 
1. Introduction 
The Court like other UN organs is bound by the purposes and principles of the Charter, l as 
Judge Schwebel writes:2 
In reaching its judgments and advisory opinions, it [the Court] shall take account of 
the generally applicable provisions of the United Nations Charter, particularly its 
Purposes and Principles. That requirement does not detract from the Court's judicial 
character, not only because of the content of those Purposes and Principles (which 
speak, inter alia, of "conformity with the principles of justice and international law") 
but because the States and international organizations which plead before the Court in 
any event are obliged to take account of those Purposes and Principles. 
Both commentators and the Court have stressed the Court's institutional status, arguing that 
its integration within the Organisation structure has had, or should have, primary impact on 
its advisory function. The stress laid by the Court on its institutional status has taken the form 
of assertions that the delivery of an advisory opinion represents the participation of the Court 
in UN activities. Therefore, in the absence of compelling reasons, an opinion ought not to be 
refused.3 Similarly, commentators assert that the Court is primajacie under a duty to 
1 The overarching purpose of the Organisation is the maintenance of international peace and security. This is to 
be achieved by "peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law." See 
Article 1(1) of the UN Charter. See also Shaw, Malcolm N., "The Security Council and the International Court 
of Justice: Judicial Drift and Judicial Function" in: Muller, Sam A., et al., (eds.), The International Court of 
Justice: Its Future Role After Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, 
p. 237; Keith, Kenneth, The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Leyden: 
A.W. Sijthoff, 1971, p. 146. 
2 Schwebel, Stephen, "Relations Between the International Court of Justice and the United Nations" in: Virally, 
Michael M. (ed.), Le Droit International Au Service de La Paix, de La Justice et du Developpement, Paris: A. 
Pedone, 1991,p.434. 
3 See discussion below. 
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cooperate with UN organs by giving requested advisory opinions unless there are compelling 
reasons to the contrary. 
This study contends that the exercise of the advisory function is essentially a two-sided 
process involving "coordination" between other UN organs and the Court.4 Each actor must 
be mindful of the need to achieve the UN's purposes, and at the same time acknowledge the 
necessity for some degree of self-restraint. It follows, therefore, that the coordination 
envisaged emerges from the organisational relationship between the Court and other UN 
organs and should be based on the respective organs' sense of responsibility towards 
realising the purposes of the Organisation in accordance with the Charter and International 
Law. By requesting advisory opinions, the UN organs demonstrate they are concerned about 
the lawfulness of their acts, and by responding to such a request the Court exercises its 
judicial function. The Court coordinates with other organs either by issuing legal opinions, 
thus helping the UN organs to execute their duties, or by evaluating through a type of 
"judicial review", the lawfulness of UN organs' acts which have been already taken. 
This Chapter introduces readers to a variety of questions raised by the Court's view of 
its advisory function, and thus provides a comprehensive background against which 
subsequent Chapters can unfold. 
4 Schwebel argues that "the fact that the Court is a principal organ of the Organization may influence its 
readiness to participate in the work of the Organization particularly insofar as it is requested by other organs to 
render advisory opinions." See Schwebel, supra note 2, p. 434. 
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2. Organisations in General: A Theoretical Perspective 
Depending upon the background and interests of researchers concerned with the dynamics of 
organisations, the emphasis on the dimensions and characteristics of organisations varies 
greatly. Nevertheless, scholars agree that organisations generally develop as instruments for 
attaining specific goals.s Parsons, for example, distinguishes organisations from other social 
collectives by noting that an organisation possesses some purpose or goal. Parsons argues 
that "primacy of orientation to the attainment of a specific goal is used as the defining 
characteristic of an organization which distinguishes it from other types of social systems.,,6 
Sociologists and administrative scientists have argued that, as the environment in which 
an organisation functions becomes more complex, the organisation becomes more 
specialised.7 Thus, each unit within the organisation is given its own task which should 
contribute to the overall shared purpose. This development consequently gives rise to the 
concept of interdependence between the various units of the organisation.s 
Thompson suggests that both the "natural-system and rational models of complex 
organizations assume interdependence of organizational parts." 9 He goes on to argue that: 10 
S See Pfeffer, Jeffrey & Salancik, Gerald R., The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence 
Perspective, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 23-24; Zedeck, Sheldon & Blood, Milton 
R., Foundations of Behavioral Science Research in Organizations, Monterey, California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1974, pp. 25-32; Perrow, Charles, Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View, Great 
Britain: Tavistock Publications, 1970, p. 133; Parsons, Talcott, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 3rd Printing, 1964, pp. 17-19; Bedeian, Arthur G., Organizations: Theory and Analysis, 
The Dryden Press, 2nd edition, 1984, pp. 2-3. 
6 Parsons, supra note 5, pp. 17-19. 
7 Rogers, David L., et aI., Interorganizational Coordination: Theory, Research, and Implementation, Ames: 
Iowa State University Press, 1982, p. 11. 
S The recognition of each unit's domain (domain consensus) leads to interdependence between the various units. 
See Rogers, ibid, p. 10. Thompson argues that "[d]omain consensus defines a set of expectations both for 
members of an organization and for others with whom they interact, about what the organization will and will 
not do. It provides, although imperfectly, an image of the organization's role in a larger system, which in turn 
serves as a guide for the ordering of action in certain directions and not in others." See Thompson, James D., 
Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory, New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1967, p. 29. 
9 Thompson, ibid, p. 54. 
10 Ibid. 
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To assume that an organization is composed of interdependent parts is not necessarily 
to say that each part is dependent on, and supports, every other part in any direct way . 
... Yet they may be interdependent in the sense that unless each performs adequately, 
the total organization is jeopardized; failure of anyone can threaten the whole and 
thus the other parts. 
This argument underlines the importance of coordination between the various parts of an 
organisation in pursuit of their common goals. The UN is no exception. 
3. The United Nations Organisation 
The delegates at San Francisco provided the UN with a decentralised structure laid out in the 
Charter. Thus, the UN is made up of the following principal organs: the General Assembly, 
the Security Council, the ECOSOC, the Trusteeship Council, the Secretariat and the ICl. 
These are called the principal organs of the UN and usually comprise a number of 
committees, subsidiary organs and ad hoc bodies. All UN organs are expected to act within 
the framework of functions and powers conferred on them by the Charter. I I 
The term 'UN system' often refers both to the UN principal organs and the various 
specialised agencies connected to the UN by relationship agreements. Article 57(1) of the 
Charter defines specialised agencies as international organisations that have been established 
by treaties between States and that have been brought into relationship with the UN in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 63 of the Charter. The specialised agencies form a 
decentralised system. They perform global functions as defined in their respective basic 
instruments. At present, there are sixteen specialised agencies which have entered into 
agreements with the UN which determine their degree of closeness to and dependence on the 
Organisation. 12 
11 Idris, Kamil & Bartolo, Michael, A Better United Nations for the New Millennium, The Hague; London: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 16. 
12 For the full names of the specialised agencies see Section II in Chapter Two, supra; See also Simma, Bruno, 
et aI., (eds.) The Charter of The United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 947-950. 
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Judge Bedjaoui has argued that in general the UN is governed by four principles: 13 
• First, a specialisation principle whereby all UN organs are expected to act within the 
framework of functions and powers conferred on them by the Charter. Although the 
Charter delimits the functions and powers for each organ, there still exists some 
overlapping of those functions and powers. 
• Second, a non-subordination principle between the principal organs. Although the 
Charter has delimited the functions and powers for each organ, there is no hierarchical 
order between the principal organs. Each enjoys autonomy while carrying out its special 
mission. 14 
• Third, the competence principle including the Kompetenz-Kompetenz concept. This is the 
logical consequence of the organs' autonomy which is derived from the above 
specialisation and non-subordination principles. Hence each organ may inevitably 
interpret from day to day those provisions of the Charter which concern its activities. IS 
Judge Bedjaoui further maintains that out of this system emerges a fourth principle, a 
coordination principle, which is in tum a logical consequence of the above three principles. 
Judge Bedjaoui argues that Coordnation principle obligates the organs to achieve the overall 
purposes of the UN. 16 
Before discussing what "coordination" might mean in the UN context, it might be 
useful to first summarise what has been written about "coordination" in the field of 
managerial studies. 
13 Bedjaoui, Mohammed, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of its Acts, 
Dordrecht, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 12-13. 
14 Thirlway, Hugh, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 1960-1989" Part Eight, 67, 
BYIL, 1996, p. 39. 
15 UNCIO, 13, p. 831. 
16 Bedjaoui, supra note 13, p. 13. 
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4. Coordination: A Theoretical Perspective 
Robbins defines an organisation as "a consciously coordinated social entity, with a relatively 
identifiable boundary, that functions on a relatively continuous basis to achieve a common 
goal or set of goals." I? He went on to explain that the words 'consciously coordinated' imply 
management, and the term 'social entity' indicates that it is made up of people or groups of 
people who interact with each other within the organisation in premeditated patterns. 18 
Robbins explained that: 19 
[B]ecause organizations are social entities, the interaction patterns of their members 
must be balanced and harmonized to minimize redundancy yet ensure that critical 
tasks are being completed. The result is that ... the need for coordinating the 
interaction patterns of people. 
In general terms coordination20 is the act of working together and thus is a collective 
response involving more than a single unit. 21 The origin and necessity for coordination 
derives from the process of functional differentiation (or specialisation), and integration,22 
and is frequently suggested as a way to make the UN system function better. 23 It has been 
argued that, in the organisational context, coordination can be split up into intra and inter 
organisational coordination.24 Dijkzeul claims that "[i]ntra-organizational coordination 
17 Robbins, Stephen P., Organization Theory: Structure, Design, and Applications, Prentice-Hall International, 
3rd edition, 1990, p. 4. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 To coordinate has been defined as meaning "to place or arrange things in proper position relatively to each 
other and to the system of which they form parts; to bring into order as parts of a whole." See Chisholm. Donald 
W., Informal Organization and the Problem of Coordination, Ph.D. dissertation. University of California, 
Berkeley, 1984, p. 14. 
21 Rogers. David L.. et al., supra note 7, p. 179. 
22 Dijkzeul. Dennis, The Management of Multilateral Organizations. Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997, 
p. 64. This really points to dividing the organisation's goal among its units and how to obtain integration within 
it. See Lawrence, Paul R. & Lorsch, Jay W., "Organizations and Environment: Managing Differentiation and 
Integration" in: Brinkerhoff, Merlin B. & Kunz, Phillip R. (eds.), Complex Organizations and Their 
~nvironments. Dubuque. Iowa: WM. C. Brown Company Publishers. 1972. pp. 249-250. 
Dijkzeul, supra note 22, p. 61. 
24 Ibid. p. 64; See also Rogers, David, et al., supra note 7, p. 11. 
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concerns the control and fine-tuning of the internal work flows of one organization.,,25 This 
fine tuning takes into consideration the shared task between the involved units, which is to be 
realised in accordance with created and/or existing decision rules established to deal 
collectively with the shared task.26 
Despite the unique aspects which distinguish coordination from other forms of 
interaction, coordination has sometimes been seen as synonymous with, or defined in terms 
of cooperation.27 However, specialists have shown that cooperation and coordination differ in 
terms of, first, the existence of decision rules (in the case of coordination) and, second the 
kind of goals that are emphasised. It has been suggested that the goals involved in 
cooperation are likely to be comparatively vague and the tasks less clearly delimited. 
Moreover, the outcomes of coordination and cooperation are different. With cooperation, 
participants seek to accomplish respective individual goals. Moreover, cooperation is more 
likely to be characterised by informal trade offs and attempts to establish reciprocity in the 
absence of rules.28 With coordination the outcomes might be different to the initially 
preferred ones. Coordination is usually more formal than cooperation and may involve 
contractual agreements. Dijkzeul argues that "[ c ]oordination is more limited, it concerns 
systematically ordered forms of cooperation. Hence it often becomes more formalized than 
most other forms of cooperation.,,29 
To sum up: cooperation has been defined as "[b]ehaviors that occur when it is 
perceived that the goals of the self and others are compatible and in which individuals 
25 Dijkzeul. supra note 22. p. 64. 
26 Rogers. David. et al .• supra note 7. pp. 12-13. 
27 Deware. Robert & Aiken. Michael. et al., Coordinating Human Services. San Francisco. London: Jossey-
Bass Publishers, 1975, pp. 7-16; Rogers, David et al., supra note 7. p. 12. 
28 Schermerhorn. John R., "Determinants of Interorganizational Cooperation", 18 Academy of Management 
Journal, 1975, pp. 846-856. 
29 Dijkzeul. Supra note 22. p. 64. 
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believe they are benefiting both themselves and others.,,3o By contrast, coordination differs 
from cooperation in two important aspects: first, the decision rules (or agreement) can be 
developed by the participants or mandated by a third party and second, the participants 
decisions are made with regard to their shared task environment and the focus is upon the 
attainment of collective goals, not those of the individual participants. 
The above discussion suggests several requisites for achieving successful coordination. 
First, the various units involved in coordination are not expected to be competitors or 
mutually antagonistic.31 Second, common purposes and shared goals are fundamental to the 
coordination process. Third, the existence of an agreement in which formal rules and joint 
goals are stated is usually a fundamental requirement.32 
Scholars agree that coordination can be accomplished through several strategies,33 and 
that the use of possible coordination mechanisms is contingent on the practical situation.34 
Moreover, the kind of mechanisms and the timing of their use "will constitute an important 
variable in the explanation of the degree and success of coordination.,,35 At any rate, various 
forms of coordination mechanism can be applied simultaneously and in different 
combinations.36 The major factor which may impede or hamper coordination is the need for 
mutual adjustment between the coordinating units. Coordination necessarily implies a loss of 
autonomy and therefore a loss of power for participants.37 The strategic implication of 
placing a high value on autonomy results in an implicit hierarchy of preferred alternative 
30 Greenberg, Jerald & Baron, Robert A., Behavior in Organizations, Prentice Hall, 8th edition, 2003, p. 412. 
31 Rogers, supra note 7, p. 7. 
32 Ibid, p. 13. 
33 Ibid, pp. 17-26. 
34 D"k I IJ zeu, supra note 22, p. 71. 
35 Ibid, p. 71. 
36 Ibid, p. 66. 
37 Ibid, p. 65. 
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strategies where the most preferred are proprietary ones because "these maintain possession 
and control over resources and protect boundaries.,,38 On the other hand, it has been 
suggested that the quest for survival by an organisation is the prime factor motivating 
coordination.39 This includes situations in which an organisation seeks to forestall or prevent 
future crisis which may imperil its success or even continuation.4o 
Approaching the ICJ for an advisory opinion represents one of the coordination 
strategies between UN organs. Both the requesting organ and the Court are concerned about 
achieving UN goals and the proper functioning of the Organisation, in conformity with the 
Charter and the principles of general International Law. It is suggested that the institutional 
relationship between the Court and the other UN organs should facilitate coordination among 
them to achieve the overall purposes of the UN. However, it is at the same time expected that 
UN political organs might view a request for an advisory opinion as a threat to their 
autonomy. Judge Bedjaoui has argued that for the political organs, and especially for the 
Security Council, consulting the Court would be incompatible with their autonomy to 
determine their own powers.41 In general, the political organs may consider that reference to 
the Court would make them subordinate to an outside organ.42 This is because of doubts 
concerning the effect of such a request upon their capacity or competence to continue to 
consider, or seek to resolve, a particular issue. 
38 Rogers, supra note 7, p. 11,27. 
39 Rogers, supra note 7, p. 54. 
40 Ibid, p. 54. 
41 B d' , e JaoUl, supra note 13, p. 19. 
42 Ibid. 
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5. The Organisational Relationship between the ICJ and the UN: Its Implications for 
the Court's Readiness to Participate in the UN Activities43 
As indicated in Chapter One, the relationship of the ICI to the UN differs from that of its 
predecessor to the League because the pcn was not an organ of the League. By contrast, the 
ICI is the UN's principal judicial organ.44 Jt functions in accordance with the terms of its 
Statute, and "forms an integral part of the present Charter." The legal relationship between 
the ICI and the UN is regulated not only by the provisions of the Charter but also by 
interorganisational agreements concluded in accordance with those provisions.45 
For Keith, the 'organic relationship' between the Court and the UN is important 
because it highlights the closeness of the connection of the Court to the remainder of the UN 
structure. He argues that the closer this connection is, the more likely it is that the Court 
would give an opinion where it would be of great value to the Organisation, despite the 
Court's absolute discretion under the Statute.46 This relationship strongly inclines the Court 
to answer a request for an opinion. Simma and others claim that "the advisory function of the 
ICJ, even more than its activities in contentious disputes, marks its role as one of the 
43 This Section is only concerned with the effect of this relationship on the Court's advisory function. 
For a detailed discussion about the consequences of the institutional relationship upon both the Court and the 
UN, see Amr, Mohamed S., The Role of the International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of 
the United Nations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, pp. 26-41. 
44 See Articles 7 and 92 of the UN Charter and Article 1 of the Statute. 
45 See Articles 34(1), 34(2), 92, 93, 94,and 96 of the UN Charter. See also the relationships agreements between 
the UN and the Specialised Agencies especially clauses providing for furnishing information to be provided to 
the ICJ. However, all the agreements except that with the Universal Postal Union authorise the agency to 
request advisory opinion of the ICI on any legal question arising within the scope of their activities. See Sands, 
Philippe & Klein Pierre, Bowett's Law of International Institutions, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th edition, 
2001, pp. 78-81 
46 Kieth, supra note 1, p. 146. Fitzmaurice argued on behalf of the United Kingdom in the Peace Treaties Case 
that the Court is organically and constitutionally linked to the UN. Therefore the Court is the organ to which the 
UN and other organs are entitled to refer for purposes of legal advice. This is "subject, therefore, to the inherent 
right of the Court as a court, and therefore as independent, and as the highest international tribunal in the world, 
to decline to give an opinion in a case where the Court itself considered that it would be wrong for it to do so, I 
respectfully submit, subject to those reservations, that the Court has unquestionably a right, and (with the same 
limits) an obligation, to give an opinion if it possibly can." ICI Pled., 1950, p. 306. 
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principal organs of the UN.,,47 The Court, through its advisory function, has demonstrated its 
willingness to carry out its task of assisting the UN by complying with duly made requests.48 
Judge Bedjaoui suggests that the Court has been assisting the political organs by rendering 
advisory opinions which take "into account its preoccupations or difficulties of the moment 
and by selecting, from all possible interpretations of the Charter, the one which best serves 
the actions and objectives of the political organ concerned.,,49 
Klabbers, moreover, upholds the view that "[w]ithout having the needs of the 
organization in view, advocacy of the implied powers doctrine simply falls flat, and has little 
to offer: its attraction resides precisely in its being hooked up with a normative 
proposition.,,5o He went on to state that the concept of functional necessity "is biased in 
favour of international organizations, and therewith based on the view that international 
organizations are a good thing.,,51 This view is clearly asserted in the Application for Review 
of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Advisory Opinion where 
the Court stated: 52 
The stability and efficiency of the international organizations, of which the United 
Nations is the supreme example, are however of such paramount importance to world 
order, that the Court should not fail to assist a subsidiary body of the United Nations 
General Assembly in putting its operation upon a firm and secure foundation. 
47 Simma, Bruno etal. (eds.), supra note 12, p. 1182. 
48 Ibid, p. 1182. 
49 Bedjaoui, supra note 13, p. 22. 
so Klabbers, Jan, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002, p. 41; For the discussion of the implied powers doctrine see Section 2.2 in Chapter Six, infra. 
51 Klabbers, ibid, p. 37. 
52 The Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case, ICI 
Rep., 1982, p. 347. Along the same theme Schwarzenberger suggested that in the advisory opinion on 
Reparations for Injuries, the Court resisted the suggestion to base the competence of the United Nations to 
bring international protection to its officials on the grounds of diplomatic protection, and based such 
competence on the more secure ground of the interpretation of the Charter. Schwarzenberger, Georg, 
International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, London: Stevens & Sons, 1957, p. 64. 
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Nevertheless, as will be made clear throughout this thesis,53 the Court while responsive to the 
needs of the Organisation has not been subordinate to any external authority in the exercise 
of its judicial function.54 
The Court in several advisory opinions has emphasised its perception of its role as the 
UN's principal judicial organ.55 In its most recent advisory opinion the, Legal Consequences 
a/the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,s6 the Court reiterated its 
view of its role as an organ ofthe UN. It was contended that the Court should decline to give 
the requested advisory opinion on the basis, inter alia, of the Status of Eastern Carelia Case. 
The Court however, stated that: 57 
The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in 
contentious cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory proceedings even 
where the Request for an Opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between 
States. The Court's reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding 
force. It follows that no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can 
prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to be 
desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take. 
The Court's Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to 
request it; the reply of the Court, itself an 'organ of the United Nations', represents its 
participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be 
refused. 
In the above passage the Court made five important points:58 first, it declared that "the reply 
of the Court, itself an 'organ of the United Nations' represents its participation in the 
activities of the Organization", second, the reply "in principle, should not be refused", third, 
53 The following three Chapters deal extensively with the impact of the institutional link on the Court's view of 
its advisory function. 
54 Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, The Hague, London: 
Martinus NijnhoffPublishers, 1997, p. 139. 
55 See Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five of this thesis. 
S6 H . f . d "h erema ter clte as: t e Wall Case", available at: 
http://www.icj-ciLorg/icjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm. (accessed 21 October 2004) 
57 See Para. 47 of the Court's Opinion. For the facts of the Eastern Carelia Case, See Chapter Four, infra. 
S8 For a similar line of discussion see Gross, Leo, "The International Court of Justice and the United Nations", 
120 RCADI, 1967. p. 339. 
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the reply "is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force", fourth, it follows 
that "no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an 
Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain 
enlightenment as to the course of action it should take." Lastly, that while the consent of 
States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases, the 
situation is different with advisory proceedings. 
Relying on the Court's dicta and on the fact that the Court is a principal organ of the 
UN and, consequently, has a duty to attain the UN goals, Rosenne, Azvedo, Kieth and 
Pomerance have argued that the Court, in its advisory procedure, must cooperate with fellow 
organs unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. Rosenne has argued that the 
Court, in exercising its judicial function of deciding a dispute or in giving an advisory 
opinion, must "co-operate in the attainment of the aims of the Organization and strive to give 
effect to the decisions of other principal organs, and not to achieve results which would 
render them inconsequential."s9 Judge Azevedo, in the Peace Treaties Case, pointed out that 
"the Court, which has been raised to the status of the principal organ and thus more closely 
geared into the mechanism of the U.N.O, must do its utmost to co-operate with the other 
organs with a view to attaining the aims and principles that have been set forth.,,6o Keith also 
suggested that "[t]he Court as a principal organ of the Organization is under a general 
obligation to cooperate whenever possible with the other organs and with member States in 
the attempted attainment of their objects.,,61 Pomerance argues that the status of the Court as 
59 Rosenne, supra note 54, p. 112. 
: S~p. Op. of judge Azevedo, leI Rep., 1950, p. 82. 
Kleth, supra note I, p. 146. 
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the principal UN judicial organ "would significantly influence the way the Court viewed its 
advisory task; it would provide the basis for judicial 'duty -to-eo-operate' doctrine.,,62 
A careful study of the commentators' views indicates that the UN purposes, as a shared 
goal for all the UN organs including the Court itself, means that the Court is under a 'duty to 
cooperate' with the other UN organs. However, one could argue that 'cooperation' may not 
be the proper expression to use.63 The foregoing analysis of the concept of coordination 
suggests that when some legal writers state that the Court must cooperate with the other UN 
organs in attaining the Organisation's aims, they really mean coordination. 
It is submitted that UN organs must coordinate in order to achieve the interests of the 
Organisation even if this interest clashes, on occasion, with the interest of the individual 
organ. On the other hand, the Court, if circumstances so require, ought to coordinate with the 
other organs in attaining the Organisation's objects, especially if giving an opinion would 
contribute to the smooth running of the Organisation. Therefore, international organisations 
should make full use of the advisory function, taking into account the safeguards 
recommended at San Francisco. Coordination among UN member States and between the 
organs themselves will give the Court the chance to meet the demands of the international 
community by either clarifying important legal issues for future courses of action or by 
ensuring the lawfulness of UN decisions. The latter aspect of the Court's coordination 
constitutes the material of the following Section. 
62 Pomerance, Michla, "The Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice and its 'Judicial' Character: 
Past and Future Prisms", in: Muller, Sam A. et al (eds.), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role 
Aft.er Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1997, p. 290. 
6 See discussion above. 
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6. "Judicial Review" as a New Direction 
Despite the wide powers with which the Charter entrusts the two principal political organs, 
and despite the assertion in the Charter that Security Council measures should be compatible 
with UN purposes and principles, the Charter and the Statute of the Court lack any 
mechanism to determine compatibility.64 Of course, as the great majority of scholars agree,65 
the UN organs, including the Security Council, are limited by law and by the purposes and 
principles of the UN.66 The IC], for its part has also asserted that the powers of the political 
organs are limited by the Charter. In the Admissions Case, and in replying to the argument 
put before the Court that the General Assembly and the Security Council have complete 
freedom in regard to the admission of new members to the Organisation, the Court stated:67 
[T]he political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the 
treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its 
powers or criteria for its judgment. To ascertain whether an organ has freedom of 
choice for its decisions, reference must be made to the terms of its constitution. 
64 It was suggested that in the absence of any express provision authorising '~udicial review", this power cannot 
be implied. See Skubiszewski, Krzysztof, "The International Court of Justice and the Security Council" in: 
Lowe, Vaughan, & Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (eds.) Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essay in 
Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 623. 
65 Bedjaoui, supra note 13, p. 35; Brownlie, Ian, " The Decisions of Political Organs of the United Nations and 
the Rule of Law" in: Macdonald, R. (ed.) Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, Dordrecht; London: M. Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1994, p. 102; Shaw, supra note I, p. 225; Judge Fitzmaurice also argued that the limitations on the 
powers of the Security Council "are necessary because of the all too great ease with which any acutely 
controversial international situation can be represented as involving a latent threat to peace and security, even 
where it is really too remote genuinely to constitute one. Without these limitations, the functions of the Security 
Council could be used for purposes never originally intended." See Diss. Op. of Judge Fitzmaurice in the 
Namibia Case, ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 294. Contrary to these views, see D' Angelo who argued that the Security 
Council must have absolute freedom to take the appropriate resolutions without "impediment" as any review by 
the Court frustrates the purposes of the UN. D'Angelo, Deborah, "The "Check" on International Peace and 
Security Maintenance: The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review of Security Council Resolutions", 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 2000, p. 590. 
66 See Article 1 (1) concerning the purposes of the UN which provides that one of the aims of the Organisation is 
"to bring about by peaceful means in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment 
or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace." Article 24(2) of 
the UN Charter which provides that the "Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations." 
67 ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 64. 
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Therefore, the issue examined in the following Section is not whether the UN is bound by the 
law or the Charter, rather the focus is on the Court's role in determining the compatibility of 
the UN organs' acts with International Law and with the Charter. 
6.1 The Complexities of 'Judicial Review' 
The extent to which the Court may exercise a judicial review function is the subject of 
extensive debate. Although the ICI enjoys a very special status within the UN, it functions in 
accordance with its Statute which is annexed to the Charter and forms "an integral part" of it, 
however, there are no express provisions in the Statute authorising the IC] to review the 
decisions of the UN's political organs. The San Francisco Conference rejected Belgium's 
suggestion that the IC] should be granted the power of 'judicial review', and decided instead 
that each organ of the UN would be responsible for interpreting the provisions of the Charter 
applicable to its particular function. 68 
Rosenne asserts that proposals for judicial review must consider the following 
questions: the meaning of the expression,69 who is to initiate review proceedings and who 
68 UNCIO, 13, 1945, pp. 709-710; Watson, Geoffrey R., "Constitutionaism, Judicial Review, and the World 
Court", 34 HfU, 1993, p. 13. In the same context, the Court has also asserted, on more than one occasion, that 
it is not a constitutional court. In the Expenses Case, the Court asserted the fact that proposals made during the 
drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret the charter in the ICJ were not accepted. See, 
ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 168. The Court has asserted the same meaning in the Namibia Case, ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 45; 
Sep. Op. of Judge De Castro, ICJ, Rep., 1971, p. 180. 
69 The concept of judicial review, in general, has been defined by Kaikobad as: 
[T]he power of a court or a system of courts to examine an act of either a constitutional organ of 
government, or of a statutory body or official thereof, with a view to determining whether or not the 
act is consistent with the provisions of the constitutions, a statue or statues or other sources of law 
and/or whether the said act is void and thus incapable of producing any lawful effect. Where the Court 
is satisfied that the act is in violation of the law, constitutional or otherwise, the decision of the court 
will have the effect of nullifying the offending act; but direct formal annulment is not crucial to the 
notion of judicial review. 
See Kaikobad, Kaiyan H., The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review: A Study of the Court's 
Powers with Respect to Judgments of the fLO and UN Administrative Tribunals, The Hague; London: Kluwer 
Law International, 2000, p.11. Moreover Amr defined this concept as "a judicial body within a legal system of 
the community reviews the legality of the decisions and acts of the executive and legislative organs in the light 
of the existing rules of law and the provisions of the constitution that regulate their functions either directly or 
indirectly." See Amr, supra note 43, p. 290. 
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might be the respondent. Rosenne argues that the Court's Statute does not permit the Court to 
become a 'constitutional court' as "[i]t is neither in a position of superiority nor in one of 
inferiority in relation to the others.,,7o Indeed, one must recognise that the UN Charter is not a 
constitution with a system of checks and balances71 and the IC] is not a 'constitutional court' 
regardless of the fact that it has been described as the guardian of legality for the 
international community as a whole.72 The absence of hierarchy among the six principal 
organs of the UN and the nature of the decisions adopted by the Court indicates that the 
Court lacks the power to annul the acts of the UN organs.73 
In responding to those who claim that the IC] may assume the power of judicial review, 
by analogy to the Marbury v. Madison Case in the US,74 it must be said that the IC] is not in 
the same position as a supreme court in a national constitutional structure.75 In a word, the 
system of judicial review as understood in municipal law is, to some extent, difficult to apply 
at the international level. 76 
70 Rosenne, Shabtai, The World Court: What It Is and How It Works, Dordrecht, London: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995, p. 36; Malanczuk, Peter, "Reconsidering the Relationship Between the ICI and the Security 
Councir' in: Heere, Wybo P. (ed.), International Law and the Hague's 75(jh Anniversary, T.M.C Asser Press, 
1999, p. 88. 
71 Reisman, Michael, "The Constitutional Crises in the United Nations", 87 AJIL, 1993, p. 95. 
72 Sep. Op. of Judge Lachs, ICJ Rep., 1992, p. 138. 
73 See Kaikobad Kaiyan who argues that the Court's judgments are binding only on the States which agree to 
put a dispute before the Court, therefore, these decisions cannot produce direct legal effects in terms of 
nullification of any act of an international organisation. On the other hand he continued to say that the same 
r,ropositions apply to advisory opinions which are non-binding. See Kaikobad, supra note 69, pp. 45-46. 
4 This case has introduced the system of ''judicial review" into the American court. See Reisman, Michael, 
supra note 71, p. 92; Watson, supra note 68, pp. 1-45. 
75Brownlie, Ian, "The United Nations as a Form of Government" in: Fawcett, I. & Higgins, Rosalyn (eds.), 
International Organization: Law in Movement. Essays in Honour of John McMahon, Oxford University Press. 
1974. p. 26; Malanczuk, supra note 71, p. 97. 
76 In this sense Kaikobad Kaiyan argues that: 
Any attempt to transpose the municipal notions of judicial review onto the plane of international law 
must take into account not only the fact that most international legal concepts, principles and institutions 
are different from national legal system. It is also important to bear in mind that the notion in municipal 
law is itself beset with so many variations in nature [and] scope. 
Kaikobad defines 'judicial review' in terms of international law as: 
[T]he power of an international tribunal to pass upon questions dealing with the validity of international 
institutions action and decisions in the light of various principles of law, but mainly those originating in 
the relevant constitutive instruments of international organizations. 
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On the other hand, and while denying the possibility of applying the system of "judicial 
review" as known in domestic law to the UN system, one must acknowledge that it is 
difficult to have "any real democratization of the United Nations without raising inter alia 
the fundamental problem of controlling the acts of the political organs, above all of the 
kingpin, the Security Council.,,77 In order to ensure the rule of law, UN decisions must be 
compatible with the law. Therefore, some sort of mechanism to assess legality must be 
evolved. 
6.2 'Judicial review' within the Coordination Context 
Some writers refer to the possibility of utilising the ICJ to render advisory opinions on the 
political organs' interpretation of the Charter and on the validity of UN organs' resolutions.78 
They suggest that the advisory function might "provide an indirect path to a judicial 
supervision of the decisions of organs of the UN and other international organisations.,,79 
Judge Alvarez has also noted that the failure to use the device of the advisory opinion to 
determine the legality of UN organs' acts seems to be "short-sighted" in view of the 
importance of the advisory jurisdiction in developing the institutional law of the UN.8o 
Despite Judge Alvarez's recognition of the potential importance of the use of advisory 
opinions to restrain the actions of UN organs, he maintained that the Court cannot effectively 
review Security Council decisions due to the non-binding nature of its advisory opinions.8! 
See Kaikobad, supra note 69, p. 27. 
77 Bedjaoui, supra note 13, p. 7. 
78 Elias has argued that "the Intcrnational Court of Justice should, to the extcnt of its power of review, be able to 
say whether or not one of the principal organs has acted ultra vires in any given case, albeit by way of an 
advisory opinion only." See Elias, Taslim 0., New Horizons in International Law, Dobbs Ferry, New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1979, p. 89. 
79 Gras, A., "Concerning the Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice", in: Friedmann, Wolfgang, et 
al., (eds.), Transnational Law in Changing Society: Essays in Honour of Philip C. Jessup, 1972, p. 324. 
:~ Alvarez, Jose E., "Judging the Security Council", 90 AJIL, 1996, p. 8. 
Ibid, p. 5. 
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However, some commentators argue that the determination by the Court through an advisory 
opinion that a particular decision of an organ was illegal, would undermine the legitimacy of 
that decision and weaken its claim for compliance.82 To borrow the words of Schermers and 
Blokker, "[f]or all practical purposes, an advisory opinion holding a UN decision illegal will 
have the same effect as an annulment.,,83 
In practice, as Section 6.3 will demonstrate the political organs have used the device of 
the advisory opinion to obtain an interpretation of the Charter several times. Nevertheless, it 
is unrealistic to expect any reference for an advisory opinion to be made by the organs when 
a legal argument is raised against one of their own decisions or proposed decisions. These 
organs are unlikely to encourage the practice of 'judicial review', even on a non-binding 
basis.84 This might explain why some organs seem to be wary of the Court. In this regard, 
Rosenne argues that one of the considerations which has led the Security Council not to 
request advisory opinions are doubts concerning the effect of such a request upon a continued 
consideration of an issue by the Council. 85 
However, '~udicial review" can still be used to set legal limits upon UN organs' 
decisions. Even though the Court cannot give an opinion on its own initiative and given the 
fact that organs may be hesitant to ask for an advisory opinion if the risk of embarrassment is 
great,86 the Court, through the indirect use of its advisory function, might stilI be able to 
82 De Wet, Erika, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council, Oxford; Portland Oregon: 
Hart Publishing, 2004, p. 58; Schweigman, David, "The Authority o/the Security Council Under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice", The Hague; London; Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 278. 
83 Schermers, Henry & BIokker, Niels, International Institutional Law, The Hague; London; Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 576. In fact the lack of powers of annulment by the Court ought not to be seen as 
necessarily weakening the notion of judicial review because this incapacity is not a crucial issue here. 
84 Schachter, Oscar, .. The United Nations Law", 88 AJIL, 1994, p. 8. 
8S Rosenne, supra note 54, p. 144. See also, Section 5 in Chapter Nine, infra. It is interesting to note that the 
Security Council has just once approached the Court for an advisory opinion. See the Namibia Case in Section 
6.3 below. 
86 Alvarez, supra note 80, p. 8. 
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challenge the legality of UN organs' decisions. Thus one organ could properly ask for an 
interpretation of the decision of another organ by requesting an advisory opinion. 
Judge Higgins foresaw this eventuality and speculated on the possibility that the 
General Assembly "if aggrieved at certain decisions of the Security Council, [could] ask for 
an Advisory Opinion on whether they were lawful." Higgins would leave it to the Court to 
decide whether it wished to exercise its discretion by answering the question put to it.87 
Similarly Judge Alvarez suggests that the General Assembly might conceivably request an 
advisory opinion on the congruency of a sanctions regime established by the Council with the 
corpus of existing human rights law, or that the WHO might request an opinion of the Court 
on the health impact of a particular sanctions regime, or that ECOSOC might seek an opinion 
on the economic effects.88 Further one can imagine the General Assembly requesting an 
advisory opinion on the abuse of the veto power by Security Council Permanent Members. 
Such coordination among organs requesting opinions concerning the compatibility of certain 
acts with the law "might create a kind of control upon the acts of the GA and the SC, thereby 
helping to protect the institutional life of the organization.,,89 
Through its advisory opinions and by exercising its judicial function the Court could 
then pass on the validity of challenged acts. In this context Shaw argues that, "[ w ] here the 
Court considers that it flows from the proper exercise of its judicial function, the Court may 
assert the competence to examine thoroughly particular resolutions.,,9o As argued previously, 
87 Higgins, Rosalyn, "A comment on the current health of Advisory Opinions", in Lowe, Vaughan & 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert 
Jennings, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1996, p. 577. 
88 Alvarez, supra note 80, p. 9, note 49. 
89 Amr, supra note 43, p. 72. In accordance with Article 12 (1) of the Charter, the General Assembly is 
prohibited from dealing with any dispute or situation, that is currently, before the Security Council. As a 
consequence of this Article if a matter is on the Security Council's agenda, the General Assembly cannot 
~scuss the matter, or request an advisory opinion from the ICI. See Amr, ibid, p. 73. 
Shaw, supra note 1, p. 257. 
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UN organs have a duty to respect the law and this duty "is capable of judicial determination 
and is part of the function of the Court.,,91 Shaw conceives that this judicial determination 
could be achieved with care and respect for the other principal organs and in "spirit of co-
operation and in the light of the subjection of all UN organs to the Charter.,,92 Because the 
ICJ was established as the principal judicial organ within the UN, it has ajudicial duty to 
achieve UN purposes. Moreover, Skubiszewski has noted that the contemporary perspective 
of the problem of ')udicial review" might be achieved in a different perspective. Thus he 
proposed that: 93 
[T]o achieve this we need a more coherent system of dispute management and 
settlement. One element of building such a system would be a better definition of the 
place the Court would have in it, a place of less isolation and more links and co-
ordination with other modes and institutions. The Court would here be conceived as 
constituting part of a process of settlement without detracting from, and 
complementing, the traditional adjudication as an autonomous means where one party 
wins and the other loses. 
In the final analysis, the need to assure the legality of the UN acts cannot be achieved without 
the active participation of its organs, member States and the Court itself. The Court as the 
principal judicial organ of the UN is in a position to carry out this task through its advisory 
opinions, and therefore Judge Bedjaoui suggests that it is for the Court "to develop its 
advisory role and to go beyond the mere interpretation of the Charter in order to broach 
questions of legality-control if it has the conviction that it is thereby assisting the organ in 
question and contributing to the proper functioning of the United Nations.,,94 The Court 
within the framework of its advisory function "could give an opinion not only on 
interpretation of the Charter but also on any questions with bearing upon the assessment of 
91 Skubiszewski, supra note 64, p. 627. 
92 Shaw, supra note I, p. 257. 
93 Skubiszewski, supra note 64, p. 629. 
94 Bedjaoui, supra note 13, p. 86. 
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the validity of the acts of the political organs. From that angle, the Court is on a par (so far as 
the scope of its advisory jurisdiction is concerned) with the tribunals of broad contentious 
jurisdiction created by the most highly integrated organizations.,,95 
Therefore, coordination is a prerequisite in order to use advisory jurisdiction as a route 
for controlling the acts of the political organs. Any request for an advisory opinion needs the 
required votes of the majority in the General Assembly and the non-use of the veto by the 
Permanent Security Council Members. Unless this pre condition is satisfied a political organ 
can never be brought before the Court for the interpretation of a Charter text shedding light 
on the validity of a proposed decision.96 Of course, the Court as a principal judicial organ of 
the UN must continue to assist the UN organs and consequently "contribute to the proper 
functioning" of the various organs by providing "useful" answers to the questions put to it.'.97 
In this connection, it is interesting to note that despite scholarly controversy, the 
Court's jurisprudence provide several examples of the use of ')udicial review", and, perhaps, 
precedents upon which its expanded use could be justified. 
6.3 The Advisory Function as a Route for 'Judicial Review': Some Case Studies 
This Section demonstrates how in practice the Court through its advisory opinions has dealt 
with questions of compatibility with the UN Charter. In this sense one must distinguish 
between situations in which there is an explicit request to pass upon the validity of an act of 
an organ or specialised agency, and second, where there is no such request but the Court 
passes on the validity while executing its judicial function. In the first case, it is obvious that 
the source of the power for testing the validity is clear: a definite request by the concerned 
95 Ibid, p. 85. In the above text the author was referring to the system of judicial review in the European system. 
96 Bedjaoui, supra note 13, p. 81. 
97 Ibid, p. 86. 
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organ. Instances of such requests include the 1960 Constitution of the Maritime Safety 
Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation Case,98 and the 
1955 Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the 
Territory of South-West Africa Case.99 
As for the second situation, the Court's power to pronounce on the validity of an act of 
a UN organ emerges from the fact that nobody can place any limitations on the Court when it 
is deliberating and formulating its answer to admissible question. As Rao observed "[ilt thus 
appears quite conceivable to acknowledge that the exercise of the judicial function of the IC] 
could some times result in judicial review."loo Cases relating to this second situation might 
include the 1962 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article17, Paragraph 2, of the 
Charter) Case,101 and the 1971 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276( 1970) Case. 102 One example from the first situation (IMCO) and two examples from the 
second situation will be discussed to shed light on the way the Court has dealt with the 
question of compatibility with the UN Charter or with a constituent instrument of a 
specialised agency. 
98 Hereinafter cited as: "the IMea Case", IeJ Rep., 1960, p. 150. 
99 In this case the question posed was whether "Rule F' formulated by the Assembly in Resolution 844 (IX) 
with respect to the voting procedure relating to questions and petitions on South Africa, was consistent with the 
Court's earlier advisory opinion of the 1950 International Status of South West Africa Case where the Court had 
held that the degree of supervision effected by the General Assembly must not exceed that which was applied in 
the Mandate system under the League". The Court decision was that "Rule F' was consistent with its previous 
advisory opinion. IC] Rep., 1955, p. 75 
100 Rao, Pemmaraju Sreenivasa, "The United Nations and International Peace and Security- An Indian 
Perspective" in: Tomuschat, Christian (ed.), The United Nations at Age Fifty: A Legal Perspective, Kluwer Law 
International, 1995, p. 179; Judge Morelli also argues that "[ilt is exclusively for the Court to decide, in the 
process of its reasoning, what are the questions which have to be solved in order to answer the question 
submitted to it." He also argued that the requesting organ cannot "place any limitations on the Court as regards 
the logical processes to be followed in answering it.. .. Any limitation of this kind would be unacceptable 
because it would prevent the Court from performing its task in a logically correct way." IC] Rep., 1962, p. 217. 
101 H . fi . d h erema ter cite as: lit e Expenses Case" IC] Rep 1962 p 151 
102 ' .".. 
Hereinafter cited as: "the Namibia Case", IC] Rep., 1971, p. 16. 
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6.3.1 The 1960 IMCO Case 103 
The Court here exercised the power of 'judicial review' over the acts of one of the 
Specialised Agencies (!MCO) now (!MO). This Case involved the interpretation of Article 
28(9) of the !MCO Convention after the failure of the !Meo Assembly to elect Liberia and 
Panama to the Maritime Safety Committee.104 This failure led to controversy over the 
interpretation of Article 28 of the Convention. Article 28(9) laid down the rules to be 
followed for electing members of the Committee. Under this article the Assembly had to 
elect the eight largest ship-owning nations. Liberia and Panama were among the first eight on 
the relevant list of registered tonnage of !MCO Members. 105 Therefore, the !MeO Assembly 
raised the question as to whether !MeO, by refusing to elect Liberia and Panama, had acted 
in accordance with the Convention. 
The Court examined the meaning of the terms "elected" and "the largest ship-owning 
nations" and concluded that "ship-owning nations" refers to registered tonnage, so that the 
largest ship-owning nations are those which have the largest registered ship tonnage. 106 
Therefore, the Court held that "the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization, which was elected on 15 January 1959, was not 
constituted in accordance with the Convention for the Establishment of the Organization.,,107 
Although the Court was unable directly to nullify the election itself, this Opinion led to 
a substantial revision of the Agency's constituent instrument and to its transformation from 
103ICJ Rep., 1960, p. 150. The question posed was "[i]s the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, which was elected on 15 January 1959, constituted in 
accordance with the Convention for the Establishment of the Organization? Ibid, p. 15. 
104 Ibid, p. 155. 
IDS L'b' h' d d P . I ena was t Ir an anama eighth on the list 
106 CJ . I Rep., 1960, p. 170. 
107 ICJ Rep., 1960, p. 171. 
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an advisory body to an organisation with executive powers. !Os It was further decided to 
constitute a new Maritime Safety Committee in accordance with Article 28 of the 
Convention as interpreted by the IC] in its Opinion. 
6.3.2 The 1962 Certain Expenses of the UN Case109 
The central question in this case, discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six, was whether the 
expenditure as authorised by the General Assembly, in relation to UN peacekeeping 
operations in the Congo and in the Middle East, constituted "expenses of the organisation." 
This question was not directed to the validity of the General Assembly resolutions which had 
led to the establishment of the peacekeeping forces. This is evident from the General 
Assembly rejection of the French amendment to the resolution requesting an advisory 
opinion which had called for a ruling as to whether the resolutions authorising the 
expenditures were decided in conformity with the Charter. 110 Nevertheless, the Court was 
convinced that in order to answer the question put to it, it had to review the resolutions 
authorising the expenditures. The Court stated that: 111 
The rejection of the French amendment does not constitute a directive to the Court to 
exclude from its consideration the question whether certain expenditures were 
"decided on in conformity with the Charter, if the Court finds such consideration 
appropriate. It is not to be assumed that the General. Assembly would thus seek to 
fetter or hamper the Court in the discharge of its functions; the Court must have full 
liberty to consider all relevant data available to it in forming an opinion on a question 
posed to it for an advisory opinion 
108 Rosenne, Shabtai, "The Perplexities of Modern International Law", 291 RCAD!, 2001. p. 454. footnote 832. 
Lauterpacht, Elihu, "The Legal Effect of Illegal Acts of International Organizations" in: Cambridge Essays in 
International Law. Essays in Honour of Lord McNair, London: Stevens and Sons, 1965, pp. 100-103. 
109 ICJ Rep., 1962. For details about the fact of this case and its significant impact on the scope of the General 
Assembly's powers vis-a.-vis the Security Council, see Chapter Six, infra. 
110 Judge Bedjaoui argues that even when the Court is called upon to examine only certain aspects of a problem. 
"it is not required to shut its eyes to any part of the relevant legal background." Bedjaoui, supra note 13. p. 86. 
111 ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 157. 
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The Court examined the resolutions which established the UN Emergency Force in the 
Middle East (UNEF) and concluded that they were valid. 1l2 However, the Court in this case 
endorsed" a presumption of validity" for decisions taken by the political organs whenever 
these decisions are appropriate for the fulfilment of the UN purposes and concluded that 
"when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for 
the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that 
such action is not ultra vires the Organization.,,113 
6.3.3 The 1971 Namibia Case. 
As a consequence of the continuing presence of South Africa in South West Africa, and its 
maintenance a system of apartheid there, the General Assembly adopted Resolution No 2145 
(XXI) of 27 October 1966 which declared that South Africa had violated the League of 
Nations Mandate. It therefore terminated the Mandate and declared that South Africa had no 
right to administer the territory. 1 14 Subsequently, the Security Council adopted several 
resolutions including Resolution 264 (1969) declaring that South West Africa's continued 
presence in Namibia was illegal and called upon South Africa to withdraw. I 15 However, 
South Africa refused to comply and the Security Council, for the first time, requested an 
advisory opinion on the legal consequences of South Africa's continued presence in 
Namibia. 116 
South Africa objected, inter alia, that a series of Assembly and Council resolutions 
particularly General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) and Security Council Resolutions 264 
112 Higgins noted that the Court, by reaching this decision in the Expenses Case, had confirmed the legality of 
peace- keeping operation in Middle East and in the Congo. See Higgins, Rosalyn, "Peace and Security 
Achievements and Failures", 6 EJIL, 1995, p. 448. 
113 IC] Rep., p. 168. 
114 GA Res. No. 2145 (XXI) of October 271966. UN. GAOR, 21 st session, supp No, 16. 
liS See SC Res. No. 264, 1969, UN, SCOR, 24th session. 
116 SC Res. No. 284, 1970, SCOR, 15 th session, 1550th meeting. 
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(1969) and 248 (1970) were invalid and had no legal effect on the Mandate of South West 
Africa. The Court after deciding its competence to hear the case considered the contention of 
France and South Africa that the General Assembly, when adopting resolution 2145 (XXI), 
had acted ultra vires. The Court stated that: 117 
Before considering this objection, it is necessary for the Court to examine the 
observations made and the contentions advanced as to whether the Court should go 
into this question. It was suggested that though the request was not directed to the 
question of the General Assembly resolution and of the related Security Council 
resolutions, this did not preclude the Court from making such an enquiry. On the 
other hand it was contended that the Court was not authorized by the terms of the 
request, in the light of the discussions preceding it, to go into the validity of these 
resolutions. It was argued that the Court should not assume powers of judicial review 
of the action taken by the other principal organs of the United Nations without 
specific request to that effect, nor act as a Court of appeal from their decisions. 
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in 
respect of the decisions taken by the United Nations Organs concerned. The question 
of the validity or conformity with the Charter of General Assembly resolution 2145 
(XXI) or of related Security Council resolutions does not form the subject of the 
request for advisory opinion. However, in the exercise of its judicial function and 
since objections have been advanced the Court, in the course of its reasoning, will 
consider these objections before determining any legal consequences arising from 
those resolutions. 
A careful reading of the above long passage demonstrates that although the Court stated that 
it did not possess the power of judicial review, it nevertheless reviewed the validity of the 
Security Council Resolution and examined the relationship of the Security Council 
Resolution to the UN's purposes. 
The Court also examined the validity of the General Assembly Resolution which 
terminated the Mandate in South West Africa. It concluded that the Assembly had the power 
to terminate the Mandate, and that it did not exceed its competence by declaring South 
117 Ie] Rep, 1971, para. 88-89, p. 45. 
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Africa's presence illegal and consequently terminating the mandate. lIs The Court stated 
that: 119 
The resolution in question is therefore to be viewed as the exercise of the right to 
terminate a relationship in case of a deliberate and persistent violation of obligations 
which destroys the very object and purpose of that relationship. 
The Court stated also that the General Assembly "lacking the necessary powers to ensure the 
withdrawal of South Africa from the Territory, it enlisted the co-operation of the Security 
Council by calling the latter's attention to the resolution, thus acting in accordance with 
Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Charter.,,120 The Court, further held that the Security Council 
Resolutions leading up to Resolution 276 (1970)121 were valid as they were adopted in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and in the exercise of the 
Council's responsibilities of maintaining peace and security.122 Consequently the decisions 
bound all member States. 123 
It has been observed that despite the careful drafting of the Security Council's request 
to the Court in order to avoid testing the underlying issue of the validity of General Assembly 
118 ICJ Rep., 1971, para. 88-89, p. 45. 
119 Ibid, Para. 95, p. 47. The Court also concluded that it would not be correct to assume that because the 
General Assembly is, in principle, vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting in special 
cases, within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make determinations or have operative 
design. See para. 105, p. 50. 
120 Ibid, para. 106, p. 51. 
121 This Resolution adopted on January 30, 1970 reaffirmed General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 
October 1966, whereby the General Assembly had decided that the Mandate of South Africa was terminated 
and declared that all acts taken by the Government of South Africa on behalf of, or concerning Namibia after 
the termination of the Mandate were illegal and invalid. This resolution also recalled Security Council 
Resolution 269 (1960) which was adopted on 12 August 1969 and condemned South Africa for its refusal to 
comply with Resolution 264(1969) and called upon States to refrain from all dealings with South Africa in 
respect of Namibia. 
122 IC] Rep, 1971, pp. 51-53. The Court stated: "the decisions made by the Security Council in paragraphs 2 
and 5 ofthe resolution 276 (1970), as related to paragraph 3 ofthe resolution 264 (1969) and paragraph 5 of 
resolution 269 (1969), were adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter and in 
accordance with its Articles 24 and 25." Ibid, para. 115, p. 53. 
123 Ibid, para. 116, p.54. 
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Resolution 2145, the Court considered the validity of both the General Assembly and the 
Security Council Resolutions. 124 
Before ending the discussion about 'judicial review' and for the sake of completeness, 
one contentious case namely the Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and 
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie,125 will be singled out for a brief legal analysis to illustrate the relationship 
between one of the political organs and the Court. 
6.3.4 The 1992 Lockerbie Case 
In 1992 the Security Council adopted Resolution 731 requiring Libya to surrender two 
Libyan nationals charged with terrorism to the UK and the US and to pay appropriate 
compensation.126 Libya claimed that the Security Council's resolution was ultra vires 
because it violated the fundamental principle of international law by which a State cannot be 
forced to extradite its own nationals. Libya also regarded the question of extradition as 
falling within the scope of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 23 September 1971 to which all three States were 
parties.127 
On the basis of Article 14 of the Montreal Convention, Libya requested the IC] to 
determine whether Libya was under a legal obligation to extradite two of its own 
124 Butcher, Goler T., "The Consonance of U.S. Positions with the International Court's Advisory Opinions" in 
Damrosch Lori F. (ed.), The International Court of Justice at a Crossroads, Dobbs Ferry, New York: 
Transnational Publishers Inc., 1987, p. 436. 
125 Hereinafter cited as: "the Lockerbie Case." 
126 For the discussion of the Lockerbie Case, see Marcella, David, "Passport to Justice: Internationalizing the 
Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World Court", 40 mu, 1999, pp. 81-150. 
127 Hereinafter cited as: "Montreal Convention", Reprinted in 10 International Legal Materials, 1971. 
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nationals. 128 In addition, Libya brought an application before the ICJ asking the Court to 
indicate provisional measures against the UK and US under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, 
which provides for such an order in circumstances where it is necessary to preserve the 
respective rights of the parties. 
While the case was sub judice, the Security Council adopted Resolution 748 under 
Chapter VII of the Charter requiring Libya to extradite its two nationals, and providing that 
in the case of non-compliance, the Security Council would impose an arms embargo on 
Libya. 129 Bedjaoui suggested that the Council by adopting this resolution: 130 
[F]aced the Court with the highly invidious choice to "follow" the Council at the cost 
of resigning its role or to take the responsibility of entering into open conflict with the 
Council. Above all, it would mean disregarding the duty of United Nations organs to 
place their functional co-operation in the forefront of their concerns. It is a necessary 
extrapolation from the inter-state co-operation hymned by so many articles of the 
Charter that co-ordination should prevail within the Organization itself. 
The Court rejected the Libyan request for provisional measures and did not question the 
validity of the Council's Resolution. 13 ) In light of this outcome Akande argues that the Court 
assumed the validity of the resolution and proceeded accordingly.132 In trying to understand 
why the Court was so hesitant to pronounce on the Security Council Resolution, Rosenne 
concluded that the Court was careful "not to trespass on the competence of the Security 
Council, despite powerful urgings, both in the pleadings and in the internal deliberations of 
128 Article 14 provides that: "Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation 
or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of 
them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are 
unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, anyone of those Parties may refer the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court." 
129 See SC Res. 748, UN, SCOR, 47th Session, 3063,d mtg., 31 March 1992. 
130 Bedjaoui, supra note 13, p. 74. 
131 The Court by eleven votes to five, found that the circumstances of the case were not "such as to require the 
exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate provisional measures." 
131 ICJ Rep., 1992, p. 127. 
132 Akande, Dapo, "The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There Room for Judicial 
Control of Decisions of the Political Organs?", 461CLQ, 1997, p. 341. 
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the Court, that it takers] action which could be interpreted as "judicial control" of the 
decisions of the Security Council."l33 Some commentators suggest that the Court realised 
that "had it acted otherwise, had it indicated any measures (whether those requested by Libya 
or those of its own choice), it would have contradicted the Council." 134 
Indeed, one must acknowledge that due to a lack of complete separation of powers 
between the Security Council and the Court in the issue of settlement of disputes, the two 
organs have to work in harmony, not in competition, in order to avoid any divergence 
between the decisions of the two organs on the same issue. It is submitted here that the 
political organs and more specifically the Security Council, have to coordinate with the Court 
by doing several things: first, although nothing requires any UN organ to ask for an advisory 
opinion of the Court, it would be important if these organs approached the Court through the 
medium of an advisory opinion before taking a decision in a delicate and important matter. 
For instance, in the Lockerbie Case the Security Council, before adopting resolution 
731 of 21 January 1992, could have requested an advisory opinion on the proposed measures 
to be taken. Second, although the Security Council, by adopting both resolutions, was acting 
within the sphere of its competence, it would have been better if the Council had delayed its 
second Resolution until the Court had given its opinion. Finally, the Court's attitude in 
Lockerbie might be criticised because, by not examining the legality of the Security Council 
resolution, the Court placed its integrity and its role as a judicial organ in question. 
133 Rosenne, supra note 70, p, 251. 
134 Sk b' k' U Iszews I, supra note 37, p. 617, 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has examined the institutional relationship between the IC] and the UN and the 
effects of this relationship on the Court's advisory function. It has been shown through 
examining some of the relevant Court case-law that this relationship has been highly relevant 
to the attitude of the Court when giving advisory opinions. 
As the remainder of this thesis will argue, the Court seems to adopt a liberal approach 
when considering requests for advisory opinions. In a word, the Court's assertion of the 
organisational interest underlying requests for an advisory opinion, the Court's practice in 
reformulating requests for an advisory opinion in order to give maximum assistance to a 
fellow organ and the Court's practice in giving effect to the UN organs' decisions are 
examples of the impact of the institutional setting on the Court's advisory function. 
On the other hand, this 'organic relationship' between the Court and the UN has had 
less effect on the attitude of the political organs which have been largely cautious of 
developing the habit of approaching the Court whenever the need arises. The reasons for this 
caution are discussed in Chapters Seven and Nine. However, it should be clear that the 
Court's coordination with the UN organs, which is manifested by its liberal approach in 
dealing with requests for advisory opinions, did not affect the integrity of the Court as the 
following Chapter demonstrates. 
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Chapter Four 
The Judicial Character of the ICJ's Advisory Function 
and the Problem of Consent 
1. Introduction 
The preceding Chapter discussed how the institutional link between the Court as the 
'principal judicial organ of the United Nations' and the rest of the UN Organisation has 
influenced the Court's behaviour.1 Because of this relationship the Court has reasoned that, 
as an organ of the UN, its answer to requests for advisory opinions "represents its 
participation in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not be refused.,,2 
Consequently, only "compelling reasons" should prevent the Court from giving the opinion 
requested.3 
Although the Court regards the rendering of advisory opinions as a kind of 
participation in UN activities, there are certain limits to this participation.4 These limits flow 
from the fact that the Court, while acting in an advisory capacity, must still adhere to its 
judicial character. This principle was laid down by the PCIJ in the Status of Eastern Carelia 
Case where the Court held that "the Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving 
advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules guiding their activity as a Court."s This 
I Nantwi has suggested that a logical consequence of the special relationship between the Court and the UN is 
that the Court "is bound to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations and to act in conformity with the 
provisions of the Charter as well as those of its Statute" as far as it is consistent with the Court's essentially 
judicial character. Nantwi, Emmanuel K., The Enforcement of International Judicial Decisions and Arbitral 
Awards in Public International Law, Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 2nd printing, 1966, p.14. (Emphasis in original). 
2 See the Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of A Special Rapporteur of the Commission on 
Human Rights Case, IC] Rep., 1999, p. 78; the Interpretation of Peace Treaties, First Phase, IC] Rep., 1950, 
f· 71 . 
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, IC] Rep., 1996, para. 14, p. 235; see also the 
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities o/the United Nations 
Case, IC] Rep., 1989, para.37, pp. 190-191; the Certain Expenses o/the UN Case, IC] Rep., 1962, p. 155. 
: The ~nterpre~ation o~:eace Treaties Case (First Phase), IC] Rep., 1950, p. 71. 
Heremafter CIted as: the Eastern Carelia Case", PCIJ, Ser.B, No.5, p. 29. 
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Chapter explores how the Court has reconciled its role as a principal organ of the UN with its 
duty to adhere to its judicial character. 
2. The Court as an Organ of the UN and the Nature of its Judicial Character 
Pomerance claims that the Court's awareness of its duty to cooperate with other UN organs 
has led to the "overlooking and overcoming of difficulties in order to extend maximal 
assistance to fellow organs and agencies of the UN" when dealing with a request for an 
advisory opinion.6 Consequently, Pomerance, basing her conclusions on some of the Court's 
case law, has stated that the Court has not embraced the philosophy of ')udicial restraint" in 
its advisory opinions.7 In the absence of restraint on the part of the Court, Pomerance 
suggests that the UN political organs themselves must exercise "political restraint" when 
requesting advisory opinions.8 
Amerasinghe notes that the principle that the Court must participate as the principal 
judicial organ in the work of the Organisation might sometimes conflict with its judicial 
6 Pomerance claims that over the years many compelling reasons have been invoked to prevent the Court from 
giving advisory opinions such as (the political nature of the question and the absence of consent on the part of 
states principally concerned), however, none of those reasons have ever been found compelling. Pomerance, 
Michla, "The Advisory Role of the International Court ofJustice and its 'Judicial' Character: Past and Future 
Prisms", in: Muller, A. S. & Raic, D. et at. (eds.), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role After Fifty 
Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 290 ff. For a discussion about this 
statement, namely, , a duty to cooperate' see Section 5 in Chapter Three, supra. 
7 Pomerance while auditing the Court's advisory practice concluded that: 
[T]he Court has not prone to adopt a philosophy of 'judicial restraint'. As opposed to the US Supreme 
Court, which often asserts a 'political question doctrine' and, even when it does not, frequently 
exhibits a "political questions mentality", the ICI has embraced a 'legal question' doctrine, and has 
habitually demonstrated a 'legal question mentality'. Difficulties which have stood in the way of 
compliance with requests have, ineluctably and consistently, been either overlooked or 
overcome ... The absence of an ICI philosophy of 'judicial restraint' has also been linked to the dearth 
of cases with which the Court has been seized. "It is because the [US] courts decide so many political 
questions that there are a few from which they abstain". But for the ICJ, such self-denial cannot be 
expected unless it were a "court as abstemious as a panel of panda bears. 
See Pomerance, ibid, pp. 318-319. 
8 Pomerance asked the political organs to protect the '~udicial character" of the Court by abstaining from using 
the Court's advisory procedure as a backdoor to the Court's contentious jurisdiction. Therefore Pomerance 
remarks that "if the Court chooses, or feels compelled, to ignore or minimize the effect of the absence of 
consent by interested states, the same should not be true of the requesting organ, whose responsibility it should 
be to shield the Court from such inept requests." Ibid, pp. 320-321. 
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character.9 However, unlike Pomerance, he believes that while the Court has striven to satisfy 
the interests of the Organisation, it has nevertheless taken a "sagacious approach to 
interpreting and applying the principle that its own judicial character must be protected."lo 
Rather than rely on commentators and on theory, careful examination of the Court's 
jurisprudence is needed to determine if in fact the Court's role as a principal organ has in any 
way interfered with its judicial character as a court of justice. The Court throughout its 
existence has considered that, in principle, it should if possible comply with any advisory 
requests. According to Rosenne this seems to imply two presumptions. II One relates to the 
competence of the requesting organ,12 and the other one relates to the subject matter of the 
request which should be legal in nature. 13 
The Court in more than fifty-five years of experience with the advisory function has 
only once concluded that a request for an advisory opinion was ultra vires, insofar as it did 
not lie within the competence of the requesting organ. 14 In no case has the Court decided that 
the subject matter of the request was not a legal question. IS 
9 Amerasinghe, Chittharanjan F., Jurisdiction of International Tribunals, The Hague; London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003, p. 537. 
\0 Ibid. 
11 Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, The Hague; London; 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 1028. 
12 The request is intra vires the organ means out of its competence. See Section 3.1.1 of Chapter Two, supra. 
13 See Chapter Two, supra. 
14 See the discussion of the 1996 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case, in 
Section ii, Chapter Two, supra. 
IS For details about the scope of the legal question, see Section 3.2 in Chapter Two, supra. 
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2.1 The Court's Judicial Character and States' Consent 
Under its Statute, the Court's competence in contentious cases is dependent primarily on the 
consent of States parties to the dispute. However, the Statute does not provide clear guidance 
on the need for consent by States when the exercise of advisory jurisdiction is requested. 
Consequently, there has always been disagreement over whether the IC] can comply with 
requests for an advisory opinion that relate to a pending dispute between States or between a 
State and an international organisation without the consent of the concerned parties. 16 
Rosenne has observed that most challenges to the Court in regard to its judicial 
character were based on the principle audiatur et altera pars,17 so that where the request 
related to legal disputes between two States the Court could not give the opinion requested 
without the consent of the States parties to the dispute. IS The following two Sections examine 
the work of publicists and the Court's views concerning consent as a precondition to 
rendering advisory opinion. 
2.1.1 Publicists' View of Consent as a Precondition for Exercising Jurisdiction 
Some scholars consider that States' consent may in some circumstances constitute a 
precondition to the exercise of the Court's advisory jurisdiction.19 The States concerned may 
also argue that the Court should not give an advisory opinion against their opposition.20 
16 A general principle in international adjudication indicates that States are not subject to adjudication without 
their consent. 
17 This principle means that one should not be condemned without being heard. See Fox, James, Dictionary of 
International and Comparative Law, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, Inc. 2003, p. 26. 
18 Rosenne, supra note II, p. 1014. 
19 Pomerance, supra note 6; ada, Shigeru, "The International Court of Justice Viewed from the Bench (1976-
1993)",244 RCADI, 1993, p. 92; Hudson, Manley 0., International Tribunals: Past and Future, Washington 
[D.C.]: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Brookings Institution, 1944, p. 69; The committee of 
jurists which prepared the PCIJ Statute was of the view that consent would be necessary for the exercise of the 
Courts advisory function. See Hambro, Edvard, "The Authority of Advisory Opinions of the International Court 
ofJustice", 3 ICLQ, 1954, p. 11. 
20 See the arguments by the US in its written statement in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Case, available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.orglicjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htmpp. pp. 19-20, (accessed 25 October 2004). 
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These views must be examined in light of the fact that the purpose of the advisory procedure 
is not to circumvent the rights of States to determine whether to submit their disputes to 
judicial settlement.21 Consequently, the Court must respect the independence of States which 
retain sovereign control over whether to submit a dispute to which they are party to the 
Court. 
In accordance with this view, the Court must be aware that it would be incompatible 
with the advisory procedure for an opinion to be used to determine the substantive outcome 
of a particular legal dispute between parties without their prior consent. Moreover, it has 
been suggested that an advisory opinion is "iII-suited" to the application of principles of law 
to particular factual situations without the participation by an interested State which could 
provide the Court with necessary or pertinent information.22 
Nevertheless other commentators maintain that States' consent is not a precondition for 
the Court to give an advisory opinion.23 For instance, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht argued that:24 
There seems to be no decisive reason why the sovereignty of States should be protected 
from a procedure, to which they have consented in advance as Members of the United 
Nations, of ascertaining the law through a pronouncement which, notwithstanding its 
authority, is not binding upon them. 
Rosenne also suggests that the Court is entitled "to act independently of any formal 
expression of consent on the part of States individually.,,25 Moreover, Conforti suggests that 
nothing prevents a question posed for an advisory opinion "from being the object of a dispute 
between States; nor is there anything to prevent, for instance, the General Assembly or the 
21 US argument in the Wall Case, ibid. 
22 See the written statements of the US in the Wall Case, supra note 20, pp. 19-20. 
23 Lauterpacht, Hersch, The development of International Law by the International Court, London: Stevens and 
Sons Ltd, 1958, pp. 357-358. This point of view is based on the fact that requesting an advisory opinion does 
not constitute litigation in the strict sense because there are no real parties before the Court. 
24 Lauterpacht, ibid, p. 358. 
25 Rosenne, supra note 11, p. 989. 
124 
Security Council from asking the Court, even against the will of one or more of the parties, to 
indicate which is the correct legal solution of a given dispute submitted to them.,,26 Conforti 
points out that his conclusion was drawn not only from Article 96 of the UN Charter, which 
talks vaguely of a legal question, but also from Articles 14 and 37 of the UN Charter, which 
entitle the General Assembly and the Security Council respectively "to recommend to the 
parties terms of settlement on the merits-not excluding legal terms." 
In a more recent work, discussing the Court's 'discretionary power', Conforti has 
argued that the Court should once and for all state that the existence of a dispute does not 
limit in any way its competence to render an advisory opinion. In this regard Conforti has 
stated that the idea of discretionary power is puzzling:27 
The textual argument on which it is based (the "may" in Article 65 of the Statute) is 
very weak and should yield to the spirit of the provision on the advisory function which 
testifies to the obligatory co-operation of the Court with the UN organs in the solution 
of legal questions. It is clear that the most delicate point of the whole matter is that of 
the connection between the advisory function and contentious or binding jurisdiction. 
However, it is exactly on this point that the Court, once and for all, should say that the 
existence of a dispute does not limit in any way its competence to render an opinion, 
rather than quibbling as it has done up to now. Why should the Court be authorized to 
sacrifice, at its discretion, the advisory function to the contentious function, thereby 
sacrificing co-operation between the organs to respect for the desire of an individual 
State to avoid the opinion (even the non-binding opinion!) of the judicial organ? Such a 
sacrifice may have been justified at the time of the League of Nations and of the 
advisory function of the old Permanent Court it seems anachronistic today. 
An examination of the relevant case law demonstrates that the Court has placed great 
emphasis on its role as the principal judicial organ of the UN and therefore has rightly 
rejected arguments that it should decline to give advisory opinions simply because the 
26 Conforti, Benedetto, "Observations on the Advisory Function of the International Court of Justice" in: 
Cassese, Antonio (ed.), UN Law! Fundamental Rights: Two Topics in International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979, p. 86. 
27 Conforti, Benedetto, The Law and Practice of the United Nations, The Hague; London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, p. 270. 
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request is related to pending disputes between States or between a State and an international 
organisation. 
2.1.2 The Court's Case Law on Consent as a Precondition for Exercising Jurisdiction 
The Court on several occasions has rejected arguments that it should decline to render an 
advisory opinion because the request was related to a dispute between States or between a 
State and an international organisation. The comments of the Court in the 1950 Interpretation 
of Peace Treaties Case, the 1951 Reservations to the Convention of Genocide Case, the 1975 
Western Sahara Case, the 1989 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Case and, lastly, the 2004 Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Case 
illustrate how it dealt with the problem of consent. 28 
In each of these cases the States concerned contended that the Court should decline to 
give an advisory opinion on the basis inter alia of the principle laid down in the Eastern 
Carelia Case.29 Here the League Council requested an opinion from the Court, on a legal 
dispute between Finland which was a member of the League of Nations and the Soviet Union 
28 Hereinafter cited as: "the Wall Case", available at: 
http://www.ici-ciLorg/icjwwwlidocketJimwp/imwpframe.htm (Accessed 21 October 2004). 
29 The Eastern Carelia Case arose out of a dispute between Finland, a member of the League, and the Soviet 
Union, a non-member of the League. Articles 12-16 of the Covenant laid down procedures for peaceful 
settlement of disputes between members only. According to these Articles, members that were parties to a 
dispute were required, in the absence of settlement by diplomatic means, to submit the matter to the League 
Council. According to Article 17 of the Covenant, the Council had the power to adopt resolutions regarding 
disputes only between member States of the League, unless a non-member State accepted the Council's 
intervention in the case. Finland alleged that the Soviet Union had failed to carry out its obligations under the 
peace treaty and therefore expressed its desire that the Council eonsider[ed] the matter. On February 1923 the 
Soviet Union informed the Council its rejection of any invitation, claming that the Eastern Carelia was a 
domestic matter. Under these circumstances the Council requested an advisory opinion from the PCIJ regarding 
this matter since it involved a treaty interpretation. Russia denied the Court's competence to deal with the 
matter. The Court declined to answer the question put to it on the ground that "[a]nswering the question would 
be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties." Since the question submitted to the 
Court concerning a pending dispute between two States (Russia and Finland), the consent of the two States was 
required by the Court in order to render its opinion. PCIJ, Ser. B, No.5, 1923; pp. 27-29; Keith, Kenneth, The 
Extent o/the Advisory Jurisdiction o/the International Court 0/ Justice, Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971, 
pp.93-94. 
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which was not yet a member of the League, despite the objection of Soviet Union. The PCIJ 
stated that: "no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its dispute with other 
States to adjudication.,,3o However, in all these cases, the Court distinguished the Eastern 
Carelia Case from the case in question and decided to exercise its jurisdiction despite the 
objections of the States concerned. The Court in its most recent advisory opinion, the Wall 
Advisory Opinion, followed its previous findings and explained that only on one occasion 
did its predecessor, the PCIJ, take the view that it should not reply to a question put to it. The 
Court explained that such a refusal was due to: 31 
[T]he very particular circumstances of the case, among which were that the question 
directly concerned an already existing dispute, one of the States parties to which was 
neither a party to the Statute of the Permanent Court nor a Member of the League of 
Nations, objected to the proceedings, and refused to take part in any way" (Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, I.e.]. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 235-236, para. 14). 
The Court in all the above cases emphasised that lack of consent had no bearing on its 
jurisdiction to give an advisory opinion. The following two Sections examine the Court's 
reasoning for not requiring consent where the question relates to a dispute between States or 
between States and international organisations. 
i. The Court's Case Law on Consent in Disputes Pending Between Two or More States 
In both the Peace Treaties and Reservations Cases it was argued that the General Assembly's 
decision to request an advisory opinion was ultra vires. In the Peace Treaties Case, which 
concerned the interpretation of the 1947 peace agreements with Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Romania, these States argued that questions of human rights and fundamental freedoms were 
30 PCIJ, Ser. B, No.5, 1923; pp. 27-29. 
31 S ee para. 44 of the Wall Case, supra note 28. 
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matters of domestic jurisdiction and therefore not proper subjects for an advisory opinion.32 
The Court disagreed on the grounds that the object of the request was to obtain from the 
Court legal clarification on the applicability of the procedure for dispute settlement 
established by the peace treaties. The Court stated that:33 
The object of the Request is much more limited. It is directed solely to obtaining from 
the Court certain clarifications of a legal nature regarding the applicability of the 
procedure for the settlement of disputes by the Commissions provided for in the express 
terms of Article 36 of the Treaty with Bulgaria, Article 40 of the Treaty with Hungary 
and Article 38 of the Treaty with Romania. The interpretation of the terms of a treaty 
for this purpose could not be considered as a question essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a State. It is a question of international law which, by its very nature, lies 
within the competence of the Court. 
Although Article 2(7) of the UN Charter restricts the jurisdiction of the UN by preventing it 
from intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
State", in practice, Pogany has observed, this Article has been given a restrictive meaning, 
especially "where issues of human rights or self-determination are involved, United Nations 
organs are unlikely to construe the question as falling 'essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction' of the state concerned.,,34 Moreover, the Court reasoned in the Peace Treaties 
Case that its reply to the request was only of an advisory character and had no binding force. 
Therefore, no State, whether a member of the UN or not, could prevent the Court giving an 
advisory opinion which the UN needed for guidance on the course of action it should take.35 
In the Reservations Case, the question referred to the Court, by the General Assembly, 
concerned the effects of reservations to the Genocide Convention, which did not expressly 
32 It has been argued before the Court that the request for an opinion was "interfering" in matters essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. This argument had been also raised in the General Assembly but was 
rejected. 
33 IC] Rep., 1950, pp. 70-71. 
34 Pogany, Istvan, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Aldcrshot: Gower Publishing, 1984, p. 4. 
35 Ibid, p. 71. 
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provide for reservations of any kind.36 Here the Government of the Philippines contended in 
its written statement that the dispute between Australia and Philippines concerning the 
Convention had arisen as a result of the disagreement of the two governments regarding the 
effect of the Philippines' reservation to the Convention. According to the Philippines' view, 
the Court should decline to give an opinion as the question put to it directly related to a 
dispute actually pending between the Philippines and Australia.37 It was also contended that 
the request constituted an inadmissible interference by the General Assembly and by non-
contracting States since only States parties to the Convention were entitled to interpret it or to 
seek an interpretation.38 In reply the Court stated that: 39 
[N]ot only did the General Assembly take the initiative in respect of the Genocide 
Convention, draw up its terms and open it for signature and accession by States, but 
that the express provisions of the Convention (Articles XI and XVI) associate the 
General Assembly with the life of the Convention; and finally, that the General 
Assembly actually associated itself with it by endeavoring to secure the adoption of the 
Convention by as great a number of States as possible. 
The Court in the Reservations Case specifically referred to the principle laid down in the 
Peace Treaties Case to the effect that the response of the Court to a request represents its 
participation in the work of the Organisation and therefore should not be refused. The Court 
held that:4o 
[T]he Court can confine itself to recalling the principles which it laid down in its 
Opinion of March 30th, 1950 (IC] reports, 1950, p. 71). A reply to a request for an 
Opinion should not, in principle, be refused. 
36 IC] Rep., 1951, p. 16. While ratifying or acceding to the Genocide Convention of 1948, several States, 
including the Soviet Union, , made reservations to which other contracting parties objected. Therefore, the 
Secretary-General informed the reserving States that they could not become parties to the Convention unless 
they withdrew their reservations. The Secretary-General's view was contested by the reserving states, thus, the 
General Assembly decided to request an advisory opinion from the Court to end this uncertainty about the legal 
effect of reservations to multilateral conventions. 
37 IC] pled., 1951, p. 296. 
38 IC] Rep., 1951, p. 19. 
39 Ibid, pp. 19-20. 
40 IC] Rep., 1951, p. 19. The Court also stated that: U[a]t the same time, Article 68 of the Statute recognizes 
that the Court has the power to decide to what extent the circumstances of each case must lead it to apply to 
advisory proceedings the provisions of the Statute which apply in contentious cases". 
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The Court concluded that the General Assembly, which drafted and adopted the Convention, 
and the Secretary-General who is the depositor of the instruments of ratification and 
accession, had an interest in knowing the legal effect of the reservations to the Convention.41 
In the Western Sahara Case,42 the Court gave an advisory opinion regarding the legal 
status of the Western Sahara, an area which had been disputed by Spain, on the one hand, and 
by Morocco and Mauritania on the other. The request by the General Assembly was aimed at 
ascertaining the status of the territory and the legal ties between Morocco and Mauritania at 
the time of colonisation. Spain had objected to the request, darning the Court lacked 
jurisdiction without its consent. However, the Court, after referring to its holding in the 
Peace Treaties Case, stated:43 
The Court, it is true, affirmed in this pronouncement that its competence to give an 
opinion did not depend on the consent of the interested States, even when the case 
concerned a legal question actually pending between them. However, the Court 
proceeded not merely to stress its judicial character and the permissive nature of Article 
65, paragraph 1, of the Statute but to examine, specifically in relation to the opposition 
of some of the interested States, the question of the judicial propriety of giving the 
opinion. Moreover, the Court emphasized the circumstances differentiating the case 
then under consideration from the Status of Eastern Carelia case and explained the 
particular grounds which led it to conclude that there was no reason requiring the Court 
to refuse to reply to the request. Thus the Court recognized that lack of consent might 
constitute a ground for declining to give the opinion requested if, in the circumstances 
of a given case, considerations of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse an 
opinion. In short, the consent of an interested State continues to be relevant, not for the 
Court's competence, but for the appreciation of the propriety of giving an opinion. 
41 The Court had observed that the question put to the Court was limited to the Convention by the terms of the 
General Assembly resolution. The same resolution had invited the ILC to study the general question of 
reservations to multilateral Conventions from point of view of codification and progressive development of the 
International Law. Therefore, the Court considered that its reply was necessary to promote the interests of the 
UN. IC] Rep., 1951, p. 20. 
42 ICI Rep., 1975, p. 12. 
43 Ibid, para. 32, pp. 24-25. 
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The Court, after stating that "consideration of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to 
refuse an opinion" held that:44 
In certain circumstances, therefore, the lack of consent of an interested State may 
render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatible with the Court's judicial 
character. An instance of this would be when the circumstances disclose that to give a 
reply would have the effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to 
allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent. If such a 
situation should arise, the powers of the Court under the discretion given to it by Article 
65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, would afford sufficient legal means to ensure respect for 
the fundamental principle of consent to jurisdiction. 
In applying this principle to the request, the Court found that a legal controversy did indeed 
exist, but one that had arisen during the proceedings of the General Assembly and in relation 
to matters with which the General Assembly was dealing. Therefore, it had not arisen 
independently in bilateral relations, so the Court could properly exercise its advisory 
function. 45 
The Court, in the 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion rejected the argument advanced by 
Israel and some other States that the Court should decline to give an advisory opinion 
because Israel had not consented to the request. According to the Israeli argument, the 
subject matter of the question posed by the General Assembly "is an integral part of the 
wider Israeli-Palestinian dispute concerning questions of terrorism, security, borders, 
settlements, Jerusalem and other related matters." Israel had also emphasised that: 46 
[I]t has never consented to the settlement of this wider dispute by the Court or by any 
other means of compulsory adjudication; on the contrary, it contends that the parties 
repeatedly agreed that these issues are to be settled by negotiation, with the possibility 
of an agreement that recourse could be had to arbitration. 
44 ICI Rep., 1975, para. 33, p. 25. 
45 Ibid, para. 34, p. 25. The Court in this case concluded that the object of the General Assembly request has not 
been to bring before the Court, by way ofrequest for advisory opinion, a dispute on legal controversy. Rather 
the object was to obtain from the Court an opinion to assist the General Assembly in the proper exercise of its 
functions concerning the decolonisation ofthe territory. See ICI Rep., ibid, para. 41, p. 37. 
46 See para. 46 of the Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 28. 
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In responding to Israel's argument the Court acknowledged that:47 
Israel and Palestine have expressed radically divergent views on the legal consequences 
of Israel's construction of the wall, on which the Court has been asked to pronounce. 
However, as the Court has itself noted, "Differences of views ..... on legal issues have 
existed in practically every advisory proceeding." 
The Court concluded that it did not consider that the subject matter of the General 
Assembly's request could be regarded as only a bilateral matter between Israel and Palestine 
because of "the powers and responsibilities of the United Nations in questions relating to 
international peace and security." The Court added that, in its view, "the construction of the 
wall must be deemed to be directly of concern to the United Nations.,,48 The Court then 
emphasised that:49 
The object of the request before the Court is to obtain from the Court an opinion 
which the General Assembly deems of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its 
functions. The opinion is requested on a question which is of particularly acute concern 
to the United Nations, and one which is located in a much broader frame of reference 
than a bilateral dispute. In the circumstances, the Court does not consider that to give an 
opinion would have the effect of circumventing the principle of consent to judicial 
settlement, and the Court accordingly cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, decline to 
give an opinion on that ground. 
The above case law demonstrates that, despite the Court's findings in the Western Sahara 
Case and others about considerations of judicial propriety, the Court down to the present has 
never invoked this principle in order to decline to give an advisory opinion when requeste 
Lastly, it is important to note that not only did the Court decline to apply the Eastern 
Carelia principle where there was a legal question pending between two or more States,50 but 
47 See para. 48 of the Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 28. It is worth noting that the Court in the last part of 
the above quotation was referring to its findings in Namibia Case, ICI Rep., 1971, para.34, p. 24. 
48 The Court stated that the responsibility of the UN in this matter has been described by the General Assembly 
as: 
"[A] permanent responsibility towards the question of Palestine until the question is resolved in all its aspects 
in a satisfactory manner in accordance with international legitimacy." See para. 49. 
49 See para. 50 of the Court's Opinion. 
so The Court's view has always been that an Opinion should be given when a competent organ desires to obtain 
guidance on its course of action while carrying its duties. Furthermore, under Article 7 of the Charter, because 
the Court is an organ of the United Nations, it has a duty to participate in the activities of the Organisation. The 
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that it has also chosen not to apply the principle in disputes pending between a State and an 
international organisation. The South West Africa Cases, The Applicability of Article VI, 
Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Case,51 
and the Interpretation of the Agreement of25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt 
Case52 are illustrative of this proposition. 
ii. The Court's Dicta on Consent in Disputes Pending between a State and an 
International Organisation 
In the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Case,53 the 
Government of South Africa contended that the question referred to the Court related to a 
dispute between South Africa and other Members of the UN. Therefore, the Court should 
refuse to give an opinion.54 South Africa argued that even if the Court had competence to 
give the opinion requested, it should nevertheless refuse to do so as a matter of judicial 
propriety.55 Also South Africa had requested for the appointment of ajudge ad hoc based on 
Article 83 of the 1946 Rules, now Article 102 (2).56 However, the Court had refused this 
application. In replying to the request, the Court stated:57 
South Africa, as a Member of the United Nations, is bound by Article 96 of the Charter, 
which empowers the Security Council to request advisory opinions on any legal 
question. It has appeared before the Court, participated in both the written and oral 
PCIJ, however, was not an organ of the League of Nations, and, indeed, the ICJ cannot depart from its duties as 
the principle judicial organ of the United Nations. See the discussion in Chapter Three, supra. 
51 Hereinafter cited as: "the Mazilu Case". 
52 Hereinafter cited as: " the WHO/Egypt Case". 
53 Hereinafter cited as: "the Namibia Case." For details about this Case see Section 6.3.3 in Chapter Three, 
supra and Section 6 in Chapter Six, infra. 
54 South Africa contested the validity of the Security Council Resolution 284. See Section 6.3.3 in Chapter 
Three, supra. 
55 ICJ Rep., 1971, para. 27, p. 23. 
56 This Article provided for the application of Article 31 of the Statute which relates to the appointment of 
judges ad hoc "if the advisory opinion is requested upon a legal question actually pending between two or more 
States." For details about South Africa's application for the judge ad hoc, see Section 3.1 in Chapter Five, infra. 
57 IC] Rep., 1971, para. 31, pp. 23-24. 
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proceedings and, while raising specific objections against the competence of the Court, 
has addressed itself to the merits of the question. 
The Court asserted that by replying to the request "it would not only 'remain faithful to the 
requirements of its judicial character' ... but also discharge its functions as "the principal 
judicial organ of the United Nations.,,58 
In the Mazilu Case, the Economic and Social Council concluded that a difference had 
arisen between the UN and the Government of Romania as to the applicability of Article VI, 
Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN in the case of Mr. 
Mazilu as a Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities.59 Romania had made a reservation to Section 30 of the General 
Convention for the Settlement of Disputes between the UN and States Parties to the 
Convention which provides: 
If a difference arises between the United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the 
other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any legal question 
involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of 
the Court. The opinion given by the Court shall be accepted as decisive by the parties. 
Because of the reservation made by Romania to Section 30, Romania argued that the Court 
could not give an advisory opinion without its consent.60 In reply the Court stated:61 
The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the 
Statute, to give advisory opinions on legal questions, enables United Nations entities to 
seek guidance from the Court in order to conduct their activities in accordance with the 
law. These opinions are advisory, not binding. As the opinions are intended for the 
58 Ibid, para 41, p. 27. 
59 IC] Rep., 1989, p. 178. 
60 Romania made the following reservation: 
The Romanian People's Republic does not consider itself bound by the terms of section 30 of the 
Convention which provide for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court in differences 
arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention; with respect to the competence of the 
International Court in such differences, the Romanian People's Republic takes the view that, for the 
purpose of the submission of any dispute whatsoever to the Court for a ruling, the consent of all the 
parties to the dispute is required in every individual case. 
See IC] Rep., 1989, p. 188. 
61 IC]Rep., 1989,para.31,pp.188-189. 
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guidance of the United Nations, the consent of States is not a condition precedent to the 
competence of the Court to give them. 
The Court had then to consider, in view of Romania's reservation to Article 30 and absent its 
consent to the request, whether giving an opinion would circumvent the principle that "a 
State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement without its 
consent.,,62 The Court concluded that in the case under consideration a reply by the Court 
would have no such effect and that:63 
[T]he Council, in its resolution requesting the opinion, did conclude that a difference 
had arisen between the United Nations and the Government of Romania as to the 
applicability of the Convention to Mr. Dumitru Mazilu. But this difference, and the 
question put to the Court in the light of it, are not to be confused with the dispute 
between the United Nations and Romania with respect to the application of the General 
Convention in the case of Mr. Mazilu. 
In the present case, the Court thus does not find any compelling reasons to refuse an 
advisory opinion. 
Judge Higgins argues that in this case, the Court sought to distinguish between the abstract 
applicability of the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities of 1946 and its actual 
application to the specific case. However, Higgins concluded that the Court has performed 
the former task.64 Indeed, the distinction between "applicability" and "application" is 
subtle.65 
In the WHO/Egypt Case, the Court had been requested by the WHO Assembly to render 
an advisory opinion about whether any transfer of the WHO Regional Office would be 
62 This principle was laid down by the Court in its advisory opinion in the Western Sahara Case. See the above 
discussion. 
63 ICI Rep., 1989, para. 38-9, p. 191. 
64 Higgins, Rosalyn. "A Comment on the Current Health of Advisory Opinions", in: Lowe, Vaughan and 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essay in Honour of Sir Robert 
Jennings, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1996, p. 571. 
65 See Rosenne, supra note II, p. 1019; Amerasinghe, supra note 7, p. 534. 
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covered by Section 37 of the 1951 Agreement between the WHO and Egypt which provides 
that: 66 
The present Agreement may be revised at the request of either party. In this event the 
two parties shall consult each other concerning the modifications to be made in its 
provisions. If the negotiations do not result in an understanding within one year, the 
present Agreement may be denounced by either party giving two years notice. 
There were different views expressed in the World Health Assembly on the question whether 
transfer of the Regional Office could occur without regard to Section 37 mentioned above. In 
its meeting on 16 May 1980, the WHO Assembly'S committee had before it a draft resolution 
submitted by 20 Arab States under which the Assembly would decide to transfer the 
Regional office to Jordan as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Committee also had 
before it another draft resolution submitted by the US under which the Assembly would 
decide "prior to taking any decision on removal of the Regional Office" to request an 
advisory opinion from the Court. This was the request submitted to the Court.67 It is worth 
noting that 17 Arab States had addressed a letter to the Director-General of the Organisation 
informing him of their decision to "boycott" the Regional Office in Alexandria, and to deal 
with the Headquarters in Geneva instead.68 
It was in these circumstances that the Assembly found it necessary to request an 
advisory opinion from the Court. What is of importance in this case is that the Court 
emphasised that "if it is to remain faithful to the requirements of its judicial character in the 
exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, it must ascertain what are the legal questions really in 
issue in questions formulated in a request.,,69 Accordingly, the Court redrafted the legal 
question at issue and decided that the true legal question under consideration in the WHO 
66 IeJ Rep., 1980, para. 34, p. 88. 
67 IeJ Rep., 1980, para. 34, p. 88. 
68 Ibid. 
69 IeJ Rep., 1980, ibid. 
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Assembly was "[ w ]hat are the legal principles and rules applicable to the question under 
what conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the Regional Office 
from Egypt may be effected?,,70 
The Court observed that regardless of the different views expressed concerning the 
relevance of the 1951 Agreement and the interpretation of Section 37, the Court had to 
examine certain legal principles and rules.71 The Court decided that the mutual relationship 
between Egypt as the host State and the WHO Organisation was based upon a body of 
mutual obligations of co-operation and good faith. Therefore the situation arising in the event 
of any transfer was one which, by its nature, called for consultation, negotiation and co-
operation between the Organisation and Egypt. 72 The Court considered a considerable 
number of host agreements of different kinds that had been concluded between States and 
international organisations containing various provisions regarding the revision, termination 
or denunciation of these agreements.73 The Court explained after its review that those 
agreements confirmed the existence of mutual obligations which made it incumbent upon the 
parties to resolve the problems attendant upon a revision, termination or denunciation of a 
host agreement. 74 
70 The original questions were: 
1. Are the negotiation and notice provisions of Section 37 of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between 
the World Health Organization and Egypt applicable in the event that either party to the Agreement 
wishes to have the Regional Office transferred from the territory of Egypt? 
2- If so, what would be the legal responsibilities of both the World Health Organization and Egypt, with 
regard to the Regional Office in Alexandria, during the two-year period between notice and termination 
of the Agreement? 
See Ie] Rep., 1980, para. 1 and 35, p. 74 and pp. 88-89. 
71 Ibid, para. 42, p. 92. 
72 Ibid, para. 46, p. 94. 
73 Ibid., para. 45, p. 94. 
74 Ibid., para. 46, p. 94. 
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On commenting upon the Courts findings, Thirlway argues that: 75 
[W]hiIe it is well recognized that the conclusion of similar treaties may amount to 
State practice constitutive of a customary rule, yet to deduce the existence of a 
custom from similar provisions in a number of treaties is always open to the objection 
that the existence of such treaties might, in many instances, equally well be taken to 
point to a conviction on the part of the States concerned that there was no customary 
rule to the effect suggested, since if such rule had existed, the treaty provisions might 
have been thought unnecessary. 
Thirlway continued to say that in the case of a dispute, as the WHO/Egypt Case clearly was, 
the treaty must be given effect and the customary rule can only be invoked to supplement the 
treaty but not to contradict it. 76 However, one could argue here that the choice of the law to 
be applied by the Court in accordance with Article 38 of the ICJ's Statute is germane to the 
judicial reasoning as will be shown in the next Chapter, and hence, should not be confined to 
a hierarchical structure. The Court, in the WHO/Egypt Case stated:77 
[T]he Court must first ascertain the meaning and full implications of the question in 
the light of the actual framework of fact and law in which it falls for consideration. 
Otherwise its reply to the question may be incomplete and, in consequence, 
ineffectual and even misleading as to the pertinent legal rules actually governing the 
matter under consideration by the requesting Organization. 
In a Separate Opinion Judge Oda argued that it was necessary to redraft the question because 
the 1951 Agreement did not govern the transfer procedure. Moreover, Section 37 of the 
Agreement did not apply to such a transfer.78 However, the Court as a judicial organ has the 
power to interpret any request for an advisory opinion to determine the object of the request 
before it. It has been rightly argued that if the Court is to fully exercise its duty as a Court of 
7S Thirlway, Hugh, .. The Law and Procedure of The International Court of Justice, 1960-1989",67 BYIL, 1996, 
p.17. 
'6 Ibid. 
77 ICJ Rep., 1980, para. 10, p. 76. 
78 See Sep. Op. of Judge Oda, ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 131. 
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justice: 79 
[I]t cannot content itself with giving a formalistic or simplistic reply based on a narrow 
construction of the question as drafted. It is incumbent upon it to establish what is at 
issue and what is involved when an international organization is contemplating a certain 
course of action and seeking clarification of legal issues and the provision of guidelines 
based on legal principles and rules. 
The case law of the IC] shows that the Court's general approach is to place a heavy emphasis 
on the "organisational interest" aspects of requests for advisory opinions and thus inclined 
the Court to uphold such requests.80 The Court has also emphasised that consent of the States 
concerned is not necessary for exercising its advisory function. 81 Pomerance argues that the 
Court attributes greater weight to the form of the request than the substance because the latter 
might be of a quasi-contentious character. She concluded that because of the status of the 
Court as the principal judicial organ of the UN and its desire to cooperate to the fullest extent 
with the political organs, the Court tends in practice to ignore the quasi-contentious elements 
involved in requests for advisory opinions in order to reply to the request. 82 
One could argue that the Court sees its advisory function as not dependent on a State's 
consent but as flowing from the general acceptance by member States of Article 96 of the 
UN Charter and consequently of Article 65 of the ICJ's Statute.83 Nevertheless, the Court 
has sought to establish a balance between its role as a principal organ of the UN and as a 
79 See Sep. Op. of Judge El-Erian, ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 167. 
80 Sugihara, Takane, "The Advisory Function of the International Court of Justice", 17 JAIL, 1973, p. 4. ; 
Pomerance, Michla, "The Badintcr Commission: The Use And Misuse of The Intcrnational Court of Justice's 
Jurisprudence", 20 Michigan JIL, 1989, p. 45. 
81 The PCIJ, in the Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne Case, stated that the absence of the consent of one 
of the States concerned was not a sufficient reason to prevent giving an advisory opinion on a qucstion of 
r:rocedure and the interpretation ofthe Covenant. PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 12, 1925, pp. 6-33. 
2 Pomerance, Michla, "The Admission of Judges Ad Hoc in Advisory Proceedings: Some Reflections in the 
Light of the Namibia Case", 67 AJIL, 1973, p. 454. 
83 See the discussion regarding the Court's statement in the Namibia Case in Section II above. 
139 
judicial institution with a duty to administer justice. The case law shows that the Court has 
recognised only one circumstance which could lead the Court to refrain from giving the 
opinion requested. That was when the opinion requested would have the effect of 
circumventing the principle that "a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted 
to judicial settlement without its consent.,,84 
On the other hand, one must note that although the Court repeatedly states that only 
compelling reasons should lead it to decline to give an opinion, it nevertheless has not 
identified these compelling reasons.8S Rosenne has observed that despite the powerful trend 
manifested by the Court to reject all suggestions that it should exercise its discretion and 
decline to render a requested opinion, the Court has on the whole been careful to limit the 
apparent generality of its observations by relating them closely to the circumstances of each 
concrete case, including the asserted purposes for which the request was made.86 In other 
words, the Court is mindful not to generalise its findings but, on the contrary, to restrict them 
to a particular case. 
2.2 Forum Prorogatum in Advisory Proceedings 
It would be pertinent to examine the possible relevance of the doctrine of forum prorogatum 
. to advisory proceedings. This doctrine suggests that if there is no explicit consent to the 
Court's jurisdiction, the parties may nevertheless be deemed to have acquiesced to the 
84 See the above discussion about the Western Sahara Case. 
85 However, the Court in the ILO Case stated that it must consider whether "its Statute and its judicial character" 
do or do not stand in the way of its participating in the procedure by complying with the request put for an 
advisory opinion. See Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization Upon 
Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Case, ICI 
Rep., 1956, p. 85. 
86 Rosenne, supra note II, pp. 1027-1028. 
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jurisdiction of the Court through their subsequent acts, such as their participation in the 
proceedings.87 
Judge Bedjaoui maintains that the Court has applied this doctrine in its advisory 
proceedings.88 As an example he took the Namibia Case where the Court observed that South 
Africa had given its consent by participating in the proceedings and addressing the merits. 89 
Contrary to this view, Yee argues that there is no place for this doctrine in advisory 
proceedings.9o He bases his argument on the grounds that the absence of a concerned State's 
consent does not affect the Court's advisory jurisdiction as consent cannot enlarge or reduce 
the Court's jurisdiction. He concludes thatforum prorogatum only figures in the Court's 
decision "as to whether it should exercise discretion to decline a request for an advisory 
opinion, either because of the Court's judicial character or because of its special status as a 
principal organ of the United Nations.',9l 
In light of the above argument and in view of the Court's case law that when giving an 
advisory opinion the Court does not pronounce on the merits of the dispute, it seems safe to 
conclude that there is no need to rely on this doctrine to ascertain the consent of States. This 
conclusion is based on the Court's practice that a State's consent is not a requirement for the 
advisory jurisdiction except where giving an opinion might affect the judicial propriety of the 
exercise of its jurisdiction, as the Court emphasized in the Western Sahara Case.92 
87 See Fox, supra note 17, p. 121. 
88 Bedjaoui, Mohammed, "The Forum prorogatum Before the International Court of Justice: The Resources of 
an Institution or the Hidden Face of Consensualism ", (speech before the Sixth Committee of the UNGA on 
November 4, 1996 as President of the ICJ. IC] Year Book, 1996-97, No. 51, p. 216. 
89 B d· . e ~aoU1, supra note 88, p. 232. 
90 Yee, Sienho, "Forum Prorogatum and the Advisory Proceedings of the International Court", 95 AJIL, 2001, 
~. 381. 
1 Ibid, p. 383, (emphasis in original). 
92 IC] Rep., 1975, Para. 21, p. 20. 
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3. Judicial and Political Restraints and the Judicial Function 
The Court must decline to render an advisory opinion whenever its independence and the 
integrity of its judicial function are at stake. In this connection, Bedjaoui suggests that no 
obligation could be imposed upon the Court to comply with a request for an advisory opinion 
"if it risks prejudicing the integrity of its judicial function.,,93 Indeed, as Szasz has observed, 
any legal process is subject to misuse by the parties.94 However, Szasz suggests that the IC] 
can counter any threat of abuse by declining to render an opinion requested; calling for the 
views of a large number of entities if it considers this desirable;95 and rendering a 
deliberately narrow opinion closely and explicitly restricted to the terms of the submission. In 
fact, the Court alone can reconcile the problem of non-consent to the advisory proceedings 
with the essentially judicial character of the Court through its awareness of its role and its 
status within the Organisation and by exercising the discretion provided in Article 68 of its 
Statute.96 
The Court when exercising its advisory function acts judicially and applies legal 
principles and rules, including Article 68 of the Statute. Judge Moore stated that: 97 
The Court has not thought it feasible to fill a dual role, acting at one moment as a 
judicial body rendering judgments on international differences, and at the next moment 
as a board of counselors giving private and ex parte advice on such matters. Indeed, an 
auditor or spectator would detect no difference between a proceeding for a judgment 
and a proceeding for a judgment and a proceeding for an advisory opinion. Moreover, 
the Court has in all its proceedings shown an appreciation of the fact that the very 
breath of its life is ... public confidence. 
93 Bedjaui, Mohammed, "Expediency in the Decisions of the International Court of Justice", 71 BYIL, 2000, 
£.18. 
4 Szasz, Paul C., "Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court" in: Gross, Leo, (ed.), The Future 
o{the International Court of Justice, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1976, p.521. 
9 See Articles 66, 34 (2)- (3) of the ICJ Statute. 
96 Gross, Leo, "The International Court of Justice and the United Nations", 120 RCADI, 1967. p. 419. 
97 See collected Papers of John Bassett Moore, 1944, vol. 6, p. 104, cited in Pomerance, supra note 6, p. 277. See 
also Chapter Five, infra. In fact, no dual procedure for "dispute" and "non-dispute" cases was ever invoked, 
therefore, the procedure for all advisory opinions is a judicial procedure. 
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As a result, in practice the Court has largely assimilated its advisory procedure to that 
followed in contentious proceedings with respect to publicity, the right of parties to present 
written and oral statements, and the right to admit ad hoc judges. 98 In other words, it 
recognises that the judicial function remains the same whether the proceedings are 
contentious or advisory. 99 The Court in Northern Cameroon Case stated that: 100 
Both Courts have had occasion to make pronouncements concerning requests for 
advisory opinions, which are equally applicable to the proper role of the Court in 
disposing of contested cases; in both situations, the Court is exercising a judicial 
function. 
It has been suggested that the judicial guarantees of the advisory opinion are fundamental 
requirements to the administration of justice, because there always remains the possibility 
that a subsequent contentious case will bear on matters previously considered in advisory 
proceedings. tOl 
Also, in practice the Court has shown independence while articulating its reasoning and 
the choice of the legal basis of its decision, relying on the principle of jura novit curia. 102 
This was made amply clear in the WHO/Egypt Case where the Court reformulated the 
question in order to apply the legal rules that the Court believed appropriate. Indeed, as Abi 
Saab has stated, the Court is not restricted to the parties' arguments in support of their claims, 
provided that the Court is capable of rendering a complete answer to the subject matter of the 
98 See Chapter Five, infra. 
99 See Goodrich, Leland, "The Nature of the Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice", 32 AJIL, p. 756. 
\00 The Northern Cameroons Case, ICJ Rep., 1963, p. 30. 
10\ This was one of the principal arguments in Moore's Memorandum on Advisory Opinions submitted to the 
Court in its preliminary session. See PCIJ, Ser. D, No.2, p. 383. 
102 This maxim influences the manner in which the International Court handles questions of international law. 
As a consequence the Court is not restricted to the law presented by the parties, but is free to pursue its own 
research. See Fox, supra not 17, p. 180 ; Abi-Saab, Georges, "The International Court as a World Court" in 
Lowe, Vaughan & Fitzmaurice, Malagosia, (eds.), Fifty years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in 
Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 8. 
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dispute as defined by the parties in their submissions. lo3 In this regard, the Court held in the 
Northern Cameroons Case that: 104 
There may thus be an incompatibility between the desires of an applicant, or, indeed, of 
both parties to a case, on the one hand, and on the other hand the duty of the Court to 
maintain its judicial character. The Court itself, and not the parties, must be the 
guardian of the Court's judicial integrity. 
The exercise of the advisory function is essentially a two-sided process involving the 
interplay between UN organs and the ICI. Each must be mindful of the need for some degree 
of restraint. Thus, organs should request an opinion only if there is a genuine need for a legal 
answer which is clearly demonstrated in the question, and, consequently, an accurate 
formulation of the relevant point of law. The request has to be the product of careful 
drafting. lOS Most importantly, the question must be formulated in such a manner that the 
responding advisory opinion will provide the needed clarification to the requesting organ. 106 
If Pomerance is correct in her conclusion that the Court has no self imposed policy of 
"judicial restraint", then exercise of some sort of restraint by the political organs in their 
requests for advisory opinions becomes particularly important. The way that the requesting 
organ drafts the request is of vital importance. Such drafting may lead to one or more of the 
following outcomes: turning down of the request by the Court;I07 the Court's answering the 
request with only a minimal contribution to the clarification of the point at issue; 108 a failure 
to address the real issue by the Court which consequently might lead the Court to redraft the 
103 Abi Saab. ibid. 
104 The Northern Cameroons Case. IC] Rep., 1963, p. 23. 
105 Rosenne, supra note 11. p. 355. Rosenne believes that the formulation of the request as a whole. and of the 
question in particular. carry the same importance in advisory cases as the formulation of questions in 
contentious cases. 
106 Ibid, p. 360. 
107 The Legality o/the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case. IC] Rep., 1996, p. 66. 
108 The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 226. See the discussion in 
Chapter Six and Chapter Nine, infra. 
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question. 109 In fact, a satisfactory answer would require that the question be a legal question 
which is sufficiently specific and clear so that the Court is able to answer it by the application 
of judicial methods. For the Court's part it should decline to render an opinion if giving the 
requested opinion would jeopardise its judicial integrity. In this regard it has been suggested 
that requests which are "devoid of object or purpose" or "remote from reality" have to be 
regarded as compelling reasons for preventing the Court from rendering a requested 
I 
opinion.110 
In the final analysis, as argued in the previous Chapter, the request for and giving of an 
advisory opinion is a collective coordinated response involving more than one organ, or part 
of the Organisation. Restraint, therefore, should not rest exclusively with the Court. Restrain 
in formulating requests must be exercised by the requesting bodies which should not seek to 
use the Court for purposes other than guidance concerning applicable legal principles. 
4. The Judicial Character of the Court and its Effect on the Authority of Advisory 
Opinions 
The extent to which advisory opinions have a binding effect has always been debated. 111 The 
Court's case law was always that the Court's reply to a request put for an advisory opinion 
109 See Section 4.1 in Chapter Five, infra (relating to the WHO/ Egypt Case). 
110 See the written statement of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the Wall advisory 
opinion available at: 
http://www.icj-ciLorg/icjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm. (Accessed 25 October 2004). See ICJ Rep., 
1975, p. 37. See ICJ Rep., 1963, p. 33. 
III The majority of international lawyers consider that advisory opinions of the ICJ are not binding. Hudson has 
pointed out that "[i]t is advisory. It is not in any sense a judgment under Article 60 of the Statute, nor is it a 
decision under Article 59". Hudson, Manley 0., The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942, 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943, p. 511; Janis, Mark W.o "The International Court" in: Janis, Mark 
W. (ed.),lnternational Courts for the Twenty-First Century, Dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1992, p. 29. However, this point of view does not detract from the legal and moral authority of the 
Advisory Opinions. Hudson argued that: "they are advisory not legal advise in the ordinary sense, not views 
expressed by counsel for the guidance of client, but pronouncements as to the law applicable in given situation 
formulated after deliberation by the court." Hudson, Manley, ''The Effect of Advisory Opinions of the World 
Court", 42 AJIL, 1948, p. 630. Some other scholars consider the Court's opinion as having a legal effect upon 
the requesting organ. See Gros, A, "Concerning the Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice" in: 
Friedmann, Wolfgang, et al., (eds.), Transnational Law in a Changing Society. Essays in Honour of Philip C. 
Jessup, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 315. Politis pointed out that "advisory opinions, being 
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"is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force." 112 The opinions are not 
binding in the sense of res judicata and the doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable. In this 
regard, Nantwi suggestes that "the binding force of advisory opinions, since it does not stem 
from the principle of res judicata, belongs to a class of its own.") 13 Advisory opinions are, 
nevertheless, authoritative as Thirlway rightly statedY4 
The essence of an advisory opinion is that it is advisory, not determinative: it expresses 
the view of the Court as to the relevant international legal principles and rules, but does 
not oblige any State, nor even the body that asked for the opinion, to take or refrain 
from any action. The distinction, clear in theory, is less so in practice: if the Court 
advises, for example, that a certain obligation exists, the State upon which it is said to 
rest has not bound itself to accept the Court's finding, but it will be in a weak position if 
it seeks to argue that the considered opinion of the Court does not represent a correct 
view of the law. 
While recognising the non-binding nature of advisory opinions, they could be seen as binding 
under certain circumstances as so-called "compulsive opinions", which have been described 
as an attempt to overcome the procedural incapacity of the international organisations before 
the Court. ))5 This system of "compulsive opinions" is based on the acceptance by the parties 
to an agreement of an obligation to request an advisory opinion in certain circumstances and 
to act in conformity with such an opinion. 116 
An example of this can be found in Article VIII, Section 30 of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the UN which provides that if differences arise out of the 
interpretation or application of the Convention an advisory opinion may be requested 
in reality no longer such, were accordingly equivalent in the eyes of the Council, of public opinion and of the 
interested parties to ajudgment", cited in Hudson, 1943, p. 513; De Visscher, 26 ReAD!, 1929, p. 23. 
112 IC] Rep., 1950, p. 71. This statement has been affirmed in subsequent Cases see for instance ICJ Rep., 1956, 
~. 84. 
13 Nantwi, supra note I, p. 74. 
114 Thirlway, Hugh, "The International Court of Justice" in: Evans, Malcolm D. (ed.), International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 582. 
I IS Rosnne, supra note 11, p. 1056. It is known that the international organisations headed by the UN are not 
permitted to appear before the Court as parties to contentious proceedings, in accordance with Article 34 (1) of 
the Court's Statute, which provides that "only states may be parties in cases before the court." 
116 Rosenne, ibid. 
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provided that such opinion given "shall be accepted as decisive by the parties." I 17 Another 
example is Section 32 of the 1947 Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the 
Specialised Agencies. II g This procedure was also incorporated in section 21 of the 1947 
Headquarters Agreement between the UN and the US regarding the headquarters of the 
UN. 119 More examples include Article XIII, Section 26 of the 1954 Agreement Relating to 
the Headquarters of the "Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East" between the UN 
and Thailand; Article 66(2) of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organisations or between International Organisations. 120 Moreover, 
one might say that this system of advisory opinions might be used to resolve legal disputes 
within the framework of the internal affairs of the United Nations. Provisions for binding 
opinions are to be found in the Statutes of the ILO Tribunal, and previously in the UNAT.121 
\17 ICJ Yearbook, 1946-47, p. 229. 
118 This Section provides that if a difference arises between one of the specialised agencies, on the one hand, 
and a member ofthat agency, on the other hand, a request shall be made for an advisory opinion on any legal 
question involved in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute and the opinion 
~iven by the Court shaH be accepted as decisive by the parties. 
19 Article VIII, Section 21, of the Headquarters Agreement addresses the eventuality of a dispute between the 
United Nations and the United States concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement. Paragraph 
(a) of Section 21 provides that in such an eventuality, and once the various modes of settlement failed, the 
dispute shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators to be named in a specified way. 
Moreover paragraph (b) states: 
The Secretary-General or the United States may ask the General Assembly to request of the 
International Court of Justice an advisory opinion on any legal question arising in the course of such 
proceedings. Pending the receipt of the opinion of the Court, an interim decision of the arbitral tribunal 
shall be observed by both Parties. Thereafter, the arbitral tribunal shall render a final decision, having 
regard to the opinion of the Court. 
See "Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949", Department of 
State Publication 8761, Volume 12, 1974, p. 964. 
120 For a comprehensive study about these agreements see Ago, Roberto, "Binding Advisory Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice", 85 AJIL, 1991, p. 441. 
121 According to Article XII of the Statute of the ILOT, the question of the validity of the decision given by the 
tribunal shall be submitted by the governing body, to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. The opinion given by the 
Court shall be binding. In the case of the UNAT, the abolished Article II called for the right of member States, 
the Secretary-General or a person aggrieved by the tribunal's judgments to request the General Assembly to 
seek an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. Article II was abolished by the General 
Assembly Resolution 50/54 on 11 December 1995. This resolution provides: "[n]oting that the procedure 
provided for under article II of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations has not proved 
to be a constructive or useful element in the adjudication of staff disputes within the organization, and noting 
also the view of the Secretary-General to that effect, decides .... a) Delete article 11." 
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The Court has remarked that "[tJhe special feature of this procedure is that advisory 
proceedings take the place of contentious proceedings which would not be possible under the 
Statute of the Court", according to which only States may be parties before it. 122 Moreover, 
the Court has held that such clauses in international agreements are in no wise: 123 
[A]ffects the way in which the Court functions; that continues to be determined by its 
Statute and its Rules. Nor does it affect the reasoning by which the Court forms its 
Opinion or the content of the Opinion itself. Accordingly, the fact that the Opinion of 
the Court is accepted as binding provides no reason why the Request for an Opinion 
should not be complied with. 
Kaikobad argues that even if advisory opinions are not judgements by definition, they are 
nevertheless "in terms of essential quality, not far removed from the latter. That they are not 
judgements in the proper sense of the term has nothing to do with the intrinsic elements of 
the decisions themselves, but with the nature of the Court's advisory jurisdiction as a whole. 
It is this fact which precludes advisory opinions from descending to mere legal advice given 
as an institution either collectively or individually by members of the International Court.,,124 
The authority of the Court does not depend upon the binding or non-binding nature of 
its opinions or its judgements. Rather, it is derived from the extent to which it fulfils 
conscientiously and persuasively its obligations to provide the necessary legal guidance to 
enable the requesting organs to carry out the objectives of the Organisation. Consequently, 
the opinion will be authoritative once it has served its purpose of providing guidance for the 
requesting organ and can be used for future action in the specified field. 125 Rosenne argues 
122 IC] Rep., 1956, p. 85. 
123 IC] Rep., 1956, p. 84. 
124 Kaikobad, Kaiyan H., The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review: A Study of the Court's Powers 
with Respect to Judgments of the ILO and UN Administrative Tribunals, The Hague; London: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000, p. 56. 
125 Rosenne, supra note II, p. 1055. 
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that advisory opinions have sometimes contributed to preventing the particular issue from 
resurfacing on the diplomatic level. 126 Hambro has summarised factors relating to the 
authoritativeness of advisory opinions: 127 
The Opinions of the Court can really be useful only if the question submitted for 
opinion is a legal question not charged with political tension, if the question is 
important enough to warrant the seising of the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations, if it is sufficiently well framed to provide a good basis for the work of the 
Court, if the Opinion carries conviction on account of its intrinsic value and if the Court 
is not divided and the majority Opinion is not undermined by the dissenting judges. 
And if all these conditions are fulfiIled, it does not matter much if the Opinion is 
characterized as 'binding' or not. 
It should also be emphasised here that the reasoning of the Court in the advisory cases plays 
a considerable role in the authoritativeness of its opinions. Whether a case is contentious or 
advisory the Court's decision represents "the Court's legal conclusion concerning the 
situation which is being dealt with, and its weight is the same in both cases: there are no two 
ways of declaring law.,,128 Indeed, Hambro has observed that advisory opinions of the Court 
even more than judgments in contentious cases will be judged on their merits as well as upon 
the degree of consensus among the Court's judges: 129 
A judgment of the Court, even if it is not perfect and even if there reasoning can be 
criticised, can serve a useful purpose because it will put an end to a dispute between 
two or more States. An Advisory Opinion, on the other hand, does not serve this 
purpose. It stands or falls with the legal arguments that can be deducedfrom the 
reasoning of the majority and it is very much to be feared that a Court seriously split on 
any legal question submitted to it for an Advisory Opinion will not contribute anything 
useful to the solution of that question. 
126 Rosenne, Shabtai, "On the Non-use of the Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice", 
39 BYIL, 1963, p. 38. 
127 Hambro, supra note 19, pp. 21-22. 
128 Gros, A., "Concerning the Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice" in: Friedmann, Wolfgang, et 
al., (eds.), "Transnational Law in a Changing Society. Essays in Honour of Philip C. Jessup", 1972, p. 315. It 
could also be argued that Article 38 of the Court's Statute which provides that judicial decisions are sources of 
law does not distinguish between advisory and contentious cases. 
129 Hambro, supra note 19, p. 21. (Emphasis added) 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
An examination of the Court's advisory opinions demonstrates that it has been careful not to 
overlook difficulties and not to sacrifice its judicial character for the sake of assisting the 
requesting organ. In fact, the Court's jurisprudence recognises one important circumstance 
where the lack of an interested State's consent may render the giving of an opinion 
incompatible with the Court's judicial character, that is, when the circumstances disclose that 
to give an opinion would have the effect of circumventing the principle that "a State is not 
obliged to allow its dispute to be submitted to judicial settlement without its consent." If such 
a situation arose, the Court's discretion "would afford sufficient legal means to ensure 
respect for the fundamental principle of consent to jurisdiction.,,13o 
Finally it could be argued that the success of the advisory procedure depends on the 
interplay between both the Court and the UN. Each side must be aware of the need for 
restraint. The genuine need for legal advice can be the only motive for requesting an advisory 
opinion, but the Court must always be mindful of the need to protect its judicial character and 
not to sacrifice its independence in order to satisfy the interest of the requesting organ. The 
following Chapter will demonstrate that the Court, when exercising its advisory function, 
acts judicially by applying largely the same procedures that are used in contentious cases. 
The judicial function remains the same whether proceedings are contentious or advisory. 
130ICJ Rep., 1989, para. 33, p. 191. 
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Chapter Five 
Procedural Aspects of the Advisory Function of the ICJ 1 
1. Introduction 
The task of this Chapter is to stress the judicial character of the advisory function by 
shedding light on the Court's procedure in exercise of its advisory jurisdiction. A true gauge 
of the quality of the law administered by a court of law is its procedure, as the quality of the 
law administered by the Court is reflected, at least in part, in the procedures employed. 
A legal system cannot resolve disputes by means of substantive law alone. Thus, a body 
of procedural law is required to govern the modalities by which questions are referred to and 
handled by courts or tribunals.2 However, this does not imply that procedure can remedy any 
defects in the substantive law, but rather that both go hand in hand. Some scholars suggest 
that procedure "is often one of the keys to success in litigation.,,3 Others consider that 
procedure is, by definition, "no more than a way of getting somewhere; and in the sphere of 
international judicial action, the destination (the decision) is usually of more interest to jurists 
than the anfractuosities of the route (the procedural incidents).,,4 Whatever the purpose of 
1 The terms "procedure" and "proceedings" are used interchangeably in the English version of the Statute of the 
ICI, contrary to the French version. See Hudson, Manley 0., The Permanent Court of International Justice, 
1920·1942, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943, p. 547. 
According to Oxford Dictionary "proceeding" means: the action of going on with something already begun, 
while the term "procedure" means: a system of proceedings. See The Oxford English Dictionary: Being A 
Corrected Re-Issue with an Introduction, Supplement, and Bibliography of a New English Dictionary on 
Historical Principles, vol. VIII, Poy-Ry, Oxford, 1961, pp. 1406-1407. This definition seems to fit with what 
Hudson has suggested that the term "procedure" is used as a global term, hence it is used as the title for Chapter 
III of the Statute and in various provisions such as: "the rules for regulating the Court's procedure." In the 
Anglo-American, and most other legal systems, the term "procedural" indicates the machinery as distinct from 
the principles. See Wehle, Louis B., "The U.N. By-Passes the International Court as the Council's Advisor, a 
Study in Contrived Frustration", (1949-50), 98 UPLR, p. 309. 
2 O'Connell, Mary E. (ed.), International Disputes Settlement, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, p. xxvi. 
3 Shaw, Malcolm N., "The International Court of Justice: A Practical Perspective", 46ICLQ, 1997, p. 854. 
4 Thirlway, Hugh, "Procedural Law and the International Court of Justice" in: Lowe, Vaughan & Fitzmaurice, 
Malgosia (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, 
Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 389. 
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procedural rules, however, they must be applied fairly and evenly in keeping with a Court's 
judicial character. 
This Chapter examines the IC]' s procedure in advisory cases, including the source of 
the procedural rules, the use of ad hoc judges and the issues of impartiality and 
independence. Then the Chapter addresses three additional issues: first, the procedures to be 
followed by the organs requesting advisory opinions; second, the implications of the 
assimilation of the Court's procedure in advisory proceedings to its procedure in contentious 
proceedings whenever appropriate, and, finally the process of decision making, which 
includes the choice of law to be applied by the Court in accordance with Article 38 (I) of the 
Court's Statute, and rules governing the deliberations of the Court and the reading of the 
opinion. 
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2. Sources of the Procedural Rules Governing Advisory Proceedings 
Under Article 30 of its Statute, the Court has the general power to make rules 'for carrying 
out its functions', including rules of procedure. Certain procedures to be observed with 
respect to the advisory function are then set out in Articles 65 (2), and 66 of the Court's 
Statute.5 These Articles are supplemented by Articles 102-109 of the Rules of the Court 
made pursuant to Article 30 of the Statute.6 The resolution concerning the internal judicial 
practice of the Court, adopted by the Court in 1976 indicates that its provisions should apply 
"whether the proceedings before the Court are Contentious or Advisory.,,7 
s Article 65(2) provides: 
"Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before the Court by means of a 
written request containing an exact statement of the question upon which an opinion is required, and 
accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question." 
Article 66 provides: 
(1) "The Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the request for an advisory opinion to all States entitled to 
appear before the Court." 
(2) "The Registrar shall also, by means of a special and direct communication, notify any State entitled to 
appear before the Court or international organization considered by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the 
President, as likely to be able to furnish information on the question, that the Court will be prepared to receive, 
within a time-limit to be fixed by the President, written statements, or to hear, at a public sitting to be held for 
the purpose, oral statements relating to the question." 
(3) " Should any such State entitled to appear before the Court have failed to receive the special 
communication referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, such State may express a desire to submit a written 
statement or to be heard; and the Court will decide." 
(4) "States and organizations having presented written or oral statements or both shall be permitted to 
comment on the statements made by other States or organizations in the form, to the extent, and within the time 
limits which the Court or, should it not be sitting, the President, shall decide in each particular case. 
Accordingly, the Registrar shall in due time communicate any such written statement to States and 
organizations having submitted similar statements." 
6 For the full texts of these Articles, see appendix 1 appended to this thesis. Article 30( 1) provides that: "The 
Court shall frame rules for carrying out its functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of procedure." 
Rosenne observes that the Rules of Court "constitute the Court's generalized and practical interpretation of the 
Statute put in the form of a regulatory text" and" the Rules are an international example of delegated or 
subordinate lawmaking." Rosenne, The Law and Practice o/the International Court, 1920-1996, The Hague; 
London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 1073. 
7 See Article 10 of the Resolution available at: 
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictextlibasicotherdocuments.html. (Accessed 18 November 
2004). 
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3. The Composition of the Court when Exercising its Advisory Function 
The IC] is composed of fifteen judges of different nationalities,8 elected by the General 
Assembly and the Security Council "from among persons of high moral character, who 
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in intemationallaw.,,9 While 
the Court may sit in chambers in certain contentious proceedings, pursuant to Article 26 of 
the Court's Statute, there is no corresponding arrangement provided for advisory opinions 
and, in accordance with Article 25 of the Court's Statute, "[t]he full Court shall sit except 
when it is expressly provided otherwise." Therefore, according to Rosenne, advisory 
opinions should be given by the full court and not by a chamber. 10 In practice most advisory 
cases before the Court are heard and decided by the full Court unless a judge ad hoc is 
appointed, or if one or more members of the bench do not take part in a particular case. These 
two exceptions are discussed below. 
8 Article 9 of the ICI's Statute provides that "[alt every election, the electors shall bear in mind not only the 
person to be elected should individually possess the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole 
the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the world should be 
assured." 
9 See Article 2 of the ICJ's Statute. 
10 Rosenne, supra note 6, p. 1722. Rosenne argues that it is doubtful whether it would be appropriate to form an 
ad hoc chamber in advisory proceedings even if the request related to a question pending between two or more 
States. 
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3.1 National Judges and Judges Ad hoc in Advisory Casesll 
The appointment of a judge ad hoc was initially used for contentious cases where there was 
no judge of the nationality of one or both of the parties on the bench. In such a case each 
party may nominate a judge ad hoc of its own nationality under Article 31 of the Court's 
Statute. 12 
Although the Statute did not provide for the use of ad hoc judges in advisory opinions, 
Article 1 02 (3) of the Rules of the Court, that were adopted subsequently, declares that if an 
advisory opinion is requested in connection with a legal question actually pending between 
two or more States, the provisions regarding judges ad hoc shall apply.13 
The procedure for the appointment and use of judges ad hoc has been criticised. The 
basic complaint is that this procedure is the antithesis of the principle which calls for the 
composition of the Court to remain detached from the influence of the parties. The ad hoc 
procedure, in one way or another, it is argued, introduces the principles of international 
11 It has been shown in Chapter One that the PCIJ in 1927 amended Article 71 of its Rules to provide for the 
application of Article 31 of the Statute to "a question relating to an existing dispute between two or more States 
or members of the League of Nations." 
12 Article 31 provides: 
1. Judges of the nationality of each of the parties shall retain their right to sit in the case before the Court. 
2. If the Court includes upon the Bench ajudge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party 
may choose a person to sit as a judge. 
3. If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties 
may proceed to choose a judge as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article. 
If several parties have the same interest in the case, they are considered as one party only in accordance with 
Article 31 (5) of the Statute. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court. In this regard, 
Article 36 of the Rules states: 
1. If the Court finds that two or more parties are in the same interest, and therefore are to be reckoned as 
one party only, and that there is no Member of the Court of the nationality of anyone of those parties 
upon the Bench, the Court shall fix a time-limit within which they may jointly choose ajudge ad hoc. 
2. Should any party amongst those found by the Court to be in the same interest allege the existence of a 
separate interest of its own, or put forward any other objection, the matter shall be decided by the 
Court, if necessary after hearing the parties. 
In the South West Africa Case, the two States, Ethiopia and Liberia, were allowed to appoint one judge jointly. 
See IC] Rep., 1966, p. 6. 
\3 Article 102(3) provides if an "advisory opinion is requested upon a legal question actually pending between 
two or more States, Article 31 of the Statute shall apply." Article 68 of the Statute conveys clearly the discretion 
of the Court to assimilate a request for an advisory opinion to the Court's contentious procedure. 
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arbitration into the sphere of international adjudication. 14 It is also feared that judges ad hoc 
might act as advocates for the States that chose them. 15 
One might suppose that if appointing a judge ad hoc is meant to constitute an 
opportunity for continuation of a State's pleadings during the deliberation phase, the concept 
would clash with Article 17 of the Court's Statute, since the judge ad hoc would be 
advocating the interests of the State that nominated him. 16 It has been suggested that a judge 
ad hoc has a twofold purpose: first, he is expected to supply local knowledge and to explain 
the appointing State's point of view, thus promoting the States' confidence in the process. 11 
Second, Judge Elihu Lauterpacht maintains that ajudge ad hoc seeks to re-state the 
arguments of the party that has appointed him, making sure that they are appreciated, though 
not necessarily accepted during this collegial consideration. 18 Rosenne notes that, in practice, 
with very few exceptions, most judges ad hoc have voted against the majority in favour of 
the States that appointed them. 19 
The propriety of the use of judges ad hoc in advisory proceedings arose for the first 
time in the 1971 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) 
Case.20 Here South Africa had submitted that the question on which the Court was asked to 
14 See Oellers-Frahm, Karin, "International Court of Justice", in: Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, North-Holland: Elsevier, 1995, vol. 2, p. 1088. 
IS Judge Oda questions the fears that ajudge ad hoc is liable to be an advocate for the State which proposed 
him. See Oda, Shigeru, "The International Court of Justice Viewed From the Bench (1976-1993)", 244, ReAD!, 
1993, p. 115. 
16 For the full text of Article 17 see Section 3.2 below. 
17 Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee, Section 4, para 39 AJIL, 39 supp., 1945, p. 11. 
18 Sep. Op. of Judge Elihu Lauterpacht, Application of the Genocide Convention Case, ICI Rep., 1993, para.6, 
~. 409. 
9 For further details see Rosenne, Shabtai, The World Court: What It Is and How It Works, Dordrecht, London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 74. 
20 Hereinafter cited as: "the Namibia Case", ICI Rep., 1971, p. 16. 
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advise, should be regarded as 'a legal question actually pending between two or more States 
within the meaning of Article 83 of the Rules of Court, and that the South African 
Government was therefore entitled to choose a judge ad hoc in the terms of Article 31, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute.21 
The Court, once it had heard South Africa's arguments, decided by its order of29 
January 1971 22 to reject South Africa's interpretation even though South Africa had insisted 
that it was an "absolute logical priority.,,23 The Court's finding was based on its view that 
there was no legal dispute pending between two or more States. The Court, after taking into 
consideration the circumstances in which the request had been submitted and the absence of a 
dispute, concluded that South Africa was not entitled under Article 83 [now Article 102(2)] 
of the 1946 Rules of the Court to appoint a judge ad hoc.24 
The Court's decision was criticised by a dissenting minority judges who stated that 
even if there were no legal dispute actually pending, the Court should have exercised the 
discretion conferred on it by Article 68 of the Statute.2S Judge Onyeama, who agreed with the 
majority of the Court that there was no legal question pending between South Africa and any 
other State, nevertheless stated that, "in view of the wide discretion vested in the Court by 
Article 68 of the Statute of the Court, the inapplicability of Article 83 of the Rules would not, 
in my view, conclude the matter.,,26 
21 ICJ Rep., 1971. para 35, p. 25 
22 Ibid, p. 13. 
23 Ibid, para. 36, p. 25. 
24 Ibid, para. 35, p. 24. 
25 See Sep. Op. of Judge Petren who argued that there was a legal question pending which justified the 
afPointment of judge ad hoc. ICJ Rep., 1971, pp. 129-130. 
2 Sep. Op of Judge Onyeama, ibid, p. 139. However, the Court decided that "[iln the present case the Court, 
having regard to the Rules of Court adopted under Article 30 of the Statute, came to the conclusion that it was 
unable to exercise discretion in this respect." See ICJ Rep., 1971, para. 39, p. 27. 
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Four years later, the judge ad hoc question arose again in the 1975 Western Sahara 
Case.27 Here Morocco and Mauritania alleged that there was "a legal question actually 
pending" between each of those Sates and Spain.28 Therefore they requested the appointment 
of two judges ad hoc to sit on the bench. The Court by its order of 22 May 1975 decided 
that:29 
[W]hen resolution 3292 (XXIX) was adopted, there appeared to be a legal dispute 
between Morocco and Spain regarding the Territory of Western Sahara; that the 
questions contained in the request for an opinion may be considered to be connected 
with that dispute; and that, in consequence, for purposes of application of Article 89 
of the [1972] Rules of the Court, the advisory opinion requested in that resolution 
appears to be one "upon a legal question actually pending between two or more 
states. 
The Court accordingly concluded that "Morocco is entitled under Articles 31 and 68 of the 
Statute of the Court and Article 89 of the Rules of the Court to choose a person to sit as judge 
ad hoc in the present proceedings.,,3o Concerning Mauritania, the Court found that: 31 
[T]here appeared to be no legal dispute between Mauritania and Spain regarding the 
Territory of Western Sahara" and consequently concluded that the conditions for the 
application of Article 31 and 68 of the Court's Statute and Article 89 of the Court's 
Rules were not satisfied. 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that although the issue was not raised in the Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Case,32 
had the appointment of a judge ad hoc been requested, the Court would have been confronted 
with an unprecedented and awkward situation. Palestine, which may be characterised as a 
party to the dispute, is not recognised as a State for the purposes of the Court's Statute, or 
27 IC] Rep., 1975, p. 6. 
28 The Court in this case included on its bench ajudge of Spanish nationality (Judge De Castro). 
29 IC] Rep., 1975, pp. 7-8. 
30 Ibid. 
31 ICI Rep., 1975, p. 8. 
32 H . f . d " h eretna ter cite as: t e Wall Case", available at: 
http://www.icjciLorg/icjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm. (Accessed 21 October 2004.) 
158 
under general International Law. However, it is a member of the league of Arab States and is 
thus treated as a State by League members. Judge Awada asked hypothetically what would 
happen if Israel sought to appoint a judge ad hoc while Palestine could not. 33 
3.2 Impartiality and Independence of Judges 
Article 20 of the Court's Statute provides that "[ e ]very member of the Court shall, before 
taking up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers 
impartially and conscientiously.,,34 From a legal standpoint 'impartiality' has been defined 
An aspect of equality, a quality generally accepted as desirable in judges and 
administrators of law, connoting determination to deal equally with both or all parties 
to a dispute, and not to favour any, but to apply the law equally and fairly to all. 
Partiality of an arbitrator would justify setting his award aside. 
To guarantee impartiality the IC] Statute lays down some particular requirements. Article 2 
provides that "[t]he Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges." This is 
reinforced in Article 16 (1) which prohibits any member of the Court from exercising any 
political or administrative function or indeed any other occupation of a professional nature. A 
judge on the bench of the Court is in a full-time occupation and his duties take priority over 
any other activities.36 
Parties are, however, not prohibited from challenging the participation of one or more 
members of the bench. Challenges may be based on a conflict of interest, previous statements 
or the advocacy of a position on an issue before the Court. Articles 17 and 24 of the Court's 
Statute are considered as safeguards for judicial independence. Article 17 provides: 
33 Sep. Op. of Judge Hisashi Owada, para. 19. Available at: 
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocketJimwp/imwpframe.htm. (Accessed 25 October 2004.) 
34 Article 17(2) and 24 of the Statute corroborate the requirement of impartiality. 
35 Walker, David, Oxford Companion to Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, p. 601. 
36 Rosenne, supra note 19, p. 70. 
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1. No member of the Court may act as agent, counsel, or advocate in any case. 
2. No member may participate in the decision of any case in which he has previously 
taken part as agent, counsel, or advocate for one of the parties, or as a member of a 
national or international court, or of a commission of inquiry, or in any other 
capacity. 
3. Any doubt on this point shall be settled by the decision of the Court. 
Moreover, Article 24 provides: 
1. If, for some special reason, a member of the Court considers that he should not take 
part in the decision of a particular case, he shall so inform the President. 
2. If the President considers that for some special reason one of the members of the 
Court should not sit in a particular case, he shall give him notice accordingly. 
3. If in any such case the member of the Court and the President disagree, the matter 
shall be settled by the decision of the Court. 
In light of paragraph 1 of Article 24, French Judge Basdevant did not participate in the Effect 
of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Advisory 
Opinion37 because his daughter was president of that Tribunal. 38 Later, in the Application for 
Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case,39Judges 
Petren and Pinto informed the President that they had participated in the development of the 
jurisprudence of the Tribunal referred to in the case and they therefore asked to be excluded 
from sitting on the case.40 
Articles 17 and 24, referred to above, are intended to ensure the independence and 
impartiality of judges. A court of law must be impartial or else it will not be considered a true 
court of law and will therefore lose legitimacy. A corollary to impartiality is the principle of 
equality. This means parties should be given equal chances to present their cases. This 
principle will be undermined by a judge who has already made up his mind about the case 
37 Hereinafter cited as: "the Effect of Awards Case", IC] Rep., 1954, p. 47. 
38 ICI Pled., 1954, p. 281. 
39 Hereinafter cited as: "the Review of Judgment No J 58 of UNAT Case", ICI Rep., 1973. p. 166. 
40 ICI Pled .• 1973. p. 179. See also: 
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummarics/irjsummary730712.htm. (Accessed 25 October 2004.) 
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through his previous involvement with it in one way or another.41 The application of the 
provisions pertaining to judicial independence is an internal matter for the Court, which is 
governed by Article 34 of the Rules.42 Consequently, in line with the principle of judicial 
independence, only the Court itself is entitled, through use of its discretion, to determine the 
disqualification of any judge. 
The first challenge to judges in advisory proceedings occurred in the Namibia Case.43 
Here South Africa objected to the participation of three judges, namely, Zafrulla Khan, 
Padilla Nervo, and Morozov. South Africa's objections were based "on statements made or 
other participation by the Members concerned, in their former capacity as representatives of 
their Governments, in the United Nations organs which were dealing with matters concerning 
South West Africa.,,44 The Court by its three orders on 26 January 1971 rejected the South 
African challenges.45 In each case, the Court found that:46 
[T]he participation of the Member concerned in his former capacity as representative 
of his Government, to which objection was taken in the South African Government's 
written statement, did not attract the application of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the 
Statute of the Court. 
41 Jennings, Robert Y., "The Role of the International Court of Justice", 68 BYIL, 1997, p. 43. 
42 Article 34 (1) provides: [i]n case of any doubt arising as to the application of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the 
Statute or in a case of a disagreement as to the application of Article 24 of the Statute, the President shall inform 
the Members of the Court, with whom the decision lies. See also Rosenne, supra note 6, p. 1102. 
43 ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 16. 
44 Ibid, para 9, p. 18. 
45 Ibid, p. 4, 7 and 10. 
46 Ibid, para 9, p. 18. The Court concluded that there was no reason to depart from the decision made earlier in 
the South West Africa cases with reference to Judge Padilla Nervo. As far as the other two judges were 
concerned, the Court found that the U.N activities to which South Africa referred did not justify a different 
conclusion from those raised in the application which the Court had rejected in 1965. Ibid, para. 9, p. 19. The 
Court's decision regarding Judge Morozov was controversial. Judge Petren was not persuaded by the Court's 
finding that the previous activities of a judge as a representative of his country at the UN did not contravene 
Article 17(2) and argued that "if a person has formulated or defended the text of resolutions upon the validity of 
which the Court has to decide, he may not take part in the case as ajudge, whether the matter be contentious or 
advisory." See Sep. Op. of Judge Petren, ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 130; Similarly, Judge Gros noted that "[o]rder No.3 
of 26th January 1971 marked a change in practice, and that the Court has discarded the criterion of active 
participation." Diss. Op. of Judge Gros, ICJ Rep., 1971, p. 324. 
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Pursuant to Article 34(2) of the Rules of Court, the Government of Israel in the Wall Case 
asked the Court to exclude Judge Elaraby, one of the two Arab Judges in the Bench, from 
sitting in the case.47 Israel argued that its request was due to the previous participation of 
Judge Elaraby in the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly from which 
the advisory opinion request has originated. Moreover, Israel contended that Judge Elaraby 
has participated as principal legal adviser to the Egyptian Delegation to the Camp David 
Middle East Peace Conference of 1978. The Court rejected Israel's arguments and noted that 
the activities of Judge Elaraby were performed in his capacity of a diplomatic representative 
of his country, most of them many years before the question of the construction of the wall 
arose. Therefore, the Court held that "Judge Elaraby "could not be regarded as having 
"previously taken part" in the case in any capacity.,,48 
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that the procedural rules do not cover situations where 
the disqualification of several judges leaves the Court with less than the required quorum49 
Hypothetically, Thirlway speculates how the Court would deal with the disqualification of 
seven judges, a theoretical issue not covered by the rules of procedure. 50 
47 A letter of 31 December 2003, and a confidential letter of 15 January 2004 which both addressed to the 
President. 
48 Order of 30 January 2004, available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketJimwp/imwpframe.htm (Accessed 25 November 2004) See also para. 8 
of the Wall Case, supra note 32. 
49 The term "disqualification" means: U[a]ny fact which has the legal effect of making a person previously 
qualified or entitled to do something no longer qualified or entitled to do so". See Walker, supra note 35, 
ro i~~lway, Hugh, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960-1989", 72 BYlL, 2001, 
p.45. 
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4. The Process of Requesting an Advisory Opinion 
It is important to shed light on the procedures to be followed by requesting organ_and by the 
Court in advisory cases. These procedures, as mentioned previously, are codified in the 
Court's Statute and in the Rules of the Court adopted by virtue of Article 30 of the Court's 
Statute. 
4.1 Initiating the Request 
A formal request for an advisory opinion is necessary to initiate advisory proceedings. 51 This 
means that the Court cannot give an opinion on its own motion, i.e. proprio motu. The 
request may take the form of a resolution adopted by the requesting organ to seek the Court's 
opinion on a legal question. In some cases the requesting organs tum to special internal 
committees for legal advice to assist them in formulating the request.52 The request is then 
submitted to the Court in a letter from the Secretary-General containing the text of the 
question for which an opinion is requested.53 This request should contain an exact statement 
of the question which means that the question should be formulated in a clear way to avoid 
anyambiguity.54 
The fact that the question submitted to the Court has been formulated by the requesting 
organ after debating its content and not directly by the requesting parties generally has the 
effect of making the Court less strict in interpreting the question. Rosenne argues that the 
51 Pasqalucci, Jo M., The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 71. 
52 For the General Assembly. in an Annex to its Rules of procedure, previous advice is recommended by the 
Sixth Committee. Other organs and agencies have special legal committees. See Eyffinger. Arthur, The 
International Court of Justice, 1946-1996, The Hague; London: Kluwer Law International. 1999, p. 148. 
53 Article 104 of the Rules provides that: [a]1l requests for advisory opinions shall be transmitted to the Court 
either by the Secretary General of the United Nations or, as the case may be, the chief administrative officer of 
the body authorized to make the request. The documents referred to in Article 65, paragraph 2, of the Statute 
shall be transmitted to the Court at the same time as the request or as soon as possible thereafter, in the number 
of copies required by the Court." 
54 For the full text of Article 65(2) of the Statute, see Section 2 above. 
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Court deals with the question leniently, through exercising its interpretation power, in order 
to accommodate any drafting inadequacies.55 
In practice, there has even been some fundamental reformulation by the Court of a 
number of requests. For instance, the Court in the 1980 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 
March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt Case,56 decided that the request should be 
reformulated. The Court asserted that rules do not operate in a vacuum but must relate to 
facts and the context of a wider framework of legal rules. If it is to remain faithful to the 
requirements of its judicial character, the Court "must first ascertain the meaning and full 
implications of the question in the light of the actual framework of fact and law in which it 
falls for consideration."s7 
The Court also reformulated the request in the Application for Review of Judgment 
No.273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case. 58 In spite of a series of 
irregularities in drafting the question, the Court used its power to reformulate the question 
submitted by the Committee on Application for Review of Administrative Tribunal 
judgements rather than rejected it. The Court found that the question was, "on the face of it, 
at once infelicitously expressed and vague." S9 However, it decided that: 60 
While it would have been a compelling reason, making it inappropriate for the Court 
to entertain a request, that its judicial role would be endangered or disregarded, that is 
not so in the present case, and the Court thus does not find that considerations of 
judicial restraint should prevent it from rendering the advisory opinion requested. 
55 Rosenne, supra note 6, p. 357; Weissberg, Guenter, "The Role of the International Court of Justice in the 
United Nations System: the First Quarter Century" in: Gross, Leo, The Future of the International Court of 
Justice, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, 1976, p. 136. 
56 Hereinafter cited as "the WHO/Egypt Casc", ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 73. For details about this case see Section II 
of Chapter Four, supra. 
57 ICJ Rep., 1980, Para.lO, p. 76. 
58 Hereinafter cited as: "the Review of Judgment No. 273 Case", ICJ Rep., 1982, p. 325. 
S9 Ibid, para. 46, p. 348. 
60 ICI Rep., 1982, para. 45, p. 347. 
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Thirlway, while criticising the Court's finding, observed that the Court had had in this case to 
balance the requirements of its judicial character, which would point to a refusal to appear to 
endorse the thoroughly flawed quasi-judicial procedure underlying the request with its role as 
the UN's principal judicial organ "which would point to co-operation in the review 
procedure" and give it the opportunity to call the Committee to order for its slovenly 
procedure. A refusal of the request, however, "would leave in suspense a very serious 
allegation against the Administrative Tribunal, that it had in effect challenged the authority of 
the General Assembly.,,61 Therefore, the Court had to reformulate the question in order to 
give a legal opinion which would assist a subsidiary UN body. 
However, whenever the Court undertakes such a reformulation process it is still limited 
by the basic elements of the question. Thus, the PCIJ in the Interpretation of the Greco-
Turkish Agreement of 1 December 1926 (Final Protocol) Case stated that:62 
[I]t is essential that it should determine what this question is and formulate an exact 
statement of it, in order more particularly to avoid dealing with points of law upon 
which it was not the intention of the Council or the Commission to obtain its opinion. 
Moreover, Article 65(2) of the Statute and Article 104 of the Rules require that the written 
request be "accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the question." In fact, 
this requirement has not been interpreted literally in practice and the Court's jurisprudence 
suggests that requisite documents did not always accompany the request but followed later. 
Keith believes that although a delay in submitting documents may be regarded as a breach of 
the letter of Article 65(2) there is no breach of the spirit of the provision.63 
61 Thirlway, Hugh, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice", 71 BYIL, 2000, pp. 133-134. 
62 PCIJ, Ser. B, No.1 6, 1928, p.14. 
63 Keith, Kenneth, The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Leyden: A.W. 
Sijthoff, 1971, p. 49. In the WHO/Egypt Case, the Court noted that the dossier which was received in the 
Registry on 11 June 1980 was not accompanied by written statements, a synopsis of the case and an index of 
documents. In response to requests by the President, the WHO supplied the Court with a number of additional 
documents. ICJ Rep., 1980, para 5, p. 75. 
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4.2 Participation in Advisory Proceedings 
As soon as a request is filed with the Court, The Court's Registrar, in accordance with Article 
66 (2) of the Court's Statute, send to any States and international organisations that are likely 
to be able to furnish information on the question a • special and direct communication' 
notifying them that the Court is ready to receive their written statements within a certain 
time-limit.64 
In accordance with Article 66(3) of the Statute, the Court has discretion to allow written 
or oral statements to be made by States which were not so notified, although they were 
entitled to appear before the Court.65 The purpose of this provision is to encourage States and 
international organisations to assist the Court by submitting relevant information. The table 
below shows the number of participating States in the oral and written proceedings in 
advisory cases. 
States' 
Case Name Partici pation 
Written 
Phase 
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 14 
4 of the Charter), IC] Reports, 1948, p. 57. 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, IC] 5 
Reports, 1949, p. 174. 
Competence of the General. Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 9 
Nations, IC] Reports, 1950, p. 4. 
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, IC] 11 
Reports, 1950, First Phase, p. 65 
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, ICJ 1 
Reports, 1950, Second Phase, p. 221 
64 For the full text of Article 66(2) of the Court's Statute, see supra note 5. This Article distinguishes between 
States and international organisations. 
65 For the full text of Article 66(3) of the Court's Statute, see supra note 5. 
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Oral 
Phase 
6 
3 
1 
3 
3 
States' 
Case Name Participation 
Written Oral 
Phase Phase 
International Status of South-West Africa, IeJ Reports, 1950, p. 128. 5 3 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 16 4 
of Genocide, IeJ Reports 1951, p. 15 
Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative 15 6 
Tribunal, IeJ Reports 1954, p. 47 
Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the 6 -
Territory 0/ South-West Africa, IeJ Reports 1955, p.67 
Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour 
Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational, 5 -
Scientific and Cultural Organisation, IeJ Reports 1956,p. 77 
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 2 1 
IeJ Reports 1956, p. 23 
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental 13 7 
Maritime Consultative Organization, IeJ Reports 1960, IeJ Reports 1960, p. 150 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), 23 9 
IeJ Reports 1962, p. 151 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 12 10 
(1970), IeJ Reports 1971, p. 16 
Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative 1 -
Tribunal, IeJ Reports 1973, p. 166 
Western Sahara, IeJ Reports 1975, p. 12 12 5 
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between the WHO and Egypt, 9 5 
IeJ Reports 1980, p. 73 
Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative 3 -
Tribunal, IeJ Reports 1982, p. 325 
Application for Review of Judgment No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative 5 -
Tribunal, IeJ Reports 1987, p. 18 
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United 3 1 
Nations Headquarters Agreement 0/26 June 1947, IeJ Reports 1988, p. 12 
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and 5 2 
Immunities o/the United Nations, IeJ Reports 1989, p. 177 
Legality of the Use BY a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 35 20 
IeJ Reports 1996, p. 66 
Legality o/the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, IeJ Reports 1996, p. 226 28 22 
Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of 5 4 
the Commission on Human Rights, IeJ Reports 1999, p. 62 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. Available at: 44 12 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm 
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4.3 The Role of the Secretary General in Advisory Proceedings 
Article 104 of the 1978 Rules of the Court requires that the Secretary-General or the chief 
administrative officer of the authorised requesting organisation shall forward all requests for 
advisory opinions to the Court. The Secretary-General or his representatives must be 
available to answer the Court's questions concerning a request.66 However, the Secretary-
General frequently comments on the subject matter of the question, either orally or in 
writing, or in both forms.67 
The range of issues in such comments have included detailed statements of 
"observations" on the legal problem;68 historical analyses;69surveys of all summaries of the 
discussions, arguments and debates relating to the question that have arisen in the UN;70 and 
explanatory notes.71 Rosenne has observed that the Secretary- General has not offered his 
own substantive opinions when the request related to controversial issues where the requests 
66 For example in the Namibia Case the Secretary-General had addressed himself to the question of whether 
action taken under Article 24 of the UN Charter could bind members under Article 25, which he answered in 
the affirmative. See Higgins, Rosalyn, "The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding 
under Article 25 of the Charter", 21 ICLQ, 1972, p. 286. 
67 Bowett, D.W, The Law of International Institutions, London, Stevens and Sons, 1982, p. 281. 
68 In the South West Africa (Status) Case, the role of the Secretary-General took the form of a long and reasoned 
statement of the legal issues involved in the case, emphasizing the conflict of views between the majority of the 
General Assembly and the Union of South Africa. Rosenne, Shabtai "The Secretary-General of the United 
Nations and the Advisory Procedure of the International Court of Justice" in: Wellens, Karel, (ed.), 
International Law: Theory and Practice Essays in Honour of Eric Suy, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, pp. 709-710. 
69 See for instance, the Peace Treaties Case and the Competence of the General Assembly Case. In these cases 
the Secretary-General refrained from giving any indication of his legal views and confined himself to historical 
analysis. Rosenne, supra note 6, p. 1749. 
70 Like the Secretary-General's representative oral statement in the Admissions Case. See Rosenne supra note 
68, p. 709. 
71 In the South West Africa (Voting) Opinion, two written statements were filed containing an incomplete 
survey of the discussion that took place since 1950 additional notes related to the voting rules in the League 
Council and UN General Assembly were included. See Rosenne, supra note 68, pp. 709-710. 
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were made after a "bitterly divisive vote",72 except when the request had related to, or had an 
effect on, the Secretary General's performance or his functions.73 
The statements of the Secretary-General, or those of his representatives, are expected to 
provide a neutral point of view or to reflect the specific interests of the UN in the outcome of 
the proceedings.74 The Secretary-General's statements, however, seem to be influential. 
Regarding the Admissions Case, Rosenne has noted that the Court's opinion and the 
individual opinions appended to it suggest that the Secretary-GeneraI's statement played a 
significant role in the Court's deliberations.75 Moreover, in the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal Case, the Secretary-General's statement had a decisive influence on 
the Court.76 
Lastly, in the Wall Case, the Court relied largely on the Secretary-General's reports 
from 14 April 2002 to 20 November 2003, which described the works constructed by Israel 
in the Occupied Territory. For developments subsequent to the publication of that report the 
Court referred to complementary information contained in the UN's written statement which 
was intended by the Secretary-General to supplement his report.77 
72 Like the WHO and General Assembly requests on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Opinions. Rosenne, supra note 68, p. 708. 
73 Like the Peace Treaties Case concerning functions which concerned peace treaties "sought to impose on the 
Secretary-General as appointing authority for treaty commissions", Rosenne, ibid, p. 708. 
74 Rosenne, ibid. 
75 In this case the representative of the Secretary-General surveyed the treatment of admission problems in the 
Security Council and the debates in the General Assembly which led to the request and appended to his oral 
statement two memoranda consisting of guides to the relevant records of the San Francisco Conference. See 
Rosenne. supra note 6. p. 1749; Rosenne, supra note 68, p. 709. 
76 In this Case, the Secretary-General submitted a detailed written statement which dealt with the functions and 
powers of the Administrative Tribunal itself which was of a great importance to the Court. Rossene, ibid, 
~. 713. 
7 See paras. 79-80 of the Court's Opinion, supra note 32. 
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4.4 Written and Oral proceedings 
As in contentious cases, advisory proceedings are generally divided into written and oral 
phases so that the Court may be in full possession of the facts before it renders an opinion.78 
While there are no specific provisions regulating written and oral stages in advisory 
proceedings, the Rules for contentious cases concerning written or oral proceedings, as well 
as internal procedures, apply mutatis mutandis.79 The Court also has discretion to apply 
Article 43( 1) of the Statute, which relates to contentious proceedings, to advisory 
proceedings as well. 80 
Written proceedings consist of communications to the Court and to the parties in the 
form of memorials and counter-memorials, and if necessary, replies, in addition to all 
supporting papers and documents. 81 The Court may invite States and organisations to file 
written statements within a time-limit, usually of two months.82 In the Namibia Case and in 
the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case the time limit 
for written statements was extended. The function of pleadings, whether written or oral, is to 
clarify the core issues which the Court's decision must address. 
As stated previously, by virtue of Article 66(2) of the Court's Statute, the Registrar 
must by means of a special, direct communication notify any State or international 
organisation entitled to appear before the Court and likely to be able to furnish information 
on the submitted question, of the readiness of the Court to receive within a fixed time limit 
written statements or to hear oral statements. As a corollary to this, States and international 
78 See http://www.icj-ciLorg/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibhookIBbookframcl.age.htm. (Accessed 25 October 
2004). 
79 Oda, supra note 15, p. 119. 
80 Article 43 divides procedures into written and oral. 
81 See Article 43(2) of the Statute. 
82 The time limit might be extended on the request of any State or organisation. 
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organisations having presented written or oral statements or both are permitted within fixed 
time limits to comment on statements made by other States or international organisations.83 
The oral stage takes place after the closure of the written proceedings, and in advisory 
cases time limits are shorter than in contentious cases. The parties are represented by agents 
who may call upon the assistance of counselor advocates. Rosenne maintained that these 
agents, in advisory cases, are technically known as representatives as the Court tends to 
reserve the designation "agent" to States' representatives in contentious or quasi-contentious 
cases, although there is no consistency in such usage.84As a general rule, oral proceedings in 
advisory cases do not take more than a few sittings. However, in the Namibia Case, the Court 
held 24 sittings; in the Western Sahara Case 27 sittings and in the Legality of the Use by a 
State of Nuclear Weapons Case the Court held 13 sittings.85 
Oral proceedings are important to any court of law as they guarantee the principle of 
pUblicity. This stage is, in fact, a continuation of the written stage and gives parties the 
opportunity to argue their positions in the presence of the bench and of the opposing party, 
which has the right to reply. This is quite different from a system, which relies only upon 
written statements argued at a distance on paper.86 Nevertheless, in some advisory cases the 
Court has dispensed with oral proceedings, without undermining its judicial character, where 
it was satisfied that it had sufficient information to enable it to decide the question before it. 
This situation has most typically arisen where the Court has been authorised to review 
the judgments of Administrative Tribunals established to settle disputes between 
83 See Article 66(4) of the leJ's Statute. . 
84 R osenne, supra note 6, p. 1736. 
85 Available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformationlibbookIBbookframepage.htm. (Accessed 25 October 2004.) 
86 J . enmngs, supra note 41, p. 14. 
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international organisations and their staff over the terms of their contracts of appointment. 87 
For example, the IC] was empowered under Article 11 (1) ofthe UNAT Statute88 and it is 
still empowered under Article 12 of the ILOAT Statute 89 to review the judgements of these 
administrative tribunals, if requested to do so, through binding advisory opinions. However, 
because individuals, namely staff members, are not entitled to appear before the Court, they 
cannot participate in oral proceedings. The absence of equality between the parties before the 
Court was advanced as a reason for challenging requests for advisory opinions. In order to 
carry out its advisory function and still comply with its obligation to hear all parties equally, 
the Court developed the practice, in such cases, of refusing to hold any oral hearings at all. 
The Staff's views were, instead, to be transmitted to the Court by the requesting organ in 
written form. In other words, the Court in these cases refused to hold oral hearings as a 
means of providing equality. 
The 1956 Judgments o/the Administrative Tribunal o/the International Labour 
Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the United Nations Educational Scientific and 
Cultural Organization90 illustrates the way in which the Court dealt with this type of cases. 
Here the problem of lack of equality was raised in the context of an ILOAT judgment handed 
down in favour of the four UNESCO officials.91 Subsequently, the UNESCO Executive 
87 These Tribunals were established within the framework of the UN to decide disputes between international 
organisations and their officials regarding staff contracts of employment and conditions of appointment. 
88 For the full text of the previous Article 11 and the General Assembly's resolution No. 50154 1995 which 
deleted Article II, see appendix 2 appended to this thesis. The Administrative Tribunal of the UN has 
jurisdiction in respect of the UN and IMO. Under Article 11 (1) of the UNAT. the Committee on Application 
for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments was authorized until this system was abolished altogether in 
1995. 
89 For the full text of Article XII. see appendix 2 appended to this thesis. The Administrative Tribunal of the 
ILO has jurisdiction in respect of the ILO; the WHO and UNESCO; Under Article XII of the ILOAT. the 
request for an advisory opinion may be initiated either by governing body of the ILO or its Executive Board. 
90 Advisory opinion of 23 October 1956. 
91 The background of this Case was that four staff members obtained fixed-term appointments with UNESCO. 
These appointments. subsequently renewed. were due to expire on 31 December 1954. The failure by the 
Director General of UNESCO to renew the fixed term contracts forced the employees to complain to the 
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Board challenged these judgments. The Court observed that there was inequality between 
UNESCO and its officials as Article 12 only permits the concerned organisation or 
specialised agency to apply for a request to the Court. No equal right was vested in favour of 
staff members of the organisation.92 Similarly, Article 66 (2) of the Court's Statute provides 
that only States and international organisations have access to the Court in advisory cases. 
Therefore, only UNESCO and not its staff members enjoy the right to make written and oral 
presentations. 
The Court's view was that its judicial character requires that both parties may be 
affected by the Court's proceedings and that they should therefore be in an equal position to 
submit their own views and arguments to the Court.93 Therefore, to meet the obstacles raised 
by Article 66(2), the Court allowed staff members to submit their views through UNESCO as 
an intermediary and thus to dispense with oral proceedings.94 In this way, the Court was 
"satisfied that the adequate information has been made available to it" and held that "the 
principle of equality of the parties follows from the requirements of good administration of 
justice. ,,95 
In the 1973 Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal Case, the Court reviewed a UNAT judgment with respect to the 
application of a UN's staff member who had objected to a decision rendered by the Tribunal 
UNESCO Appeals Board. The Board decided that the contracts had to be renewed. Despite the Board decision, 
the Director General maintained his decision not to renew the contracts for the employees concerned. Therefore, 
a complaint was referred to ILOAT, which in its judgment of April 26th, 1955 declared itself competent and 
decided on the merits of the case. 
92 Judge Klaestad noted that Article 12, which introduced a review procedure, had failed to observe the primary 
rrinciple of equality of justice and impartiality of procedure. See his Sep. Op. in ICJ Rep., 1956, p. III. 
3 ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 86. 
94 The Court's decision to dispense with the oral phase was subject to criticism. Judge Khan claimed that such a 
decision deprived the court of a means of obtaining valuable assistance in the discharging of its judicial 
function. See Sep. Op. of Judge Muhammed Khan, ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 114. 
95 ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 86. 
173 
in his case.96 This opinion was requested by the Committee on Application for Review of 
Administrative Tribunal Judgments established by Article 11 (4) of the Statute.97 
The Court found that any absence of equality between staff members and the Secretary-
General inherent in the terms of Article 66 of the Court's Statute could be cured by the 
adoption of appropriate procedures to ensure equality in the particular proceedings.98 The 
Court also observed that when written statements have been submitted to the Court in 
advisory proceedings, under Article 66(2) of the Statute, the further proceedings in the case 
and, in particular, the holding of oral proceedings, lies within the discretion of the Court:99 
In exercising that discretion, the Court will have regard both to the provisions of its 
Statute and to the requirements of its judicial character. But it does not appear to the 
Court that there is any general principle of law which requires that in review 
proceedings the interested parties should necessarily have an opportunity to submit 
oral statements of their case to the review tribunal. General principles of law and the 
judicial character of the Court do require that, even in advisory proceedings, the 
interested parties should each have an opportunity, and on the basis of equality, to 
submit all the elements relevant to the questions which have been referred to the 
review tribunal. But that condition is fulfilled by the submission of written 
statements. 
In this case, the procedural safeguards afforded to the staff member were more secure than in 
the previous case, the 1956 UNESCO Case, because Article 11 (2) of the UNAT Statute 
expressly provides that when the Committee requests an advisory opinion the Secretary-
General shall transmit to the Court the views of the staff members concerned. The Court 
96 Mr. Fasla, an official of the UN Development Program (UNDP), made a fixed-term contract which was due 
to expire on 31 December 1969. Due to the non-renewal of his contract, Mr. Fasla complained to the Joint 
Appeals Board and to UNAT. The Tribunal ruled against Mr. Fasla. However, Mr. Fasla objected to the 
decision and asked the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments to request 
an advisory opinion of the Court. 
97 This Committee is authorised by Article 96 (2) of the UN Charter to request an advisory opinion of the Court. 
The Committee is composed of the Member States "the representatives of which have served on the General 
Committee of the most recent regular session of the General Assembly." See paragraph (4) of Article 11 of the 
UNAT Statute. 
98 ICJ Rep., 1973, p. 180. 
99 Ibid, para. 36, p. 181. 
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noted that under this Article there was a "right guaranteed by the Statute" with regard to the 
transmission of views of staff member and thus: 100 
[T]he equality of a staff member in the written procedure before the Court is not 
dependent on the will or favour of the Organization, but is made a matter of right 
guaranteed by the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal. 
Therefore, pursuant to the above Article, the Secretary-General transmitted the statements of 
the staff member, Mr. Fasla, to the Court, which thereafter dispensed with oral statements. 
The Court asserted that dispensing with oral proceedings was a matter of discretion for the 
Court, and therefore "if the Court is satisfied that adequate information has been made 
available to it, the fact that no public hearings have been held is not a bar to the Court's 
complying with the request for an opinion."lol 
This conclusion was reiterated by the Court in subsequent cases, such as the 1982 
Applicationfor Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal 
Case. 102 Here the Court as in its previous cases received a staff member's submission through 
an intermediary, namely the Secretary-General, and reiterated its findings in the 1973 Review 
of Judgment No 158 of UNAT Case. The Court noted that the decision "to do without oral 
100 ICJ Rep., 1973, para. 35, p. 180. 
101 Ibid, para. 36, p. 181. The Court found that the UNAT had not failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it as 
claimed by Mr. Fasla in his application to the review committee, and that the Administrative Tribunal had not 
committed a fundamental error in procedure which had occasioned a failure of justice as contended in the 
a~plication to the Committee. 
1 2 Advisory Opinion of20 July 1982. In this Case the US had applied to the Committee for Review of 
Administrative Tribunal Judgments to request an advisory opinion of the Court in accordance with Article 11 
(1) of the UNAT Statute. The background of this case was that Mr. Mortished, entered the service of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1949. In 1958 he was transferred to New York, and in 
1967 to the UN office at Geneva. Attaining the age of 60 he retired on 30 April 1980. The question was about 
the eligibility for repatriation grants of retiring UN employees. This request was the first request to arise from 
the Committee's consideration of an application by a Member State. Mortished had argued that allowing a third 
party (US) to object to judgments constituted an intervention by an entity not a party to the original 
proceedings. However, the Court rejected this challenge on the ground that UN members even if they are not 
party to the UNAT still have an interest sufficient to initiate the review procedure. The Court also decided to 
dispense with oral proceedings in this case to ensure equality between the parties. 
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proceedings, while for the Court it amounts to depriving itself of a very useful procedure, 
appears to be a sacrifice which is justified by concern thereby to ensure actual equality.,,103 
Finally, the same procedure was adopted in the Application for Review of Judgment 
No.333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case. 104 The Court stated that the 
submissions of Mr. Yakimetz were transmitted to it by the Secretary -General and that it had 
no intention of holding any public sitting for the purpose of hearing oral statements. 105 
The cases discussed indicate that the Court considers maintaining equality between 
parties to be central part of its judicial function. 
103 IC] Rep., 1982, p. 339. 
104 Advisory opinion of 27 May 1987. 
IDS IC] Rep., 1987, p. 20. 
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5. The Legal Bases Relied Upon by the Court for Decision-Making 
Rosenne suggests that the law to be applied by the Court ultimately governs how the Court 
reaches its decision and, indeed, provides the reason for the decision. 106 Shaw also argues 
that the authoritativeness of a Court's decision in any particular case "relates to the very 
nature and content of the decision itself.,,107 This is because the legal arguments that underpin 
the decision of the Court must be sound.108 Against this background this Section examines 
the sources of the applicable law and the Court's jurisprudence in advisory cases when 
dealing with these sources. 
5.1 Sources of the Applicable Law 
Contrary to international arbitration where the parties generally have the right to choose the 
law which they wish to apply, the IC] is presumed to be applying existing and recognised 
rules or principles of International Law. This dictates that its decisions must be clearly 
derived from recognised sources of law. 109 Shaw defines "sources" of law as the "provisions 
operating within the legal system on a technical level, and such ultimate sources as reason or 
morality are excluded, as are more functional sources such as libraries and journals."llo 
Article 38(1) of the Ie] Statute provides: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law. 
106 Rosenne, supra note 6, p. 1070. 
107 Shaw, supra note 3, p. 847. 
108 Ibid, p. 848. 
109 Jennings, supra note 41, p. 43. 
110 Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition, 2003, p. 66. 
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2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo 
et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
The sources of law applied by the Court have been divided by some scholars into two parts: 
law creating processes, which include international conventions, custom and general 
principles of law, and law-determining agencies which include judicial decisions and 
academic writings of publicists. I I I Other scholars divide these sources into constitutional 
and subsidiary sources. According to them treaties, custom and general principles of law 
form what are considered as constitutional sources, while judicial decisions and the writings 
of the most highly qualified publicists form a subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
oflaw. 1l2 A distinction has also been made between formal and material sources. 113 Formal 
sources, it is suggested, are "those legal procedures and methods for the creation of rules of 
general application which are legally binding on the addressees", while material sources 
"provide evidence of the existence of rules which, when proved, have the status of legally 
binding rules of general application.,,114 
The following Section examines the practice of the Court when applying Article 38(1) 
of the Statute in advisory opinions. lls 
III Schwarzenberger, Georg, International Law, London: Stevens and Sons, vol. 1, pp. 26-27. 
\12 Waldock, Humphrey, "General Course on Public International Law", 106 ReADI, 1962, Chapter 6, 
"Subsidiary and Derivative Sources of International Law", p. 88. 
113 Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 5. 
114 Ibid. 
lIS Jennings noted that although Article 38(1) seems to be applied just to contentious cases since it refers to 
"dispute", in practice the same sources have been applied in advisory cases. See Jennings, Robert Y., "General 
Course on Principles ofInternational Law", 121 ReADl, 1967, Chapter 1 "The Sources of the Law", p. 330. 
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5.1.1 International Conventions 
International conventions or treaties are express agreements which reflect the principle of 
freedom of contract in International Law. Hence, treaties are a form of substitute legislation 
undertaken by States and they create binding obligations for parties. 116 Article 38 of the ICI 
Statute does not distinguish between types of treaties. Despite that, some publicists 
distinguish two types of treaties, i.e. law making and contractual treaties. 117 While the first 
are said to be universal and to have a general purpose, the second are between two or a small 
number of States. liS 
In practice, the Court has intensively relied on the UN Charter as a law making treaty 
when rendering advisory opinions. For instance the Court in the International Status of South 
West Africa Casel19 relied on several Articles of the UN Charter to conclude that a 
supervisory function should be exercised by the UN's General Assembly over south Africa's 
conduct in South West Africa. 120 In the Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, 
Article 4), Case the Court based itself on Article 4(2) of the Charter to conclude that the 
General Assembly does not have the power to admit a State to membership in the absence of 
a recommendation of the Security Council. 121 In the United Nations Administrative Tribunal 
Case, the Court basing its decision on Articles 7, 22, and 10 1 (1) of the Charter, concluded 
that "the power to establish a tribunal to do justice between the Organization and the staff 
members may be exercised by the General Assembly.,,122 
116 Shaw, supra note 110, p. 89; Bobbitt, Philip, "Public International Law" in: Patterson, Dennis (cd.), 
A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Blakwell Publishing, 2nd reprint, 2003, p. 101. 
117 Sh aw, supra note 110, p. 88. 
118 Ibid. 
119 ICI Rep., 1950, p. 128. 
120 The Court has relied on Articles 10,75,77,79,80 and 85. See ICI Rep., 1950, pp. 133-142. 
121 ICI Rep., 1948, p. 9. 
122 ICI Rep., 1954, p. 58. 
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In the Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) 
Case123 the Court relied on several Articles of the Charter to conclude that the responsibility 
conferred on the Security Council to maintain international peace and security is a "primary" 
responsibility and not exclusive. 124 Later, in the Western Sahara Case, the Court invoked 
Article 1 (2) of the Charter which refers to one of the purposes of the UN as "to develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples." It further relied on Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, whose 
provisions have direct the particular relevance for non-self governing territories, to conclude 
that" ... the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self- governing 
territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations made the principle of self-
determination applicable to all of them.,,125 
More generally, some commentators claim that the Court through its advisory opinions 
has had an important influence on the law of treaties because it has developed and applied the 
teleological approach to the interpretation of the constituent instruments of international 
organisations. 126 
123 H . f . d 5 eretna ter cIte as: "the Expenses Case", ICI Rep., 1962, p. 1 l. 
124 Ibid, pp. 157-164. 
12S ICI Rep., 1975, para. 54, p. 31. 
126 Mendelson, Maurice "The International Court of Justice and the sources of international law" in: Lowe, 
Vaughan & Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (eds.), Fifty years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of 
Sir Robert Jennings, Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 65. See the findings of the 
Court in the Reparations Case, ICI Rep., 1949, p. 174.; the International Status of South West Africa Case, ICI 
Rep., 1950,p. 128; the Expenses Case, ICIRep., 1962,p.151 and the Namibia Case, ICJ Rep., 1971,p. 16. 
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5.1.2 International Custom 
Article 38 refers to international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law 
and is more usually referred to as customary international law. Schwarzenberger suggests 
that the word order of the Article should be reversed since general practice accepted as law is 
the test by which international custom is ascertained. 127 
Customary international law is considered to be the most responsive source to the 
changing needs of the international community.128 This is contradicted by some writers who 
say that custom cannot any longer be of major significance as a source of law because 
International Law is developing at a much more rapid pace than before, mainly through the 
conclusion of treaties, due to the complex issues that international law has to confront. 129 
However, this view ignores the existence of "instant" customary law, which may create rules 
without any need for an extended period of time. 
In the Namibia Case, the Court had to rule on a South African objection to the validity 
of the resolution requesting the opinion because the resolution had been adopted by the 
Security Council with the voluntary abstention of two Permanent Members. However, the 
Court nevertheless recognised the validity of the resolution and asserted that the practice of 
voluntary abstention has been "generally accepted by Members of the United Nations and 
evidences a general practice of that Organization.,,130 It was claimed that the Court, by 
adopting this principle, established that customary law could be created not only by States 
but also by international organisations, although this cannot be deduced from Article 38 of 
127 Schwarzenberger. supra note Ill. p. 39. 
128 Higgins, Rosalyn, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United 
Nations, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 1; Shaw, supra note 110, p. 69. 
129 Friedmann, Wolfgang, The Changing Structure of International Law, New York, 1964, pp. 121-123, cited in 
Shaw, supra note 110, p. 69. 
130 Ie] Rep., 1971, p. 22. 
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the Statute. 131 However, it has been rightly observed that international organisations may, in 
fact, be instrumental in the creation of customary law. For example, the Advisory Opinion of 
the IC], in the Reparations Case, declaring that the UN possessed international personality, 
was based partly on the actual practice of the UN and it led to the recognition of a new 
customary norm. 132 
5.1.3 General Principles of Law 
It is true that Article 38(l)(C) refers to general principles of law as recognised by civilised 
nations, and does not expressly distinguish between national and international law. Still, 
some writers have considered that "general principles of law" can refer to general principles 
of international law as well as to general principles of municipallaw. 133 In other words, this 
term is sufficiently broad to embrace both. As noted by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, this source is 
an "ultimate safeguard against the possibility of non liquet.,,134 
The way that the Court has applied the concept of general principles of law has been 
reflected in several advisory opinions, two of which are mentioned here. In the Reservations 
to the Convention on Genocide Case,135 the Court pointed out that it was a generally 
recognised principle that a multilateral treaty is the result of an agreement freely concluded, 
and this principle is linked to the notion of the integrity of the treaty. 136 The Court has also 
referred to the existence of a general principle of law which states that "[ilt is well 
established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent" in order to 
131 Arechaga, Eduardo, "International Law in the Past Third of a Century", Chapter One "Custom as a Source of 
International Law", 159 RCADI, 1978, p. 29. 
132 Sh aw, supra note 110, p. 79. 
133 Akehurst, Michael, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law", 47 BYIL, 1974-5, p. 278. 
134 Lauterpacht, Hersch, The Development of International Law by The International Court, London: Stevens 
and Sons, 1958, p. 166; The same meaning was conveyed by Hudson, supra note I, p. 611; See also Rosenne, 
Shabtai, "The Perplexities of Modern International Law", 291 RCADI, 20m, p. 64. 
J3S Hereinafter cited as: "the Reservations Case", IC] Rep., 1951, p. 15. 
136 IC] Rep., 1951, p. 21. 
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justify its statement that "no reservation can be effective against any State without its 
agreement thereto.,,137 Moreover, in its advisory opinion on the Judgments of the 
Administrative Tribunal of the fLO Case, the Court relied upon the principle of efficiency to 
conclude that the General Assembly has the power to establish a tribunal. The Court found 
[T]he power to establish a tribunal, to do justice as between the Organization and the 
staff members, was essential to insure the efficient working of the Secretariat, and to 
give effect to the paramount consideration of securing the highest standard of 
efficiency, competence and integrity. 
5.1.4 Judicial decisions139 and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists 
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the IC] refers to judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists "as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." 
Schwarzenberger regarded these as 'law-determining agencies' rather than as sources of 
international law. It was suggested that this term was used because findings of other courts 
are evidentiary sources which may assist the Court in determining the existence of a 
conventional or of a customary rule or of a general principle of law. 140 However, the Court 
alone can determine which rules of law are acceptable to it as rules of internationallaw. 141 
Courts, whether national or international, are not empowered to make new laws, at least 
in theory. However, they possess the power and creativity to adapt rules to new situations 
\31 ICI Rep., 1951, p. 21. 
138 ICI Rep., 1956, p. 57. 
139 The term "judicial decisions" includes judgments, advisory opinions and orders of the leI and of other 
standing and ad hoc courts and awards of international arbitral tribunals. See Rosenne, supra note 134, p. 66. 
140 Waldock, supra note 112, p. 88. 
141 Waldock, supra note 112, p. 92. 
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and needs and, even more, to develop law to such an extent that they might be regarded as 
having changing it.142 
Although the Court does not observe a doctrine of precedent, it nevertheless strives to 
maintain judicial consistency.143 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht explained that the Court follows its 
own decisions at least in practice: 144 
[B]ecause such decisions are a repository of legal experience to which it is convenient 
to adhere; because they embody what the Court has considered in the past to be good 
law; because respect for decisions given in the past makes for certainty and stability .. ; 
and ... because judges are naturally reluctant, in the absence of compelling reasons to 
the contrary, to admit that they were previously in the wrong ... reliance on precedent 
is not only in keeping with the ever-present requirement of certainty in the 
administration of justice, but with the necessity of avoiding the appearance of any 
excess of judicial discretion. 
The IC], when referring to previous decisions, has not differentiated between contentious and 
advisory cases. In fact, there is great value in advisory opinions as precedents, although in 
theory the Court's opinions are not supposed to constitute binding precedents for later cases. 
However, judges of the IC] do refer to previous opinions in order to support their arguments 
in later cases. Indeed, it is hard to find any judgment or advisory opinion which does not 
refer to some previous Court's decision. For example, the Court in its advisory opinion in the 
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case, quoted from its 
previous opinion in the Western Sahara Case in order to define what the legal question 
was.
145 
However, the Court has rarely referred to the decisions of other international tribunals. 
Mendelson has suggested more than one reason for this reticence. The most important of 
142 Jennings, Robert Y., "The Judiciary, International and National, and the Development of International Law", 
45 ICLQ, 1996, p. 3. 
143 B I' rown Ie, supra note 113, p. 21. 
144 Lauterpacht, supra note 134, p. 14. 
145 ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 73 Quoted from the Western Sahara Case; ICJ Rep., 1975, p. 18. 
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these is the reason given by the Court in the Barcelona Traction Case (Second Phase) where 
it stated that decisions of other international tribunals may be conditioned by the terms of the 
. bl' h' h 146 mstruments esta IS mg tern. 
Rosenne suggests that the teaching of publicists is a subsidiary source for two reasons: 
first, teachings are not considered positive law and therefore do not stand on the same footing 
as judicial decisions; second, they are not the product, directly or indirectly, of the authority 
of States.147 However, the Court in some rare instances has referred in general terms to 
"writers.,,148 It is noted that such references are more likely to appear in the separate and 
dissenting opinions of judges and in the pleadings of parties. In any event, both the PCIJ and 
ICJ have displayed reticence in citing publicists' names in support of any principle law. 149 
In addition to the sources of law enumerated in Article 38(1), the Court may also look 
to Article 38(2) which allows it to decide a case ex aequo et bono if the parties agree. This is 
not the same as "equity" in the English sense. Indeed, "equity" employed as a general 
concept in the judicial function is imperative and represents a constituent part of the integrity 
of the Court and the fairness of its decisions in all cases. It is related to reasonableness and 
good faith in the application of a rule of law and was basically introduced to moderate the 
harshness of the strict application of rules of law. 
146 ICI Rep., 1970, para 63, p. 40. For some other possible reasons see Mendelson, supra note 126, p. 83. 
147 Rosenne, supra note 134, p. 75. Rosenne also suggests that there is no authoritative way of estahlishing who 
is "most highly qualified" in any nation. 
148 See the Nottebohm Case, ICI Rep.1955, p. 22; see also Rosenne, ihid, p. 75. III Lalld, Island and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute Judgment Case, the Court has cited Oppenheim, Hersch Lauterpacht and Gidel, which is 
considered to be a new departure in the view of Mendelson. See Mendelson, supra note 126, p. 84. 
149 Rosenne, supra note 6, p. 1615. An example of such a reference is to be found in the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Levi Carneiro in the Effect of Awards Case. Judge Carneiro quoted the writings of two leading French 
publicists, Laferriere and Louis Renault. This reference was to support his opinion in rejection of the views of 
the Court which treated the Administrative Tribunal as ajudicial body. In this regard, he stated that: 
'Administrative Tribunals'- whatever may be the binding force of their decision- are not, and never have 
been, regarded in France as judicial organs: they are administrative organs. 
See ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 93. 
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Brownlie sees equity as comprising considerations of fairness, reasonableness and 
policy in the sensible application of settled rules of law. He considers equity to be an 
important factor in the process of making a decision, even though it is not listed as a source 
of law. 150 He also maintains that the "power of decision ex aequo et bono involves elements 
of compromise and conciliation whereas equity in the English sense is applied as a part of the 
normal judicial function.,,151 
The Court in the Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 
February 1982 in the case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisial Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya Casel52 distinguished between equity and the notion of ex aequo et bono by 
stating that: 153 
Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court whose 
task is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it. ... Application of 
equitable principles is to be distinguished from a decision ex aequo et bono 
As far as advisory opinions are concerned, the power given to the parties by Article 38(2) 
has remained nominal only.154 In the Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO 
Case, it was alleged that the judgments of the ILO Administrative Tribunal were flawed 
because the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction by not awarding compensation in 
accordance with legal rules, but based on the notion of ex aequo et bono. The Court 
rejected the allegation and held that: ISS 
It does not appear from the context of the judgment that the Tribunal thereby intended 
to depart from principles of Law ... the Tribunal fixed what the Court, in other 
circumstances, has described as the true measure of compensation and the reasonable 
figure of such compensation. 
150 Brownlie, supra note 113, p. 25. 
151 Ibid, p. 26. 
152 IC] Rep., 1985, p. 192. 
153 IC] Rep., 1985, para. 45, p. 39. 
154 Jenks, Clarence, The Prospects of International Adjudication, London: Steven and Sons, 1964, p. 320. 
155 IC] Rep., 1956, p. 100. 
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Although in advisory opinions there are no 'parties' in the strict sense, concerned parties can, 
if they so wish, include within the request submitted to the Court by the requesting organ an 
agreement to allow a determination ex aequo et bono. 
5.1.5 Resolutions of the General Assembly as a Supplementary Source ofInternationai 
Law?156 
Regardless of the controversy over the legal nature of the General Assembly's resolutions, 
these resolutions are, generally, in the nature of recommendations. In general, they are non-
binding, 157 and are not included in Article 38(1) of the Statute which outlines the sources of 
law to be applied by the Court. However, General Assembly resolutions can contribute to the 
creation of customary international law or assist in the interpretation of treaties, notably the 
UN Charter. 
Schachter considers that resolutions are declarative of international law and therefore 
may playa role in the formation of customary internationallaw. 158 He argues that the intent 
of the States to express a rule of law in a declaratory resolution is an important factor in 
weighing the legal effect of the resolutions. 159 Arechaga also maintains that resolutions in the 
form of declarations may constitute a process of formulating principles and rules that might 
contribute to the development of International Law. 160 On this view, which remains 
156 While this Section deals exclusively with thc Gcncral Assembly rcsolutions, it is to be noted that thc Court 
has also cited the resolutions of the Sccurity Council in the Expenses Casc. ICI Rcp.1962 and in thc Nuclear 
Weapons Case where the Court took notc of Resolution 984 of 1955. Sec ICJ., Rcp, 1996, p. 225. For further 
discussion about the impact of the Security Council decisions on the ICJ scc Grcenwood, Christopher, "The 
Impact of Dccisions and Resolutions of the Security Council on thc International Court of Justice" in: Hcere, 
Wybo P, International Law And the Hague's 75(jh Anniversary, Thc Haguc: T.M.C Asser Press, 1999, p. 83. 
157 An exception to this rule is that certain resolutions of the Assembly are binding upon thc UN organs and 
member States. See Article 17 of the UN Charter. 
158 Schachter, Oscar, "International Law in Theory and Practicc", Chaptcr VI, "Rcsolutions and political texts", 
178RCADI,1982,p.117. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Arechaga, supra note 131, p. 31. 
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controversial, "such declarations may constitute a source of rules of international law similar 
to the consensus reached in conferences for the codification and progressive development of 
internationallaw.,,161 
Thirlway suggests that some of the General Assembly's resolutions are "convenient 
material sources of law, inasmuch as they state, with apparent authority, propositions of 
general law, and are often assented to by a very large majority of the Members, and thus of 
the States of the world.,,162 Lastly, Shaw maintains that "the way states vote in the General 
Assembly and the explanations given upon such occasions constitute evidence of state 
practice and state understanding as to the law.',163 
Contrary to the above views, Judge Schwebel argues that UN resolutions are only 
recommendations and before they can be treated as law they must be supported by actual 
State practice. 164 This is necessary, in Schwebel's view, because UN member States may 
vote on resolutions to please other members rather than with the intention of creating legal 
bl ' . 165 o IgatIOns. 
At any rate the salient question is to what extent, if any, does the Court through its 
advisory opinions apply General Assembly resolutions? In practice, the General Assembly 
has adopted numerous resolutions which have had great impact on International Law and 
which have been cited frequently in the Court's decisions. A notable example is Resolution 
161 ATt!chaga, ibid. 
162 Thirlway, Hugh, "The Sources of International Law" in: Evans, Malcolm D., (cd.), International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 141. Thirlway has suggested some examples of General Assembly resolutions 
which constitute material sources of law including the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, General Assembly Res. 2625 (XXV). 
163 Sh aw, supra note 110, pp. 108-109. 
164 Schwebel, Stephen M., "The Effect of Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on Customary 
Law", Proceedings of American Society of International Law, 1979, pp. 301-304. 
165 Ibid, pp. 301-304. 
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1514(XV), the Declaration on the Granting ofIndependence to Colonial Countries and 
People. This Resolution, which related to decolonisation has had a great effect. For example, 
the Court in the Namibia Case has relied on it as important evidence of customary law. 
Moreover the Court has characterised this Resolution as a "[a] further important stage in this 
development", and went on to say that " ... the Court must take into consideration the 
changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot 
remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law through the Charter of the United 
Nations and by way of customary law.,,166 
Again, in the Western Sahara Case, the Court indicated that Resolution 1514(XV) had 
become a rule of positive customary law through the subsequent actions of States. The Court 
observed that "General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) provided the basis for the process of 
decolonisation which has resulted since 1960 in the creation of many States which are today 
Members of the United Nations." 167 
Most recently, in the Wall Case, the Court relied on General Assembly Resolution 2625 
(XXV) of 1970 as expressing two principles of customary international law relevant to its 
decision, that is, the illegality of the acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of 
force, and the right of people in non-self governing territories to self -determination. 168 
166 IC] Rep., 1971, p. 31. (Emphasis added). 
167IC ] Rep., 1975, para. 57, p. 32. 
168 See para 870f the Wall Opinion, supra note 32. 
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5.2 Deliberation by the Court and the Giving of Advisory Opinions 
Deliberations of the Court are conducted in camera and remain confidential. 169 In accordance 
with Article 54(3) of the Court's Statute "the deliberations of the Court shall take place in 
private and remain secret." Indeed, the majority decisions of the Court are 'co]]egiate' ones 
based on the judges' serious deliberations and exchanges of views and thoughts. 170 These 
procedures and formalities may result in a decision which cannot be accurately predicted. 
The Court's opinion is given after deliberation by the Court and indicates the number and 
identity of the judges constituting the majority. 
Advisory opinions are delivered in open Court, just as in contentious proceedings, in 
accordance with Article 67 of the Statute. Article 107 of the Rules requires that advisory 
opinions shall contain the date of delivery, the names of judges participating, a summary of 
the proceedings, a statement of the facts, the reasoning on points of law, the reply to the 
question put to the Court, the number and names of the judges constituting the majority and a 
statement as to which language text is authoritative. Any judge is entitled to attach a separate 
or dissenting opinion. 171 This means that the secrecy of the deliberation does not extend to 
preventing an individual judge from making his view's known. 112 
Under Article 108 of the Rules the Registrar must inform the Secretary-General of the 
UN, and, where appropriate, the chief administrative officer of the body which requested the 
opinion, as to the date on which the opinion will be delivered. Then, under Article 109 of the 
Rules one original copy of the opinion duly signed and sealed is placed in the archives of the 
169 Oda, supra note 15, p. 119. 
170 J . cnnmgs, supra note 41, p. 47. 
171 Article 85 of the Court's Rules. 
172 Thirlway, Hugh, "Procedures of International Courts and Tribunals", in: Bernhardt, R. (cd.), Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., Vol. 3, 1997, p. 1130. 
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Court, and another sent to the secretariat of the requesting organisation. Finally, the opinion 
is printed in two official languages of the Court in the official reports of judgements, 
advisory opinions and orders. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The IC] under Article 30 of its Statute has the power to set its own procedural rules. The 
procedures followed by the Court in considering advisory requests generally mirror the 
procedures observed in contentious proceedings. The Court's decisions examined above 
illustrate that in some cases where a problem of equality between the parties to the advisory 
case has arisen, the Court's view has been that its judicial character requires that both parties 
which may be affected by the Court's opinion must be able to submit their views to the Court 
on an equal footing. Therefore, in such cases the Court dispensed with the oral phase. 
In fact, what a requesting organ seeks when approaching the Court in its advisory 
capacity is an authoritative statement of law based on well-established reasons and informed 
by International Law. This desire will in tum require that the requesting organ should lodge 
an exact and clear statement of the question. The Court, on the other hand, is expected to act 
justly. Therefore, the independence and impartiality of the judges, and equality between 
parties, are not to be compromised. The next Chapter will continue by demonstrating the 
effect of the Court's judicial character on the development of International Law through its 
advisory proceedings. 
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Chapter Six 
The Contribution of Advisory Opinions to the Development of the Law of 
International Institutions and to Public International Law 
1. Introduction 
The ICI as the principal judicial organ of the UN, through its contentious and advisory 
procedures, has played a major role in the development of the law of international institutions 
and of International Law in general. Some commentators have even suggested that the ICJ's 
greatest utility lies in its capacity for developing or clarifying rules of International Law 
rather than in contributing to the pacific settlement of disputes. 1 
The task of this Chapter is to acknowledge that the real measure of the role of the ICI's 
advisory function cannot be determined exclusively in terms of the number of advisory 
opinions handed down. Of more importance is the Court's contribution to providing 
authoritative statements of law, thus aiding the development of International Law in a wide 
variety of areas. This Chapter argues that the Court's advisory opinions, in addition to 
providing guidance to the requesting organs for the solution of international legal problems 
and questions, have also contributed to the growth and development of International Law. 
The term "development" is employed here to refer to instances where the Court has, 
arguably, established new rules, as well as to instances where the Court has clarified existing 
rules. However, while establishing new norms and clarifying older ones, the Court has still 
been mindful of the evolving nature of International Law, particularly as it relates to the law 
1 Lissitzyn, Oliver J., The International Court of Justice: Its Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951, p. 18 ; Lauterpacht, Hersch, The 
Development of International Law by the International Court, London: Stevens and Sons, 1958, pp. 4-5; Janis, 
Mark W., ''The International Court" in: Janis, Mark W. (ed.), International Courts For the Twenty-First 
Century, Dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, pp. 29-30. 
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of international organisations, the law of treaties, human rights law, humanitarian law and 
international environmental law as will be articulated in the discussion below. 
2. Advisory Opinions and the Development of the law of the United Nations 
The IeJ's advisory opinions have contributed to the development of the law of the UN by 
developing new rules in three areas: first, the concept of the international legal personality of 
international organisations, second, the implied powers of international organisations, and 
third "succession" as between international organisations.2 
2.1 The International Legal Personality of the United Nations 
The doctrine that international organisations may possess a measure of international 
personality largely owes its origins to the reasoning of the ICJ in the 1949 Reparation for 
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case.3 Prior to this milestone opinion, it 
had been widely assumed since the nineteenth century that only States could be subjects of 
International Law.4 However, in the Reparations Case, the Court asserted that international 
personality is not restricted to States and that a degree of personality can also be possessed by 
international organisations like the UN. Consequently, legal personality is now considered to 
be an important feature of international organisations.5 
2 Whether the Court ought to apply the law as it exists or whether it can be creative in applying the law, is a 
debated subject. See Jennings, Robert Y., "The Role of the International Court of Justice", 68 BYIL, 1997, p. 41; 
Fitzmaurice, Gerald, "Judicial Innovation-Its Uses and its Perils- As exemplified in some ofthe Work of the 
International Court of Justice During Lord McNair's Period of Office" in Cambridge Essays in International 
Law: Essays in honour of Lord McNair, London: Stevens and Sons, 1965, p. 25; Weeramantry, Christopher G, 
"The Function of the International Court of Justice In the Development ofInternational Law", 10 UIL, 1997, 
fP. 309-340. 
Hereinafter cited as: "the Reparations Case", ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 174. 
4 Bederman, David J., "The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape 
Spartel", 36 VJIL, 1996, p. 367. Prior to the Reparations case there was controversy over whether international 
organizations can be regarded as possessing legal personality. For more details see Jenks, Wilfred, "The Legal 
Personality oflnternational Organizations", BYIL, 1943, p. 267. 
S Sands, Philippe & Klein, Pierre, Bowett's Law of International Institutions, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
2001, p. 469. 
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The origin of the General Assembly's request for the Reparations Advisory Opinion 
was the assassination of the UN mediator in Palestine in a sector of Jerusalem then under the 
de facto control of the Israeli armed forces. The question submitted to the Court was:6 
In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of his duties suffering 
injury in circumstances involving the responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, 
as an Organization, the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible 
de jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation due in respect of 
the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to persons entitled 
through him? 
The approach adopted by the Court to this question was to ask "whether the Charter has 
given the Organization such a position that it possesses, in regard to its Members, rights 
which it is entitled to ask them to respect.,,7 The Court then related this question to whether 
the Organisation possessed international personality. Because the actual terms of the Charter 
did not provide an answer,8 the Court had to consider what characteristics the drafters of the 
Charter had intended to give to the Organisation. It stated that despite the fact that the term 
"international legal personality" had sometimes given rise to controversy, it could be used in 
this case to mean that "if the Organization is recognized as having the personality, it is an 
entity capable of availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its Members.,,9 
The Court concluded that the UN possesses an international personality because of 
the purposes and principles laid down in the UN Charter. lo The Court then proceeded to 
6 ICJ Rep., 1949, pp. 176-177. 
7 Ibid, p. 178. 
8 The preparatory work of the UN Charter made it clear that the lack of provision to regulate the international 
legal personality of the Organization was intentional. Only Article 104 provides for the legal capacity of the 
organization "in the territory of each of its member states." However, it has been argued that even if the Charter 
had regulated the question under consideration, Israel was not, at that time, a member of the organization. See 
Klabbers, Jan, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002, p. 52. 
9 ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 178. 
10 See Article 1 of the UN Charter. 
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enumerate the various functions entrusted to the UN and concluded that international 
personality distinct from that of its members is indispensable if the UN is to carry out its 
functions and duties. The Court stated that: 11 
[T]he Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and 
enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the 
possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate 
upon an international plan. It is at present the supreme type of international 
organization, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid 
of international personality. It must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting 
certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it 
with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged. 
The Court in reaching the above conclusion relied on several factors such as the privileges 
and immunities enjoyed by the UN in the member States' territory and the capacity of the 
UN to conclude treaties. 12 The Court pointed out that the Organisation "occupies a position 
in certain respects in detachment from its Members.,, 13Still, the Organisation for its part is 
under certain duties towards its members, for instance "to remind them, if need be, of certain 
obligations." 14 
It is interesting to note that the Court had to decide the question of whether the legal 
personality of the UN is subjective, in the sense that only member States are bound to 
recognise this personality, or whether this personality is objective, thus even non-member 
States have to recognise the UN's international personality. This question was important 
because Israel was not at that time a UN member. The Court held that: 15 
[F]ifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international 
community, had the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being 
an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality 
recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims. 
11 IC] Rep., 1949, p. 179. 
12 Sands, Philippe & Klein, Pierre, supra note 5, pp. 471-472. 
13 IC] Rep .• 1949. p. 179. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, p. 185. 
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Lastly, some commentators observed that although the Court affirmed that the UN has the 
capacity to bring international claims, it did, however, fall short of identifying the precise 
source of its legal personality. 16 Nevertheless, the Advisory Opinion in the Reparations Case 
has put an end to all controversies over whether international organisations can have legal 
personality, provided they satisfy certain recognised criteria, and thereby contributed to the 
establishment and the crystallisation of the concept of the international personality of 
international organisations. 
2.2 The Doctrine of Implied Powers 
The advisory opinion in the Reparations Case has been considered to be "the initial legal and 
theoretical foundation for implied powers of international organizations.,,17 Having found 
that the UN possesses international personality, the Court proceeded to inquire whether such 
personality includes the capacity to bring an international claim for damage caused to the 
UN. The Court stated that "the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must 
depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents 
and developed in practice." The Court concluded that "the Members have endowed the 
Organization with capacity to bring international claims when necessitated by the discharge 
of its functions.,,18 
16 There are two schools of thought on how to determine whether or not an organisation possesses international 
personality in the absence of an express treaty provision. The first school. employing the inductive method. 
asserts that legal personality relies on the existence of certain rights and duties conferred upon the organization 
in order to derive from these rights and duties a general international personality. That is to say that the 
international personality can only be established by the will of member States which confers personality on the 
organization. The second school. the objective method. asserts that international personality is not derived from 
the will of member States. but can be acquired once the organization. which exists as a matter of law. carries out 
the purposes and requirements of its establishment. See Rama-Montaldo. Manuel. "International Legal 
Personality and Implied Powers of International Organizations". 44 BYIL, 1970. p. 112. 
17 Makarczyk. Jerzy. "The International Court of Justice on the Implied Powers of International Organizations" 
in: Makarczyk. Jerzy (ed.). Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs. The Hague; 
Boston: Martinus NiJ'hoff Publishers 1984 p 506 18 • •• • ICJ Rep .• 1949. p. 180. 
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Having found that the Charter did not explicitly confer on the UN the capacity to bring 
an international claim,19 the Court proceeded to enquire whether the provisions of the Charter 
concerning the functions of the Organisation implied such a capacity. The Court concluded 
that:2o 
Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers 
which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties. 
On this basis the Court found that the UN's need to ensure that its agents were able to 
perform their missions required that the Organisation should be able to protect them. The 
Court concluded that: 21 
Upon examination of the character of the functions entrusted to the Organization and 
of the nature of the missions of its agents, it becomes clear that the capacity of the 
Organization to exercise a measure of functional protection of its agents arises by 
necessary intendment out of the Charter. 
Consequently "[i]t cannot be doubted that the Organization has the capacity to bring an 
international claim against one of its Members which has caused injury to it by a breach of its 
international obligations towards it.,,22 
19 Article 34 (1) of the ICJ Statute provides that "only states may be parties in cases before the Court". This 
provision undoubtedly imposes a limitation on international organisations to be parties before the Court in 
contentious proceedings. 
20 ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 182. The Court relied on the experience of the PCIJ where this principle had been applied 
to the ILO in its advisory opinion No. 13 of July 1926. See ICJ Rep., ibid, p. 183. 
21 ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 184. The Court's application of the principle of implied powers did not escape criticism. 
Judge Hackworth, in his dissenting opinion, stated that: "[plowers not expressed cannot freely be implied. 
Implied powers flow from a grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those that are "necessary" to the 
exercise of powers expressly granted". See Diss. Op. of Judge Hackworth, ibid, p. 198. Contrary to this view, 
Judge Alvarez in his Separate Opinion maintained that the powers of international organisations are not limited 
to what is expressed in their constitution, but include all powers which are necessary to enable an organisation 
to develop in accordance with contemporary international life. See Sep. Op. of Judge Alvarez, ICJ Rep., 1949, 
f:' 190. 
2 ICJ Rep., 1949, p. 180. Klabbers notes that the Court has failed to refer to the specific source of the right of 
international organisation to bring claims. See Klabbers, supra note 8, p. 47. 
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The IC] applied the principle of implied powers which it developed in the Reparations 
Case in various subsequent cases, such as the 1950 International Status of South West Africa 
Case23 and in the 1954 Effect of A wards of Compensation made by the UN Administrative 
Tribunal Case.24 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht rightly observed in 1958 that the contribution of the 
Court, in the Reparations Case, to international law was of double significance. The Opinion 
expressly affirmed the international personality of the UN as well as the principle of implied 
powers which provides additional rules for the interpretation of the constitutions of 
international organisations.25 
2.3 Succession of International Organisations 
An organisation's existence may come to an end by a variety of means. A question then may 
arise as to the extent to which a successor organisation inherits the rights and obligations of 
its predecessor. A succession of international persons "occurs when one or more international 
persons takes the place of another international person, in consequence of certain changes in 
the latter's condition.,,26 Few difficulties will be encountered if the replacement of one 
institution by another is regulated in treaties that specify whether the rights and duties of the 
23 In the South West Africa Status Case, in the absence of express provisions in the Charter empowering the 
General Assembly to exercise supervisory functions over mandated territories which were not placed under 
trusteeship, the Court stated that the General Assembly "is legally qualified to exercise the supervisory 
functions previously exercised by the League of Nations with regard to the administration of the Territory." ICI 
Rep., 1950, p. 137. 
24 In this Case the question was whether or not the General Assembly had the right to refuse to give effect to an 
award of compensation made by the Tribunal. In considering the arguments advanced before the Court by 
States which contended that the General Assembly may refuse to give effect to a Tribunal's award because the 
General Assembly had no power to establish a judicial organ with a 'legal power' to render judgments binding 
upon the General Assembly, the Court noted that there was no express provision regulating the establishment of 
a judicial body by political organs. Nonetheless, the Court concluded the General Assembly had the power to 
establish tribunals to do justice as between the Organisation and the staff members. The Court held that "[ilt 
would, in the opinion of the Court, hardly be consistent with the expressed aim of the Charter to promote 
freedom and justice for individuals ... that it should afford no judicial or arbitral remedy to its own staff for the 
settlement of any disputes which may arise between it and them". ICJ Rep., 1954, p. 57. 
25 Lauterpacht, supra note 1, p. 181. 
26 Jennings, Sir Robert & Watts, Sir Arthur, Oppenheim's International Law, London: Longman, 1996, vol. 1, 
9th edition, p. 208. 
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predecessor devolve upon the successor, or whether they lapse. However, the situation may 
be quite difficult and complicated in the absence of such provisions in the constitution of an 
organisation.27 
The Court had an occasion in its advisory opinion in the International Status of South 
West Africa Case28 to deal with a new situation in International Law.29 It is well known that 
South West Africa had been a German overseas possession, and that, following the First 
World War, it was placed under a League of Nations Mandate, i.e. an international regime 
provided for by Article 22 of the League Covenant. The idea behind the mandates system 
was to provide an effective administration for former colonies the peoples of which were 
considered to be unready, as yet, for independence.3o Under the mandates system, the Union 
of South Africa was given a mandate over South West Africa with the object of promoting 
the well-being and development of the inhabitants. However, the League was dissolved on 18 
April 1946 by the unanimous decision of the League Assembly.3l Unfortunately, the 
dissolution resolution did not deal with the status of the mandated territories, nor did the UN 
27 In some instances the organisation may be dissolved by the decision of its highest representative body. See 
Amerasinghe, ChiUharanjan P., "Dissolution and Succession", in: Dupuy, Rene-Jean (ed.) A Handbook On 
International Organizations, Dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd edition, 1998, p. 367; 
Schermers, Henry & BIokker, Niels, International Institutional lAw: Unity Within Diversity, The Hague; 
London: M. Nijhoff, 1955, p. 1015. 
28 Hereinafter cited as: "the South West Africa Status Case", ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 128. 
29 Traditional international law concerned itself with the subject of succession between States. However, there 
were no authoritative views on succession as between international organizations. See in general: Chiu, 
Hungdah "Succession in International Organizations", 14/CLQ, 1965, p. 119; See also Diss. Op. of Judge 
Alvarez, IeJ Rep., 1950, p. 181. 
30 The mandate system was created in order to give effect to two principles of paramount importance: the 
principle of non-annexation and the principle that the well-being and development of the peoples of such 
territories should form "a sacred trust of civilization". ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 131. On the hypocrisy in the operation 
of the mandates system, especially in the Middle East, see e.g. Pogany, Istvan, The Arab League and 
Peacekeeping in the Lebanon, Aldershot: Gower, 1987. 
31 The League was ineffective in stopping the military aggression that led to World War II. It ceased its work 
during the war and dissolved on April 18, 1946. The United Nations assumed its assets and carries on much of 
its work. See: http://www.lihrary.northwestern.edulgovpuh/collectionslleaguelbackground.html#introduction. 
(Accessed 24 October 2004). 
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Charter provide that former mandated territories should automatically come under the UN 
trusteeship system. 
A serious problem thus arose when the Union of South Africa contended that the 
Mandate had lapsed with the dissolution of the League, along with the machinery for its 
supervision, which included an obligation to submit annual reports on the territory and its 
development under the Mandate.32 Therefore, the General Assembly requested an advisory 
opinion about the status of the Mandate for South West Africa and the obligations of the 
Union under the Mandate.33 
The Union argued, inter alia, before the Court that the mandate had terminated with the 
dissolution of the League,34 that there was no legal nexus between the League and the UN 
because each of these organisations was a creation of a different treaty.35 Consequently, 
South Africa submitted that the UN had no supervisory jurisdiction over the territory, and 
that therefore the Union was under no obligation to submit annual reports on its Mandate to 
the General Assembly.36 
The Court held that the dissolution of the League and its supervisory machinery had not 
brought about the lapse of the Mandate and, therefore, the Mandatory power was still under 
an obligation to give an account to the UN for its administration of the Territory. The Court 
32 It is of interest to note that Article 18 of the UN Charter requires a two-thirds majority for the adoption of 
resolutions on important questions by the General Assembly. 
33 The question was: "[d]oes the Union of South Africa continue to have international obligations under the 
Mandate for South-West Africa and, if so, what are those obligations?" See GA Res. 338 (IV) of 6 December 
1949; IC] Rep., 1950, p. 131. 
34 IC] Rep., 1950, p. 132; Lauterpacht, supra note I, p. 278. 
3S IC] Pled., 1950, p.75. 
36 In 1946 and 1947 the Union submitted annual reports to the UN. But a year later the Union contended that it 
was under no obligation to submit any report and the previous annual report was submitted voluntarily and not 
in any way as a precedent and a commitment to further action. See Amr, Mohamed S., The Role of the 
International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations, The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003, p. 132; IC] Rep., 1950, p. 135. 
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reasoned, inter alia, that Article 80(1) of the UN Charter preserved the rights of States and 
peoples and the terms of existing international instruments until the territories in question 
were placed under the trusteeship system.37 The Court noted that the object of the Mandate 
was the well-being of the inhabitants of the territory and of humanity in general, and the 
authority of South Africa to administer the territory was based on the Mandate. Therefore, 
"[t]o retain the rights derived from the Mandate and to deny the obligations thereunder could 
not be justified.,,38 
Having determined that the obligations of South Africa continued beyond the League's 
dissolution, the Court next decided that the General Assembly was competent to exercise the 
League's supervisory function and to receive and examine reports.39 The Court adopted the 
view that this competence of the General Assembly derived from Article 10 of the Charter 
which authorises the General Assembly to discuss any question and any matters within the 
scope of the Charter.4o 
Although the Court did not state that there was an 'automatic succession' from the 
League to the UN it found that, in essence, there had been passed on to the UN certain 
supervisory functions of the League regarding the mandated territories. However, Judge 
McNair in his Dissenting Opinion stated that there were no legal grounds to justify the 
37 Article 80 provides "[e]xcept as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under 
Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been 
concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever 
of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United 
Nations may respectively be parties." 
38 IC] Rep., 1950, p. 133. 
39 The Court noted that the degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly should not exceed 
that which applied under the mandates system and should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed 
in this respect by the League's Council. 
40 The Court concluded that the General Assembly "is legally qualified to exercise the supervisory functions 
previously exercised by the League of Nations with regard to the administration of the Territory, and that the 
Union of South Africa is under an obligation to submit to supervision and control of the General Assembly and 
to render annual reports to it." IC] Rep., 1950, p. 137. 
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Court's decision to replace the Council of the League with the UN for the purposes of the 
administrative supervision of the Mandate. In McNair's view this decision was "a piece of 
judicial legislation" as the Charter contained no provisions for succession. 41 He argued that if 
the succession of the UN to the administrative functions of the League in regard to the 
Mandates had been intended, it would have been expressly vested in the UN in wording 
similar to Article 37 of the Statute of the IC] regarding the jurisdiction of the pcn :42 
Whenever a treaty or convention in force provides for reference of a matter to a 
tribunal to have been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court 
of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the present Statute, 
be referred to the International Court of Justice. 
One can conclude from the Court's findings that in the case of the League and the UN there 
was a functional continuity between predecessor and successor. In this regard, Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht in his Separate Opinion in the Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the 
Committee on South West Africa Case stated "[i]t will be noted that the supervision by the 
United Nations of the mandate for South West Africa constitutes the most important example 
of succession in international organization.,,43 
41 Sep. Op. of Judge McNair, IeJ Rep., 1950, pp. 161-162. 
42 For the reasoning of Judge McNair dissenting from the Court's findings see IeJ Rep., ibid, pp. 159-162. 
McNair's view was shared by Judge Read who concluded that, in the absence of any express provision in the 
Charter, no implications or inference should be drawn from the nature of the League and the UN and that 
"[s]uch a succession could not be implied, either in fact or in law". See Sep. op. of Judge Read, IeJ Rep., 1950, 
ff" 17~-173. . 
Heremafter CIted as "the South West Africa (Admissibility) Case", IeJ Rep., 1956, p. 48. 
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3. The Contribution of ICJ Advisory Opinions to the Rules Governing the 
Interpretation of Treaties 
Interpretation, in general, has been defined as "the art or process of discovering and 
expounding the intended signification of the language used, that is, the meaning which the 
authors of the law designed it to convey to others.,,44 Indeed, interpretation is often required 
even where terms of provisions and words seem clear.45 
Although various techniques of interpretation were already recognised in International 
Law, their present development owes much to the ICI, primarily cases in which the Court has 
interpreted the UN Charter and agreements between the UN and its specialised agencies vis-
a-vis member States. 
3.1 The Interpretive Function of the IeJ 
The issue of the ICJ's power to interpret the UN Charter was raised at the San Francisco 
Conference, where Belgium submitted a proposal to give the Court the exclusive right to 
interpret the Charter. However, this proposal was defeated and another approach to 
interpretation adopted. It was stated:46 
In the course of the operations from day to day of the various organs of the 
Organization, it is inevitable that each organ will interpret such parts of the Charter as 
are applicable to its particular functions. This process is inherent in the functioning of 
any body which operates under an instrument defining its functions and powers. It will 
be manifested in the functioning of such a body as the General Assembly, the Security 
Council, or the International Court of Justice. Accordingly, it is not necessary to include 
in the Charter a provision either authorizing or approving the normal operation of this 
principle .... .If two Member States are at variance concerning the correct interpretation 
of the Charter. they are of course free to submit the dispute to the International Court of 
Justice as in the case of any other treaty. Similarly. it would always be open to the 
General Assembly and to the Security Council. in appropriate circumstances. to ask the 
44 Garner, Bryan (ed. in Chief), "Black's Law Dictionary", 7th edition, p. 824. 
4S Fitzmaurice argued that the conclusion that the meaning of the text is clear is in itself a process of 
interpretation. See, Fitzmaurice, Gerald G., The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 
Grotius Publications Limited, 1986, p. 46. 
46 See UNCIO, 13, p. 709. 
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International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion concerning the meaning of a 
provision of the Charter. 
Although the ICJ does not have an exclusive right to interpret the Charter, it may 
nevertheless do SO.47 Indeed, the Court has not hesitated to do so since its inception and it 
regards the interpretative function as falling within the normal exercise of its judicial 
function.48 The Court throughout its jurisprudence has exercised its interpretative function 
not only of Charter's provisions,49 but also of treaties other than the Charter, so of agreements 
between the UN and its specialised agencies vis-a.-vis their member States,SI and of some of 
its previous advisory opinions. S2 
47 The General Assembly in its second session, during its discussion of the "[n]eed for greater use by the United 
Nations and its organs of the International Court of Justice", considered the issue of whether the UN organs 
may refer questions on constitutional interpretations of the Charter. Subsequently, under General Assembly 
Resolution No.171 it was recommended that points of law relating to the interpretation of the Charter or the 
constitutions of the special agencies "should be referred to the Court for an advisory opinion." See GA Res. No. 
171 (11), 1947. This Resolution has encouraged other UN organs and specialised agencies to refer to the Court 
any question pertaining to Charter interpretation. 
48 Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of The International Court, 1920-1996, The Hague; London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, vol. I, 1997, p. 79; the Admissions Case, ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 61. 
49 The Court exercised an interpretative function in a number of cases, inter alia, the 1948 Admission of a State 
to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4) Case, ICI Rep., p. 61,' the 1950 Competence of the General 
Assembly regarding admission to the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep., p. 6; the 1949 Reparationfor injuries 
suffered in the service of the United Nations Case where the Court interpreted the Charter so as to recognise the 
legal personality of the UN. For further details about the international personality of international organisations, 
see discussion above; the 1962 Expenses Case where the Court affirmed the General Assembly's power in 
respect of the "expenses of the organisation", and in respect of the maintenance of international peace and 
security. For further details about this Case, see the discussion below. Lastly in the 2004 Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Case the Court interpreted the Charter and 
several international conventions to determine the illegality of the Wall built by Israel in the West Bank and 
Occupied Territories. 
so The Court has had an opportunity to interpret treaties other than the UN Charter on various occasions: the 
1950 Interpretation of Peace treaties Case and the 1951 Reservations to the Convention on Genocide Case. 
SI Examples of such agreements are headquarters agreements and host agreements which regulate the 
diplomatic privileges and immunities of the organisations and their employees. See Muller, Sam A., 
International Organizations and their Host States: Aspect of their Legal Relationship, The Hague; Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, 1995, p. 17. 
52 The Court in the 1955 South West Africa Voting Procedure Case and in the 1956 Admissibility of Hearings by 
the Committee on South West Africa Case was asked to interpret its advisory opinion in the 1950 International 
Status of South West Africa Case. For details about these three Advisory Opinions, see Section 5 in Chapter 
Eight, infra. 
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3.2 The Special Legal Position of the UN Charter 
The objective legal personality attributed to the UN by the Court has, in the view of some 
scholars, made the UN different from most other international organisations53 and the Charter 
also has certain features, which distinguishes it from other treaties. 54 In the Certain Expenses 
of the United Nations (Article.17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) Case 55 the Court recognised 
the Charter's special characteristics and held that: 56 
On the previous occasions when the Court has had to interpret the Charter of the 
United Nations, it has followed the principles and rules applicable in general to the 
interpretation of treaties, since it has recognized that the Charter is a multilateral 
treaty, albeit a treaty having certain special characteristics. 
The UN Charter, therefore, is not only the multilateral treaty which established the 
organisation and outlined the rights and obligations of those States signing it, it is also the 
constitution of the UN, laying down its functions and limitations.57 The Charter, in fact, has 
been characterised as a constitution for the world communit/8 containing both 
"constitutional 59" and "contractuaI6o"characteristics. 
~3 Simma, Bruno, et al., (eds.), The Charter o/the United Nations: A Commentary, Oxford University Press, 
2nd edition, 2002, p. 16. See also the discussion above. 
~4 See Amr, supra note 36, p. 122. 
ss Hereinafter cited as "the Expenses Case". IC] Rep., 1962, p. 151. 
56 IC] Rep., 1962, p. 157. 
57 Shaw, Malcolm N.,lnternational Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition, 2003, p. 1083. 
58 Simma, supra note 53, p. 16; Conforti, Benedetto, The Law and Practice a/the United Nations, The Hague; 
London: Kluwer Law International, 2000, p. 10. 
59 The Charter has constitutional elements since it authorises the UN to make decisions binding upon the 
member States and to exercise jurisdiction over their territories. See, Amr, supra note 36, p. 123. Moreover, the 
so called "objective legal personality" attributed to the UN by the IC] in the Reparations Case constitutes 
evidence that the Charter is more than an ordinary treaty as this objective personality contradicts the general 
principle that treaties have no effect on third parties. For dctails about the objective personality of the UN, see 
the above discussion. 
60 An example of this is the_conclusion and tcrmination of the treaty, and the provisions in Chapter 9 on human 
rights and Chapters 11 and 12 dealing with the position of non-self-governing, mandated and trust territories. 
See Lauterpact, Elihu, "The Development of the Law of International Organization by the Decisions of 
International Tribunals", 152 ReADI, 1976, p. 416; Rosenne, Shabtai, Developments in the law a/Treaties: 
1945-1986, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 224. 
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According to Article 5 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the 
instrument applies to any treaty concluded between States. A logical consequence of this is 
that Articles 31 to 33 of the Convention apply to the interpretation of the Charter. 
Nevertheless, techniques relating to treaty interpretation may not be fully adequate or 
applicable to the interpretation of a constitution.61 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts 
maintain that a treaty of a 'constitutional' character "should be subject to somewhat different 
rules of interpretation so as to allow for the intrinsically evolutionary nature of a 
constitution. ,,62 
The present thesis does not claim that the methods of interpretation adopted by the 
Court, in its advisory opinions, are totally different from the ordinary rules of treaty 
interpretation. Rather, it is suggested here that the development of general techniques of 
interpretation owes much to their application by the Court which has developed a system of 
constitutional interpretation. As Simma and others claim, the ICJ has emphasised the 
"functional interpretation" principle by calling attention to the purposes of the Organisation. 
(i) The Principle of Natural and Ordinary :Meaning of the Words in Their Context 
This principle is considered the main principle of interpretation in the VCLT, which in 
Article 31 (1) provides that a treaty shall be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose." The natural and ordinary meaning of the treaty can be determined by 
looking at the context in which it is used. The Court in the Constitution of the Maritime 
Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization Case, 
:~ Lauterpacht, Elihu, supra note 60, p. 416. 
Jennings & Watts, supra note 26, p. 1268. 
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while interpreting the term 'elected', emphasised the importance of the context and held 
that: 63 
The meaning of the word 'elected' in the Article cannot be determined in isolation by 
recourse to its usual or common meaning and attaching that meaning to the word 
where used in the Article. The word obtains its meaning from the context in which it 
is used. If the context requires a meaning which connotes a wide choice, it must be 
construed accordingly, just as it must be given a restrictive meaning if the context in 
which it is used so requires. 
The Court then held that:64 
The words of Article 28(a) must be read in their natural and ordinary meaning, in the 
sense which they would normally have in their context. It is only if, when this is 
done, the words of the Article are ambiguous in any way that resort needs to be had to 
other methods of construction. 
In the Competence of the General Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations Case 
the Court found that:65 
[T]he first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions 
of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary 
meaning in the context in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural and 
ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter. If, on the 
other hand, the words in their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead to 
an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the Court, by resort to other 
methods of interpretation, seek to ascertain what the parties really did mean when 
they used these words. 
(ii) Functional or Teleological Interpretation Principle 
According to Article 31 (1) of the VCLT a treaty shall be interpreted, in part, by reference to 
its object and purpose. The main objective of this functional or teleological method of 
interpretation is to give full effect to a treaty and to avoid any interpretation that runs counter 
to the purpose served by the treaty,66 Shaw notes that this approach centralises the role of the 
63 Hereinafter cited as "the IMeO Case", IC] Rep., 1960, p. 158. 
64 Ibid, p. 159. 
65 Ie] Rep., 1950, p. 8, 
66 Schwarzenberger, Georg, International Law, London: Stevens and Sons, vol. 1, p. 518. 
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judge, since he will be called upon to define the object and purpose of the treaty and this may 
lead to judicial law-making.67 
The Court applied the teleological approach in the Reparations Case when it held that 
the UN Organisation could not carry out its functions unless it was regarded as having an 
international legal personality.68 In its advisory opinion on the International Status of South 
West Africa,69 the Court held that the Mandate conferred by the League of Nations over 
South West Africa was, inter alia, instituted for the benefit of the inhabitants of the territory, 
and that it was an international institution with an international aim. The Court then 
interpreted Article 80 (1) of the UN Charter in the light of the objectives and purposes of the 
mandates system which was created to give effect to two principles,70 non-annexation of 
overseas territories ceded by the defeated powers in the peace settlement after World War 
One, and the well being and development of the peoples inhabiting the mandated territories. 
The interests of the latter, who were judged to be unready, as yet, to stand by themselves, 
were said to form "a sacred trust of civilization.,,71 
67 Shaw, supra note 57, p. 839. 
68 ICI Rep., 1949, p. 179. 
69 ICI Rep., 1950, p. 128. 
70 See ICI Rep., 1950, pp. 131-133. Article 80(1) of the UN Charter provides: "[e]xcept as may be agreed upon 
in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the 
trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed 
in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing 
international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties." ICI Rep., 1950, 
~p. 131-133. 
1 Iudge McNair in his Separate Opinion analysed the "sacred trust" by stating that: 
Nearly every legal system possess some institution whereby the property (and sometimes the persons) of 
those who are not sui juris, such as a minor or a lunatic, can be entrusted to some responsible person such 
as a trustee or tuteur or curateur. The Anglo-American trust serves this purpose, and another purpose 
even more closely akin to the Mandates System, namely, the vesting of property in trustees, and its 
management by them in order that the public or some class of the public may derive benefit or that some 
public purpose may be served. The trust has frequently been used to protect the weak and the dependent. 
See Sep. Op. of Judge McNair, ICJ Rep., 1950, p. 149. 
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The Court relied on the objects of the mandate treaty between the League and the 
Union of South Africa and held that the 'necessity' for supervision continued and, therefore, 
the obligation to submit to supervision could not disappear "merely" because the supervisory 
organ had vanished, particularly when the UN had "another international organ performing 
similar, though not identical, supervisory functions."n In light of this interpretation, the 
Court concluded that: 73 
[T]he General Assembly of the United Nations is legally qualified to exercise the 
supervisory functions previously exercised by the League of Nations with regard to 
the administration of the Territory, and that the Union of South Africa is under an 
obligation to submit to supervision and control of the General Assembly and to render 
annual reports to it. 
(iii) The Use of Travaux Preparatoires as Supplementary Means of Interpretation 74 
Article 32 of the VCLT stipulates that recourse may be had to "supplementary means of 
interpretation" in certain circumstances: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31 : 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
Thus, The Court may refer to the preparatory work when there is a lack of clarity in the text 
and persisting ambiguity, or where a literal interpretation would lead to a result that is 
'unreasonable'. In the Admissions Case, the request for an opinion arose in the context of a 
deadlock over the criteria to be applied to the admission of States to the UN and which 
reflected the bipolar division of the world into Eastern and Western blocs. Following the 
72 Ie] Rep., 1950, p. 136. 
73 Ibid, p. 137. 
74 The term "travaux preparatoires" is a French term which means "preparatory work" and may include 
materials used in preparing the ultimate form of an agreement or statute, and especially of an international 
treaty; such materials constitute a legislative history. See Garner, Bryan, supra note 44, p. 1505. 
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establishment of the UN, a number of States applied for admission. However, their 
applications were rejected by the Security Council because of vetoes by one or more 
permanent members of the Council. The General Assembly referred to the Court the question 
whether a member of the UN must make its consent to admission of another State to the UN 
dependent on conditions not expressly stated in Article 4( 1) of the Charter.75 The Court 
considered that: 76 
[T]he text [of the Charter] is sufficiently clear; consequently it [the Court] does not 
feel that it should deviate from the consistent practice of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, according to which there is no occasion to resort to preparatory 
work if the text of a convention is sufficiently clear in itself. 
Therefore, the Court declared that the conditions laid down in the Charter for the admission 
of States were exhaustive and that, if they were fulfilled by a State which was a candidate, 
the Security Council ought to make a recommendation which would enable the General 
Assembly to decide upon the admission. The Court reaffirmed its view in the Competence of 
the General Assembly Case and held that it had no difficulty in ascertaining the natural and 
ordinary meaning of the words in question. Therefore, it was not permissible to resort to the 
travaux preparatoires.77 
On the other hand, the Court has relied on the travaux preparatoires in subsequent 
cases such as the IMCO Case, which involved interpretation of Article 28(a) of the 
75 Article 4 provides: 
(1) "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations 
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these 
obligations. 
(2) "The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the 
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." 
76 IC] Rep., 1947-48, p. 63. The minority judges referred to the preparatory work for the purpose of showing 
that members were free to refer to any kind of consideration in determining whether or not a State should be 
admitted. See Joint Opinion of Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair and Read, ibid, pp. 87-90. 
71 IC] Rep., 1950, p. 8. 
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Convention establishing the Organisation.78 According to Article 28 (a) the IMCO 
Committee, consists of 14 members elected by the Assembly from members of the 
organisation having an important interest in maritime safety, "of which not less than eight 
shall be the largest ship-owning nations. " 
On 15 January 1959, the IMCO Assembly failed to elect Liberia and Panama to the 
Committee, although those two States were among the eight members of the Organisation 
who possessed the largest registered tonnage. Subsequently, the Assembly decided to ask the 
Court whether the Maritime Safety Committee was constituted in accordance with the 
Convention for the establishment of the Organisation. The Court decided that the preparatory 
work of the Convention establishing IMCO confirmed that the underlying principle of Article 
28(a) was that the largest ship owning nations should constitute the majority at the 
Committee.79 Consequently the Court replied to the requested question in the negative. 
Most recently, in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory Case,80 the Court, in order to determine the scope of application of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, resorted to the intentions of the drafters of both the Convention 
and of the Hague Regulations of 1907 to conclude that the Geneva Convention was 
applicable to Israel regardless of the status of the occupied territories.81 The Court noted that, 
according to the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that 
78 The question referred to the Court was: "[i]s the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization, which was elected on 15 January 1959, constituted in accordance with the 
Convention for the Establishment of the Organization?" 
79 ICJ Rep., 1960, pp. 161-164. 
80 Hereinafter cited as: "the Wall Case", See http://www.icj-ci;.org/icjwww/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm. 
(Accessed 21 October 2004). 
81 Israel had objected that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not applicable de jure within those territories 
because Article 2 (2) applies only in the case of occupation of territories falling under the sovereignty of a High 
Contracting Party involved in an armed conflict. Israel explained that while Jordan was admittedly a party to the 
Convention in 1967, the territories occupied by Israel during that conflict had not previously been under 
Jordanian sovereignty. See Para. 94 of the Wall Opinion. 
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Convention is applicable when two conditions are fulfilled: that there exists an armed 
conflict (whether or not a state of war has been recognised); and that the conflict has arisen 
between two contracting parties. If those two conditions are satisfied, the Convention applies, 
in particular in any territory occupied in the course of the conflict by one of the contracting 
parties. 82 The Court stated that:83 
The object of the second paragraph of Article 2 is not to restrict the scope of 
application of the Convention, as defined by the first paragraph, by excluding 
therefrom territories not falling under the sovereignty of one of the contracting 
parties. It is directed simply to making it clear that, even if occupation effected during 
the conflict met no armed resistance, the Convention is still applicable. 
The Court then held that the above interpretation:84 
[R]eflects the intention of the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention to protect 
civilians who find themselves, in whatever way, in the hands of the occupying Power. 
Whilst the drafters of the Hague Regulations of 1907 were as much concerned with 
protecting the rights of a State whose territory is occupied, as with protecting the 
inhabitants of that territory, the drafters of the Fourth Geneva Convention sought to 
guarantee the protection of civilians in time of war, regardless of the status of the 
occupied territories, as is shown by Article 47 of the Convention. 
The Court explained that, according to the Convention's travaux preparatoires, the drafters 
of the second paragraph of Article 2: 85 
[H]ad no intention, when they inserted that paragraph into the Convention, of 
restricting the latter's scope of application. They were merely seeking to provide for 
cases of occupation without combat, such as the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia 
by Germany in 1939. 
In sum, the Court has not been hesitant to resort to the preparatory work whenever it 
considered it to be essential to determine or to confirm the meaning of words obtained by the 
application of other principles.86 
82 See para. 95 of the Wall Advisory Opinion. supra note 80 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Judge Alvarez. as a general rule. did not favour using the preparatoires work method. He stated in the 
Competence of the General Assembly Case that: "[ilt is therefore necessary. when interpreting treaties-in 
particular. the Charter of the United Nations-to look ahead. that is to have regard to the new conditions. and not 
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(iv) Subsequent Practice as a Guide to Interpretation 
Article 31 (3)(b) of the Vienna Convention permits reference, by the interpreting organ, to 
any subsequent practice in the application of a treaty. In the Wall Case, in order to examine 
the significance of Article 12( 1) of the UN Charter, the Court referred to UN practice.87 The 
Court held that: 88 
As regards the practice of the United Nations, both the General Assembly and the 
Security Council initially interpreted and applied Article 12 to the effect that the 
Assembly could not make a recommendation on a question concerning the 
maintenance of international peace and security while the matter remained on the 
Council's agenda. 
In the Competence of the General Assembly Case, the Court found that UN organs have 
consistently interpreted the text of Article 4 of the UN Charter to mean that the General 
Assembly could decide to admit a State to UN membership only on the basis of a 
recommendation of the Security Council. 89 The Court thus confirmed the consistent 
application by UN organs of the natural and ordinary meaning principle to Article 4 of the 
Charter. 
Once again, in the Expenses Case, the Court referred to the practice of the Organisation 
in order to interpret the word "budget" in Article 17(2) of the Charter as encompassing both 
to look back, or have recourse to rravaux preparatoires. A treaty or a text that has once been established 
acquires a life of its own. Consequently, in interpreting it we must have regard to the exigencies of 
contemporary life, rather than to the intentions ofthose who framed it." IC] Rep., 1950, p. 18. 
87 Article 12 (1) of the Charter provides: "[ w ]hile the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or 
situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." 
88 See para. 27 of the Wall Opinion. See supra note 80. It is interesting to know that the Court in the Expenses 
Case said that initially the General Assembly cannot deal with a matter while it is on the Council's agenda, but 
provided the General Assembly did not propose measures that could amount to 'action', it could deal with 
matters affecting international peace and security and even establish peacekeeping operations. See discussion 
below. 
89 IC] Rep., 1950, p. 9. 
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the administrative and operational budgets of the UN. The Court held that "the practice of the 
Organization is entirely consistent with the plain meaning of the text.,,90 
From the above cases it is clear that the IC] through its advisory opinions has had 
occasions to develop and consolidate jurisprudence in the area of treaty interpretation and to 
confirm the various recognised techniques of treaty interpretation. 
4. The Contribution of Advisory Opinions to the Interpretation and Application of 
Agreements between the UN, its agencies and Member States 
This Section illustrates how the Court's advisory opinions have provided guidance regarding 
the interpretation and application of conventions between the UN and/or its agencies on the 
one hand, and the member States on the other. 
4.1 The Court's Interpretation of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the UN 
International organisations, in the pursuit of their objectives, need protection from undue 
interference by States.91 Therefore, they are often granted privileges and immunities as a 
matter of "functional necessity,,92 which enable them to "function properly without undue 
interference in their affairs by States and thus ensure the independent discharge of the tasks 
entrusted to them.,,93 Article105 of the UN Charter regulates the immunities given to the UN 
within the sovereign territory of Member States and provides:94 
90 The Expenses Case, IC] Rep., 1962, p. 160. 
91 Schermers & Blokker, supra note 27, p. 235. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Scobbie, lain, "International Organizations and International Relations", in Dupuy, R, (ed.) A Handbook On 
International Organizations, 2nd edition, Dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, p. 833. 
94 Simma, supra note 53, p. 1315. Although the General Convention supplements Article 105 and regulates the 
privileges and immunities enjoyed by the UN, it has been suggested that Article 105 is a self-executing Article 
and needs no further international agreement to confer functional immunity on the UN. Therefore, even 
members which did not accede to the General Convention of 1946 must provide identical immunities. Simma, 
ibid, p. 1316. 
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(1) The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. 
(2) Representative of the members of the United Nations and officials of the 
Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for 
the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization. 
The UN Charter is supplemented by the General Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the UN which regulates these privileges and immunities in Article VI Section 
(22).95 The Court has constantly in its advisory opinions ruled that this protective measure 
provides privileges and immunities for experts while on mission for the UN even if they are 
not permanent UN officials or employees. In the 1989 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, 
of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Case,96 a dispute 
arose between the ECOSOC and Romania over the applicability of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities to Mr. Mazilu, a Romanian national and Special Rapporteur of the 
Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 
The background of this case is that the Sub-Commission had asked Mazilu to prepare a 
report on human rights and youth analysing the efforts and measures for securing the 
implementation and enjoyment by youth of human rights, particularly, the right to life, 
education and work.97 However, no report had been received from Mr Mazilu. Romania 
informed the UN that Mr. Mazilu had been taken into hospital, and he had not yet begun to 
draw up the report entrusted to him. Mazilu claimed that the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs requested him not to submit the report, and that the Romanian authorities were 
9S This Section provides that: 
Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Article V) performing missions for the United 
Nations shall be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise 
of their functions during the period of their missions, including the time spent on journeys in 
connection with their missions. 
Cited in the ICJ Rep., 1989, p. 192. 
96H . f . d 97 erema ter cIte as: "the Mazilu Case", leJ Rep., 1989, p. 177. 
ICJ Rep., 1989, p. 180. 
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refusing him a travel permit. Romania, for its part, claimed that due to Mazilu's illness he 
had "applied personally for disability retirement because of this condition, submitting the 
appropriate medical certificate." The Romanian Government also argued that the case of 
Mazilu was an internal matter between a citizen and his government and that any intervention 
of the UN Secretariat would be considered as interference in Romania's internal affairs. 
Therefore, Romania argued that "the problem of the application of the General Convention 
does not arise in this case. ,,98 
Under these circumstances, ECOSOC requested an advisory opinion of the Court on the 
applicability of Article VI, Section 22 of the General Convention to Mazilu. The Court 
found that the treaty did not itself define "experts on mission", and that the relevant Section 
does not refer to the nature, duration or place of such missions. Nevertheless, using a 
functional interpretation of the Convention, the Court stated:99 
The purpose of Section 22 is nevertheless evident, namely, to enable the United 
Nations to entrust missions to persons who do not have the status of an official of the 
Organization, and to guarantee them "such privileges and immunities as are necessary 
for the independent exercise of their functions". The experts thus appointed or elected 
mayor may not be remunerated, mayor may not have a contract, may be given a task 
requiring work over a lengthy period or a short time. The essence of the matter lies 
not in their administrative position but in the nature of their mission. 
The Court, therefore found that Section 22 also applies to experts who are not permanent 
officials of the UN and unanimously ruled that: 100 
The privileges and immunities of Articles V and VI are conferred with a view to 
ensuring the independence of international officials and experts in the interests of the 
Organization. This independence must be respected by all States including the State 
of nationality and the State of residence. 
98 leI Rep., 1989, para. 24, p. 185. 
99 Ibid, para. 47, p. 194. 
100 Ibid, para. 51, p. 195. 
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Some commentators have noted that this case demonstrates the potentially important role of 
judicial organs "in preventing states from abusing their sovereignty, and enabling 
international organizations to perform their functions.")O) 
The Court again ruled on Article VI of Section 22 of the General Convention in 
the 1999 Differences Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission On Human Rights Case. 102 Here the Court concluded that Article VI, Section 22 
of the General Convention applied to Mr. Cumaraswamy, a Special Rapporteur of the 
Commission on Human Rights who had been entrusted with a mission by the UN and was 
therefore an expert within the terms of the Section. The Case arose because Mr. 
Cumaraswamy had given an interview to International Commercial Litigation, a magazine 
published in the UK and Northern Ireland but circulated in Malaysia. Two commercial 
companies in Malaysia claimed that an article published on the basis of that interview 
contained defamatory words that had 'brought them into public scandal, odium and 
contempt.' Therefore, the companies sued Mr. Cumaraswamy in the Malaysian Courts. 
The issue was whether words used by Mr. Cumaraswamy during an interview could be 
regarded as words spoken in the course of the performance his mission, which would mean 
that he would be entitled to immunity. The UN's Legal Counsel, acting on behalf of the UN 
Secretary-General, said that the interview was conducted in Mr. Cumaraswamy's official 
capacity as Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers. Accordingly, he 
requested the Malaysian authorities to advise the Malaysian courts of Mr. Cumaraswamy's 
immunity from legal process. However, Counsel's request was rejected and the competent 
judge of the Malaysian High Court concluded that she was "unable to hold that the 
101 S h c ermers & Blokker, supra note 27, p. 266. 
102 Hereinafter cited as: "the Immunity from Legal Process Case", Ie] Rep., 1999. p. 62. 
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Defendant is absolutely protected by the immunity he claims." Therefore, the Legal Counsel 
considered that there was a dispute between Malaysia and the UN and referred to Section 30 
of the 1946 Convention which provides that all differences arising out of the interpretation or 
application of the Convention shall be referred to the ICJ. Under these circumstances 
ECOSOC requested an advisory opinion on the applicability of Article VI, Section 22 of the 
General Convention to Mr. Cumaraswamy. 
In response the Court referred to its previous findings in the Mazilu Case, where it 
concluded that the purpose of Section 22 was to enable the UN to entrust missions to persons 
who do not have the status of an official of the Organisation and that it guarantees them the 
privileges and immunities necessary to execute their function. Therefore, on the basis of 
Mazilu Case and after examining Article 105 of the UN Charter, the Court concluded that Mr. 
Cumaraswamy must also be regarded as an 'expert on mission' within the meaning of Article 
VI of the General Convention and that he therefore enjoyed immunity.103 The Court 
acknowledged also that the Secretary-General, as "the chief administrative officer of the 
Organization, has the authority and the responsibility to exercise the necessary protection 
where required."l04 The Court considered that when a national court confronted the issue of 
immunity of a UN agent: 105 
[T]hey should immediately be notified of any finding by the Secretary-General 
concerning the immunity. That finding, and its documentary expression, creates a 
presumption which can only be set aside for the most compelling reasons and is thus 
to be given the greatest weight by national courts. 
It has been suggested that the Court's finding did not go so far as to state that the Secretary-
General has the final word on the issue of immunity which leaves room for the possibility of 
103 IeJ Rep., 1999, pp. 83-84. 
104 Ibid, para. 50, p. 84. 
105 Ib'd 1 ,para. 61, p. 87. 
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a rebuttal. 106 However, the Court did conclude that the Government of Malaysia had an 
obligation to inform its courts of the Secretary-General's position and an obligation to deal 
with the question of immunity from legal process as a preliminary issue to be decided in 
limini litis. 107 
4.2 The Court's Interpretation of the Headquarters Agreement between the UN and the US 
The request for an advisory opinion on the Applicability 0/ the Obligation to Arbitrate Under 
Section 21 o/the United Nations Headquarters Agreement 0/26 lune1947, 108 arose out of an 
existing dispute between the UN and the US regarding the application of the Agreement. The 
background to the request was the US closure of the New York Office of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) under a law "to make unlawful the establishment or 
maintenance within the United States of an office of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization.,,109 
The Secretary-General pointed out to the General Assembly that the members of the 
PLO Mission were invitees of the UN and therefore covered by Sections 11, 12 and 13 of the 
Agreement. I 10 The General Assembly then voted to request an advisory opinion about the 
applicability of Section 21 of the Agreement which provided for arbitration of disputes. I II In 
106 Klabbers, supra note 8, p. 161. 
107 ICJ Rep., 1999, pp. 89-90. 
108 IC] Rep., 1988, p. 9. 
109 IC] Rep., 1988, para. 9, p. 15. The US had taken a number of measures against the PLO in New York. The 
Secretary General had regarded these measures as contrary to the Headquarters Agreement. The US did not 
dispute this point and stated that the measures were taken "irrespective of any obligations the United States may 
have under the Agreement." para. 49, p. 32. 
110 Para. 21, p. 21. 
III Section 21, paragraph (a) provides: 
Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States concerning the interpretation or 
application of this agreement or of any supplemental agreement, which is not settled by negotiation or 
other agreed mode of settlement, shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one 
to be named by the Secretary General, one to be named by the Secretary of State of the United States, and 
the third to be chosen by the two, or, if they should fail to agree upon a third, then by the President of the 
International Court of Justice .. 
Cited in IeJ Rep., 1988, p. 14. 
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its subsequent opinion, the Court concluded that "the United States is bound to respect the 
obligation to have recourse to arbitration under section 210f the Headquarters Agreement." 11 2 
It also concluded that the provisions of a treaty prevail over the domestic law of a State party 
to that treaty, thereby affirming "the fundamental principle of international law that 
international law prevails over domestic law.,,113 
5. The Contribution of Advisory Opinions to the Clarification of the Functions and 
Powers of UN Political Organs 
This Section focuses exclusively on the use of the advisory function to provide guidance for 
UN political organs, specifically the General Assembly and the Security Council, on difficult 
or contested legal issues concerning their powers, jurisdiction or functions. While Charter 
provisions variously categorise the powers and functions of the General Assembly and of the 
Security Council as exclusive,114 concurrent, l1Sor joint,116 in practice many problems have 
arisen out of the allocation of these powers and functions as set out in the Charter. 
This is primarily because, at the San Francisco Conference, the participating States 
left it to the discretion of each organ to interpret and apply the Charter provisions within its 
own field of competence. 117 The Court's advisory opinions have helped clarify the 
distribution of the powers and functions of the political organs as shown in the following 
sections. 
112 IC] Rep., 1988, para. 57, p. 34. The Court has reached its Opinion unanimously. 
113 Ibid. 
114 See ValIat, F. A., " The General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations", 29, BYIL, 1952, 
p. 70; EI-Rashidy, Ahmad, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Cairo: Alhaia AI-
Masria AI- Amaa Lelketab, 1992 [in Arabic], pp. 341-510; Amr, supra note 36, pp. 137-143. The exclusive 
powers of the General Assembly are set out in many articles of the United Nations Charter, e.g. Article 11, 
13( 1) and 17. The exclusive powers of the Security Council are contained in Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the UN 
Charter. 
115 The UN Charter entrusted both the General Assembly and the Security Council with the responsibility to 
achieve the main objectives of the UN. 
116 Art· I 4 IC es ,5, and 6 of the UN Charter. 
117 Vallat, supra note 114, p. 67. 
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5.1 Concurrent and Exclusive Functions of the General Assembly and of the Security 
Council 
In practice, problems have arisen as a result of the overlapping activities of the two political 
organs, the Security Council and the General Assembly. The ICI's opinions regarding the 
exclusive and concurrent functions of these organs have been helpful in indicating the 
spheres of responsibility of the Council and of the Assembly. 
5.1.1 Peace-Keeping Operations: Concurrent Roles of the General Assembly and of 
the Security Council 
The term "peace-keeping" does not appear in the UN Charter. However, since the 
establishment of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) by the General Assembly 
in 1956, the term and the institution of peace-keeping have been frequently used. I IS The 
object of peace-keeping has been found to be consistent with the aims of the UN Charter 
which are to 'maintain international peace and security'. 119 However, the lack of any express 
provisions in the Charter on peace-keeping has led to controversy over the scope of the 
powers of the various organs that have been involved in peace-keeping. 120 
118 Suy, Eric "Peace-Keeping Operations" in: Dupuy, R. (ed.), A Handbook on Imernational Organizations, 
Dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989, p. 53; Gray, Christine, "The Use of Force and 
the International Legal Order" in: Evans, Malcolm D., (ed.),llIternational Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, 
p. 611; Zemanek, Karl, "Peace Keeping or Peace Making" in: Blokker, Niels & Muller, Sam (eds.), Towards 
More Effective Supervision by International Organizations: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, vol. I, 1994, p. 32 
119 Article 1(1) of the UN Charter. 
120 The Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary General are the main organs involved in 
peace-keeping. See Suy, supra note 118, p. 545. In accordance with Article 24( 1) of the Charter the Security 
Council has the primary responsibility on issues of maintaining international peace and security and enjoys, 
under Chapters VI, and VII, a wide range of powers to maintain peace and security including the right to 
establish peacekeeping forces. In accordance with Chapter VI, the Security Council has the right to investigate 
any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute in order to determine 
whether the continuance of the dispute is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 
If the situation or dispute is one which may endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
Security Council also has the right to decide whether to act under Article 36 or merely to make 
recommendations for an appropriate settlement, and call upon the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful 
means in accordance with Article 33(1). The General Assembly also has a considerable role to play in peace-
keeping. Article 10 of the UN Charter gives the General Assembly wide competence to discuss any matter 
within the scope of the Charter. Therefore, it would seem to be perfectly acceptable for the General Assembly to 
deal with issues of peace and security provided it does not encroach on the exclusive powers of the Security 
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In the late 1940s, because of the paralysis of the Security Council as a result of the 
Cold War, the need for General Assembly involvement in maintaining peace and security had 
increased. 121 However, some States objected on the grounds that the Assembly was assuming 
powers which properly belong to the Security Council alone. The Court had to confront this 
issue in the Expenses Case which arose out of the refusal of some member States, most 
notably the Soviet Union and France, to pay their shares of the costs of the UN Emergency 
Forces (UNEF) and of the UN force in the Congo (ONUC).122 
The objecting States maintained that peace-keeping operations fell within the 
exclusive competence of the Security Council. Therefore, the General Assembly requested an 
advisory opinion as to whether certain expenditures authorised by it to finance peace keeping 
operations in the Congo and the Middle East, in some of which the Assembly has been 
significantly involved, constituted "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of 
Article 17(2) of the Charter. To determine the issue the Court had first to examine the powers 
of the General Assembly and the Security Council with respect to establishing peace keeping 
operations and the maintenance of international peace and security. It was argued before the 
Court that peace-keeping lies within the exclusive competence of the Security Council and, 
Council. Article 11 (1) of the UN Charter also empowers the General Assembly to deal with any situation which 
might threaten the peace or be considered as an act of aggression. 
121 Pogany, Istvan, The Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Aldershot: Grower, 1984, p. 76. Due to 
the failure of the Security Council, during the Cold War era, to exercise its responsibility in maintaining peace 
and security because of the vetoes cast by some of its permanent members, the General Assembly on 3 
November 1950 adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution to enhance its role in maintaining international peace 
and security. See GA Res. 377(V). Pogany has emphasised that this resolution Was "consistent with the 
provisions of the Charter, and did not involve a de facto amendment of the constitution of the United Nations". 
Pogany, ibid. In contrast to this view Shaw is of the opinion that Article 11 of the UN Charter, which states that 
any question regarding international peace and security issue has to be referred to the Security Council, 
appeared to cast some doubts upon the validity of the provisions in the Uniting for Peace Resolution. See Shaw, 
Supra note 57, p. 1152. 
122 The Soviet Union declined to pay its share to either UNEF or to the ONUC while France declined to 
contribute to the latter. The UNEF was established by the General Assembly in 1956. See Res. 1000 (ES-l) of 
5 November 1956 and 1001 (ES) of7 November 1956. The ONUC waS established by the Security Council in 
1960. See Res. 143 of 14 July 1960; Res. 145 of22 July 1960 and lastly Res. 146 of9 August 1960. 
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therefore, that the General Assembly had no role to play in such matters. 123 The Court, in 
reply, examined Articles 11 (2), 14, and 24 of the Charter, and found that Article 24(1) 
provides: "[iln order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security ... " However, the Court also noted that the Charter's 
provisions124 made it clear that the General Assembly is "also to be concerned with 
international peace and security." Thus, the Court concluded that the powers of the Security 
Council with regard to maintaining peace and security are primary but not exclusive, and 
that: 125 
[T]he functions and powers conferred by the Charter on the General Assembly are not 
confined to discussion, considerations, the initiation of studies and the making of 
recommendations; they are not merely hortatory. 
The Court recognised that the General Assembly, by virtue of Article 14 of the UN Charter, 
could: 126 
[R]ecommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of 
origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among 
nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present 
Charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
Moreover, Article 11(2) of the Charter confirms the General Assembly's competence to 
discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, as well 
as its recommendatory powers with regard to such questions. However, Article 11 (2) sets 
123 ICI Rep., 1962, p. 162. 
124 Article 11 (2) refers to the duty of the General Assembly to refer any question relating to international peace 
and security on which action is necessary to the Council. See also Article 14 of the UN Charter which provides: 
"the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of 
origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including 
situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations." 
125 ICI Rep., 1962, p. 163. 
126 ICI Rep., 1962, p. 163. 
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limits on the Assembly's competence where it provides that "[a]ny such question on which 
action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either 
before or after discussion." 
The Court interpreted the term "action" in Article 11 (2) to mean "coercive or 
enforcement action" which would be solely within the province of the Security Council. 
However, the term did not refer to recommendations which the Security Council might make, 
as for instance under Article 38, because the General Assembly under Article 11 also has a 
comparable power. 127 Consequently, the Court found that the establishment by the General 
Assembly of UNEF in the Middle East was not contrary to Article II (2) of the UN Charter 
since no enforcement action was involved.128 Despite the inability of the Security Council to 
fulfil its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, particularly 
during the Cold War era, Pogany has pointed out, with reference to the Suez crisis of 1956, 
that: 129 
[T]he UN system had shown itself to be sufficiently supple to respond to this 
situation. The resolve of the General Assembly to discharge its responsibility under 
the Uniting for Peace Resolution ... made a significant contribution to the restoration 
of peace in the Middle-East. 
127 Ie] Rep., 1962, p. 165. 
128 Sh aw, supra note 57, p. 1153, footnote 345. 
129 P ogany, supra note 121, p. 78. 
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5.1.2 The Exclusive Competence of the Security Council to Take Coercive Action 
The Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and more specifically by virtue of 
Articles 41 and 42 may adopt or authorise enforcement action in the event of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression within the meaning of article 39. In the 
Expenses Case, the Court confirmed the exclusive competence of the Security Council 
regarding coercive action to maintain international peace and security and stated that: 130 
[I]t is the Security Council which is given a power to impose an explicit obligation of 
compliance if for example it issues an order or command to an aggressor under 
Chapter VII. It is only the Security Council which can require enforcement by 
coercive action against an aggressor. 
The Soviet Union had argued that: 131 
[T]he analysis of the relevant provisions of the Charter leaves no doubt that while 
Article 17 lays down a general rule, Article 43 contains a particular rule, a lex 
specialis, which relates to expenditures for certain actions for the purpose of 
maintaining international peace and security. Such actions may be undertaken in 
pursuance of a decision of the Security Council. 
Responding to this argument the Court held that the General Assembly's establishment of 
UNEF and the far-reaching activities of ONUCI32 were not enforcement action as understood 
by Chapter VII of the Charter and that therefore Article 43 could not have applicability to 
this case. 133 The Court further emphasised that even if Article 43 were applicable the Court 
130 ICI Rep., 1962, p. 163. It is clear that the Court has based its arguments on the provisions in Chapter VII, 
more specifically Articles 39, 41, 42, and 24 of the UN Charter. 
13\ ICI Pled., 1961, p. 404. 
132 In the case of ONUC, the Secretary-General assumed broader powers with respect to the direction of the 
operation than might otherwise have been the case. The main issue in regard to ONUC was the role of the 
Secretary-General and the departure of ONUC from conventional peacekeeping to a more coercive function. 
See e.g. Gray, Christine, International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.l5l-152. 
133 Article 43(1) provides that: "All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in 
accordance with a special agreement or agreemenls, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of 
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." 
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did not accept any limited interpretation of the Article because that would impede the 
efficiency of the Council. The Court stated: 134 
The Court cannot accept so limited a view of the powers of the Security Council 
under the Charter. It cannot be said that the Charter has left the Security Council 
impotent in the face of an emergency situation when agreements under Article 43 
have not been concluded. 
As some commentators have observed the failure to conclude agreements in accordance with 
Article 43 was a consequence of the Cold War and of the resulting inability to achieve 
consensus among the Security Council's permanent members. 13S Because the Security 
Council could rarely obtain agreement among its permanent Members, peace- keeping 
authorised by the General Assembly became an important means for dealing with conflicts 
during the Cold War period. 136 
5.1.3 The Exclusive Competence of the General Assembly over the UN's Budget 
According to Article 17(1) of the Charter, the General Assembly enjoys exclusive power 
over the UN's budget. 137 Although this exclusivity was not disputed in the Expenses Case, 
the extent of the Assembly's authority in this regard has been questioned. It was argued by 
some States that the costs of peace-keeping operations were not the 'expenses of the 
Organisation' within the meaning of Article 17(2) to be borne by Members as apportioned by 
the General Assembly. The Security Council, in the view of the Soviet Union, was the only 
organ empowered to finance these operations. 138 
134 Ie] Rep., 1962, p. 167. 
\35 Pogany, supra note 121, p. 13. 
136 Katayanagi, Mari, Human Rights Functions of United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Warwick 2000, p. 20. 
\31 Article 17 provides (1) "[t]he General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization". 
(2) "[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General 
Assembly." 
138 The Opinion of the Soviet Union. 
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It was also argued that "budget" as used in Article 17(1), applied only to the 
"administrative budget" and, therefore, that expenses related to operations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security were not 'expenses of the Organisation' 
within the meaning of Article 17(2), and could not be described as administrative 
expenses.139 The Court however, stated that the term "expenses" in Article 17(2) could not be 
limited to the normal administrative budget of the Organisation. 140 The Court observed that 
the Charter distinguishes between the words in Article 17(1), "[t]he General Assembly shall 
consider and approve the budget of the Organization" and paragraph 3 of the same Article 
which provides that the General Assembly "shall examine the administrative budgets of such 
specialized agencies." The Court concluded that: 141 
If it had been intended that paragraph 1 should be limited to the administrative budget 
of the United Nations Organization itself, the word "administrative" would have been 
inserted in paragraph 1 as it was in paragraph 3. 
The Court's approach to determining whether the actual expenditures authorised constituted 
'expenses of the Organisation' was to test whether such expenditures were incurred to 
achieve one of the UN purposes. The Court stated that it: 142 
[A]grees that such expenditures must be tested by their relationship to the purposes of 
the United Nations in the sense that if an expenditure were made for a purpose which 
is not one of the purposes of the United Nations, it would not be considered an 
'expenses of the Organization. 
The Court also found that: 143 
[W]hen the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization. 
139 ICI Pled., 1961, p. 273. 
140 ICI Rep., 1962, p. 159. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid, p. 167. 
143 Ibid, p. 168. 
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5.2 The Joint Competence of the Political Organs144 
The Court had occasion in its advisory opinion in the Competence of the General Assembly 
to rule on the problem of the joint competence of the two political organs. When the Court's 
opinion in the Admissions Case did not lead to a settlement of the problem of admissions to 
the UN and in order to avoid a veto in the Security Council, members of the General 
Assembly proposed that the word 'recommendation' in Article 4(2) of the Charter should be 
interpreted as not necessarily signifying a favourable recommendation by the Security 
Council and sought the opinion of the Court on this matter. The question posed by the 
General Assembly was the following: 145 
Can the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to Article 
4, paragraph 2, of the Charter, be effected by a decision of the General Assembly 
when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission by reason of 
the candidate failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a 
permanent Member upon a resolution so to recommend? 
The Court examined Article 4(2) of the Charter, which provides that the "admission of any 
such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General 
Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." The Court found that the 
Charter requires two steps to admit a new member, firstly a "recommendation" by the 
Security Council and secondly a decision by the General Assembly. It concluded: 146 
The Court has no doubt as to the meaning of this text. It requires two things to effect 
admission: a "recommendation" of the Security Council and a "decision" of the 
General Assembly. It is in the nature of things that the recommendation should come 
before the decision. The word "recommendation", and the word "upon" preceding it, 
imply the idea that the recommendation is the foundation of the decision to admit, 
and that the latter rests upon the recommendation. Both these acts are indispensable to 
144 The joint functions of the two political organs include: the admission of new Members in accordance with 
Article 4 of the Charter, the suspension or expulsion from the Organization and the appointment of the 
Secretary-General. Decisions on these issues are to be taken by the General Assembly upon recommendation of 
the Security Council. 
145 IC] Rep., 1950, p. 5. 
146 IC] Rep., 1950, pp. 7-8. 
228 
form the judgment of the Organization to which the previous paragraph of Article 4 
refers. The text under consideration means that the General Assembly can only decide 
to admit upon the recommendation of the Security Council; it determines the 
respective roles of the two organs whose combined action is required before 
admission can be effected: in other words, the recommendation of the Security 
Council is the condition precedent to the decision of the Assembly by which the 
admission is effected. 
In another paragraph the Court highlighted the relationship between the General Assembly 
and the Security Council and held that: 147 
The General Assembly and the Security Council are both principal organs of the 
United Nations. The Charter does not place the Security Council in a subordinate 
position. Article 24 confers upon it "primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security", and the Charter grants it for this purpose certain 
powers of decision. Under Articles 4,5 and 6, the Security Council co-operates with 
the General Assembly in matters of admission to membership, of suspension from the 
exercise of the rights and privileges of membership, and of expUlsion from the 
Organization. It has power, without the concurrence of the General Assembly, to 
reinstate the Member which was the object of the suspension, in its rights and 
privileges. 
The Court's Opinion helped to clarify the respective functions of the two political organs 
and to preserve the integrity and the autonomy of each. Although some UN member States 
were hoping the Court would grant the General Assembly wider powers vis-a-vis the 
Security Council in order to improve the effectiveness of the Organisation in the Cold War 
period, the Court adhered to the intentions of the founders as expressed in the Charter. 
Rosenne has rightly concluded that any other approach in its findings upon the issue of the 
relationship between the two political organs "would have had the most far-reaching 
consequences, not excluding the complete disintegration of the Organization.,,148 
147 ICI Rep., 1950, pp. 8-9. 
148 Rosenne, Shabtai, "The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the United Nations",lndian 
Journal of International Law, 1995, p. 73. 
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6. The Contribution of Advisory Opinions to the Development of International Human 
Rights Law 
A number of the Court's advisory opinions have made a profound contribution to the 
evolution of human rights norms and of the consequent responsibilities of States. This 
Section deals with the principal advisory opinions which have influenced the International 
Law of human rights, although the interpretation of human rights standards has also been 
evidenced in various contentious decisions. 149 
In the Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, the General Assembly requested 
the ICI to give an advisory opinion regarding the circumstances under which States can make 
reservations to the Convention and whether a State that makes a reservation could be still 
regarded as being a party to the Convention if some, but not all, of the parties objected to the 
reservation. lso The Court noted that the Genocide Convention was adopted for humanitarian 
and civilising purposes and that the contracting States should have a common interest in the 
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'etre of the Convention. The 
Court held that: 151 
The origins of the Convention show that it was the intention of the United Nations to 
condemn and punish genocide as "a crime under international law" involving a denial 
of the right of existence of entire human group, a denial which shocks conscience of 
mankind and results in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law 
and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations (Resolution 96 (I) of the General 
Assembly, December 11 th, 1946). The first consequence arising from this conception 
is that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized 
by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation. A 
second consequence is the universal character of both of the condemnation of 
genocide and of the cooperation required "in order to liberate mankind from such an 
odious scourge" (Preamble to the Convention). 
149 See for instance Corfu Channel Case, IC] Rep., 1949, p. 22; Asylum Case, IC] Rep., 1950, p. 284; Barcelona 
Traction Case, IC] Rep., 1970, p. 32. For the contribution of those opinions and others to human rights law, see 
Schwebel, Stephen, "Human Rights in the World Court" in: Justice in International Law: Selected Writings of 
Stephen M. Schwebel, Judge o/the International Court of Justice, Cambridge University Press, 1994, 
PPo' 159-168. 
o ICI Rep., 1951, p. 16. 
151 ICI Rep., 1951, p. 23. 
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The Court, in this Case, introduced the object and purpose of a treaty as the criterion to 
assess the admissibility of reservations to the Convention and stated that: 152 
It is inconceivable that the contracting parties readily contemplated that an objection 
to a minor reservation should produce such a result. But even less could the 
contracting parties have intended to sacrifice the very object of the Convention in 
favour of a vain desire to secure as many participants as possible. The object and 
purpose of the Convention thus limit both the freedom of making reservations and 
that of objecting to them. It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with 
the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the criterion for the 
attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal 
by a State in objecting to the reservation. Such is the rule of conduct which must 
guide every State in the appraisal which it must take, individually and from its own 
standpoint, of the admissibility of any reservation. 
Judge Schwebel noted that the Court's finding in this case was important in two ways: first, it 
limited the use of reservations to international conventions with humanitarian objects; 
second, it stated that the obligation not to commit genocide was binding on all States as 
customary law. Therefore, he concluded that "the Court's references to the 'universality' of 
the obligation and its 'inderogability' were the ingredients for the conceptualization of jus 
cogens.,,153 
In its 1971 advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970), the Court set out various fundamental principles of international 
human rights law, 154 including the right of people to self-determination and decolonisation. 
152 ICJ Rep., 1951, p. 24. 
153 Schwebel, Stephen M., "The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of 
International Law" in: Heere, Wybo P. (ed.), International Law And The Hague's 75(jh Anniversary, The 
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999, p. 411; Zemanek, K., "Some Unresolved Questions Concerning Reservations 
in the Vienna Convention in the Law of Treaties" in: Makarczyk, J. (cd.), Essays in International Law in 
Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, The Hague; Boston; Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984, 
rE. 325-326. 
4 Hereinafter cited as: "the Namibia Case." The 1971 Case was referred to the Court by the Security Council 
after General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), of 27th October 1966 had revoked the mandate of South Africa 
over Namibia. The General Assembly, "convinced that the administration of the mandated territories by South 
Africa has been conducted in a manner contrary to the Mandate, the Charter of the U.N and the Universal 
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In particular, the Court observed that: 155 
Under the Charter of the United Nations, the former Mandatory had pledged itself to 
observe and respect, in a territory having an international status, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. To establish instead, and 
to enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on 
grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial 
of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of 
the Charter. 
The Court found that South Africa's policy of apartheid constituted a flagrant violation of the 
Charter's purposes and principles. Moreover, as Schwelb has rightly pointed out, the Court 
did not intend to convey that only Article 1 (3) of the UN Charter had been violated. Rather, 
it was the court's view that there had been a violation of international human rights norms in 
general. I56 The Court declared that "the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being 
illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia 
immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory.,,157 Moreover, the Court 
held that member States of the UN are: 158 
Under obligation to recognize the illegality and invalidity of South Africa's continued 
presence in Namibia. They are also under obligation to refrain from lending any 
support or any form of assistance to South Africa with reference to its occupation of 
Namibia. 
Declaration of Human Rights", stated that "South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the 
administration of the Mandated Territory and to insure the moral and material well-being and security of the 
indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate." Therefore, the General 
Assembly concluded, "South Africa has no other right to administer the territory." The Security Council for its 
part called upon South Africa to withdraw its administration from the territory of Namibia. In other words the 
Security Council adopted and applied the General Assembly's decisions. All the objections raised concerning 
the validity of the resolutions were rejected by the Court and, in effect, the Court found that these decisions 
were constitutionally valid and beyond any challenge. See Section 6.3.3 in Chapter Three, infra. 
155 IC] Rep., 1971, para 131, p. 57. 
156 Schwelb, Egon "The International Court of Justice and The Human Rights Clauses of the Charter", 66 AJIL, 
1972, p. 348. Schwelb's conclusion was based on the Court's referring to the pledge of Member states which is 
contained in Article 56 of the Charter. 
157 IC] Rep., 1971, p. 58. 
158 ICJ Rep., 1971, para. 119, p. 54. 
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Lastly, the Court affirmed that the UN Charter had made the principle of self-determination 
applicable to all non self governing territories,159 stating that "the subsequent development of 
international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the 
United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them. 160 
Commenting upon this finding Crawford notes that: 161 
[T]he court adopted a mode of co-operation with the political organs, and in particular 
the General Assembly, that has characterised its work in this field since ... the court 
has treated the 'subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self 
governing territories' as in large part resulting from the application of Charter norms 
by the political organs, and in particular the General Assembly ... it has sought 
whenever possible to align 'the corpus iuris gentium I with the policies and practice of 
the Assembly. 
The issue of self-determination and decolonisation came before the Court again in the 1975 
Western Sahara Case. To help it resolve the conflicting claims, the General Assembly 
requested an advisory opinion on the following questions: 162 
1. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization 
by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?" 
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, 
2. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco 
and the Mauritanian entity" 
Spain had unilaterally withdrawn from the Western Sahara territory after holding it as a 
colony. Morocco and Mauritania subsequently claimed title to Western Sahara while the 
indigenous peoples asserted their right to self-determination. In answering the questions put 
159 The principle of self determination is enshrined in Articles 1(2),55,56 of the UN Charter. The principle has 
been confirmed and elaborated by a number of General Assembly resolutions, most importantly resolutions 
1514(XV) and 2626(XXV). The last of these was endorsed by the Court in the Namibia Case. 
160 ICJ Rep., 1971, para. 52, p. 31. 
161 Crawford, James, "The General Assembly, the International Court of Justice and Self-Determination" in: 
Lowe, Vaughan & Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in 
Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 591. 
162 IeJ Rep., 1975, p. 12. 
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to it, the Court supported and analysed the right to self-determination in light of the Charter's 
provisions and the "subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self 
governing territories.,,163 It has been suggested that the UN Charter, while mentioning the 
word self-determination, does not clearly establish it as a binding requirement. 164 Moreover, 
the Charter "neither supplies an answer to the question as to what constitutes a 'people' nor 
does it lay down the content of the principle.,,165 Nevertheless, the Court regarded the 
principle of decolonisation as an essential part of the question submitted to it,I66 and noted 
that the General Assembly's Resolution 1514 (XV), which asserted that "all people have the 
right to self-determination", had provided the basis for decolonisation which had resulted 
since 1960 in the creation of many of the UN's member States. 167 
The Court asserted that the decolonisation process should be accelerated to respect the 
right of the population of Western Sahara "to determine their future political status by their 
own freely expressed Will",168 and that it should be carried out in accordance with the 
"principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the 
peoples of the Territory.,,169 
In the Court's opinion the ties which had existed between the claimants and the 
territory during the colonial period in the 1880s could not affect the application of Resolution 
163 IC] Rep., 1975, p. 31. Article 1(2) of the Charter, reinforced by Articles 55 and 56, refers to the development 
of friendly relations among States based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determinution. 
164 See Tomuschat, Christian, "International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New 
Century", 281 RCADI, 1999, p. 242. 
165 Thurer, Daniel, "Self Determination" in: Bernhardt, R. (cd.), Encyclopedia of Public IllIematiof/a/ Law, 
2000, vol. 4, p. 365. Tomuschat suggests that the word "people" means, in view of the historical context, people 
under colonial rule. See Tomuschat, supra note 164, p. 242. 
166 IC] Rep., 1975, p. 30. 
167 The General Assembly resolution provides that "[a]11 peoples have the right to self-determination: by virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development". See IC] Rep., 1975, p. 32. The Court also had occasion to refer to this resolution in the 1971 
Namibia Case. See IC] Rep., 1971, p. 31. 
168 IC] Rep., 1975, p. 36. 
169 Ibid, p. 68. 
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1514 (XV) and, in particular, could not affect the principle of self determination. 170 Finally, 
the Court examined the concept of terra nullius and found that territories already inhabited 
by tribes or peoples cannot be regarded as terra nullius and thus open to occupation and 
ownership by their discoverers. 171 The Court asserted that the population of Western Sahara 
had in no case ever been under the legitimate sovereignty of other States but were peoples 
who retained the right to self-determination. The Court's opinion was an important 
pronouncement on the principle of self-determination and has been held to be "a fair 
refutation of assertions minimising the relevance of self-determination." 172 
In the 1996 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, the question 
referred by the General Assembly for the Court's advisory opinion was whether the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons was in any circumstance permitted under International Law. 173 The 
General Assembly linked violation of human rights with the use of nuclear weapons by 
stating that nuclear war is "a violation of the foremost human right - the right to life."t74 
More specifically, it was contended by some of the proponents of the illegality of nuclear 
weapons t75 that their use would violate the right to life guaranteed under Article 6 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. t76 However, other States argued that the 
170 ICJ Rep., 1975, p. 68. 
171 Ibid, para. 80, p. 39. 
172 Shaw, Malcolm, ''The Western Sahara Case", 49 BYIL, 1978, p. 153. 
173 International law scholars had been debating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons long before the 
Court's decision. See Pogany, Istvan (ed.), Nuclear Weapons and International Law. Avebury: Gower 
Publishing, 1987; Dewar, John, et al., (eds.), Nuclear Weapons, the Peace Movement alld the Law, The 
Macmillan Press, 1986. 
174 GA. Res. 38n5 of 15 December 1983. 
175 See for example the Written Statements of Malaysia, Egypt and Indonesia. One of the rights thnt wns 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the right to life. See Article 3 of the Declnration; see 
also the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 6(1) which provides: "[e]very human 
being has the inherent right to life. This life shall be protected by law." see also Article 2 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and Article 4 of the 
American Convention of Human Rights of 1969 and certain other human rights instruments. 
176 Article 6 (1) provides "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shaH be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 
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International Covenant did not mention either war or weapons. Therefore, they maintained 
that the question before the Court related to the unlawful loss of life in armed hostilities, 
which is governed by the law applicable to armed conflict and not by the Covenant. 177 
The Court stated, however, that the International Covenant "does not cease in times 
of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be 
derogated from in a time of national emergency.,,178 However, in examining what might 
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of life under Article 6 of the Covenant, the Court found 
that arbitrary deprivation must be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law 
applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. 179 The 
Court stated: 180 
[W]hether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is 
to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, 
can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and not 
deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. 
As far as genocide is concerned, it was argued before the Court that the prohibition contained 
in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 
December 1948 was a relevant rule of customary international law which the Court must 
apply. It was also contended before the Court that:!8! 
[T]he number of deaths occasioned by the use of nuclear weapons would be 
enormous; that the victims could, in certain cases, include persons of a particular 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group; and that the intention to destroy such 
groups could be inferred from the fact that the user of nuclear weapon would have 
omitted to take account of the well-known effects of the use of such weapons. 
177 See the written statements of US, Netherlands, UK, France and Russia. 
178 Ie] Rep., 1996, para 25, p. 240. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid, para. 26, p. 240. 
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In response, the Court examined the definition of genocide in the Convention and concluded 
that its prohibition would be applicable only if recourse to nuclear weapons entailed the 
element of intent and was directed against one of the groups falling under Article 11. 182 
However, the Court could only arrive at such a conclusion after taking into account the 
specific circumstances of each case. 183 
Both the dissenting Judges in the Nuclear Weapons Case and various human rights 
scholars have criticised the Court's rather restrictive findings and have asserted that killing 
entire populations by nuclear weapons during armed conflict must definitely constitute the 
crime of genocide. Therefore, regardless of the circumstances, the use of nuclear weapons 
cannot be lawful. 184 
In 2004, the Court in the Wall Case was once again given the opportunity to rule on 
questions of human rights law. Here, the General Assembly by Resolution ES-IO/14 sought 
the Court's opinion on the legal consequences arising from the construction by Israel, the 
Occupying Power, of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including in and around 
East Jerusalem. 
The Palestinian authority and other participants in the proceedings contended that the 
construction was, inter alia, an attempt to annex the territory contrary to International Law; 
182 Genocide has been defined in the Convention as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
a) Killing members of group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." 
183 ICJ Rep., 1996, para. 26, p. 240. 
184 See the Diss. Op. of Judges Weeramantry and Korma, pp. 517, 577 respectively. See also Gowlland-Dcbbas, 
Vera, "The Right to Life and Genocide: The Court and An International Public Policy" in: Boisson De 
Chazournes, Laurence & Sands, Philippe (eds.), International Law, the International Court of Justice and 
Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 333. 
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and a violation of the legal principle prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of 
force. Moreover, the de facto annexation of land interferes with the territorial sovereignty 
and consequently with the right of the Palestinians to self determination. Israel, however, 
maintained that the wall's sole purpose was to enable it to effectively combat terrorist 
attacks launched from the West Bank, and that the barrier was a temporary measure. ISS 
The Court, after unanimously establishing its jurisdiction, decided by 14 votes to 1 that 
Israel's building of the wall contravened International Law; that Israel was obliged to stop 
construction of the wall which should be dismantled immediately; and that Israel was obliged 
to make reparations for any damage caused. Finally, the Court stated that the General 
Assembly and Security Council could take further action to terminate the illegal situation 
resulting from the wall's construction in light of the Court's advisory opinion. 186 
In particular, The Court found that the act of building the wall violated a number of 
international humanitarian and human rights law provisions: 187 
[T]he construction of the wall and its associated regime impede the liberty of 
movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (with the 
exception of Israeli citizens and those assimilated thereto) as guaranteed under Article 
12, paragraph 1, ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. They 
also impede the exercise by the persons concerned of the right to work, to health, to 
education and to an adequate standard of living as proclaimed in the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Lastly, the construction of the wall and its 
associated regime, by contributing to the demographic changes referred ... contravene 
Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Security Council 
resolutions cited [cited above]. 
185 See Akram, Susan & Quigley, John, "A Reading of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality ofIsrael's Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories" • available at: 
http://www.palestinecenter.org/cpap/pubs/update on wall On004.pdf ,(accessed at 24 October 2(04). 
186 See para. 163 ofthe Wall Opinion note 80, supra. 
187 See para. 134, ibid 
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In response to Israel's argument that the main purpose of constructing the wall was to 
enhance its security, the Court held that it was not convinced that: 188 
[T]he specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to attain its security 
objectives. The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated regime gravely 
infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, 
and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military 
exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order. The 
construction of such a wall accordingly constitutes breaches by Israel of various of its 
obligations under the applicable international humanitarian law and human rights 
instruments. 
Regarding the applicability of international human rights provisions to Israel in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, the Court held that the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) and the UN Convention on the Rights of Child, all of which were ratified by Israel 
were all applicable in the occupied Territory. 189 Although Israel argued that human rights law 
does not apply in times of armed conflict, the Court ruled that the protection offered by these 
human rights conventions did not cease in case of armed conflict. 190 
As to the right of Palestinian peoples to self determination, the Court pointed out that 
"the existence of a "Palestinian people" is no longer in issue.,,191 The Court recalled its 
previous case law which emphasised that current development in "international law in regard 
to none self governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the 
principle of self determination applicable to all [such territories]." The Court observed that 
beside UN Resolutions recognising the Palestinian people as a people, Israel's own 
agreements with the Palestinians showed that it recognised them as a people. The Court 
188 See para. 137 ofthe Wall Opinion, supra note 80. 
189 See paras. 102-104, ibid. 
190 See para. 105, ibid. 
191 See para. 118, ibid. 
239 
therefore found that Israel was legally obligated to respect the rights of the Palestinian people 
to self-determination. The Court found that "the construction of the wall and its associated 
regime create a ''fait accompli" on the ground that could well become permanent, in which 
case, and notwithstanding the formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be 
tantamount to defacto annexation,,192 which "severely impedes the exercise by the 
Palestinian people of its right to self-determination, and is therefore a breach of Israel's 
obligation to respect that right." 193 
As regards Israeli settlements, the Court noted that Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention provides that "[t]he Occupying Power sha1l not deport or transfer parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies." The Court noted that this provision 
"prohibits not only deportations or forced transfers of population such as those carried out 
during the Second World War, but also any measures taken by an occupying Power in order 
to organise or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied territory." 
The Court observed that since 1977 Israel had conducted a policy and developed practices 
involving the establishment of settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory contrary to 
the terms of Article 49 (6) of Fourth Geneva Convention. As a result, the Court concluded, 
"the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem) have been 
established in breach of internationallaw.,,194 
Finally, the Court considered whether Israel could rely on a state of necessity which 
would preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the wall. The Court stated that Israel 
could not rely on this excuse for its action because a state of necessity is a ground recognised 
192 See para. 121 of the Wall Opinion. supra note 80. 
193 See para. 122, ibid. 
194 See para. 120. ibid. 
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by customary international law that "can only be invoked under certain strictly defined 
conditions which must be cumulatively satisfied." The Court noted that one of those 
conditions is that the act taken must be the only way for the State to protect an essential 
interest. 
In the light of the material before it, the Court was not convinced that the construction 
of the wall along the route chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel 
against the peril which it had invoked as a justification for its actions. 
The Court acknowledged that Israel has the right and the duty to respond to the numerous 
and deadly acts of violence directed against its civilian population in order to protect the life 
of its citizens, however, the measures taken must conform with International Law. In this 
regard the Court stated: 195 
The fact remains that Israel has to face numerous indiscriminate and deadly acts of 
violence against its civilian population. It has the right, and indeed the duty, to 
respond in order to protect the life of its citizens. The measures taken are bound 
nonetheless to remain in conformity with applicable international law. 
7. The Contribution of Advisory Opinions to the Development of International 
Humanitarian Law 
In the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, the Court had to determine 
whether the use of nuclear weapons is illegal in light of international humanitarian law. Some 
States have contended that the principles and rules of international humanitarian law evolved 
prior to the invention of nuclear weapons and so were not relevant. Moreover, the Geneva 
conferences of 1949 and of 1974-1977 did not specifically address the problem of nuclear 
weapons. 196 The Court nevertheless concluded that the rules of humanitarian law were 
195 S ee para. 141. 
196 Ie] Rep., 1996, para. 85, p. 259. 
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applicable to the threat or use of nuclear weapons, as the intrinsically humanitarian character 
of these laws applies to all forms of warfare and weapons. 197 To the credit of the Court, on 
this point the Court has reaffirmed the celebrated Martens' clause which is considered 
applicable to the whole of humanitarian law. 198 The Court, despite the outcome of the case, 
contributed to humanitarian law by asserting two basic principles: first, States must avoid 
civilian targets and, as a corollary to this, they must avoid using weapons that are incapable 
of distinguishing between military and civilian targets. 199 Second, States are forbidden to 
cause unnecessary suffering to combatants and therefore are prohibited from using weapons 
which would cause them needless suffering. In the words of the Court: 2OO 
The cardinal principles contained in the text constituting the fabric of humanitarian 
law are the following. The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population 
and civilians objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants; States must never make civilians the object of attack and must 
consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian 
and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause 
unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons 
causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In application of that 
second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the 
weapons they use. 
197 IC] Rep., 1996, para. 86, p. 259. The Court unanimously agreed thut the threat or use of nuclear weapons is 
governed by "the international law applicable in armed connict, particulnrly those of the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which 
expressly deal with nuclear weapons." See para. 105(2) D, p. 266. 
198 Dieter, Fleck, (cd.) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conf/icts, Oxford University Press, 1995, 
p. 29. The Marten Clause provides: "Until a more complete code of the Laws of war has been issued, the High 
Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the Inw of 
nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the 
dictates of the public conscience." The Marten clause was originally devised to cope with a disagreement 
between the parties to The Hague Peace Conference regarding the States resistance movement in occupied 
territory. See Fleck, ibid, p. 29. 
199 I CJ Rep., 1996, para. 92, p. 262. 
200 IC] Rep., 1996, para. 78, p. 257. 
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While sections of the international community hoped that the Court would elaborate the 
concept of jus cogens,201 the Court confined itself to stating:202 
It has been maintained in these proceedings that these principles and rules of 
humanitarian law are part of jus cogens as defined in Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. The question whether a norm is 
part of the jus cogens relates to the legal character of the norm. The request addressed 
to Court by the General Assembly raises the question of the applicability of the 
principles and rules of humanitarian law in cases of recourse to nuclear weapons and 
the consequences of that applicability for the legality of recourse to these weapons. 
But it does not raise the question of the character of the humanitarian law which 
would apply to the use of nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no need for the Court 
to pronounce on this matter. 
This opinion is the first decision by any international tribunal that has clearly formulated 
limitations on nuclear weapons and declared that nuclear weapons are subject to the 
requirements of the UN Charter and of the International Law applicable in armed conflicts. 
The Court unanimously held that: 203 
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements 
of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the 
principles and rules of international and humanitarian law, as well as with specific 
obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with the 
nuclear weapons. 
However, some observers believe that the rules and findings that led the Court to the above 
conclusion should, as a result, also have led it to conclude that any use of nuclear weapons is 
201 Werksman, Jacob & Khalastchi, Ruth, "Nuclear Weapons and Jus Cogens: Peremptory Norms and Justice 
Pre-Empted", in: Boisson De Chazournes, Laurance & Sands, Philippe (cds.), International Law, the 
International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, Camhridge University Press, 1999, p. 183. The authors 
argued that although the Court had failed to address the jus cog ens status of international humanitarian law, by 
stating that "these fundamental rules are to be observed by all states ...... because they constitute 
intransgressible principles of international customary law" the Court had arrived at a similar conclusion. See 
ibid; Debbas, supra note 184, p. 316. 
202 ICJ Rep., 1996, para. 83, p. 258. It is worth mentioning that Judge Bedjaoui, President of the Court at the 
time of this Opinion, emphasised in his Declaration that he did not doubt that most of the principles of 
humanitarian law, specifically principles prohibiting the use of weapons with indiscriminate effect and 
proscribing the use of arms causing unnecessary suffering, constitute part of jus cogens. However, Bedjaoui 
maintained that the Court did not refer to the nature of these rules as the question addressed to the Court failed 
to cover this point. Declaration of Judge Bedjaoui, ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 273. 
203 ICJ Rep., 1996, para. 105.2 (D), p. 266. 
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unlawful under International Law, in particular under the law applicable to armed conflicts. 
Unfortunately, contrary to its own findings, the final opinion of the Court was that:204 
[I]n view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its 
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake. 
Shaw argues that the Court's weak conclusion should be seen "in the context of continuing 
efforts to ban all nuclear weapons testing, the increasing number of treaties prohibiting such 
weapons in specific geographical areas and the commitment given in 1995 by the five 
declared nuclear weapons states not to use such weapons against non-nuclear weapons states 
that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.,,20S One could also argue that the 
Court was simply reluctant to make new law in an area affecting the vital interests of certain 
States and that it sought to be politically pragmatic in its Opinion. 
204 Ie] Rep., 1996, para. 105.2 (E), p. 266. 
20S Shaw, supra note 57, p 1067. See also SC Res. 984 (1995); Greenwood, Christopher, "The Law of War 
(International Humanitarian Law)" in: Evans, Malcolm D., International Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, 
p.808. 
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8. The Contribution of Advisory Opinions to the Development of International 
Environmental Law 
The Court in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case addressed directly 
the issue of the environment and the right of future generations to health and to an adequate 
quality of life. It was argued before the Court that any use of nuclear weapons would be 
unlawful because of the constraints imposed by existing norms relating to the protection of 
the environment. 206 While the Court rejected this argument, it nevertheless recognised that 
the "environment is under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a 
catastrophe for the environment.,,207 The Court emphasised also that the environment 
represents "the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, 
including generations unborn.,,208 Moreover, according to the Court, States are under a duty 
h · b 209 to protect t e enVIronment ecause: 
The existence of the general obligations of States to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment. 
The Court's approach reinforces Article 192 of the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, 
which provides that "States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment." Moreover, Article 194 of the same convention provides that "States shall take 
all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and control are so 
conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other states and their environment." 
206 Reference was made to several existing treaties: Additional Protocol I of 1977, Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
Article 35(3) which prohibits the adoption of "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or muy be 
expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment" and Article 1 of the 
Convention of 18 May of 1977 on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmentul 
Modification Techniques, which prohibits the use of weapons which have "widespread, long-lasting or severe 
effects" on the environment. See ICJ Rep., 1996, para. 27, p. 241. 
207 Ib'd 1 ,para. 29, p. 241. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid, para. 29, p. 242. 
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The Court concluded that both provisions, taken together in Article 35 paragraph 3 and 
55 of the Additional Protocol Iof 1977 to the Geneva Convention of 1949, "embody a 
general obligation to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and 
severe environmental damage; the prohibition of methods and means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause such damage; and the prohibition of attacks against 
the natural environment by way of reprisals.,,210 
Some scholars see this Opinion, despite its shortcomings, as an important step towards 
articulating general environmental obligations in internationallaw.211 For example, Philippe 
Sands argues that the Court's advisory opinion recognised for the first time the existence of 
norms of international environmental law as customary rules which are equally applicable In 
times of armed conflict.212 He also maintains that the Court for the first time recognised a 
rule similar to that expressed in Principle 21 of the UN Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment of 1972, to the effect that States have a duty "to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." 213 
210 Ie] Rep., 1996, para. 31, p. 242. 
211 Weiss, Edith B., "Opening the Door to the Environment and to Future Generations" in: Boisson De 
Chazournes, Laurence & Sands, Philippe (eds.), International Law, the International Court of Justice and 
Nuclear Weapons, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 343. 
212 Sands, Philippe, Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2nd edition, 2003, p. 316. 
213 Ibid, p. 338. 
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9. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has argued that the true measure of the impact of the advisory function upon 
international legal norms cannot be determined solely by the number of opinions given by the 
Court but by the quality and persuasiveness of the Court's statements of law and of its 
reflections on the development of international law in a wide variety of areas. However, 
despite the significant contribution of advisory opinions to the development of International 
Law in various spheres, one can discern some reluctance on the part of many of the UN's 
member States to invoke the Court's advisory procedure. The reasons for this reluctance will 
be explored in the following Chapter. 
247 
Chapter Seven 
The Attitude of United Nations Member States towards the Use of the 
Advisory Procedurel 
1. Introduction 
While adjudication plays a significant role in most national systems, the situation is quite 
different in International Law. Adjudication is only one of many possible ways of dealing 
with international disputes.2 Since its inception in 1945, the IC] has handed down a total of 
79 Judgements,3 and 25 advisory opinions while the PCll rendered twenty nine judgements 
and twenty seven advisory opinions in only eighteen years of existence.4 
As one commentator argues:5 
[T]he ability of the Court to perform its functions depends not so much on the 
institutional ties linking it with this or that organization or organ, or with this or that 
conception of the nature of its judicial task, as on the readiness of the States to make 
use of the Court. There is, in this respect, no real difference between a direct approach 
to the Court by States invoking the contentious jurisdiction, and an indirect approach by 
States invoking the advisory competence. The decision whether and to what extent the 
Court shall be used always rests in the States, individually or collectively. That is not 
say, however, that how the Court views its tasks, and how States in organs of an 
international organization view its tasks, and how States in organs of the international 
organization view the possibility of organic co-operation, are not important, for all 
these factors will influence the policy decision. " 
1 Attitude has been defined as "a mental state of readiness. organised through experience to behave in a 
characteristic way towards the object of the attitude." See Rollinson. Derek, et al., Organizational Behaviour 
and Analysis, Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998. p. 740. Also attitude has been defined as a set of 
interrelated beliefs that are relatively enduring and produce behavioral consequences. See Davide Rhode and 
Harold Spaeth. Supreme Court Decision Making. San Francisco. W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976, p. 75. 
2 See Article 33 of the UN Charter. 
3 These cases concern inter alia land frontiers and maritime boundaries, territorial sovereignty, the non-use of 
force, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, diplomatic relations. hostage-taking. the right of asylum. 
nationality, guardianship, rights of passage and economic rights. Available at: http://www.ici-
ciLorg/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html. (Accessed 14 December 2004). 
4 It has been made clear in Chapter One that during the League era, requesting an opinion was confined to the 
Assembly and the Council. and was. usually initiated by a unanimously adopted resolution. In contrast to this. 
requesting an opinion in the UN era has been broadened: more organs and specialized agencies are now 
authorized to request advisory opinion of the Court, at the same time requests are initiated by a majority-
adopted resolution. 
S Rosenne, Shabtai. The Law and Procedure of the International Court. 1920-1996, The Hague; London: 
Martinus NijhoffPublishers, vol. I, 1997, p. 178, (emphasis added). 
248 
The attitude of States towards the advisory procedure cannot be assessed in isolation from 
their general attitude towards adjudication and the Court. The real test of States' attitude 
towards the Court and towards the judicial settlement of disputes as Rosenne wrote, is "to be 
found in their willingness in general to allow the law to occupy a prominent and constructive 
part in their international relations.,,6 
The task of this Chapter is to discuss what States think and expect of the ICI, and to 
identify several factors which may serve to influence States' decision as whether to use the 
Court. The Chapter also goes on to argue that despite the existence of several means for the 
resolution of legal disputes, and despite a few unfortunate decisions of the ICI, judicial 
settlement should not be exceptional, particularly in a Court like the ICI which has a 
significant body of jurisprudence. 
6 Rosenne, supra note 5, p. 180. 
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2. Quantitative Significance 
A survey of the requests made to the ICJ up to now reveals that of the twenty five advisory 
opinions rendered, fifteen were sought by the General Assembly and one by the Security 
Council in accordance with Article 96(1) of the Charter, which empowers those organs to 
request an opinion on "any legal question." Two opinions were requested by ECOSOC, and 
four by specialised agencies as follows: one by UNESCO, one by IMCO, and two by WHO. 
Moreover, the Court was asked for an advisory opinion by the Committee on Applications 
for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements.7 
In the first decade of the Court's existence there were ten advisory opinions, nine of 
which were initiated by the General Assembly and one by UNESCO. During 1957- 1967, 
there was an obvious decline in requesting advisory opinions, as only two were sought. 
Between 1967 and 1977, the low demand for advisory opinions persisted as only three 
advisory opinions were requested. During the following decade, 1977- 1987, a slight increase 
was achieved as five requests for advisory opinions were submitted to the Court. Since 1987 
to the present, only five advisory opinions have been requested. During the years 1962, 1963-
66, and 1968-69, the Court did not decide any new cases, neither contentious judgements nor 
advisory opinions.8 
The above figures at least indicate that there has been an infrequent use of the 
advisory function. The reasons for this are many and complex, but largely have to do with the 
general attitude of States towards the Court. This largely negative attitude has its origins in 
the early years of the establishment of the Ie] as discussed in the following Section. 
7 See Section 4.4 in Chapter Five, supra. 
8 See Table I appended to Chapter Nine, infra; Gross, Leo, "Underutilization of the International Court of 
Justice", 27 HIU, 1986, p. 573. 
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3. Historical Background, Preparatory Work and Attitudes 
Key States have not been instrumental in promoting the role of the ICI, most specifically the 
US which did not participate in the League of Nations due to concerns relating to the PCU as 
explained below. The US Government and the League of Nations in Geneva, during 1926 
and 1929 were at an impasse over the American demand for a veto on the advisory 
jurisdiction of the PCU.9 This demand stemmed mainly from two concerns: first, the US 
government feared that the advisory jurisdiction might develop into a form of compulsory 
jurisdiction, and second, the advisory opinion might be used to legitimise League policies, 
and thereby commit the US Government, as a potential member of the League, to such 
policies. 10 
While drafting Article 14 of the League Covenant, intensive discussions took place 
among the representatives of the US, Great Britain, and France which revealed basic 
divergences. President Wilson was in favour of resorting to "political adjustment" rather than 
"strict legal justice" as a method for resolving international disputes. At the same time, Cecil, 
Miller, and Hurst were for judicial resolution. Meanwhile Burgeois, the French 
Representative, was less committed to the idea of a new court of justice and preferred to rely 
on arbitration by enlarging the role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. I I The draft 
Covenant, of 14th Feb~ary 1920, reflected these conflicting priorities. 12 
At San Francisco in 1945/46, the allied powers were cautious about the future role of 
the proposed new Court, the ICI, evidenced by some lack of enthusiasm for proposals to 
9 Dunne, Michael, The United States and the World Court, 1920-J 935, London: Pinter, 1988, p. 4. 
10 Ibid, p. 9. 
11 Ibid, pp. 21-22. 
12 Ibid. See discussion regarding drafting of the Covenant in Chapter One, supra. 
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authorise the Court to render advisory opinions. 13 However, in a major policy development, 
the US delegation at San Francisco initially accepted the principles of advisory and 
compulsory jurisdiction although with some limitations. 14 The reservations eventually made 
by certain States when accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, most notably the US' 
Connally declaration of 14th August 1946,15 and subsequent reservations of other States, 
evidenced a damaging lack of confidence in the Court. 16 Subsequently, in 1986, the US 
decided to terminate its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 17 
One wonders whether the same conflicting priorities which emerged while drafting the 
Covenant and the Charter, which reflected a lack of confidence in international adjudication, 
have persisted to the present day. They clearly surfaced again at the very first, unpleasant, 
encounter of those States before the Court. Hence, France, since the Nuclear Tests Case, has 
essentially boycotted the Court. 18 Moreover, the US after the Nicaragua Case has shown 
some ambivalence towards the Court,19 while the attitude of the Soviet Union (now Russia) 
13 Mosler, Hermann & Rudolf Bernhardt, Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, International Court of 
Justice, Other Courts and Tribunals, Arbitration and Conciliation: An International Symposium, Berlin; 
Heidelberg; New York: Springer-Verlag,1974, p. 197. 
14 About the history of the US's participation in the compulsory jurisdiction system see Franck, Thomas, 
Judging the World Court, New York: Priority Press Publications, 1986. 
IS The Connally Reservation excludes matters that fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the US from the 
Court's jurisdiction. However, this Reservation apparently permits the U S to determine for itself whether the 
dispute is a domestic one or not. See Franck, ibid, p. 22. 
16Gross, Leo, "The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the 
International Legal Order" in: Gross, Leo (ed.), The Future of The International Court of Justice, Dobbs Ferry, 
New York: Oceana Publications, vol. I, 1976, p. 38. 
17 The US terminated acceptance of the IeJ compulsory jurisdiction by its letter to the UN Secretary General in 
October, 7m, 1985. See U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, 86, 1986, p. 67. 
IS Nuclear Tests Judgment, ICJ Rep., 1974, p. 253. Since then France seems to prefer arbitration. The 
Continental SheljCase between France and the U.K, 1977; fA Bretugre Case with Canada in 1989; The 
Rainbow Case in 1990 involving New Zealand and France have all been referred to ad hoc arbitration. See 
Bowett, Derek W., "The Court's Role in Relation to International Organizations", in: Lowe, Vaughan & 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert 
Jennings, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1996, p. 182. 
19 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits), ICJ Rep., 1986, p. 14. The U.S has 
withdrawn from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua. See U.S Department of State, Bulletin, 85, March 
1985, p. 46. However, the U.S still continues to appear before the Court on an ad hoc basis Like The Aerial 
Incident Case and the Lockerbie Case. 
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was, almost one of mistrust of both International Law and the Court.20 The Soviets 
considered political negotiations as the paramount and most appropriate method of settling 
international disputes peacefully, and relegated other peaceful methods to a secondary 
place.21 
It is argued that any improvement in States' attitudes towards the judicial function 
should necessarily require a different approach on the part of the key States, and, most 
importantly, the US.22 To borrow the words of Richard Bilder:23 
If many states-particularly important ones-are willing to submit their disputes to 
impartial settlement and show respect for the International Court, this will be taken by 
the public as meaning that international law is in itself relevant and worthy of respect, 
and the public will believe in and support international law . If, on the other hand, 
important states show indifference or contempt for international adjudication and the 
Court, the public is likely to conclude that international law is meaningless-a joke-and 
withdraw its belief and support. 
4. The Role of law and International Adjudication in International Affairs 
Law is a social institution, that is an integrated process of shaping behavior and ideas which 
helps to restore, maintain and create social order.24 De Visscher argued that a necessary 
condition for the success of law is peace.25 However, as one commentator said, peace under 
law is an ideal. 26 Ferencz also maintained that there can be "no peace without justice. ,,27 
20 The Soviet Union (now Russia) has never seized the Court. 
21 Rosenne, Shabtai "On the Non-Use of the Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice", 39 
BYIL, 1963, p. 27. 
22 Gross, Leo, supra note 16, p. 38. 
23Bilder, Richard B., "International Dispute Settlement and the Role ofInternational Adjudication", in: 
Damrosch, Lori F. (ed.) The International Court of Justice at A Crossroads, Dobbs Ferry, New York: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1987, p. 179. 
24 Berman, Harold J. and Greiner, William R., The Nature and Functions of Law, Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 
1966, p. 26. 
2S De Visscher, Charles, "Reflections on the Present Prospects of International Adjudication", 50 AJlL, 1956, p. 
474. 
26 Joseph, Daly, "Is the International Court of Justice Worth the Effort", 20 Akron Law Review, 1987, p. 403. 
27 Ferencz, Benjamin B., Enforcing International Law: a Way to World Peace: A Documentary History and 
Analysis, Oceana Publications, vol. 2, 1983, p. 489. 
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Ferencz recalls that the first article of the UN Charter recognises that international security is 
linked to justice and law.28 It is interesting to recall the remarks of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice on 
this issue:29 
[J]ustice is very seldom achieved by directly aiming at it: rather it is a by-product of the 
application of legal rules and principles, a consequence of the general order, certainty 
and stability introduced into human and international relationships through the regular 
and systemic application of known legal rules and principles, even if these rules and 
principles are not always perfect and do not always achieve ideal results in every case. 
However, the function of maintaining peace and security and establishing social order in any 
society is not exclusive to law. International adjudication is only one among many possible 
methods of dispute settlement recognised by International Law, which also include 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or to the UN itself. Weisberg notes that "States are more likely to prefer a 
process of negotiation, or the tactic of allowing the issues to linger in the hope that they may 
fade or that time may otherwise work to their advantage, than a system of adjudication. Such 
alternatives are chosen although the judicial method, more than any other procedure for 
resolving conflict, minimizes the inequality of the parties.,,3o Nevertheless, judicial process 
may play an important part as one means of dispute settlement. 
There are some intrinsic qualities pertaining to legal process:3l First, the strength of the 
judicial process lies in the authoritativeness and impartiality of the Court's decisions. Second, 
the findings of a Court could represent judicial precedent, whereby a judicial decision on 
certain issues or rights will extend beyond the case in hand. Although there is no strict 
28 See Article 1 of the Charter. 
29 Cited in: Jennings, Sir Robert Y., "The Role of the International Court of Justice", 68 BYIL, 1997, p. 40. 
30 Weisberg, Guenter, "The Role of the International Court of Justice in the United Nations System: the First 
Quarter Century" in: Gross, Leo (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice, Dobbs Ferry, New 
York: Oceana Publications, 1976, p. 185. 
31 For advantages of international adjudication, see Bilder, Richard, supra note 23, pp. 163-166. 
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system of precedents in International Law, Shaw argues that the legal principles expounded 
by the ICJ may constitute "stepping stones to the development of further norms or the 
application of existing norms in other areas.,,32 He also points out that the elucidation of legal 
principles by the Court in one case may prove useful in bilateral or multilateral negotiations 
in other situations.33 Lastly, judicial settlement makes all parties to a dispute equal. Thus as 
Oduntan observes, "a Superpower state expects and gets no special concessions in relation to 
a weaker state before the international tribunal.,,34 
5. Assessment of Frequently Cited Reasons for the Reluctance to Use the Court 
Despite the clear advantages of using legal processes to settle inter States differences, any 
decision to use the Court is largely dependent on States' willingness to allow law to playa 
constructive role in their international relations.3s Scholars have identified several factors 
which may account for the reluctance of States to use the Court: the nature of the law which 
the Court applies, the risk of losing and the unpredictability of the decision outcome, fears of 
the Court's impartiality, lastly, the slowness of the procedure and the cost of litigation. 
32 Shaw, Malcolm N., "The International Court of Justice: A Practical Perspective", 46 /CLQ, 1997, p. 833. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Oduntan, Gbenga, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice (/945-1996): A Critique of the 
Contentious and Advisory Jurisdiction, Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1999, p. 215. 
35 Rosenne, supra note 5, p. 180; Couvreur, Philippe, "The Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice in 
the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes", in: Muller, A.S & Raic, D. et al. (eds.) The International 
Court of Justice: Its Future Role After Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1997, p. 115; Bowett, Derek W., "Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of 
Disputes", 180 RCADI, 1983, p. 177. 
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5.1 International Law Applied by the Court is of Western Origins 
Some commentators claim that States' perceptions of the law which the Court applies under 
Article 38 of its Statute is likely to have some influence on States' attitude towards judicial 
settlement.36 Anand claims that this law does not always "correspond to the legitimate 
aspirations of many States, particularly those which had not participated in the formulation of 
the general or customary principles of internationallaw.37 Third World States sometimes 
contend that they are not bound by customary norms to which they did not consent and argue 
instead that UN resolutions are a new means for creating international legal norms.38 
Richard Falk in his book "Reviving the World Court" also claims that the Court's 
Western judicial style and its narrow perspective have isolated it from the majority of other 
States. He asserts that: 39 
Western cultural hegemony in relation to the World Court has meant that this leading 
international judicial body operates overwhelmingly in relation to a seat of symbols and 
procedures associated with legal positivism (blended by some judges and on some 
occasions with a dose of natural law). This cultural hegemony is also evident in the 
general failure of Third World and non-Western members of the Court or other public 
officials to question the use of The Hague as the site for the World Court or to 
challenge, even symbolically, the retention of English and French as the Court's 
exclusive working languages. 
Falk concluded that the Court will not be revived until its judges "come to embody a spirit of 
cultural autonomy and pluralism that reflects the principal attitudes in the world system on 
36 Merrills, John G., International Dispute Settlement, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition, 
1998, p. 148. 
37 The statement ofWolde Giorgis (Ethiopia), UN Doc. NC.6/SR. 1277, 12 November 1971, p. S, Cited in 
Anand, R.P, "Role of International Adjudication" in: Gross, Leo (ed.), The Future of The International Court of 
Justice, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana Publications, vol. 1,1976, p. 10. 
38 See Kelly, Patrick, "The Changing Process ofInternational Law and the Role of the World Court", 11 
Michigan J. Int'l Law, 1989, p. IS2. For discussion about the General Assembly resolutions as source of 
international law, See Chapter Five, supra. 
39Falk, Richard, Reviving the World Court, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986, p. 180. 
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the leading normative issues of the day, including a range of views about the lawmaking 
processes at work in internationallife,,40 In contrast Kieth Highet considerd 'cultural 
predisposition' as an important factor however, in his view, the appropriate legal response to 
the issue before the Court, is of most importance. For Highet, "this response will be 
formulated in accordance with policy needs, which may well be more acutely appreciated by 
judges who are sympathetic to the progressive development of internationallaw.,,41 It could 
be argued that regardless of the kind of law the Court applies, the reasoning behind the 
decision is of most important. As Sir Robert Jennings has argued, the reasoning as well as the 
reasons behind the Court's decision must be such as to bear and survive examination.42 
The Western Sahara advisory opinion clearly underlines the cultural factor behind 
some of the arguments submitted by the participating States. In this case, after objections by 
Morocco and Mauritania to Spain's plan to hold a referendum in Western Sahara on 
decolonising the territory in which Spain had been the colonial power since 1884, General 
Assembly Resolution 3292 (XXIX) of 1974 requested the opinion of the Court on two 
questions:43 
I Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet el Hamra) at the time of colonization by 
Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? 
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, 
II What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the 
Mauritanian entity? 
40 Falk, Richard, ibid, p. 181. 
41 Highet, Keith, "Reflections on Jurisprudence for the "Third World": The World Court, the "Big Case", and 
the Future", 27 VJIL, 1986-87, pp. 303-304. 
42 J . 
enntngs, supra note 29, p. 44. 
43 Ie] Rep., 1975, p. 14. 
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Both Morocco and Mauritania based their objection to the referendum on the alleged status 
of the territory at the time of its colonisation.44 Hence Morocco claimed that the territory had 
been part of the Sherifan State,45 while Mauritania claimed that it had been part of the 
"Mauritanian entity" or Bilad Shinguitti.46 
Karen Knop points out that the basic legal concepts in the questions referred to the 
Court- terra nullius, legal ties and the notion of a legal entity- were concerned with the 
"degree of recognition to be given to patterns of identity [which] were based on European 
norms of political and social organization and on the relationship of European to non-
European [societies].,,47 Karen observed that although the referred questions concerned non-
European communities and the relationship that existed between them prior to European 
colonisation, the applicable international law was a colonial one, which worked against the 
recognition of non-Europeans and was insensitive to their claims.48 
Addressing the concept of terra nullius, Mr. Bayona-Ba-Meya, representing Zaire, in his 
oral statement before the Court stated:49 
44 In the proceedings before the Court, and in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3292 (XXIX), 
paragraph 2: Spain (the territory'S administering power) submitted a total of 8 volumes of "Information and 
Documents"; Morocco (as an interested party) submitted a large number of documents in support of "its written 
statement" and Mauritania (as an interested party) appended documentary annexes to its written statement. The 
United Nations Secretary-General transmitted a dossier of documents likely to throw light upon the question, 
Pursuant to Article 65 paragraph 2 of the Statute, and Article 88 of the Rules of the Court. Algeria and Zaire 
~ive their opinions. See ICJ Rep., 1975, p. 15. 
5 Consequently there were religious links and political allegiance which was renewed by the Saharan caids 
(sheikhs) to every accessioned Sultan, who appointed them as evidenced by documents and imposed Koranic 
taxes. See Shaw, Malcolm, ''The Western Sahara Case", 49 BYIL, 1978, p. 135. 
46 ICJ Rep., 1975, pp. 65-67. Mauritania did not exist as a State during the critical period under consideration. 
In its claims Mauritania laid stress on the 'Mauritanian entity', or Bilad Shinguitti as a distinct entity inhabiting 
a certain area and possessing its own language, social structure and way of life. Therefore the question for it 
centered upon the unification of its people. See Shaw, ibid, p. 136. 
47 Knop, Karen, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002, p.117. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Oral Statement of Mr. Bayona-Ba-Meya (14 July 1975), Western Sahara, ICJ Pled., vol. IV, p. 439 at pp. 
440- 445. Translated by Karen Knop, supra note 47, p. 120. 
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It is clear that an aware Africa can no longer rally to the concept of terra nullius as 
elaborated by Western jurists .. Thus, the International Court of Justice must not 
contemplate and interpret the notion of terra nullius according to a Western conception 
and a Western authenticity, rather it must approach and adapt it so as to take account of 
African reality. 
On the other hand Algeria argued that the terra nullius question should be addressed outside 
the nineteenth-century international law framework in order to avoid the Europocentric 
international law which regarded territories not belonging to "civilized" States as terra 
nullius.50 Algeria demanded that the Court should acknowledge the existence of Arab-Islamic 
civilisation at the time in the region, with its own developed public law, hence Western 
Sahara was an integral part of Dar aI-Islam (the Muslim civitas).51 Spain for its part argued 
that the status of the territory at the time of colonisation and the terra nullius question must 
be determined in accordance with the application of international rule as the only legal 
framework governing relationships between independent States.52 
On the question of legal ties, Spain argued against any cultural particularisation of 
international law, insisting that International Law is the general framework and common 
legal language without which States would be unable to reach true agreement.S3 Morocco, on 
the other hand, argued that the nineteenth-century structure could only be understood within 
the Islamic State model, and that the interpretation of the rules should be particularised in 
order to take account of the special structure of the Sherifan State.S4 
Castellino and Allen suggest that, in the absence of evidence that could be satisfactorily 
termed "documentary", when other arguments presented have their source in religion, 
so Oral Statement of Mohammed Bedjaoui, representing Algeria, (14 July 1975), Western Sahara, IeJ Pled .• vol. 
IV. pp. 455-456. Translated from French by Karen Knop. supra note 47. 
St Ie] Rep .• 1975. pp. 41-43; Shaw. supra note 45. p. 150; 
52 Shaw. ibid. pp. 149-50. 
53 Oral Statement of Fernando Arias-Salgado. representing Spain. (18 July 1975), Western Sahara. IeJ Pled .• 
vol. V. p. 51 at p. 58. Translated by Karen Knop. p. 133. 
54 Ie] Rep .• 1975. p. 43. 
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tradition or culture and when the historical nature is bitterly contested by the parties and 
equally compelling, the Court is often "left badly exposed in terms of verifying the details of 
non-documentary evidence per se. ,,55 The Court however emphasised that: 56 
The reference in those questions to a historical period cannot be understood to fetter or 
hamper the Court in the discharge of its judicial functions. That would not be consistent 
with the Court's judicial character; for in the exercise of its functions it is necessarily 
called upon to take into account existing rules of international law which are directly 
connected with the terms of the request and indispensable for the proper interpretation 
and understanding of its opinion. 
Although the Court applied International Law and not Islamic law to the question of legal 
ties, it still contextualized its analysis by taking into account the social and political structure 
of the Western Saharan population.57 The Court concluded that: "the State practice of the 
relevant period indicates that the territory inhabited by tribes or peoples having social and 
political organization were not regarded as terra nullius.,,58 This conclusion was not 
consonant with the nineteenth-century view that was common among jurists which denied 
any form of international legal personality for territorial entities that did not constitute States 
as recognised in Europe. 59 
Lastly, it is interesting to note Merrills' suggestion that "if judicial decisions are to be 
an "acceptable means of resolving disputes, the Court must recognise the diversity of its 
audience and frame its judgments in language which the bulk of the members of the 
. . I' d d d,,6o mternatlona commumty can support an un erstan . 
55 Castelli no, Joshua and Allen, Steve, Title to Territory in International Law: A Temporal Analysis, Ashgate, 
2003, pp. 152-153 
56 IC] Rep., 1975, para. 52, p. 30. 
57 Ibid, p. 42. See also MerriJIs, supra note 36, p. 149. 
58 ICJ Rep., 1975, para. 80, p. 39. 
59 Shaw, supra note 45, p. 133. 
60 MeriJIs, supra note 36, p. 149. 
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5.2 The Court's Unpopular Judgments and Advisory Opinions 
Any use of the judicial procedure depends upon States' expectations which are in turn 
usually influenced by the Court's previous decisions. Therefore, widespread acceptability of 
the Court's previous judgements may encourage more frequent resort to the Court, while the 
opposite is also right. Two cases discussed below have often been cited as discouraging 
resort to the Court. 
5.2.1 The 1966 South West Africa, Second Phase61 
In this case the two applicants, Ethiopia and Liberia, acting in the capacity of States which 
had been members of the League of Nations, put forward various allegations charging South 
Africa with violations of its obligations towards the inhabitants of the territory of South West 
Africa under the League of Nations mandate for South West Africa. The Applicants 
contended that South Africa was practising apartheid in the mandated territory, that it had 
failed to transmit petitions from the inhabitants of the territory to the UN and that it had 
attempted to modify the terms of the Mandate without the consent of the UN. The Court 
dismissed the applicants' request holding that "the Applicants cannot be considered to have 
established any legal right or interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present 
claims, and that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give effect to them.,,62 
The Court in this Case had to interpret the Mandate for South West Africa in order to 
determine whether the applicants had a legal right or interest in the matter. The Court 
recalled that the mandates system was instituted by Article 22 of the League Covenant. As a 
matter of interpretation, States had a legal interest in respect of certain provisions of the 
61 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) Second Phase Case, IC] Rep., 
1966, p. 6. 
62 Ie] Rep., 1966, p. 51. 
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mandate which were characterised by the Court as the 'special interest' provisions.63 The 
Court concluded, however, that the Applicants were not invoking interests protected by such 
provisions rather, the Applicants had referred to various provisions classified by the Court as 
'conduct' provisions, in respect of which the only supervision was through the political 
organs of the League. Accordingly, the Court declared that: 64 
[I]n holding that the Applicants ... could only have had a legal right or interest in the 
'special interests' provisions of the Mandate, the Court does not in any way do so 
merely because these relate to a material or tangible object. Nor. in holding that no 
legal right or interest exist for the Applicants, individually as States. in respect of the 
'conduct' provisions, does the Court do so because any such right or interest would not 
have a material or tangible object. The Court simply holds that such rights or interests. 
in order to exist, must be clearly vested in those who claim them, by some text or 
instrument, or rule of law;-and that in the present case, none were ever vested in 
individual members of the League under any of the relevant instruments, or as a 
constituent part of the mandates system as a whole, or otherwise. 
In responding to arguments advanced before the Court that humanitarian considerations are 
sufficient in themselves to generate legal rights and obligations the Court stated that:65 
It is a court of law. and can take account of moral principles only in so far as these are 
given a sufficient expression in legal form. Law exists, it is said, to serve a social need; 
but precisely for that reason it can do so only through and within the limits of its own 
discipline. Otherwise, it is not a legal service that would be rendered. 
Prott claims that the Court's decision in this case "created a crisis in the acceptance of the 
International Court.,,66 With this finding the Court also appeared to have contradicted its 
Judgement in the earlier phase of the Case, on 21 December 1962, in the South West Africa 
Preliminary Objections Case. In the earlier Case the Court found, by eight votes to seven, 
that the Mandate was a treaty that was still in force, and that the dispute between the parties 
63 For examples those concerning freedom for missionaries who were nationals of members of the League to 
enter and reside in the territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling. See IeJ Rep., 1966, p. 21. See also 
Brownlie Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 6th edition, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 451. 
64 See IeJ Rep., 1966, pp. 32-33. 
65 Ibid, para. 49, p. 34. 
66 Prott, Lyndell V., The Latent Power of Culture and the International Judge, Abingdon, axon: Professional 
Books Ltd, 1979, p. 107. 
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was one envisaged in Article 7 of the Mandate i.e. a dispute that could not be settled by 
negotiation. Consequently, the Court found that it had "jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the 
merits of the dispute.,,67 
Some commentators consider that the Court's strong positivist approach prevented it 
from following the new spirit of International Law, i.e. in harmony with the requirements of 
international life, in its 1966 judgment in the South West Africa Cases.68 Thus, a majority of 
judges in this Case applied a narrow interpretation of the Mandate, refusing to adopt the 
teleological method in interpreting the legal question that had been referred to them.69 For 
example, McWhinney considers the Court's decision in this Case as legally unnecessary and 
as politically disastrous.7o 
The impression that the Court's judgement left was that the Court was remote from the 
realities of international life. However, the Court subsequently realised the negative reaction 
towards its judgement. Consequently, it reviewed its role in relation to the UN policy-making 
institutions such as the General Assembly and the Security Council.7! 
67 On 4 November 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia submitted to the Court separate applications against South Africa 
in accordance with Article 7 of the Mandate for South West Africa which subjected South Africa to the 
jurisdiction of the PCI] whenever any dispute whatsoever arise between the Mandatory and another member of 
the League relating to the interpretation or application of the provisions of the Mandate and Article 37 of the 
Court's Statute, in addition to Article 80 (1) of the Charter. These applications concerned the continued 
existence of the League of Nations mandate for South Africa and the duties of South Africa as a mandatory 
power. South Africa filed four preliminary objections relating to the Court's jurisdiction. However, these 
objections were dismissed by a Court's judgment of 21 December 1962. For the details of this case, see Zacklin, 
Ralph, "The Problem of Namibia in International Law", 171 RCADI, 1981, p. 270. 
68 Bodie, Thomas J., Politics and the Emergence of an Activist International Court of Justice, Westport, 
Connecticut; London: Praeger, 1995, pp. 62-63. 
69 See the statement of the Court justifying the approach it took against teleological approach. ICJ Rep., 1966, 
f<ara. 91,. p. 48. 
<McWhmney, Edward, "Contemporary Conceptions of the Role ofInternational Judicial Settlement", 22 
RCADI, 1990, p. 37. 
71 McWhinney, ibid; see also Rosenne, Shabtai, The World Court: What It is and How It Works, Dordrecht, 
London: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1995, p. 175. 
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Lastly, as Anand suggests, this unfortunate decision, should not jeopardise the Court's 
independence: "[i]n spite of all the criticism against the South West Africa case, there is no 
basis for any doubt about the independence of the Court as a whole ... it is entirely wrong and 
rash to denounce a legal institution on the basis of a single case. In any case the Court seems 
to have regained confidence in the Namibia opinion."n 
5.2.2 The 1996 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts 
Case 
The effect and implication of the Court's refusal to give an opinion in The Legality of the Use 
by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts Case is discussed extensively in Chapter 
Two. However, it is sufficient to note here that, as a refusal of the Court's to give an opinion 
to the World Health Organization, the Court set an unfortunate precedent for other 
international organisations that may require, through the Court's advisory function, an 
interpretation or a clarification of the provisions of their constitution, while executing their 
duties in evermore overlapping and sophisticated undertakings.73 
5.3 The Risk of Losing and the Unpredictability of the Court's Decision 
States, as a general rule, resist judicial settlement because they fear losing. Unsurprisingly, 
nations are rarely indifferent to losing even when disputes concern matters of minor 
importance.74 Therefore, it is understandable that States are generally unwilling to resort to 
72 Anand, supra note 37, p. 16. For discussion about the Namibia advisory opinion see Chapters Three, Five and 
Six, supra. 
73 For details about the ramifications of this Case see Section II in Chapter Two, supra. 
74 Rovine, Arthur, "The National Interest and The World Court", in: Gross, Leo, (ed.) The Future of the 
International Court of Justice, 1976, p. 317. 
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third party settlement.75 In order to protect their essential interests, States are reluctant to lose 
control over any dispute resolution process. Thus Judge Bedjaoui argues that:76 
Some States may perhaps tend to have misgivings about such judicial settlement on the 
grounds that, unlike a political settlement, it would be completely outside their control 
and hence, given the reputed rigidity of legal rules, always liable in the end to tum out 
less favourably to themselves. 
If a party intends to seek public support and legitimisation of its position, then it would be 
easier and safer to seek such legitimisation and endorsement from a political body such as the 
General Assembly.77 However, Judge Bedjaoui's argues that there cannot be a "loser" when 
a dispute is: 78 
[S]ettled serenely and when peace prevails, it must be stressed that the Court- because 
of the nature of the law which it applies and the role which it plays- is sure never to 
apply the law blindly .... The Court itself has in fact explained on several occasions that 
it considers that its making legal judgments in no way excludes- quite the contrary-
taking into account infra legem equity, meaning that form of equity that constitutes a 
method of interpreting the law and is one of its qualities. 
The issue of predictability constitutes an old dilemma associated with adjudication. Gross 
argues that if predictability means applying the law as the Court finds it, then the Court may 
suffer from disuse. However, if the Court strikes out in a new direction, it may be accused of 
unpredictability.79It can be criticised whichever way it turns. However, unpredictability may 
not be such a grave defect and should be treated as natural. 
7S Couvreur, supra note 35, p. 91. Lissitzyn, "International Law in a Divided World", 542 International 
Conciliation, 1963, p. 37; Ciobanu. Dan, "Preliminary Objections Related to the Jurisdiction o/the United 
Political Organs", The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975, p. 9. 
76 UN Doc. N49/PY.29, cited in Couvreur, supra note 35, p. 93. 
77 Bilder, supra note 23, p. 167. 
78 Bedjaoui, Mohammed, "The Contribution of the International Court of Justice Towards Keeping and 
Restoring Peace", in: Conflict Resolution: New Approaches and Methods, Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2000, 
~. 19. 
9Gross, supra note 16, p. 23. 
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Sir Robert Jennings argues that: 80 
[I]n any case worth taking to the International Court of Justice, it will, after all its 
required fonnalities have been faithfully completed, produce a result which cannot 
accurately be foretold before this process has been carried out. .. There would be little 
point in all this highly fonnalized ceremonial if the results were simply predictable. 
This makes the adjudication method one of great efficacy, particularly in disputes 
which have proved intractable by other methods. 
Some writers suggest that it might be difficult to predict the outcome of adjudication for two 
reasons: First, there may be no relevant rules of international law covering the issue to be 
adjudicated. Second, existing rules may be rather ambiguous or uncertain.81 It is the role of 
the Court to clarify the law and find legal rules for unprecedented issues. 
5.4 The Composition of the Court and the Impartiality of the Judges 
The ICJ is composed of fifteen judges, elected to represent the major world civilisations 
regardless of their nationality.82 The General Assembly and the Security Council, voting 
separately, elect the judges from a list of qualified persons drawn up by the national group of 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), or by specially appointed national groups in the 
case of the UN Members not represented in the PCA. 83 The composition of the Court seems 
to be a source of concern to many commentators who distrust the Court. Some writers claim 
that the composition of the Court and the distribution of seats constitute a strong reason for 
avoiding the Court84 because the composition, more often than not, is not representative of 
the different legal systems and of the evolving world situation.85 
80J . ennmgs, supra note 29, p. 47. 
81 Bilder, supra note 23, p. 167. 
82 Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute. 
83 See Articles 4, 5 of the Court's Statute. 
84 Mosler, supra note 13, pp. 278-79; Oduntan, supra note 34, pp. 216-224. 
85 See statistical overview of the composition of the Court from 1946 until end of term for judges in 2003 in 
Oduntan, Ibid, pp. 218-221. 
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Third world countries have argued that their States have been under- represented on the 
Court, and consequently have suffered of judges from western States who, it is alleged, are 
biased against the newer, developing countries. 86 Prott argues that even third world judges 
are influenced by the west through their training in a particular system of law.8? On the other 
hand, the US and some western States have asserted that there is "anti-western bias on the 
Court" and have complained of the "dominance of the Court by third world states."ss The US 
after the Nicaragua Case in 1985 adopted a negative view towards the Court, believing that 
the Court was politically motivated rather than impartial.s9 
Despite the above assertions, it should be born in mind that when judges are elected 
"they are not supposed to represent the views and preferences of their electorate in the way 
required of legislators.,,9o Nevertheless, there is a possibility that judges may reflect the legal 
and political opinions prevalent in their respective countries at least subconsciously. 
However, this is not a proof of a lack of independence in the strict sense of that term.91 
Some writers have cited a mere two or three cases to support their claim that the 
judges' views vary from one case to another in accordance with their countries' interests.92 
However, an evaluation of the Court's or of the judges' impartiality cannot be determined on 
the basis of just a few cases. Any evaluation must be more comprehensive and must include 
both the advisory and contentious functions of the Court. It must also take into consideration 
86 Hensley, Thomas, "Bloc Voting on the International Court of Justice", 22 The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
1978, p. 41. 
87 P rott, supra note 66, pp. 224-226. 
88 McWhinney, supra note 70, p. 137. 
89 Tiefenbrun, S., "The Role of The World Court in Settling International Disputes: Recent Assessment", 20 
Loyola of Los Angeles Int'l & Comparative Law Journal, 1997, p. 2. 
90 Warner, Richard, "Argumentation" in: Gray, Christopher The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia, New 
York; London: Garland Publishing, Inc, vol. I, 1999, p. 47. 
91 A view expressed by M. Hambro cited in: Mosler, supra note 13, p. 57. 
92 Oduntan, supra note 34, pp. 216-24. 
267 
relevant political considerations, such as the effects of the Cold War on the Court. 93 Hensley 
conducted an interesting study of the voting pattern of IC] judges.94 Although his study 
revealed some evidence of bloc voting by the judges, the patterns of such blocs were not 
closely related to the political alignments, common historical traditions, or common legal 
systems of the judges' countries. Instead, the analysis revealed that some judges from 
countries sharing similar political interests and cultural ties did not vote together to any 
significant extent.95 Another study, conducted by Edith Weiss in 1987, reviewed the 
empirical studies of this issue and found that: 96 
[T]he record does not reveal significant alignments, either on a regional, political, or 
economic basis. There is a high degree of consensus among the judges on most 
decisions. The most that can be discerned is that some judges vote more frequently 
together during certain periods than do others, and that in rare instances, notably with 
the Soviet and Syrian judges, they have always voted the same way. But there have not 
been persistent voting alignments which have significantly affected the decisions of the 
Court. 
One could argue here that focusing on the question of the composition of the Court and the 
election of the judges does not help to explain the reluctance of States to use the Court, as 
such reluctance is hardly due to doubts about the judges' integrity and independence. 
Nevertheless, judicial partiality is not completely precluded, particularly when a 
pronouncement is made after a casting vote of the president, in accordance with Article 55(2) 
93 The period between 1947-54 was marked by the confrontation between the USSR and the US. See Archer, 
Clive, International Organizations, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 31. 
94 Hensley, Thomas, supra note 86, pp. 39-59. 
9S Ibid, p. 52. 
96 Weiss, Edith B., "Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry" in: Damrosch, L. (ed.), The 
International Court of Justice at a Crossroad, Dobbs Ferry, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 1987, p. 
134; see also Posner, Eric & De Figueiredo, Miguel, "Is the International Court of Justice Politically Biased", 
available at: http://epstein.wustl.edulresearchlcourses.LAPSPosner.pdf. (Accessed 15 December 2004). 
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Statute.97 Prott has suggested that such a decision is "somewhat less clearly regarded by the 
public as a decision of the Court.,,98 
5.5 The Slowness of the Judicial Procedure and the Cost of Litigation 
In 1996 the British Institute decided to investigate the assumption that the slowness of the 
Court's procedure was a possible reason for States reluctance to use the Court. The institute's 
1996 report analysed over 21 opinions that the Court handed down between 1948 and 1990, 
and found that the average time taken from lodging the request to the rendering of the 
opinion was 254 days.99 
Although slowness is a characteristic of the judicial process, the time taken to reach a 
decision is generally longer in contentious cases. Sir Robert Jennings defends the Court by 
stating that the Court "works remarkably quickly, and the time taken will be found in any 
event, I believe, to compare favourably with other superior courts of both domestic and 
international jurisdiction."lOo Judge Bedjaoui also claims that once the Court retires to 
deliberate in an advisory case the process quickens and, usually, the pronouncement of its 
decision is made within a few months or sometimes only a few weeks. lol In the 1950 
Competence of the General Assembly Case, the final opinion was handed down fifteen days 
after the end of public hearing. The advisory opinion on the Applicability of the Obligation to 
97 This happened twice in the history of ICJ. First, in the 1996 WHO request and secondly. with the 1966 South 
West Africa Judgment. 
98 P rott. supra note 66, p. 60. 
99 The report of the Study Group, "Efficiency of Procedures and working methods", 45 ICLQ, supp. 1996, p. 
S26. It is worth noting that one should take into consideration that a case like Yakimetz Case has taken 990 days 
ICJ Rep., 1987, p. 18. 
100 See Speech by Sir Robert Jennings, President of the International Court of Justice, to the UN General 
Assembly, 88 AJIL, 1994, p. 423. 
101 B d' . e ~aoul, supra note 78, p. 16. 
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Arbitrate under Section Twenty One oJ The U.N Headquarters Agreement oJ26th June 1947, 
although long and complex, it was given just eight days after the end of public hearings102. 
Article 103 of the Court's 1978 Rules, as amended in 2000, allows an accelerated 
procedure whenever the authorised requesting body informs the Court of the urgent need for 
a quick decision, or whenever the Court consider it desirable: 103 
When the body authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
to request an advisory opinion informs the Court that its request necessitates an urgent 
answer, or the Court finds that an early answer would be desirable, the Court shall take 
all necessary steps to accelerate the procedure, and it shall convene as early as possible 
for the purpose of proceeding to a hearing and deliberation on the request. 
The cost of litigation may be also cited as deterring States from using the Court. However, 
access to the Court, as a starting point is free for all Member States, although the litigants 
have to bear other costs including advocates fees. The Secretary-General in 1989 following 
General Assembly directive announced the establishment of a legal aid scheme to assist in 
the finance of cases brought by developing States. 104 
After reviewing the above reasons for the limited use of the IC], one might conclude 
that the principal reason for reticence seems to be States' unwillingness to subject their 
102 Report of the Study Group, supra note 99, p. S26. In this request the General Assembly asked, in resolution 
42/229B of 2 March 1988, the Court to take "in mind the constraints of time". The total time for rendering the 
opinion was eight weeks. 
103 The Security Council's request for an advisory opinion concerning Namibia, Resolution 284 (1970) 
informed the Court of the need to receive an opinion at an early date. See ICI Rep., 1971, p. 17. The General 
Assembly's request for the Western Sahara opinion, in resolution 3292(XXIX), asked the Court to give the 
opinion" at an early date", ICI Rep., 1975, p 13. Also, in the Headquarters Agreement opinion, the General 
Assembly in resolution 42/229 B (1988), asked the Court to "bear in mind the constraint of time", ICI Rep., 
1988, p. 13. In its request for an opinion in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons opinion, the 
General Assembly requested the Court in resolution 49n5 K to render the opinion "urgently". ICI Rep., 1996(1) 
p. 228. In the WHO/Egypt opinion, the Director-General of the WHO in his request letter stated that the request 
necessitated an urgent answer ICI Rep., 1980, p. 68. Lastly in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Case, the General Assembly had requested the Court to render 
urgently an advisory opinion on the legality of the wall built by Israel in the occupied territory. 
104 Amr, Mohamed S., The Role of the International Court of Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ of the 
United Nations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 395. 
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policies to judicial determination and thereby lose some control over the dispute. Although, 
the preference for non-judicial means to settle disputes is a common phenomenon, 
nevertheless depoliticising a dispute and referring it to the Court should become the normal 
not the exceptional method for resolving legal issues. Sir Robert Jennings has pointed out 
that the IC] will be strong when resort to it on legal issues "is normal, habitual, routine, not 
exceptional." 105 
Table Shows Case Duration 
Case Date Date of 
Request Rendered 
Filed Opinion 
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the 29.11.1947 28.05.1948 
United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), IC] Reports, 1948, 
p.57. 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 07.12.1948 11.04.1949 
Nations, IC] Reports, 1949, p. 174. 
Competence of the General. Assembly for the Admission of a 28.11.1949 03.03.1950 
State to the United Nations, IC] Reports, 1950, p. 4. 
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 03.11.1949 30.03.1950 
Romania, IC] Reports, 1950, First Phase, p. 65 
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and 02.05.1950 18.07.1950 
Romania, IC] Reports, 1950, Second Phase, p. 221 
International Status of South-West Africa, IC] Reports, 1950, 27.12.1949 11.07.1950 
p. 128 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 20.11.1950 28.05.1951 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, IC] Reports 1951, p. 
15 
Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United 21.12.1953 13.07.1954 
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Ie] Reports 1954, p. 47 
Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and 06.12.1954 07.06.1955 
Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa, IC] 
Reports 1955, p.67) 
Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International 02.12.1955 23.10.1956 
Labour Organisation Upon Complaints Made Against the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Orl?anisation, IC] Reports 1956, p. 77 
lOS Jennings, Sir Robert Y., "The Proper Work and Purposes of The International Court of Justice", in: Muller, 
A.S. & Raic, D. et al., The International Court Of Justice Its Future Role After Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; 
London: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1997, p. 42. 
271 
Duration 
in Days 
182 
126 
95 
149 
77 
196 
188 
204 
183 
308 
Date Date of 
Case Request Rendered 
Filed Opinion 
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on 22.12.1955 01.07.1956 
South West Africa, IC] Reports 1956, p. 23 
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter- 25.03.1959 08.06.1960 
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, IC] 
Reports 1960, IC] Reports 1960, p. 150 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 27.12.1961 20.07.1962 
2, of the Charter), IC] Reports 1962, p. 151 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 10.08.1970 21.06.1971 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), IC] Reports 1971, p. 
16 
Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United 03.07.1972 12.07.1973 
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Ie] Reports 1973, p. 166 
Western Sahara, IC] Reports 1975, p. 12 21.12.1974 16.10.1975 
Interpretation of the Agreement of25 March 1951 Between 28.05.1980 20.12.1980 
the WHO and Egypt, Ie] Reports 1980, p. 73 
Application for Review of Judgment No. 273 of the United 28.07.1981 20.07.1982 
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Ie] Reports 1982, p. 325 
Application for Review of Judgment No. 333 of the United 10.09.1984 27.05.1987 
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Ie] Reports 1987, p. 18 
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 07.03.1988 26.04.1988 
of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of26 June 
1947, IC] Reports 1988, p. 12 
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on 13.06.1989 15.12.1989 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, IC] 
Reports 1989, p. 177 
Legality of the Use BY a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed 03.09.1993 08.07.1996 
Conflict, IC] Reports 1996, p. 66 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ie] 06.01.1995 08.07.1996 
Reports 1996, p. 226 
Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a 10.08.1998 29.04.1999 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Ie] 
Reports 1999, p. 62 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 08.12.2003 09.07.2004 
Occupied Palestinian Territory. Available at: 
http://www .icjcij .org/icj www/idocketlimwp/imwpframe.htm 
• The average time for rendering an advisory opinion is 281 days 
• The average time for rendering an advisory opinion exclusive of Administrative Tribunal 
cases is 239 days 
• It took 50 days to render the advisory opinion on the Headquarters Agreement. On the 
other hand it took 1039 days to render the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear 
Weapons in Armed Conflict Advisory Opinion. 
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Duration 
in Days 
192 
441 
205 
317 
373 
299 
206 
357 
988 
50 
185 
1039 
184 
261 
214 
6. Concluding Remarks 
States' negative attitude to judicial settlement is long-standing and is simply a consequence 
of their preference for methods of settlement over which they have some control. Judicial 
settlement is only one of several means for the resolution of legal disputes. Arbitration, 
mediation, negotiation, inquiry, submissions to political bodies like the General Assembly 
are also important. Moreover, it would be misleading to suggest that every legal question 
should be resolved by judicial means. Nevertheless, judicial settlement on the international 
plane should not be exceptional for the reasons examined in this Chapter, particularly when 
there exists a Court like the ICJ with a significant body of jurisprudence. 
The Court is the chief interpreter of International Law and the UN's supreme judicial 
organ of the UN. The Court may be imperfect, but, as one commentator has asked "what 
other such institution do we possess?" Thomas Franck has also stated that: 106 
l06p 
The World Court is neither the only court we could imagine nor the only court 
operating between states. But no other court has its historic legacy, extensive 
jurisprudence, or broad base of participating states. 
ranck, Thomas, supra note 14, p. 76. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Reception of Advisory Opinions 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter examines the reactions of the requesting organs when they receive the 
opinions they solicited. The extent of compliance by any State concerned with a given 
opinion will generally not be examined here. This is because the issue of implementation 
does not affect the authority of the Court's opinions, and in any case the question of 
implementation is outside the scope of this study. 
The present Chapter also seeks to emphasise that the primary motive for most 
advisory opinions rendered so far has been for clarification of the law and guidance for 
future action, rather than judiciallegitimisation of decisions already taken. When the law 
is clear, there is a greater chance of compliance.! This is evidenced by the fact that no 
advisory opinion has ever been disregarded by any requesting body. 
1 Keith, Kenneth, The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, Leyden: 
A.W. Sijthoff, 1971, p. 42. 
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2. The Possibility of Non-Compliance and its Effect on the Court's Discretion to 
Render Advisory Opinions 
Some commentators suggest that the Court should avoid giving advisory opinions if there 
is a likelihood that its opinion will be ignored.2 According to this view, if the Court finds 
that its opinion is likely to be dismissed by those States who objected to requesting an 
opinion at the outset, and if its opinion would contribute little to the solution of disputes, 
the Court should decline to give an opinion.3 Contrary to this point of view, Shaw rightly 
argues that the possibility of non-compliance is no reason for not exercising jurisdiction 
because the Court: 4 
[I]s not in a position to assess the chances of successful implementation and in any 
event the very act of clarifying the law in the relevant circumstances itself 
constitutes a form of implementation. 
As for the Court's view of the possibility of non-compliance by the requesting organ with 
the Court's advisory opinion, the Court's findings in the Western Sahara Case is 
iIlustrative:5 
In any event, to what extent or degree its opinion will have an impact on the action 
of the General Assembly is not for the Court to decide. The function of the Court is 
to give an opinion based on law, once it has come to the conclusion that the 
questions put to it are relevant and have a practical and contemporary effect and, 
consequently, are not devoid of object or purpose. 
2 Pomerance, Michla, "The Advisory Role of the International Court of Justice and its 'Judicial' Character: 
Past and Future Prisms, in: Muller, A.S & Raie, D. et al. (eds.), The International Court of Justice: Its 
Future Role After Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 318; 
Bowett, Derek W., "The Court's role in relation to international organizations" in: Lowe,Vaughan and 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in honour of Sir 
Robert Jennings, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1996, p. 186. 
3 Bowett, ibid. 
4 Shaw, Malcolm N., ''The Security Council and the International Court of Justice: Judicial Drift and 
Judicial Function", in: Muller, A.S.; Raic, D. et al. (eds.), The International Court of Justice: Its Future 
Role After Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1997, p. 248-249. 
s ICJ Rep., 1975, para. 73, p. 37. 
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It could be argued that it is a commonplace that compliance can never be guaranteed, not 
even in judgments in contentious cases. It is left to the receiving organ in the case of an 
advisory opinion to determine the effect and mechanisms for implementing the opinion. 
Although the Charter does not include any express provision which allows UN 
organs to review the legal findings in the Court's decision, Tanzi claims that an 
interpretation of the functions and powers vested in the UN's political organs may 
suggest that such a process of review is possible.6 However, the general view expressed 
by member States and publicists is that advisory opinions should be accepted by the 
Assembly without discussion of the Court's findings and reasoning. As the United States 
Representative commented on the advisory opinion in the Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations (Article17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) Case7: 
[M]y Government sees no need for this Assembly to pass upon, or even go into, 
the reasoning of the Court .... The draft resolution [accepting the advisory 
opinion] anticipates the General Assembly performing a function which is 
proper to it. The General Assembly is not a Court. It is not a judicial organ of 
the United Nations, and still less it is 'the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations', as Article 92 of the Charter describes the International Court of 
Justice. It is not the function of this Assembly ... to act as a Court to review the 
International Court of Justice. To do so would depart from the Charter's clear 
intention. When the Court's opinion is asked, establishment and interpretation of 
the law, in the design of the Charter, is the function of the Court; action to 
implement the law is, as the case may be, the function of other organs of the 
United Nations.8 
6 According to Tanzi, The Security Council, under Article 94(2), Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter, 
and the General Assembly, under Article 10 and Chapter VI of the Charter can discuss and make 
recommendations on the merits of a question decided upon by the Court in a way which might be at 
variance with the Court's decision. See Tanzi, Attila "Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the 
International Court of Justice and the Law of the United Nations", 6 EJIL, 1995, pp. 542-43. 
7 Hereinafter cited as: "the Expenses Case", ICJ Rep., 1962, p. 151. 
8 U.S. Del to UNGA, Press Release No.4112, 1962, p. 3. 
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While the possibility exists that UN organs may reject the requested opinion when the 
majority of members in the organ concerned agree on the inappropriateness, from a 
political viewpoint, of upholding the Court's decision, nevertheless, concerns over non-
compliance should not discourage the rendering, or indeed, requesting of an advisory 
opinion. 
3. Guidance as the Primary Motive for Requesting Advisory Opinions 
Most advisory opinions requested so far have been initiated by the General Assembly 
and the rest by various other organs and specialised agencies of the UN.9 The reception of 
advisory opinions by the requesting organs provides ample evidence that the requests 
were motivated by the need for guidance in the UN's work. There has been no case 
where the requesting organ has refused to comply with the opinion requested, and most 
importantly the requesting organ has always acted in accordance with this judicial 
advice. 1O Even more, the requesting organs sometimes state expressly in the preambles of 
the resolutions requesting an advisory opinion that they need the opinion in order to 
determine their position in light of the Court's findings . 
. In the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 267(1970) 
Casell , the Security Council indicated that: 12 
[A]n advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice would be useful for 
the Security Council in its further consideration of the question of Namibia and in 
furtherance of the objectives the Council is seeking. 
9 See Chapter Seven, supra. 
10 Amr, Mohamed, The Role o/the International Court 0/ Justice as the Principal Judicial Organ o/the 
United Nations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 116; Pomerance, Michla, The Advisory 
Function o/the International Court in the League and U.N. eras. Baltimore; London: john Hopkins 
University Press, 1973, p. 341. 
11 Hereinafter cited as "the Namibia Case", ICI Rep., 1971, p. 16. 
12 IC] Rep., 1971, p. 24. 
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In the Western Sahara Case, the General Assembly stated that it was asking the Court for 
an opinion so that it could be in a position to decide "on the policy to be followed in 
order to accelerate the decolonization process in the territory ... in the best possible 
conditions, in the light of the advisory opinion.,,13 The object of the General Assembly's 
request in this Case was also stressed in the preamble of its resolution 3292 (XXIX), 
when it stated that "it is highly desirable that the General Assembly, in order to continue 
the discussion of this question ... , should receive an advisory opinion on some important 
legal aspects of the problem." 14 
Failure to perform or act in accordance with the requested advice does not attract 
sanctions or consequences similar in nature to those allowed by Article 94(2) of the 
Charter for failure to perform obligations arising from judgments. IS However, some 
writers have observed that the status of the Court within the UN indicates that its 
advisory opinions must be respected, as repeated non-compliance with the rendered 
opinions by the requesting organs would affect negatively the advisory function and the 
status of the Court. 16 
In general terms, one can conclude that some advisory opinions have been complied 
with by both the requesting organ and the concerned States. Others were implemented by 
the requesting organ but not by the concerned States. However, it should not be forgotten 
that the effects of advisory opinions are not confined just to the 'parties' in a specific 
case. Advisory opinions rendered by the Court affect the understanding and interpretation 
13 IC] Rep., 1975, para. 40, p. 27. 
14 Ibid. 
IS Article 94(2) provides: "[i]f any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a 
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it 
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the 
judgment". 
16 A mr, supra note 10, p. 38. 
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of International Law for all the international community rather than for the particular 
'parties' to an individual opinion. To borrow the words of Judge De Castro17 
[T]he effect of an advisory opinion is not confined to the parties as though it were a 
matter of a judgment; the opinion is authoritative erga omnes, and is not restricted 
to the States or organizations that make written or oral statements or submit 
information or documents to the Court. 
4. The Interests which are Served by Compliance with Rendered Advisory 
Opinions. 
In considering the issue of compliance, one should take into account the conditions 
existing in the pre-request stage. As Pomerance suggests, the post opinion stage will 
"serve merely to seal and confirm that fate [the opinion's fate].,,18 
In situations where no serious clashes of interest are present among UN member 
States at the pre request stage, advisory opinions provide legal guidance and sometimes 
lead to actual action. Indeed, compliance with the opinion in such a case leads to the 
initially desired end and serves the interests of each and every party involved in the 
situation, as well as the interests of the international community as a whole. 19 This 
category of opinions might include the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of 
the United Nations Case,2oReservations to the Convention on Genocide Case,21 the Effect 
of Awards of Compliance made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case22 
and the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization Case.23 
17 Sep. Op. of Judge De Castro, IC] Rep., 1975, p. 138. 
18 Pomerance, supra note 10, p. 330. See the tables appended to Chapter Nine, infra to see the size of the majority by 
which the requests were adopted. 
19 Ullmann, E., The Emergence of Norms, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, pp. 101-106. 
20 Hereinafter cited as: "the Reparations Case", IC] Rep., 1949, p. 174. 
21 H . f . d eretna ter cIte as: "the Reservations Case", IC] Rep., 1951. p. 15. 
22H . f . d eretna ter cIte as: "the Effect of Awards Case", IC] Rep., 1954, p. 47. 
23 H . c. • d 
eretnalter cIte as: "the [MeO Case", IC] Rep., 1960, p. 150. 
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On the other hand, where clashes of interest already existed at the pre request stage, 
compliance by States who are involved is not guaranteed because they are likely to act in 
their own self-interest. Nevertheless, such opinions have clarified legal points and 
principles which are ultimately beneficial to the entire international community. This 
second category of opinions might include the Admission of a State to the United Nations 
(Charter, Article 4) Case, 24the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case,25 the South West 
Africa Cases,26 the Expenses Case, the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Case27 and lastly the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
PI " 'T' • C 28 a estmzan J. errztory ase. 
5. Review of Actions Taken by Requesting Organs upon a Rendered Advisory 
Opinions 
The actions taken by the requesting organs upon rendered advisory opinions will not be 
examined in chronological order. Instead, these cases will be examined in terms of the 
two categories explained in the preceding Section, beginning with the first category, 
where there was no serious clash of States' interests at the pre request stage. Thus, in the 
1949 Reparations Case, the Court concluded that the UN is an international organisation 
with capacity to bring claims against States to obtain reparations for damages caused to 
24 Hereinafter cited as: "the Admission Case", ICJ Rep., 1948, p. 57. 
25 Hereinafter cited as: "the Peace Treaties Case", leI Rep., 1950, p. 65. 
26 These cases include the 1950 International Status of South West Africa Case, the 1955 South-West-Africa 
Voting Procedure Case, the 1956 Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West 
A!,:ica Case and Lastly the 1971 Namibia Case. 
2 Hereinafter cited as: "the Nuclear Weapons Case", ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 226. 
28 Hereinafter cited as: "the Wall Case", Available at : 
http://www.icj-ciLorg/icjwww/idocketJimwp/imwpframe.htm.( Accessed 21 October 2004). 
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the UN. The General Assembly acted upon the Court's finding and its Resolution of 1 
December 1949 authorised the Secretary General: 29 
[T]o bring an international claim against the Government of a State, Member or 
non-member of the United Nations, alleged to be responsible, with a view to 
obtaining reparation due in respect of the damage caused to the United Nations and 
in respect of the damage caused to the victim of persons entitled through him and, if 
necessary, to submit to arbitration, under appropriate procedures, such claims as 
cannot be settled by negotiation. 
In response to the Secretary General's request, the Government of Israel paid the full 
amount of the claim presented by the UN. This opinion was considered by Rosenne as "a 
watershed in the development of the law of international organizations.,,3o No State has 
since challenged the capacity of the UN to bring claims.31 
The opinion in the 1960 [Mea Case was requested unanimously by the member 
States of !MCO's Assembly. As a result, the !MCO Committee was reconstituted in 
accordance with Article 28 of the !MCO Convention as interpreted by the Court in its 
opinion, and eventually the name of the Organisation was changed to the !MO. 32 In this 
case the Court had, for the first time, considered the action taken by the requesting organ 
to be unconstitutional.33 
In the 1954 Effects of Awards Case, where the opinion was to be binding under 
Article XII of the International Labour Organisation's Statute, the Court concluded that 
the General Assembly did not have the right to refuse to give effect to an award made by 
the Administrative Tribuna1.34 The General Assembly then approved the Court's opinion 
29 See GA Res. 365 (IV), 1 December 1949. 
30 Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, The Hague; London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 313. 
31 Non-compliance by Egypt, Jordan to meet similar claims was not because of their rejection of the court's 
findings in the Reparations Case, see Pomerance, supra note 10, p. 364. 
32 See IMCa Res. A. II/Res. 21, of 6 April 1961. 
: See Section 6.3.1 in Chapter Three, supra. 
IC] Rep., 1954, p. 62. 
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unanimously and authorised the establishment of a Special Indemnity fund for the 
payment to staff members of compensation awards made by the Tribunal.3s UNESCO's 
Executive Board took note of the Court's opinion, and the awards were paid. 
In the 1951 Reservations Case, the General Assembly had requested an opinion 
about the effect of reservations to multilateral conventions. The General Assembly had 
noted the advisory opinion and called upon the Secretary General to "conform his 
practice to the advisory opinion of the Court.,,36 The Assembly also asked the Secretary 
General "in respect of future conventions concluded under the auspices of the United 
Nations of which he is the depository" to continue to accept "the deposit of documents 
containing reservations or objections, without passing upon the legal effect of such 
documents." It also called upon the interested States to implement the opinion. However, 
the General Assembly, despite acceptance of the opinion, has limited its effect by 
confining its application to the Genocide Convention. 
One can place the South West Africa cases, the Peace Treaties, the Admissions, the 
Nuclear weapons, and the Wall Cases in the second category because there was evident 
disagreement at the pre-request stage among the UN's member States. These advisory 
opinions, although not implemented by the States directly concerned, establish legal 
points and principles which serve the collective interests of the international 
community.37 
In the 1948 Admissions Case, the Court concluded that the conditions laid down in 
Article 4(1) for the admission of States were exhaustive, and that if these conditions were 
35 Res 888 (IX) on 17 December 1954. In this resolution the General Assembly decided to take note of the 
Court's opinion. 
36 GA Res. 598 (VI), of 12 January 1952. 
37 For the contribution of these opinions to International Law, see Chapter Six, supra. 
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met by an applicant State a member could not make its affirmative vote for the 
applicant's admission subject to the additional condition that other States must be 
admitted to Membership at the same time.38 Following the rendering of this opinion, 
The General Assembly recommended that:39 
[E]ach member of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, in exercising 
its vote on the admission of new members, should act in accordance with the 
foregoing opinion of the International Court of Justice. 
This recommendation had no effect on the Soviet Union's stance, however, so the 
General Assembly requested another advisory opinion, in1949, as to whether the General 
Assembly had the power to admit new Members to the UN in the absence of a 
recommendation from the Security Council.4o This request was another attempt by the 
General Assembly to overcome the deadlock in the Security Council regarding admitting 
new States. The Court's reply was in the negative. 
This opinion was the only advisory opinion which was not followed by a resolution 
of the General Assembly. However, in its Resolution No. 620 (VII), 21 December 1952, 
the General Assembly recalled that the Court, at the request of the General Assembly, 
had on two occasions given advisory opinions on the problem of admission of new 
members and that The General Assembly had authorised a special committee to study the 
problem of admission in light of the Court's opinion. Subsequently, on 23 October 1953, 
the General Assembly adopted Resolution 718 (VIII) to establish a Committee of Good 
Offices to find a way to facilitate the admission of new members. Finally, the deadlock 
38 IC] Rep., 1948, p. 65. 
39 Res. 197 A III of December 8, 1948. This resolution was followed by subsequent resolutions. See Res. 
197(III) in which the General Assembly asked the Security Council to reconsider certain pending 
!pplications. 
See the Competence of the General Assembly regarding Admission of a State to the United Nations Case, 
Ie] Rep., 1950, p. 4. 
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over the problem of admissions was resolved by the so-called "package deal" after the 
General Assembly Resolution 995 (X), of December 1955 admitted sixteen countries to 
the UN.41 
Following the two phases of the Peace Treaties Case, the General Assembly noted 
the Court's opinion and condemned the "willful refusal" of Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania to carry out their obligations under the peace treaties.42 The States concerned, 
however, did not accept the Court's opinion. Rosenne argues that the decision of the 
General Assembly to admit those States, in these circumstances, cannot "be regarded as 
an encouragement for the employment of the Court as part of the United Nations 
procedure. ,,43 
The Court has given four advisory opinions related to the problem of South West 
Africa. In the 1950 opinion, the Court responded to a request to answer several questions 
regarding the status of South West Africa. The most important finding by the Court was 
that the Mandate remained in force after the dissolution of the League.44 Therefore the 
South African government continued to have international obligations such as the 
submitting of reports and transmitting petitions to the UN which would exercise the 
supervisory functions formerly carried out by the League.45 
By its resolution of December, 13, 1950, the General Assembly accepted the 
Court's opinion and urged the Government of South Africa to give effect to the opinion, 
including the obligations concerning the transmission of reports on the administration of 
41 See http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art4/english/rcp sUPD 1 voll-art4 e.pdf (Accessed 1 January 
2005). 
42 GA Res. 385(V), 3 November 1950 
43 Rosenne, Shabtai, "On the Non-Use of the Advisory Competence of the International Court of Justice", 
39 BYIL, 1963, p. 42. 
44 The Court was unanimous on this point. 
4S IC] Rep., 1950, pp. 143-144. 
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the territory and of petitions from its inhabitants.46 Pomerance argues that this Resolution 
was a product of efforts to reconcile two different perceptions of the opinion.47 This 
resolution also established an ad hoc committee to confer with the Government of South 
Africa concerning the procedural measures needed for the implementation of the Court's 
opinion, and to examine the reports on the administration of the territory.48 
South Africa refused to cooperate with the committee or to submit annual reports, 
so that the committee was unable to discharge its functions. 49 Because of South Africa's 
non-cooperation, the General Assembly in 1953 established a South West Africa 
Committee to implement the substantive and procedural conclusions of the 1950 
opinion.so The Committee was also to "prepare for the consideration of the General. 
Assembly, a procedure for the examination of reports and petitions which should 
conform as far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the Assembly, the 
Council and the Permanent Mandates commission of the League of Nations."s1 
In the 1950 Opinion the Court had indicated that the degree of supervision should 
follow closely the procedures utilised by the League, and, so the General Assembly 
requested the committee to assimilate the functions assigned to it "as far as possible" to 
the procedures of the mandate system. A problem arose because in the UN a two-thirds 
majority on important questions is required, while in the League unanimity was required 
46 GA Res. 449 A (V), of 13 December 1950, UNYB, 1950, p. 821. 
47 The US sponsored a proposal to the effect that the UN had to negotiate with South Africa to implement 
the opinion. On the other hand more radical States maintained that negotiation with South Africa would be 
fruitless and harmful, therefore they sponsored a proposal to the effect that the Assembly should implement 
the opinion by establishing an organ to examine reports and petitions. See Pomerance, supra note 10, 
£. 344, footnote, 75. 
8 Ibid. 
49 This Committee was reconstituted by Res. 570 A (VI) of 21 January 1952 as a needed step to implement 
the Court's Opinion. 
so GA Res. 749 A (VIII), of 28 November, 1953. This Committee resembled the Permanent Mandates 
Commission ofthe League. See UNYB, 1953, p. 546. 
SI GA Res. 749A (VIII), para. 12 (d). 
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and the mandatory was entitled, in accordance with Article 4(5) of the League Covenant, 
to participate and vote in the Council on matters affecting the mandatory interest. S2 It 
might therefore be argued that, as the Mandatory power had a right of veto in the League 
Council on questions concerning its own Mandate, it presumably could also exercise a 
veto in the UN. 
Having failed to resolve this problem the General Assembly decided to ask for an 
advisory opinion to clarify whether under its less strict voting rules it could exercise a 
greater degree of supervision over the Mandate than the League Council, and whether the 
use of voting Rule F would be consistent with the 1950 opinion. S3 In its 1955 advisory 
opinion the Court unanimously found that use of Rule F was consistent with the 1950 
advisory opinion, and so the General Assembly would apply its own voting procedure.54 
On reception of this opinion, South Africa's representative maintained that he 
would not accept the 1955 opinion as it was merely an interpretation of the 1950 opinion 
which his Government did not accept either.55 Nevertheless, the General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 934 (X), of 3 December 1955, accepting and endorsing the opinion. 
52 The League Council in accordance with Article 5 of the Covenant, could only take decisions by a 
unanimous vote. 
S3 "The General Assembly, on 11 October 1954, adopted a special Rule F on voting procedure to be 
followed by the Assembly in taking decisions on questions relating to reports and petitions concerning the 
Territory of South West Africa. According to this Rule, such decisions were to be regarded as important 
questions within the meaning of Article IS, paragraph 2, of the United Nations Charter and would therefore 
require a two-thirds majority of Members of the United Nations present and voting". Available at: 
http://www.icj-ciLorg/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbookIBbookS-2.05-S.htm (Accessed 1 January 2005); 
see also GA Res. 904 (IX), of23 November 1954. See UNYB, 1954, p. 330. 
54 The opinion indicated that the General Assembly should not exceed levels of supervision that had applied 
under the Mandate and "should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the 
Council of the League of Nations." ICJ Rep., 1955, p. 67. 
ss South Africa's repeated argument was that UN supervision had exceeded the level prescribed by the 
Court in its opinion, i.e. that "the degree of supervision to be exercised by the General Assembly should not 
therefore exceed that which applied under the Mandates system, and should conform as far as possible to 
the procedure followed in this respect by the Council of the League of Nations". leI Rep., 1950, p. 13S. 
Therefore, South Africa maintained that the General Assembly's supervision functions over the territory 
were illegal. 
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The General Assembly had to tum to the Court for clarification again when South 
Africa refused to submit annual reports on its administration of the territory to the 
General Assembly and withheld the petitions of the inhabitants.56 The South West Africa 
Committee sought the General Assembly's approval to hear oral petitioners directly in 
order to carry out its supervisory function. The Assembly then asked for an advisory 
opinion as to whether the Committee could be authorised by the General Assembly to 
grant oral hearings to petitioners who had previously submitted written statements to the 
Committee.57 
The Court found that it would be inconsistent with the 1950 opinion if the 
Committee did not to allow oral hearings by petitioners, provided this was necessary for 
the maintenance of effective international supervision of the territory. 58 This opinion like 
the ones that had preceded was not implemented due to South African non-cooperation. 
The General Assembly, however, maintained its consistent stance by accepting and 
respecting the Court's opinion.59 
South Africa's non-cooperation continued so that none of the three advisory 
opinions nor any of the General Assembly resolutions on South West Africa were ever 
implemented. Therefore, the Assembly made another attempt to implement the opinions, 
this was by requesting the Committee on South Africa to study the question of what legal 
action was open to the UN organs, UN members, or former League members acting 
56 GA Res. 942 (X) of 3 December, 1955. See UNYB, 1955, p. 272. 
57 Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee of South West Africa, IeJ Rep., 1956, 
ff" 25-26. 
ICJ Rep., 1956, p. 32. 
59 The General Assembly accepted the opinion by its Resolution 1047 (XI) of 23 January 1957. 
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individually or jointly to ensure that the Union fulfilled the obligations assumed by it 
under the Mandate.60 
The Committee's report contemplated the possibility of approaching the Court 
either for a new advisory opinion or to invoke its contentious procedure.61 Two years 
later, the Assembly drew the attention of member States to the conclusions of the 
Committee in favour of possible contentious proceedings against South Africa.62 
Subsequently, in 1960, two African States, Ethiopia and Liberia, both former members of 
the League and parties to the League Covenant, began contentious proceedings63 based 
on the 1950 opinion on the Status oj South West Ajrica.64 In this new case the Court 
found, by eight votes to seven, that the Mandate was a treaty still in force, and that the 
dispute between the parties was one envisaged in Article 7 of the Mandate which could 
not be settled by negotiation. Consequently, the Court found that it had the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate upon the merits.65 
Following the Court's decision in 1966 rejecting the same applicants' claim,66 the 
General Assembly by Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 28 October 1966 terminated the Mandate 
and decided that "henceforth South West Africa comes under the direct responsibility of 
60 GA Res. 1060 (XI) of 26 February 1957. 
61 GAOR, supp. 12A N3625. 
62 Res. 1361 (XIV), of 17 November 1959. 
63 The General Assembly by its Resolution 1565 (XV) of 18 December 1960, praised the decision of the 
two African States to initiate contentious proceedings and declared that this decision was for the sake of the 
whole international community. The vote taken on this Resolution was 86 to 0 with 6 abstentions. 
64 Two applications, one submitted by Ethiopia and the other by Liberia, were instituted against South 
Africa relating to "the continued existence of the Mandate for South West Africa and the duties and 
Eerformance of the Union, as Mandatory, thereunder." IC] Rep., 1962, p. 321. 
5 For the details of this case, see Zacklin, Ralph, "The Problem of Namibia in International Law", 171 
ReADl, 1981, p. 270; See Chapter Seven, supra. 
66 On 18 July 1966 the Court found that "the Applicants cannot be considered to have established any legal 
right or interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of the present claims, and that, accordingly, the 
Court must decline to give effect to them." IC] Rep., 1966, p. 51. See Section 5.2.1 in Chapter Seven, 
supra. 
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the United Nations.,,67 To implement this Resolution the Assembly established the UN 
Council for Namibia to administer the Territory.68 South Africa nevertheless maintained 
its previous stance of non-cooperation and continued to occupy the territory. Therefore, 
the General Assembly sought the Security Council's assistance to implement its 
decision.69 The Security Council adopted Resolution 264 (1969) in which it recognised 
that the Assembly had terminated the Mandate and that "the continued presence of South 
Africa in Namibia is illegal" and called upon South Africa to withdraw from the territory 
immediately.70 The Security Council then, for the first time, requested an advisory 
opinion.71 
It has been suggested that the motivation behind this request was that the Security 
Council wished to be seen to be taking a position over South West Africa consistent with 
that of the General Assembly, which had requested three advisory opinions without 
obtaining any change in South Africa's position.72 Also, one commentator suggests that 
both political organs sought a judicial confirmation of the earlier advisory opinions. 73 
The case moreover, has been seen as an opportunity for the Court to rehabilitate itself 
after the 1966 decision by clarifying the legal consequences of the illegal presence of 
South Africa in Namibia.74 The Court held by 13 votes to 2 that the continued presence of 
South Africa in Namibia was illegal, and South Africa had to end its occupation of the 
67 Res. 2145 (XXI), 28 October 1966. 
68 GA Res. 2248 (S-V), 19 May 1967. 
69 The Security Council adopted Resolution 245 of 25 January 1968 which took note of GA Res. 2145. 
70 SC Res. 264 of20 March 1969. 
71 Res. 284 (1970), Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) Case. For more details about 
this Opinion see Section 6.3.3 in Chapter Three, supra. 
72 See the General Assembly requests for Advisory Opinions in 1950; 1955 and 1956. 
73 Zacklin, supra note 65, p. 291. 
74 Ibid. 
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Territory. On receiving this opinion, the Security Council adopted Resolution 301 of 20 
October 1971 in which it noted with appreciation the Court's opinion, agreed with the 
Court's findings and called upon all States to comply with the Court's decision. 
In the Expenses Case, the General Assembly had asked the Court whether the 
expenditures incurred in respect of the peace operations constituted "expenses of the 
organisation" within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Charter.75 The Court examined 
the issues and answered the question in the affirmative.76 The Assembly accepted the 
opinion in its Resolution number 1854 A (XVII), of 19 December 1962 to the effect that 
the costs of peace-keeping operations were expenses which could be apportioned by the 
Assembly among the Members. This opinion did not resolve the problem, which was 
highly political, so the General Assembly was forced to adopt a number of resolutions for 
dealing with the financial crisis of the organisation.77 
Following the advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons Case, the General 
Assembly expressed its appreciation to the Court for responding to the request, took note 
of the opinion, called upon all States to fulfil their obligations in concluding negotiations 
leading to nuclear disarmament and included in the provisional agenda of the 52nd 
Session the following item: "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.,,78 
75 GA Res. 1731 (XVI), 20 December 1961. 
76 IeJ Rep., 1962, pp. 179-180. 
77 See Para. 28 of GA Res. 1875 (S- IV), 27 June 1963 which recommended that economically developed 
countries "make voluntary contributions in addition to their assessments under this resolution in order to 
finance authorized expenditure in excess of the total amount assessed under the present resolution". Most 
importantly, the General Assembly Resolution. 1877 of 27 June 1963 expressed that "Member States which 
are in arrears and object on political or juridical grounds to paying their assessments on these accounts 
nevertheless will, without prejudice to their respective positions, make a special effort towards solving the 
financial difficulties ofthe United Nations by making those payments." Available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/artl7 lenglish/rep supp3 voll-art17 2 e.pdf (Accessed 1 January 
2005) 
78 Available at: http://www.mint.gov.my/policy/nucdisarm/unga5624S.htm (Accessed 1 January 2005). 
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Following the last advisory opinion, the Wall Case, the General Assembly in its 
Tenth special emergency session held on 20 July 2004, by 150 votes to 6 with 10 
abstentions adopted Resolution ES-I0I18 in which it accepted the advisory opinion 
rendered by the Court on 9 July 2004 calling for Israel and all UN member States to 
comply with the legal obligations embodied in the Court's opinion.79 
The General Assembly also requested the UN Secretary General to set up a register 
of damages caused to all natural or legal persons resulting from Israel's construction of 
the wall in the occupied Palestinian Territory. The General Assembly also reaffirmed the 
right and duty of all States to take action in accordance with international law to counter 
deadly acts of violence against the civilian populations. Last, the Assembly reserved the 
right to reconvene to consider further action in the case of non-compliance, which could 
include non-binding sanctions. 
79 See Press Release IGAl10248. Available at: http://www.un.orglNewslPress/docs/2004/gal0248.doc.htm 
(Accessed 1 January 2005) 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
This Chapter has emphasised that the requesting organs have always coordinated with the 
Court upon the receipt of an advisory opinion by accepting, adopting or taking note of the 
opinion and acting in accordance with it. Indeed, in no case have the requesting organs 
acted contrary to any given opinion, although the real implementations of the opinions, in 
some cases, have been hampered by States who have failed to act in accordance with the 
requesting organ's recommendations which had been made after the receipt of the 
Court's certain opinions. 
Kaikobad notes that the positive attitude of the UN and its specialised agencies 
towards the Court's opinions is due to two factors: first, it is not in the interest of the 
organ, nor it is consistent with its authority and standing, to seek an advisory opinion and 
then disregard the terms thereof if the reply it receives is regarded as somehow 
unsatisfactory, second, the Court's deliberations are definitive, even if not dispositive, 
statements on the law by the principal judicial organ of the UN. Consequently they 
cannot be dismissed as non-authoritative. Moreover, a rejection of an advisory opinion 
would undermine the authority and prestige of the Court, which would not be in the 
interest of any UN organ.so 
Given the lack of enforceability of the advisory opinion due to its non-binding 
nature, coordination of UN member States in receiving and acting upon the Court's 
decision seems vital. 
80 Kaikobad, Kaiyan H., The International Court of Justice and Judicial Review: a Study of the Court's 
Powers with Respect to Judgments of the ILO and UN Administrative Tribunals, The Hague; London: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 57-58. 
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Conclusion 
The Advisory Function of the ICJ: Concerns, Limitations and Future Role 
1. Introduction 
As noted in Chapter One, the ICJ's advisory function has had a controversial history. The 
controversy centres on whether the mere giving of advice, even in a solemn form such as by 
means of an advisory opinion, is compatible with the true function of a court of law.) In this 
regard, one may refer to the comments of Judge Hudson concerning the necessity of the 
Court keeping within the limits which characterise judicial action, "more particularly when 
exercising its advisory jurisdiction, and not to act as an "academy of jurists", but as 
responsible "magistrature.,,2 One could argue that both the PCIJ and the ICJ have treated 
their advisory function as judicial and have acted as a responsible "magistrature.,,3 
As discussed in Chapter Three, changes in the institutional setting of the IC] have 
largely turned the Court into a different kind of institution from its predecessor. These 
changes have made the Court particularly responsive to the needs of the UN Organisation, 
although the Court is not subordinate to any external authority in the exercise of its judicial 
function.4 The present study has argued that the status of the Court within the UN has not 
affected in any way the essential character of the Court as a judicial organ and, therefore, the 
issue of the compatibility of the advisory jurisdiction with the true function of a court of law 
is no longer an issue. The quality of the advisory function is now too firmly established as 
1 See the discussion in Chapter One, supra; see also Hudson, Manley 0, The Permanent Court of International 
Justice, 1920-1942, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943, pp. 510-511; See also, Diss. Op. of Judge 
Fitzmurice, IC] Rep., 1971, p. 302. 
2 Hudson, supra note I, p. 511. 
3 For the experience of the PCIJ see Hudson, ibid. For the experience of the ICJ, see Chapter Four, supra. 
4 Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996, The Hague; London: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 139. 
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judicial. The cases to date broadly demonstrate that advisory opinions have furthered the 
goals of the UN.s However, a review of these cases raises certain questions such as the 
following: what are the complexities of the institutional connection between the Court and 
the UN Organisation? Has the advisory function fulfilled its intended purposes? Has its 
contribution to the UN and International Law been significant? What obstacles does the 
Court still face in exercising its advisory jurisdiction? What will the future role of the 
advisory jurisdiction be? 
This concluding Chapter will recall, though not exhaustively, some of the principal 
issues examined in the thesis. The Chapter will discuss some of the concerns that have been 
raised about the advisory jurisdiction and its limitations, while also considering the future 
role of the advisory procedure. Finally, the Chapter will suggest certain ways to improve the 
Court's advisory function. 
S See Chapter Six, supra. 
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2. The Complexities of the Institutional Connection between the Court and the 
United Nations 
The Court's role as the principal judicial organ of the UN has been the subject of 
considerable scholarly comment. Gross has observed that the Court was created to function 
both as "an organ of the United Nations and as an organ of international law, to render 
advisory opinions in the former capacity and judgments in the latter",6 while Judge Schwebel 
suggests that the organic connection between the Court and the Organisation highlights the 
fact that problems of interpretation are to be "solved on the basis that the Court exists and 
functions in line with the general existence and functioning of the UN.,,7 It has also been 
argued that one of the implications of this organic relationship is that, in general, legal 
principles that apply to the Organisation also apply to the Court.8 
In practice, the Court, within the limits of its competence, has participated at the 
highest level in the activities of the UN. Only once in the long history of the Court's advisory 
procedure has it failed to assist an agency of the UN when asked to do so.9 Legally speaking, 
the Court seems to adopt a liberal approach when dealing with requests for advisory 
opinions. This liberal approach may be inferred from the Court's assumption of an 
'organisational interest' underlying requests for advisory opinions,lo the Court's repeated 
assertion that the consent of concerned States is not necessary to enable the Court to give an 
6 Gross, Leo, "The International Court of Justice and the United Nations", 120 RCADl, 1967, p. 320. 
7 Schwebel, Stephen M., Justice in International Law: Selected Writings of Stephen M. Schwebel, Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications, 1994, p. 16, note 4. 
8 For instance, respect for the domestic jurisdiction of a State, in accordance with Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter, is considered to be one of the key principles of the UN. It restricts the competence and authority of all 
UN organs including the Court. See Amr, Mohamed, The Role of the International Court of Justice as a 
Principal Judicial Organ of the United Nations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 30. 
9 See the WHO request in the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict Case. For 
details see Section II in Chapter Two, supra. 
10 See discussion in Chapter Four, supra. 
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advisory opinion,l1 the Court's consistent insistence that it has the power to render an 
advisory opinion on any legal question,12 and the Court's practice in reformulating questions 
for advisory opinions in order to afford maximum assistance to the requesting organ while 
still preserving its judicial character. 13 Lastly, the Court has given maximum effect to UN 
organs' decisions if these decisions promote the goals of the UN. 14 
On the other hand, the institutional link between the Court and the other UN principal 
organs, along with the liberal approach which the Court applies in advisory opinions, have 
led some scholars to view requests for advisory opinions as akin to "client-lawyer" 
consultation. IS One could argue that the term "client-lawyer" could imply the notion that the 
IC] is like a law firm and, therefore, that the advisory opinion rendered is mere advice from 
an ordinary lawyer to a client. This expression could also imply that the Court may be ready 
to sacrifice its judicial character for the sake of assisting UN organs and of reaching whatever 
conclusions the organs want the Court to provide. Also, the expression underestimates the 
uniqueness of the IC] as one of the UN's principal organs and most importantly as its 
"principal judicial organ." Viewing the relationship as that of "client-lawyer" would possibly 
change the Court from a judicial body, which should ultimately seek to achieve justice, into a 
legitimising entity for the political organs regardless of the validity of the organs' acts. 
Fortunately, as argued in Chapter Five, it is doubtful that the status of the Court as 'a 
principal organ' of the UN has changed in any way the essential character of the Court as a 
judicial body. Rosenne has pointed out that: 16 
II See Chapter Four, supra. 
12 See Section 3.2 in Chapter Two, supra. 
13 See Section 4.1 in Chapter Five, supra. 
14 See the Court's finding in the Expenses Case. For further details see Section 3.1.1 in Chapter Two, supra. 
IS Pomerance, Michla, The Advisory Function o/the International COllrt in the League and V.N Eras, 
Baltimore; London: John Hopkins University Press. 1973. pp. 292-296. 
16R osenne, supra note 4, p. 170. 
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The functional detachment of the Court from the United Nations is maintained not 
only by material aspects such as its different location, the independence of its 
Members and staff and the complete absence of control over its activities by any other 
principal organ, but also by more metaphysical elements such as its own historical 
evolution and the tradition to which it is heir, the degree of impartial and learned 
scrutiny and criticism to which its activities are permanently subjected in the 
professional literature of the law, and the cherished place which the Court has earned 
for itself in the world of law. 
Once the Court is requested to give an advisory opinion, as a court of law it must analyse all 
issues related to the facts and apply to them the appropriate law in a reasoned opinion with 
maximum neutrality, regardless of the desires of its fellow organs. Sir Robert Jennings has 
rightly pointed out that the "only authority a court has is to apply the law to a case submitted 
to it and to come to a decision accordingly.,,17 The fact remains that the Court is a court of 
justice, not of ethics, morals or of political expediency. IS It would be, in fact, detrimental to 
the Court's prestige to refrain from issuing a strong opinion in favour of a weaker one in 
order to satisfy overtures from the political organs. The Court's case law demonstrates that 
its institutional link with the UN and its liberal approach in handling advisory opinions has 
not affected its authority as a judicial organ. The Court, indeed, has taken a cautious 
approach to maintain its integrity and its judicial character. 19 Moreover, in the interests of 
consistency and fairness, the procedures applied by the Court in its advisory capacity have 
been largely assimilated to those applied in contentious procedures.2o 
17 Jennings, Sir Robert Y., "Judicial Reasoning at an International Court", Universitat Des SaarI andes, 1991, 
w· 2. 
1 Rosenne, supra note 4, p. 172. 
19 S ee Chapter Four, supra. 
20 See Chapter Five, supra. 
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3. The Usefulness of the Advisory Opinion to the United Nations Organisation 
The advisory function was primarily designed to assist UN organs in the discharge of their 
functions and to guide their future course of action by affording authoritative opinions based 
on law. Consequently, an advisory opinion is expected to provide a concrete formulation of 
the law applicable to a situation facing the Organisation. Judge Bedjaoui maintains that the 
Court's advisory opinions make "a considerable contribution, not only to the smooth running 
of international organizations, but also to the advancement of law and legal discipline.,,21 He 
further remarked that:22 
[W]e must not lose sight of the fact that a relevant legal question, asked of the Court 
at the right moment, can, either by the reply it receives or simply in itself, prove to be 
an effective instrument for preventive diplomacy or make a substantial contribution to 
the solution of a dispute that has already arisen. There is no doubt that there are many 
ways in which the advisory procedure, used in the absence of any immediate conflict, 
constitutes a privileged means for the Court to prevent and defuse tensions by stating 
the law. 
To be sure advisory opinions are non-binding. However, one could argue that their authority 
does not depend upon their binding or non-binding nature, but rather on their ability to 
facilitate the work of the UN. In fact, as examined in Chapter Six, the contribution of the 
advisory opinions has been of a considerable importance for both the UN and International 
Law.23 Moreover, the value of the contribution and the authoritativeness of the Court's 
opinions are not diminished by the non-compliance of some States concerned with the 
requested opinion.24 
21 Bedjaoui, Mohammed, "The Contribution of the International Court of Justice Towards Keeping and 
Restoring Peace" in Conflict Resolution: new approaches and methods, UNESCO Publishing" 2000, pp.12-13. 
22 Ibid, p. 13. 
23 See Chapter Six, supra. 
24 See Chapter Eight, supra. 
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The experience of the Court over the past 55 years shows that the advisory opinions 
have been requested in six general areas:25 
• First, most advisory opinions rendered during the early years of the Court dealt with the 
interpretation of the Charter, the interpretation of the constitutional instruments of the 
specialised agencies, procedural matters in connection with the work of international 
organisations, and legal questions arising out of the activities of the international 
organisations. Examples listed in table 1 below are: the Admissions Case (no. 1); the 
Reparation Case (no.2); the Competence of the General Assembly Case (noA); the Effect 
of Awards of Compensation Case (no.7); the Voting Procedure Case (no.8); the 
Admissibility of Hearing of Petitioners Case (no.9); the IMCO Case (no.24); and the 
Expenses Case (no. 10). 
• Second, Unlike the pcn, which dealt mostly with inter-State disputes in its advisory 
opinions,26 the IC] has dealt with inter-State disputes in only a few advisory opinions, 
namely: the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case (no.3); and the Western Sahara Case 
(no.II) and the Legal Consequences of the Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory Case (no. 14). The Court has also dealt in advisory opinions with 
disputes between States and international organisations: the International Status of South 
West Africa Case (no.5), was between South Africa and the V.N; the Namibia Case 
(no.I5), between South Africa and the U.N; the WHO Regional Headquarters Agreement 
Case (no.22) between the WHO and the Government of Egypt; the United Nations 
2S See Oda, Shigeru, "The International Court of Justice Viewed From the Bench (1976-1993)", 244 ReADl, 
1993, pp. 90-92. 
26 21 out of 27 advisory opinions given by the PCIJ were related to legal disputes. 
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Headquarters Agreement Case (no. 12) between the UN and the U.S; finally, the United 
Nations Privileges and Immunities Case (no.16) between the UN and the Romania. 
• Third, Advisory opinions have also been used to review the judgements of the United 
Nations Administrative Tribunals. This procedure has been dispensed with as of 11 
December 1995.27 At any rate these cases included: the Application for Review of 
Judgment No. 158 of the UNATCase (no.18); the Application for Review of Judgment 
No. 273 of the UNATCase (no.19) and the Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 
of the UNAT Case (no.20). 
• Fourth, advisory opinions have also been used to seek clarification of earlier opinions. 
For example the 1955 South-West-Africa Voting Procedure Case (no. 8), and the 1956 
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa Case (no. 
9) both sought clarification of the 1950 International Status of South West Africa 
Advisory Opinion (no.5).28 
• Fifth, in certain unprecedented situations where the law has not been fully developed the 
Court has indicated the direction in which, in its view, International Law needs to be 
evolved by States as in the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case (no.13). 
In his declaration, in that case, President Bedjaoui expressed the hope that: 29 
[T]he international community will give the Court credit for having carried out its 
mission-even if its reply may seem unsatisfactory- and will endeavour as quickly as 
possible to correct the imperfections of an international law which is ultimately no 
more than the creation of the States themselves. The Court will at least have had the 
merit of pointing out these imperfections and calling upon international society to 
correct them. 
27 See Section 4.4 in Chapter Five, supra. 
28 For details about these Cases see Section 5 in Chapter Eight, supra. 
29 Declaration of President Bedjaoui, IC] Rep., 1996, p. 269. 
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Lastly, through its advisory opinions the Court has participated in UN activities by, for 
example, evaluating the lawfulness of the UN organs' decisions. As examined in Chapter 
Three, certain advisory opinions have engaged in this judicial evaluation. The case law of the 
Court, which has been examined throughout this thesis, demonstrates that the Court has 
justified its existence as one of the principal organs of the UN, and affirmed that its advisory 
function is not secondary in importance to its contentious jurisdiction. 
However, the fact that only 25 advisory opinions have been rendered so far suggests a 
limited use of the function. Section 4 below examines some of the limitations of the advisory 
procedure system which may account for the relatively small number of cases. A clear 
evidence of such limitations on the successful use of the advisory procedure is suggested by 
situations which would have been appropriate for an opinion, but which failed to come 
before the Court.30 The tables below containing details of the voting on requests for advisory 
opinions. 
30 Space limitations do not permit the discussion of these cases, however, for an excellent study of all cases 
which failed to come before the Court see, Pomerance, supra note 15, pp. 221-276. 
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Table I 
No. Requesting Organ Resolution No. Voting Pattern Case Name 
1 General Assembly 113 B (II) of 17 Nov. 40 to 8 with 2 Conditions of Admission of a State to 
1947 abstentions Membershifl in the United Nations 
2 258 (III) of 3 Dec. 1948 Unanimous Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations 
3 294 (N) of 22 Oct. 47 to 5 with 7 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with 
1949 abstentions Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania 
4 296 J (N) of 22 Nov. 49 to 9 with 6 Competence of the General Assembly for 
1949 abstentions the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations 
5 338 (IV) of 6 Dec. 40 to 7 with 4 International Status of South West Africa 
1949 abstentions 
6 478 (V) of 16 Nov. 47 to 5 with 5 Reservations to the Convention on the 
1950 abstentions Prevention of the Crime of Genocide 
7 785 A (VIII) of 9 Dec. 41 to 6 with 13 Effects of Awards of Compensation Made 
1953 abstentions by the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal 
8 904 (IX) of 23 Nov. 25 to 11 with 21 Voting Procedure on Questions Relating 
1954 abstentions to Reports and Petitions Concerning the 
Territory of South West Africa 
9 942 (X) of 3 Dec. 1955 32 to 5 with 19 Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners 
ahstentions hy the Committee on South West Africa 
10 1731 (XVI) of 20 Dec. 52 to 11 with 32 Certain Expenses of the United Nations 
1961 abstentions (Article 17, paragraph. 2 of the Charter) 
11 3292 (XXIX) of 13 87 to 0 with 43 Western Sahara 
Dec. 1974 abstentions 
12 42/229 B, of 2 March 143 to 0 Applicability of the Obligation to 
1988 Arbitrate Under Section 21 Of the United 
Nations Head Quarters Agreement of 26 
June 1947 
13 General Assembly 49175 K of 15 Dec. 78 to 43 with 38 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
1994 abstentions Weapons 
14 General Assembly Es-I0/14 of 8 90 to 8 with 74 the Legal Consequences of the 
December 2003 abstentions Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territnrv 
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No. Requesting Organ Resolution No. Voting Pattern Case Name 
15 Security Council 284 of 29 July 1970 12 to 0 with 3 Legal Consequences for States of the 
abstentions Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council 
Resolution 276 (1970) 
16 Economic & Social 1989/75 of 24 May 24 to 8 with 19 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22 of 
Council 1989 abstentions the Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations 
17 Economic & Social 19981297 of 5 August Difference Relating to Immunity From 
Council 1998 Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of 
the Commission on Human Ri~hts 
18 Committee on Decision of the Application for Review of Judgment No. 
Applications for Committee on 158 of the United Nations Administrative 
Review of Application for Review Tribunal 
Administrative Tribunal of United Nations 
Judgments Administrati ve 
Tribunal Judgments of 
20 June 1972 
19 Committee on Decision of the Application for Review of Judgment No. 
Applications for Committee on 273 of the United Nations Administrative 
Review of Application for Review Tribunal 
Administrative Tribunal of United Nations 
Judgments Administrati ve 
Tribunal Judgments of 
13 July 1981 
20 Committee on Decision of the Application for Review of Judgment No. 
Applications for Committee on 333 of the United Nations Administrative 
Review of Application for Review Tribunal 
Administrative Tribunal of United Nations 
Judgments Administrative 
Tribunal Judgments of 
23 August 1984 
21 United Nations UNSCO Executive 12 to 5 with 4 Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal 
Education and Board Resolution of 25 abstentions of the ILO Upon Complaints Made 
Scientific Organization Nov. 1955 Against UNESCO 
~UNESCO) 
22 W orId Health WHO Resolution No. 53 to 43 with 20 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 
Organization (WHO) WHA 33.16 of 1980 abstentions March 1951 Between WHO and Egypt 
23 W orId Health WHO Resolution No. 73 to 40 with 10 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear 
Organization (WHO WHA 46.40 of 14 May abstentions and Weapons in Armed Contlict 
1993 41 absentees 
24 International Maritime IMCO Assembly Unanimously Constitution of the Maritime Safety 
Organization (IMCO) Resolution of 19 Jan. adopted Committee on the Inter-Governmental 
1959 Maritime Consultative Organization 
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Table II 
List of cases which did not come before the Court* 
Requesting Organ Voting Pattern Case Name 
General Assembly 21 to 31 with 2 abstentions The Treatment of Indians in South Africa, 1946 
General Assembly Proposals of Arab States were The Palestine Question (1947) in connection with the 
rejected in 2 votes: 18 to 25 competence of the General Assembly to recommend the 
with 8 abstentions; and 20 to 21 partition of Palestine 
with 13 abstentions 
General Assembly 21 to 21 with 4 abstentions The Palestine Question, 1948. In connection with the 
international status of Palestine after termination of the 
mandate 
General Assembly 9 to 13 with 12 abstentions The Violation by the Soviet Union of Fundamental Human 
Rights, in Connection with the Refusal to Grant Certain 
Exit Visas, 1948 
General Assembly 13 to 26 with 19 abstentions The Palestine Refugees, 1952 
General Assembly 15 to 31 with 13 abstentions The Compatibility with the Statute of The Court of The 
Amendments in The Statute of The United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal; introduced after the UNAT 
advisory opinion of 1954 (1955) 
Security Council 4 to 1 with 6 abstentions The Indonesian Question 1946-1947 
Security Council 6 to 1 with 4 abstentions The Palestine Question 1948 in connection with the 
international status of Palestine after the termination of the 
mandate 
Security Council o to 0 with 0 (weird) The Complaint of Armed Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa), 
1950 
Security Council 2 to 7 with 1 abstention The Question of Cuba, 1962 
* Cases, which were not put to vote and cases, which were withdrawn are not shown in this 
table 
304 
4. Reasons for the Limited Recourse to Advisory Opinions 
Impediments restricting recourse to advisory opinions should be considered in the light of 
States' attitudes towards International Law and adjudication, which were extensively 
analysed in Chapter Seven. One cannot but notice that the UN organs, especially the political 
organs, are wary of developing a habit of approaching the Court for advisory opinions for 
various reasons which will be discussed shortly. 
4.1 Voting Procedure and Lack of Coordination 
The political organs may encounter great difficulties achieving the necessary number of votes 
to support a request for an advisory opinion.31 Security Council permanent members may 
veto a request for an advisory opinion. Similarly, in the General Assembly States, by using 
the right of abstention or voting negatively, may also impede the successful invocation of the 
advisory function. Each political organ is constituted of individual State members who, in 
fact, represent their States' interests, although the total sum of those members are supposed 
to act in the name of the Organisation. Thus, voting is affected by both ad hoc coalitions and 
independent decision-making by States. The point which should be highlighted here is that 
the decision to request an advisory opinion is not immune from clashes of will and opinions. 
Such clashes, depending on their severity, can block entirely a resolution to request an 
opinion or water down its scope. 
31 Rosenne, Shabtai, The World Court: What It Is and How It Works, Dordrccht, London: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1995, p. 255. 
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There are no express provisions in the UN Charter, in the ICJ's Statute or in the Rules 
of the Court regarding the majority required to pass a resolution to submit a question to the 
Court for an advisory opinion. Therefore, the voting procedure must be determined in 
accordance with the general rules governing voting by the concerned organ.32 For example, 
voting in the General Assembly is regulated under Article 18 of the Charter, which 
distinguishes between the number of votes required on "important questions" as compared 
with votes on "other questions." 33 As far as the Security Council is concerned, Article 27 of 
the Charter provides that on all but procedural matters, decisions must be taken by an 
affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent 
members.34 The question which is often raised in the General Assembly is how to decide if a 
decision to request an advisory opinion falls within the category of "important questions" or 
within the category of "other questions." General Assembly practice does not provide a clear 
answer. Many General Assembly resolutions requesting advisory opinions were adopted by a 
two-thirds majority,35 yet the resolution requesting an opinion on the Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case was adopted by a simple majority as the above table 
32 Amr, supra note 8, p. 75. 
33 Article 18 provides: "[d]ecisions of the General. Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-
thirds majority of the members present and voting." 
Although this Article specifies certain questions as included in the category of 'important' questions, it does 
not, however, include requests for an advisory opinion as such. It is important to note that Rule 86 of the 
General Assembly's rules of procedure, defines the term "members present and voting" which appear in pUfuS. 
2,3 of Article 18 of the Charter to mean members casting an affirmative or negative vote and so excludes those 
that abstain or are absent from the vote. The practice of the General Assembly has supported and applied this 
rule. See UN Doc. N520fRev. 15. 
34 Article 27 provides: 
35 R 
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine 
members 
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be mude by an affirmative vote of nine 
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under 
Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstuin from voting. 
osenne, supra note 4, p. 301. 
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shows.36 A similar problem could arise if the Security Council must decide whether the 
decision to request an advisory opinion is a procedural 37or non-procedural matter.38 
However, Security Council practice is unclear since that organ has only once approached the 
Court for an advisory opinion.39 
Since classifications such as "important", "other questions", "procedural" and "non-
procedural" are not clearly defined and remain somewhat vague, some writers suggest that 
the voting procedure in the General Assembly on the resolution to request an opinion "should 
be regulated solely by para.3 of Article 18 as a non-important question which requires a 
simple majority.,,40 A similar proposal on Security Council voting procedures suggests 
considering a request for an opinion as a "procedural matter" so that a negative vote by a 
Permanent Member could not block a request and thus would allow a wider participation for 
the Court in the activities of the Organisation.41 
With respect to this proposal, it is difficult to envisage that a request for an advisory 
opinion would be treated by the Security Council as a procedural matter. If the matter were 
contested, a permanent member could use the veto to block a procedural vote. 
36 See also Amr, supra note 8, p. 77. 
37 This requires an affirmative vote of nine of the fifteen members. 
38 On which the veto is applicable. 
39 The Security Council request for an advisory opinion on Namibia in 1971 was adopted with the abstention of 
two permanent members (The Soviet Union and the UK). In this case the Court rejected the argument advanced 
by the Government of South Africa that the resolution by which the advisory opinion has been requested was 
invalid due to the abstention of the two permanent members, noting the practice of "voluntary abstention by a 
£ermanent member as not constituting a bar to the adoption of the resolutions", IC] Rep., 1971, para. 22, p. 22. 
o Amr, supra note 8, p. 77. 
41 Ibid. 
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4.2 The Autonomy of the Political Organs 
Autonomy refers to the "degree of power and control an organization has over its 
environment, and reflects [its] ability to make decisions.,,42 It is to be expected that the UN 
organs could view requesting advisory opinions as potential threats to their autonomy. Judge 
Bedjaoui has argued that the political organs, and especially the Security Council, could view 
consulting the Court as incompatible with their autonomy to determine their own powers.43 
The political organs must also consider that consulting the Court could make them 
subordinate to an outside organ.44 This is because of doubts concerning the effect of such a 
request upon the continued ability of the organ to deal with the matter in question. 
Judge Bedjaoui has observed that the Security Council has refrained over a long time 
from referring to the legal basis of its competence by "omitting any express reference to the 
chapter and article of the Charter on which its action was founded.,,45 This practice may be 
explained by the Council's fear that the Court, in addressing some sensitive or controversial 
issues might limit the ways and means available to the political organs for their solution. The 
Court also might question the propriety of the procedure or the legality of the act of the 
political organs, and, in effect, subject them to a type of "judicial review.,,46 
42 Rogers, David; Whetten, David (et al), Interorganizational Coordination: Theory, Research, and 
Implementation, Ames: Iowa State University, 1982, p. 88. 
43 Bedjaoui, Mohammed, The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the ugality of its Acts, 
Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus NijhoffPublishers, 1994, p. 19. 
44 Ibid. 
4S Ibid, p. 21. 
46 See Section 6 in Chapter Three, supra. 
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4.3 Limited Interdependence Between the UN Organs 
The UN Charter did not empower any specific organ to interpret the Charter authoritatively.47 
Therefore the General Assembly and the Security Council can decide on any legal question 
within their spheres of competence. The political organs sometimes have been particularly 
jealous regarding their rights to be the sole judges of their own competence.48 Judge Bedjaoui 
has pointed out that certain delegations in the Security Council, especially those from the 
former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, have often insisted upon the political nature of the 
Council's competence and its immunity from legal censure, especially by an organ such as 
the Court.49 
Commentators have observed that in practice the political organs, acting in a quasi-
judicial role, can decide what is legal or illegal by means of their resolutions.so The Security 
Council can even consider establishing tribunals if deemed necessary to decide questions 
before it.s1According to this view, there is only limited need to refer to the Court's advisory 
function. Pomerance has rightly observed that the UN organs have been wary of the Court 
because they "feared any crystallization and consequent restriction of their absolute freedom 
47 See Section 3.1 in Chapter Six, supra. 
48 Pomerance, supra note 15, p. 270. 
49 Bedjaoui, supra note 43, p. 20. 
50 Take for instance: the Security Council Resolution 687(1991) relating to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait; the 
Security Council & the General Assembly references to the illegality of changes in the status of territory 
including the South African administration in Namibia; the retention of territory occupied by Israel in 1967; nnd 
the status of northern Cyprus occupied by Turkey in 1974. See Brownlie, Ian, "International Law at the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations", Chapter XV "The Role of the Security Council and the Rule of Law", 255 
RCADI, 1995, pp. 211-212. 
51 A finding made under Article 39 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 41 of the Charter, which 
states that "[t]he Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions", would lead to the conclusion that the Security Council can crcutc 
tribunals. See Reisman, W. M., "The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: 
International Arbitration and International Adjudication", 258 RCADI, 1996, p. 122. 
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to set their own precedents, on a pragmatic basis.,,52 However, the fact remains as stated by 
Judge Higgins that "[a]ll institutional structures like to be masters of their own procedures. 
The longer they are in existence the less they are likely to want advice on their practices from 
the Court.,,53 
4.4 The effect of the "Cold War" 
Due to the Cold War many proposals for requesting advisory opinions from the Court were 
not adopted because of the continued refusal of the Eastern Bloc to support them. In fact, the 
political environment in which the UN functioned in those years made political resolutions 
preferable to judicial resolutions.54 One Commentator remarked that: 55 
Once the actual text of the Charter had become the focal point of a universal conflict 
between two formidable power blocs it would be naIve to believe that a strictly legal 
interpretation of the disputed text would serve to relive tension. 
Consequently, it has been suggested that the effect of the Cold War was obvious in "the use-
or misuse by the General Assembly of the advisory competence of the Court, especially in 
the early years of the United Nations.,,56 The former Soviet Union almost always opposed 
any recourse to the Court and generally tried to keep controversies within the Security Council 
where it could exercise its veto. 
52 Pomerance, supra note 15, p. 272. 
53 Higgins, Rosalyn, "A comment on the current health of Advisory Opinions", in Lowe,Vaughan and 
Fitzmaurice, Malgosia, (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in honour 0/ Sir Robert 
Jennings, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1996, p. 576. 
54 De Wet, Erika, The Chapter VII Powers o/the United Nations Security Council, Oxford and Portland Oregon: 
Hart Publishing 2004, p. 49. 
55 Greig, D.W, ''The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court and the Settlement of Disputes between 
States", 15ICLQ, 1966, pp. 139-140. 
56 Rosenne, Shabtai, "The Cold War and the International Court of Justice: A Review Essay of Stephen M. 
Schwebel's Justice in International Law", 34 VJIL, 1995, p. 671. 
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5. Suggestions for Improving the Advisory Function 
This study has avoided commenting at length on the standard suggestions to improve the 
advisory function by expanding the circle of organs authorised to request advisory opinions. 
These suggestions commonly place great emphasis on giving States,S7 international 
organisations,S8 national courts59 and the Secretary General60 the right to request advisory 
opinions and have already attracted extensive scholarly attention. 
However, as many scholars have pointed out, it is doubtful that such an expansion of 
the organs authorised to request opinions from the Court would enhance the Court's advisory 
jurisdiction.61 In fact, a great deal is said about expansion while little is said about 
coordination and how it can be important. 
On the other hand, a suggestion has been made for introducing a system of "advisory 
arbitration,,62 by the IC] in order to effectively increase the scope of Court's advisory 
jurisdiction.63 Despite the value of this suggestion, it could be argued that the advisory 
57 Mosler, Hermann & Rudolf Bernhardt (eds.), Judicial Settlements of International Disputes International 
Court of Justice. Other Courts and Tribunals, Arbitration and Conciliation: An International Symposium, 
Berlin; Heidelberg; New York: Springer-Verlag, 1974. p.259. 
S8 Sztucki. Jerzy, "International Organizations as Parties to Contcntious Procecdings bcfore thc Intcrnationul 
Court of Justice" in: Muller, A.S & Raic D. et al. (eds.), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role 
After Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus NijhoffPublishcrs, 1997, pp. 141-168; Szusz, Paul C, 
"Granting International Organizations Ius Standi in the Intcrnational Court of Justicc", ibid, pp. 169-189; Seidl-
Hohenveldern, Ignaz, "Access of International Organizations to the International Court of Justicc", ibid, 
£p. 189-204. 
9 Schwebel, Stephen M., "Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of Nutionul 
Courts", 28 VJIL, 1988, pA95; Rosenne, Shabtai, "Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at 
the Instance of National Courts: A Reply", 29 VJIL, 1989, pAO; Gross, Leo, "The International Court of 
Justice: Consideration of Requirement for Enhancing it Role in the International Legal Order" in: Gross, (cd.), 
The Future of the International Court of Justice, 1976, pp. 28-29; McLaughlin, William, "Allowing Federal 
Courts Access to International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion: Critique and Proposal", 611astings 
International and Comparative Law Review, 1983, pp. 745-772. 
60 Schwebel, Stephen M, "Authorizing the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory 
Opinion", 78 AJIL, 1984, p.4, Amr; supra note 8, pp. 57-64; Bedjaoui, supra note 43, pp. 78-79. 
61 Pomerance, supra note 15, pp. 376-38. Keith, Kenneth. The Extent of the Advisory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice, Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1971, p. 242. 
62 So called "advisory arbitration" was practiced during the PCIJ era. This method is basically determined by 
the concerned States who agree in advance to be bound by the Court's rendered opinion. 
63 Sugihara, Takane, "The Advisory Function of the Intcrnational Court of Justice", 17 JAIL, 1973, pp. 23-50. 
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function was designed primarily to assist the UN organs with their work and not to settle 
disputes between States, especially if such disputes are not of interest to the work of the 
Organisation itself. The strength of the Court's advisory function has been in playing an 
"organisational role" through rendering advice on difficulties facing the UN. Therefore, any 
new quasi-contentious function could be better addressed by means of the Court's 
contentious jurisdiction. 
Moreover, given the fact that the Court's primary mission is to contribute to the 
purposes of the UN, Richard Falk has proposed that the Court should act as an "academy of 
jurists" to make it more responsive to the "prevailing normative sensitivities of the General 
Assembly.,,64 However, this proposal has several flaws. First, the Court cannot respond to the 
prevailing "sensitivities" of the General Assembly unless these are placed in issue before it.65 
Second, Falk's view means that the Court should act as a political not a judicial body, a role 
which the Court avoids. It is a court of law, not of political expediency. Indeed, the Court 
can contribute and it is, in fact, contributing to the purposes of the UN without being an 
"academy of jurists." It accomplishes this by carrying out its role as the principal judicial 
organ of the UN and by its participation within its competence in the activities of the UN. 
However, the UN and its member States should coordinate more effectively with the Court to 
give it more chances to participate in the achievement of UN principles and purposes. As Sir 
64 Palk, Richard, Reviving the World Court, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1986, PI'. 182- 191 
65 Scobbie, lain, Legal Reasoning and The Judicial Function in the International Court, Ph.D. Thesis, 
Cambridge University, 1991, p. 25. 
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Robert Jennings has pointed out, the ICJ will be strong when resort to it on legal issues "is 
normal, habitual, routine, not exceptional.,,66 
Lastly, some scholars have suggested establishing specialised chambers to deal with 
advisory opinions similar to those constituted for contentious proceedings in accordance with 
Articles 26-29 of the Statute.67 Such suggestions seem to misconceive the nature and role of 
the advisory function: First, establishing chambers would place the emphasis on the interests 
of the concerned States rather than on the interest of the Organisation itself. Second, the 
parties to an advisory opinion are, in some sense, the whole international community. This is 
underlined by the wide range of States, international organisations and parties to agreements 
directly affected by opinions which take part in proceedings before the Court. Lastly, one 
must remember that at the inception of the Ie]' s advisory jurisdiction, it was decided that the 
advisory opinion would be rendered by all the judges sitting together.68 
66 Jennings, Sir Robert Y., "The Proper Work and Purposes of the International Court of Justice", in: Muller, A. 
S.; Raic, D.; and Thuninszky, J.M. (eds.), The International Court Of Justice: Its Future Role After Fifty Years, 
The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 42. 
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6. Towards the Future 
The standard diagnoses of the advisory function have criticised it for its inability to resolve 
disputes, even if it succeeds in providing a substantial legal opinion. These diagnoses have 
led some scholars to suggest that when a request is adopted by a majority rather than 
unanimously, the Court ought not to give an opinion.69 One could argue that such 
suggestions, which might be inspired by the past disappointing experiences with some 
advisory opinions, tend to over generalise without employing adequate perspective.70 
Moreover, critics often misconceive the real role of the advisory function, which is "designed 
primarily to assist the Security Council and the General Assembly in the discharge of their 
duties of conciliating and reporting upon disputes submitted to them by affording them an 
authoritative legal opinion upon points of law.,,71 
Other scholars praise the legal statements of the Court as authoritative statements of 
law contributing to the development of the Organisation, but at the same time criticise the 
opinions as ineffective because they were not implemented due to an opposing minority in 
the requesting organ.72 The reasons behind these divergent views and how scholars can 
reconcile their appraisals of the function should be objects of concern. 
67 Amr, supra note 8, p. 381. 
68 See Chapter One, supra. 
69 Greig, D.W., "The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the Settlement of Disputes 
between States", 15 ICLQ, 1966, pp. 325-368. 
70 Advisory opinions that did not succeed in settling the related disputes include the Admissions cases, Peace 
Treaties case, Expenses case and South West Africa cases. 
71 Singh Nagendra, Recent Trends in the Development of Imernational Law and organization promoti"g Inter-
State Co-Operation and World Peace, S. Chand and Co., 1969, p. 179. 
72 Rosenne, supra note 4, pp. 1059-1060 ; Rosenne, Shabtai, "The Contribution of the International Court of 
Justice to the United Nations", 35 JJIL, 1995, pp. 67-76. 
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The problem is with our perspectives and expectations of the function. These two issues 
are strongly related, as a proper perspective on the role of the function will put the 
expectations in their proper place. Even where an opinion of the Court has been unable to 
solve a particular problem, the advisory opinion should not be considered useless or 
marginal. The opinions of the Court in the Admissions, Expenses, Namibia, and Western 
Sahara cases were unable to settle the disputes that had prompted referrals to the Court, but 
the opinions provided international society and decision makers with very valuable and 
insightful dicta on various international legal issues.73 
What we need, then, is to change our perception of the advisory function. The role of 
the function is to clarify the law: "to remove ambiguities and to provide guidance for future 
behavior of the parties.,,74 From this perspective it can be said without exaggeration that the 
advisory function has played an important role in assisting the UN. In this regard, it is worth 
saying that what was expected from the advisory function at San Francisco has been more 
than achieved, particularly where the function has led to new contribution to International 
Law.7s This phenomenon has been referred to by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht as "a heterogeny of 
aims" where "[i]nstitutions set up for the achievement of definite purposes grow to fulfil 
tasks not wholly identical with those which were in the minds of their authors at the time of 
their creation.,,76 
Since San Francisco the advisory function has proved a successful instrument for 
providing authoritative legal opinions to aid the UN and its organs in carrying out the 
73 See Chapter Six, supra. 
74 Sohn, Louis B., "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" in: Janis, Mark (cd.),llIternational Courts for the Twenty-
First Century, Dordrecht; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992, p. 5. 
75 In contrast to this view Scobbie argues that the claim that international courts have an extensive role to play 
in the development of international law is a "central myth". Scobbic, supra note 65, p. I. 
76 Lauterpacht, Hersch, The Development of International Law by the International Court, London: Stevens and 
Sons, 1958, pp. 4-5. 
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objectives of the Organisation. Nevertheless the exercise of the function may still be 
improved. To enhance the usefulness of the function every actor in the process should carry 
out its own duties, restraints and responsibilities towards the Organisation. 
The UN organs must place their complete faith in the Court's advisory function as an 
ultimate means for deciding important legal questions despite the availability of other 
channels to resolve legal problems. However, the organs should not tum to the Court for an 
opinion unless there is organisational interest for doing so. The Court, as the principal 
judicial organ of the UN, must also "participate at the highest level in the attainment of the 
Organisation's purposes, acting in consultation and close collaboration with the other 
principal organs.77 This participation can be carried out only with due deference to the 
autonomy of each UN organ.78 
The commitment towards achieving the purposes of the Charter should be the ultimate 
joint goal for all organs. What is needed in this context, however, is coordination. If this will 
be difficult to obtain, it is also difficult to believe that the advisory function can be made 
more effective without coordination. The successes of the functional relationship between the 
Court and the political organs of the UN depends largely upon their coordination to achieve 
their shared tasks. 
It is submitted, therefore, that international organisations should make full use of the 
advisory function, taking into consideration the safeguards of the advisory function 
recommended at San Francisco. 79 The advisory function can only operate effectively when 
its 'clients' are prepared to coordinate with it. Such coordination involving UN member 
77 Couvreur, Philippe, "The Effectiveness of the International Court of Justice in the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes" in: Muller, A. S.; Raic, D.; and Thuranszky, J.M. (eds.), The International Court of 
Justice: Its Future Role After Fifty Years, The Hague; Boston; London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, 
p.84. 
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States and the political organs would give the Court a chance to meet the demands of the 
international community by clarifying important legal issues. 
It has been suggested that it would greatly help the international legal order if the 
Court, for instance, had the chance to clarify the concept of jus cogens. 80 It could be argued 
that the Court in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case had this chance 
but failed to take it by not addressing the status of the rules of humanitarian law under 
consideration. However, the Court cannot be wholly blamed because the question addressed 
to it had failed to include this point.8) The Court is not a legislative body, and the scope of an 
opinion is limited and determined by the content of the request. This example shows how 
coordination between the actors is necessary. The requesting organ must be sure that the 
request is the product of careful drafting,82and formulated in a manner which will provide an 
opinion which would yield the needed clarification for the requesting organ.83 The Court for 
its part has to adopt a liberal interpretation of the request in order to offer maximum 
assistance to a fellow organ. 
To be sure, the relationship between the Court and the other UN organs is still 
characterised by caution. However, new thinking on proper coordination based on the 
ultimate goal of achieving the interests of the Organisation should be encouraged, even if this 
goal clashes on occasion with the interests of individual UN organs. This argument is 
supported by the German doctrine of Organtreue, which states that organs of an organisation 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Chapter One, supra. 
80 Gowlland-Debbas, Vera, "Judicial Insights into Fundamental Values and Interests ofthc Internationul 
Community" in: Muller, A. S.; Raic, D.; Thuninszky J. M. (cds.), The International Court of Justice: Its Future 
Role After Fifty Years, Thc Hague; Boston;London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 364. 
81 For details about the implication of this advisory opinion see Section 7 in Chapter Silt supra. 
82 See Chapters Four and Five supra. 
83 R osenne, supra note 4, pp. 355-360. 
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must exercise their powers with mutual respect for each other and that they must be guided 
by the purpose and structure of the Organisation.84 
7. Suggestions for Further Research and Concluding Remarks 
This study suggests further areas for research. These include a systemic study of the JCJ's 
reasoning in advisory cases, which may differ from that in contentious ones. Such studies are 
much needed to determine how the reasoning of the Court has developed the law through 
advisory cases and to identify weakness in the reasoning itself. It could be argued that there 
were many advisory cases where the Court missed the opportunity to clarify some legal 
concepts that would have been of great help to the international community. An analysis of 
these cases would be of importance in further development of International Law and would 
complement the already substantial work that has been done on the ICJ's reasoning in 
contentious cases. 85 
One of the peculiar features of the ICJ's advisory opinions is that although they are not 
binding in the strict sense, they carry an authoritativeness which cannot lightly be ignored. 
Certainly, the prestige of the Court is a contributory factor. However, The quality of the 
judicial reasoning of the Court in advisory cases plays a dominant role in determining the 
authoritativeness of opinions and, therefore, the extent to which they meet expectations of the 
particular advisee. 
An advisory opinion, in contrast to a judgment in a contentious case, addresses a wide 
section of the international community. Therefore the Court in giving an opinion not only 
84 See Malanczuk, "Reconsidering the Relationship Between the ICJ and the Security Council" in: Hcere, 
Wybo P. (ed.), International Law and the Hague's 750'h Anniversary, The Hague: T.M,C. Asser Press, 1999, 
p.91. 
85 See Scobbie supra note 65; Jennings, supra note 17; Prott, Lyndell V., The Latent Power a/Culture and the 
International Judge, Abingdon, Oxon: Professional Books Ltd, 1979. 
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must address the advisee directly concerned with the opinion, but also all those parties who 
may be affected by the Court's clarification of the law. Put differently, the Court must 
consider the concerns of the international community at large and strive to satisfy "the desire 
for completely non-political treatment of a matter, and its solution on an articulated basis of 
law."s6 
86 R osenne, supra note 4, p. 163. 
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Appendix 1 
Rules of Court, Governing the Advisory Procedure (1978) 
As Amended on 5 December 2000 
Part IV 
Article 102 
1. In the exercise of its advisory functions under Article 65 of the Statute, the Court shall 
apply, in addition to the provisions of Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter IV of the 
Statute, the provisions of the present Part of the Rules. 
2. The Court shall also be guided by the provisions of the Statute and of these Rules 
which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be 
applicable. For this purpose, it shall above all consider whether the request for the 
advisory opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more States. 
3. When an advisory opinion is requested upon a legal question actually pending between 
two or more States, Article 31 of the Statute shall apply, as also the provisions of these 
Rules concerning the application of that Article. 
Article 103 
When the body authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to 
request an advisory opinion informs the Court that its request necessitates an urgent 
answer, or the Court finds that an early answer would be desirable, the Court shall take 
all necessary steps to accelerate the procedure, and it shall convene as early as possible 
for the purpose of proceeding to a hearing and deliberation on the request. 
Article 104 
All requests for advisory opinions shall be transmitted to the Court by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations or, as the case may be, the chief administrative officer of 
the body authorized to make the request. The documents referred to in Article 65, 
paragraph 2, of the Statute shall be transmitted to the Court at the same time as the 
request or as soon as possible thereafter. in the number of copies required by the 
Registry. 
Article 105 
1. Written statements submitted to the Court shall be communicated by the Registrar to 
any States and organizations which have submitted such statements. 
2. The Court, or the President if the Court is not sitting, shall: 
346 
(a) determine the form in which, and the extent to which, comments permitted under 
Article 66, paragraph 4, of the Statute shall be received, and fix the time-limit for the 
submission of any such comments in writing; 
(b) decide whether oral proceedings shall take place at which statements and comments 
may be submitted to the Court under the provisions of Article 66 of the Statute, and fix 
the date for the opening of such oral proceedings. 
Article 106 
The Court, or the President if the Court is not sitting, may decide that the written 
statements and annexed documents shall be made accessible to the public on or after the 
opening of the oral proceedings. If the request for advisory opinion relates to a legal 
question actually pending between two or more States, the views of those States shall 
first be ascertained. 
Article 107 
1. When the Court has completed its deliberations and adopted its advisory opinion, the 
opinion shall be read at a public sitting of the Court. 
2. The advisory opinion shall contain: 
the date on which it is delivered; 
the names of the judges participating; 
a summary of the proceedings; 
a statement of the facts; 
the reasons in point of law; 
the reply to the question put to the Court; 
the number and names of the judges constituting the majority; 
a statement as to the text of the opinion which is authoritative. 
3. Any judge may, if he so desires, attach his individual opinion to the advisory opinion 
of the Court, whether he dissents from the majority or not; a judge who wishes to record 
his concurrence or dissent without stating his reasons may do so in the form of a 
declaration. 
Article 108 
The Registrar shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and, where 
appropriate, the chief administrative officer of the body which requested the advisory 
opinion, as to the date and the hour fixed for the public sitting to be held for the rcading 
of the opinion. He shall also inform the representatives of the Members of the United 
Nations and other States, specialized agencies and public international organizations 
immediately concerned. 
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Article 109 
One copy of the advisory opinion, duly signed and sealed, shall be placed in the archives 
of the Court, another shall be sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, 
where appropriate, a third to the chief administrative officer of the body which requested 
the opinion of the Court. Copies shall be sent by the Registrar to the Members of the 
United Nations and to any other States, specialized agencies and public international 
organizations immediately concerned. 
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Appendix 2 
Provisions For Binding Advisory Opinions 
Convention On Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Adopted 13 
February 1946 
Article VIII-Settlement of Disputes 
Section 30 
All differences arising out of the interpretation or application of the present convention 
shall be referred to the international Court of Justice, unless in any case it is agreed by the 
parties to have recourse to another mode of settlement. If a difference arises between the 
United Nations on the one hand and a Member on the other hand, a request shall be made 
for an advisory opinion on any legal question involved in accordance with Article 96 of 
the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. The opinion given by the Court 
shall be accepted as decisive by the parties. 
Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of Amerira 
Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations. Signed on 26 .June 1947 
(a) Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States concerning the 
interpretation or application of this agreement or of any supplemental agreement, which 
is not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settlement, shall be referred for final 
decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-General, one 
to be named by the Secretary of State of the United States, and the third to be chosen by 
the two, or, if they should fail to agree upon a third, then by the President of the 
International Court of Justice. 
(b) The Secretary -General or the United States may ask the General Assembly to 
request of the International Court of Justice an advisory opinion on any leg.ll 
question arising in the course of such proceedings. Pending the receipt of the opinion 
of the Court, an interim decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be observed by both 
Parties. thereafter, the arbitral tribunal render a final decision, having regard to the 
opinion of the Court. 
349 
Article XII of the Statute of the I.L.O. Administrative Tribunal as adopted by the 
International Labour Conference on 9 October 1946 
1. In any case in which the Governing Body of the International Labour Office or the 
Administrative Board of the Pensions Fund challenges a decision of the Tribunal 
confirming its jurisdiction, or considers that a decision of the Tribunal is vitiated by a 
fundamental fault in the procedure followed, the question of the validity of the decision 
given by the Tribunal shall be submitted by the Governing Body, for an advisory opinion, 
to the International Court of Justice. 
2. The opinion given by the Court shall be binding. 
The Previous Article 11 of the Statute UN Administrative Tribunal as amended hy 
resolution 957 (Xl on 8 November 1955 
1. If a Member State, the Secretary-General or a person in respect of whom a judgment 
has been rendered by the Tribunal (including anyone who has succeeded to that 
person's rights on his death) objects to the judgment on the ground that the Tribunal 
has exceeded its jurisdiction or competence or that the Tribunal has failed to exercise 
jurisdiction vested in it, or has erred on a question of law relating to the provisions of 
the Charter of the United Nations, or has committed a fundamental error in 
procedure which has occasioned a failure of justice, Such Member State. the 
Secretary-General or the person concerned may, within thirty days from the datc of 
the judgment, make a written application to the Committee established by paragraph 
4 of this article asking the Committee to request an advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the matter. 
2. Within thirty days from the receipt of an application under paragraph 1 of this article, 
the Committee shall decide whether or not there is a substantial basis for the 
application. If the Committee decides that such a basis exists, it shall request an 
advisory opinion of the Court, and the Secretary-General shall arrangc to transmit to 
the Court the views of the person referred to in paragraph 1. 
3. If no application is made under paragraph 1 of this article, or if a decision to request 
an advisory opinion has not been taken by the Committee, within periods prescribed 
in this article, the judgment of the Tribunal shall become final. In any case in which 
a request has been made for an advisory opinion, the Secretary-General shall either 
give effect to the opinion of the Court, or request the Tribunal to convene specially 
in order that it shall confirm its original judgment, or give a new jUdgment, in 
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conformity with the opinion of the Court. if not requested to convene specially, the 
Tribunal shall at its next session confirm its judgment or bring it into conformity 
with the opinion of the Court. 
4. For the purpose of this article, a Committee is established and authorized under 
paragraph 2 of Article 96 of the Charter to request advisory opinions of the Court. 
the Committee shall be composed of the Member States the representative of which 
have served on the General Committee of the most recent regular session of the 
General Assembly. The Committee shall meet at United Nations Headquarters and 
shall establish its own rules. 
General Assembly Resolution 50/54, U.N. Doc. AIRES/SO/54 (1995 
Review of the Procedure Provided for Under Article 11 of the Statute of the 
Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, G.A. res. 50/54,). 
The General Assembly, 
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General, Noting that the procedure 
provided for under article 11 of the statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United 
Nations has not proved to be a constructive or useful element in the adjudication of staff 
disputes within the Organization, and noting also the views of the Secretary-General to 
that effect, 
1. Decides to amend the statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations 
with respect to judgements rendered by the Tribunal after 31 December 1995 as 
follows: 
(a) Delete article 11; 
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